7 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1904–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jay Alton Roachgreen2 sentences2019Under these circumstances, we will not assume, as the State’s argument asks us to do, that Hollon could not have presented a defense through cross-examination of Officer Wendler. 4 See State v. Roach, 157 Idaho 551, 555 , 337 P.3d 1280, 1284 (Ct. App. 2014) (“The physiological variables testified to by [Defendant’s expert] describe ways in which the result of a breath sample may vary depending on the individual.”). 2019Under these circumstances, we will not assume, as the State’s argument asks us to do, that Hollon could not have presented a defense through cross-examination of Officer Wendler. 4 See State v. Roach, 157 Idaho 551, 555 , 337 P.3d 1280, 1284 (Ct. App. 2014) (“The physiological variables testified to by [Defendant’s expert] describe ways in which the result of a breath sample may vary depending on the individual.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Creagreen2 sentences2000State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 876 , 908 P.2d 566, 569 (1995); State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65 , 844 P.2d 691, 694 (1992); State v. Crea, 119 Idaho 352, 355-56 , 806 P.2d 445, 448-49 (1991). 2000State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 876 , 908 P.2d 566, 569 (1995); State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65 , 844 P.2d 691, 694 (1992); State v. Crea, 119 Idaho 352, 355-56 , 806 P.2d 445, 448-49 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gleasongreen2 sentences2000State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 876 , 908 P.2d 566, 569 (1995); State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65 , 844 P.2d 691, 694 (1992); State v. Crea, 119 Idaho 352, 355-56 , 806 P.2d 445, 448-49 (1991). 2000State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 876 , 908 P.2d 566, 569 (1995); State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65 , 844 P.2d 691, 694 (1992); State v. Crea, 119 Idaho 352, 355-56 , 806 P.2d 445, 448-49 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Faughtgreen2 sentences2000State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 876 , 908 P.2d 566, 569 (1995); State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65 , 844 P.2d 691, 694 (1992); State v. Crea, 119 Idaho 352, 355-56 , 806 P.2d 445, 448-49 (1991). 2000State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 876 , 908 P.2d 566, 569 (1995); State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65 , 844 P.2d 691, 694 (1992); State v. Crea, 119 Idaho 352, 355-56 , 806 P.2d 445, 448-49 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Myersgreen2 sentences1999See Myers, supra, 118 Idaho at 612 , 798 P.2d at 457 . 6 .In order to be testimonial, an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information. 1999See Myers, supra, 118 Idaho at 612 , 798 P.2d at 457 . 6 .In order to be testimonial, an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information. | 1 | 1 |
Schaffer v. Stategreen1 sentence1995As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals observed in Schaffer v. State, 777 S.W.2d 111, 114 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), “[Wjhere there is an inescapable conclusion that a piece of evidence is being offered to prove statements made outside the courtroom, a party may not circumvent the hearsay prohibition through artful questioning designed to elicit hearsay indirectly.” Therefore, the district court was correct in ultimately sustaining Agundis’s objections to the prosecutor’s line of inquiry. 6 Agundis complains, however, not about the trial court’s ruling on his objections but about the prosecutor’s co | 1 | 1 |
Begley v. Municipality of Anchoragegreen2 sentences1992People v. Janke, 720 P.2d 613 (Colo.App.1986) (Trial court did not abuse discretion by denying defendant’s motion for a continuance where “defense counsel had ample time and opportunity to prepare adequately”); Begley v. Municipality of Anchorage, 711 P.2d 540, 543 (Alaska App.1985) (“Even if [defendant] had made a showing that the ... testimony would be relevant to her defense ... [the trial court] could have correctly concluded that [defendant] had not been diligent in pursuing this line of defense”); Clark v. State, 704 P.2d 799 (Alaska App.1985); People v. Cornelius, 41 Colo.App. 182 , 585 1992People v. Janke, 720 P.2d 613 (Colo.App.1986) (Trial court did not abuse discretion by denying defendant's motion for a continuance where "defense counsel had ample time and opportunity to prepare adequately"); Begley v. Municipality of Anchorage, 711 P.2d 540, 543 (Alaska App. 1985) ("Even if [defendant] had made a showing that the ... testimony would be relevant to her defense ... [the trial court] could have correctly concluded that [defendant] had not been diligent in pursuing this line of defense"); Clark v. State, 704 P.2d 799 (Alaska App.1985); People v. Cornelius, 41 Colo.App. 182 , 58 | 1 | 1 |
Hammond v. Justice's Courtgreen1 sentence1977This same reasoning as to the facts here in question has been upheld by the appellate courts of several states which have been called upon to decide this question. *421 See: Rose v. Crawford, 37 Cal.App. 664, 667 , 174 P. 69, 70 (1918); State Compensation Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2019Based on this disclosure, Hollon initially inquired of Officer Arrington, the arresting officer and the State’s first witness, about the absorption of alcohol. 3 The prosecutor objected, citing Tomlinson and Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Dep’t of Transportation, 153 Idaho 200 , 280 P.3d 703 (2012), and argued that, notwithstanding the State’s expert disclosure, she “no longer believe[d] such expert testimony is appropriate.” Because the district court understandably sustained the objection in light of then-existing case law, Hollon was foreclosed from pursuing the line of inquiry now permitted under Aus 2019Based on this disclosure, Hollon initially inquired of Officer Arrington, the arresting officer and the State’s first witness, about the absorption of alcohol. 3 The prosecutor objected, citing Tomlinson and Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Dep’t of Transportation, 153 Idaho 200 , 280 P.3d 703 (2012), and argued that, notwithstanding the State’s expert disclosure, she “no longer believe[d] such expert testimony is appropriate.” Because the district court understandably sustained the objection in light of then-existing case law, Hollon was foreclosed from pursuing the line of inquiry now permitted under Aus | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Janke
green
2 sentences1992People v. Janke, 720 P.2d 613 (Colo.App.1986) (Trial court did not abuse discretion by denying defendant’s motion for a continuance where “defense counsel had ample time and opportunity to prepare adequately”); Begley v. Municipality of Anchorage, 711 P.2d 540, 543 (Alaska App.1985) (“Even if [defendant] had made a showing that the ... testimony would be relevant to her defense ... [the trial court] could have correctly concluded that [defendant] had not been diligent in pursuing this line of defense”); Clark v. State, 704 P.2d 799 (Alaska App.1985); People v. Cornelius, 41 Colo.App. 182 , 585 1992People v. Janke, 720 P.2d 613 (Colo.App.1986) (Trial court did not abuse discretion by denying defendant's motion for a continuance where "defense counsel had ample time and opportunity to prepare adequately"); Begley v. Municipality of Anchorage, 711 P.2d 540, 543 (Alaska App. 1985) ("Even if [defendant] had made a showing that the ... testimony would be relevant to her defense ... [the trial court] could have correctly concluded that [defendant] had not been diligent in pursuing this line of defense"); Clark v. State, 704 P.2d 799 (Alaska App.1985); People v. Cornelius, 41 Colo.App. 182 , 58 | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Clark v. State
green
2 sentences1992People v. Janke, 720 P.2d 613 (Colo.App.1986) (Trial court did not abuse discretion by denying defendant’s motion for a continuance where “defense counsel had ample time and opportunity to prepare adequately”); Begley v. Municipality of Anchorage, 711 P.2d 540, 543 (Alaska App.1985) (“Even if [defendant] had made a showing that the ... testimony would be relevant to her defense ... [the trial court] could have correctly concluded that [defendant] had not been diligent in pursuing this line of defense”); Clark v. State, 704 P.2d 799 (Alaska App.1985); People v. Cornelius, 41 Colo.App. 182 , 585 1992People v. Janke, 720 P.2d 613 (Colo.App.1986) (Trial court did not abuse discretion by denying defendant's motion for a continuance where "defense counsel had ample time and opportunity to prepare adequately"); Begley v. Municipality of Anchorage, 711 P.2d 540, 543 (Alaska App. 1985) ("Even if [defendant] had made a showing that the ... testimony would be relevant to her defense ... [the trial court] could have correctly concluded that [defendant] had not been diligent in pursuing this line of defense"); Clark v. State, 704 P.2d 799 (Alaska App.1985); People v. Cornelius, 41 Colo.App. 182 , 58 | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Cornelius
green
2 sentences1992People v. Janke, 720 P.2d 613 (Colo.App.1986) (Trial court did not abuse discretion by denying defendant’s motion for a continuance where “defense counsel had ample time and opportunity to prepare adequately”); Begley v. Municipality of Anchorage, 711 P.2d 540, 543 (Alaska App.1985) (“Even if [defendant] had made a showing that the ... testimony would be relevant to her defense ... [the trial court] could have correctly concluded that [defendant] had not been diligent in pursuing this line of defense”); Clark v. State, 704 P.2d 799 (Alaska App.1985); People v. Cornelius, 41 Colo.App. 182 , 585 1992People v. Janke, 720 P.2d 613 (Colo.App.1986) (Trial court did not abuse discretion by denying defendant’s motion for a continuance where “defense counsel had ample time and opportunity to prepare adequately”); Begley v. Municipality of Anchorage, 711 P.2d 540, 543 (Alaska App.1985) (“Even if [defendant] had made a showing that the ... testimony would be relevant to her defense ... [the trial court] could have correctly concluded that [defendant] had not been diligent in pursuing this line of defense”); Clark v. State, 704 P.2d 799 (Alaska App.1985); People v. Cornelius, 41 Colo.App. 182 , 585 | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Maxwell
green
2 sentences1992People v. Janke, 720 P.2d 613 (Colo.App.1986) (Trial court did not abuse discretion by denying defendant’s motion for a continuance where “defense counsel had ample time and opportunity to prepare adequately”); Begley v. Municipality of Anchorage, 711 P.2d 540, 543 (Alaska App.1985) (“Even if [defendant] had made a showing that the ... testimony would be relevant to her defense ... [the trial court] could have correctly concluded that [defendant] had not been diligent in pursuing this line of defense”); Clark v. State, 704 P.2d 799 (Alaska App.1985); People v. Cornelius, 41 Colo.App. 182 , 585 1992People v. Janke, 720 P.2d 613 (Colo.App.1986) (Trial court did not abuse discretion by denying defendant’s motion for a continuance where “defense counsel had ample time and opportunity to prepare adequately”); Begley v. Municipality of Anchorage, 711 P.2d 540, 543 (Alaska App.1985) (“Even if [defendant] had made a showing that the ... testimony would be relevant to her defense ... [the trial court] could have correctly concluded that [defendant] had not been diligent in pursuing this line of defense”); Clark v. State, 704 P.2d 799 (Alaska App.1985); People v. Cornelius, 41 Colo.App. 182 , 585 | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Hunt v. Blackburn
green
2 sentences1977When Mrs. Blackburn entered upon a line of defense which involved what transpired between herself and Mr. Weatherford, and respecting which she testified, she waived her right to object to his giving his own account of the matter.” 128 U.S. at 470-471 , 9 S.Ct. at 127 . 1977When Mrs. Blackburn entered upon a line of defense which involved what transpired between herself and Mr. Weatherford, and respecting which she testified, she waived her right to object to his giving his own account of the matter.” 128 U.S. at 470-471 , 9 S.Ct. at 127 . | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Rose v. Crawford
green
1 sentence1977This same reasoning as to the facts here in question has been upheld by the appellate courts of several states which have been called upon to decide this question. *421 See: Rose v. Crawford, 37 Cal.App. 664, 667 , 174 P. 69, 70 (1918); State Compensation Ins. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Labadie v. Pellot
neutral
1 sentence1904Such an inquiry is only allowed for the purpose of honestly discrediting the witness, and there is reason to believe that it will tend to the ends of justice.” In support of this rule this case cites State v. Pfefferle, 36 Kan. 90 , 12 Pac. 406 ; State v. Probasco, 46 Kan. 310 , 26 Pac. 749 ; State v. Wells, 54 Kan. 161 , 37 Pac. 1005 ; State v. Park, 57 Kan. 431 , 46 Pac. 713 ; Hanoff v. State, 37 Ohio St. 178 , 41 Am. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Truyol v. Vázquez
neutral
1 sentence1904Such an inquiry is only allowed for the purpose of honestly discrediting the witness, and there is reason to believe that it will tend to the ends of justice.” In support of this rule this case cites State v. Pfefferle, 36 Kan. 90 , 12 Pac. 406 ; State v. Probasco, 46 Kan. 310 , 26 Pac. 749 ; State v. Wells, 54 Kan. 161 , 37 Pac. 1005 ; State v. Park, 57 Kan. 431 , 46 Pac. 713 ; Hanoff v. State, 37 Ohio St. 178 , 41 Am. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
State v. Pfefferle
neutral
1 sentence1904Such an inquiry is only allowed for the purpose of honestly discrediting the witness, and there is reason to believe that it will tend to the ends of justice.” In support of this rule this case cites State v. Pfefferle, 36 Kan. 90 , 12 Pac. 406 ; State v. Probasco, 46 Kan. 310 , 26 Pac. 749 ; State v. Wells, 54 Kan. 161 , 37 Pac. 1005 ; State v. Park, 57 Kan. 431 , 46 Pac. 713 ; Hanoff v. State, 37 Ohio St. 178 , 41 Am. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
State v. Probasco
neutral
1 sentence1904Such an inquiry is only allowed for the purpose of honestly discrediting the witness, and there is reason to believe that it will tend to the ends of justice.” In support of this rule this case cites State v. Pfefferle, 36 Kan. 90 , 12 Pac. 406 ; State v. Probasco, 46 Kan. 310 , 26 Pac. 749 ; State v. Wells, 54 Kan. 161 , 37 Pac. 1005 ; State v. Park, 57 Kan. 431 , 46 Pac. 713 ; Hanoff v. State, 37 Ohio St. 178 , 41 Am. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
State v. Wells
green
2 sentences1904This line of inquiry became important because of the contention that the prosecution was prompted by the malice of this witness resulting from a failure to extort money, and some of the circumstances surrounding the ease seem to justify a full cross-examination as to her past conduct and character.” The same court, in State v. Greenburg, 54 Kan. 161 , 53 Pac. 61 , lays down the rule in the syllabus as follows: “For the purpose of proving the character and credit of a witness, he may be cross-examined as to specific facts tending to disgrace or degrade him, although collateral to the main issue 1904Such an inquiry is only allowed for the purpose of honestly discrediting the witness, and there is reason to believe that it will tend to the ends of justice.” In support of this rule this case cites State v. Pfefferle, 36 Kan. 90 , 12 Pac. 406 ; State v. Probasco, 46 Kan. 310 , 26 Pac. 749 ; State v. Wells, 54 Kan. 161 , 37 Pac. 1005 ; State v. Park, 57 Kan. 431 , 46 Pac. 713 ; Hanoff v. State, 37 Ohio St. 178 , 41 Am. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
State v. Park
neutral
1 sentence1904Such an inquiry is only allowed for the purpose of honestly discrediting the witness, and there is reason to believe that it will tend to the ends of justice.” In support of this rule this case cites State v. Pfefferle, 36 Kan. 90 , 12 Pac. 406 ; State v. Probasco, 46 Kan. 310 , 26 Pac. 749 ; State v. Wells, 54 Kan. 161 , 37 Pac. 1005 ; State v. Park, 57 Kan. 431 , 46 Pac. 713 ; Hanoff v. State, 37 Ohio St. 178 , 41 Am. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
State v. Greenburg
neutral
1 sentence1904This line of inquiry became important because of the contention that the prosecution was prompted by the malice of this witness resulting from a failure to extort money, and some of the circumstances surrounding the ease seem to justify a full cross-examination as to her past conduct and character.” The same court, in State v. Greenburg, 54 Kan. 161 , 53 Pac. 61 , lays down the rule in the syllabus as follows: “For the purpose of proving the character and credit of a witness, he may be cross-examined as to specific facts tending to disgrace or degrade him, although collateral to the main issue | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.