line inquiry in Illinois

2015In Johnson the Illinois Supreme Court addressed whether the legislature violated the single subject rule of the Illinois Constitution in its enactment of Public Act 89-428. ¶ 70 The Illinois Supreme Court noted that the legislature "must indeed go very far to cross the line to a violation of the single subject rule." Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 515-16 , 680 N.E.2d at 1380 .

2015In Johnson the Illinois Supreme Court addressed whether the legislature violated the single subject rule of the Illinois Constitution in its enactment of Public Act 89-428. ¶ 70 The Illinois Supreme Court noted that the legislature "must indeed go very far to cross the line to a violation of the single subject rule." Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 515-16 , 680 N.E.2d at 1380 .

2000Defense counsel could not be expected to present mitigation evidence that contradicted defendant's protestations of innocence. "`A reasoned decision to make the best of a bad situation by pursuing a particular line of defense satisfies the constitutional minimum.'" Evans, 186 Ill.2d at 97 , 237 Ill.

2000Defense counsel could not be expected to present mitigation evidence that contradicted defendant’s protestations of innocence. “ ‘A reasoned decision to make the best of a bad situation by pursuing a particular line of defense satisfies the constitutional minimum.’ ” Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 97 , quoting Kokoraleis v. Gilmore, 131 E3d 692, 697 (7th Cir. 1997).

1991App. 3d at 658 .) To the contrary, “[i]t is the judge’s duty to see that justice is done, and where justice is liable to fail because a certain fact has not been developed or a certain line of inquiry has not been pursued it is his duty to interpose and either by suggestions to counsel or an examination conducted by himself avoid the miscarriage of justice.” (People v. Franceschini (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 126, 132 , 169 N.E.2d 244 ; People v. Bolton (1927), 324 Ill. 322, 329 , 155 N.E. 310 ; People v. Lurie (1917), 276 Ill. 630, 641 , 115 N.E. 130 .) Thus, the trial judge “may act to ensure that ev

1991App. 3d at 658 .) To the contrary, “[i]t is the judge’s duty to see that justice is done, and where justice is liable to fail because a certain fact has not been developed or a certain line of inquiry has not been pursued it is his duty to interpose and either by suggestions to counsel or an examination conducted by himself avoid the miscarriage of justice.” (People v. Franceschini (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 126, 132 , 169 N.E.2d 244 ; People v. Bolton (1927), 324 Ill. 322, 329 , 155 N.E. 310 ; People v. Lurie (1917), 276 Ill. 630, 641 , 115 N.E. 130 .) Thus, the trial judge “may act to ensure that ev

1991App. 3d at 483 ; People v. Walter (1980), 90 Ill.

1990App. 3d at 483 ; People v. Walter (1980), 90 Ill.

2017Necessarily, that decision entailed the exercise of judgment, because a hearing investigator’s review was required only for “major” disciplinary reports, and it was a matter of judgment whether a disciplinary report was “major.” Id. ¶ 38 No doubt, plaintiff would regard that decision as a misjudgment or an abuse of discretion, but the conscientiousness of the exercise of judgment or discretion is beside the point.

2017Necessarily, that decision entailed the exercise of judgment, because a hearing investigator’s review was required only for “major” disciplinary reports, and it was a matter of judgment whether a disciplinary report was “major.” Id. ¶ 38 No doubt, plaintiff would regard that decision as a misjudgment or an abuse of discretion, but the conscientiousness of the exercise of judgment or discretion is beside the point.

2006This is because, even casting aside the fact that Brownlee involved an after-traffic-stop encounter, there is the well-established rule that a traffic stop is a seizure ( Whren, 517 U.S. at 809-10 , 116 S.Ct. at 1772 , 135 L.Ed.2d at 95 ).

2006This is because, even casting aside the fact that Brownlee involved an after-traffic-stop encounter, there is the well-established rule that a traffic stop is a seizure ( Whren, 517 U.S. at 809-10 , 116 S.Ct. at 1772 , 135 L.Ed.2d at 95 ).

2006First, Gonzalez is a case that does deal with traffic stops, and it says that Terry principles apply to such stops "even in the presence of probable cause." Gonzalez, 204 Ill.2d at 228 , 273 Ill.Dec. 360 , 789 N.E.2d 260 .

2006First, Gonzalez is a case that does deal with traffic stops, and it says that Terry principles apply to such stops “even in the presence of probable cause.” Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 228 .

2004This court agreed but found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing this line of inquiry because the trial court had allowed the plaintiffs to elicit testimony from the defendants’ expert “that he had never used an achalasia balloon to dilate a Schatzki’s ring, and in all of his years of practice [the defendant doctor’s] treatment of [the plaintiff] was the only case he knew of in which an achalasia balloon had been used to dilate a Schatzki’s ring.” (Emphasis omitted.) Rush, 255 Ill.

2004This court agreed but found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing this line of inquiry because the trial court had allowed the plaintiffs to elicit testimony from the defendants' expert "that he had never used an achalasia balloon to dilate a Schatzki's ring, and in all of his years of practice [the defendant doctor's] treatment of [the plaintiff] was the only case he knew of in which an achalasia balloon had been used to dilate a Schatzki's ring." (Emphasis omitted.) Rush , 255 Ill.

1991App. 3d at 658 .) To the contrary, “[i]t is the judge’s duty to see that justice is done, and where justice is liable to fail because a certain fact has not been developed or a certain line of inquiry has not been pursued it is his duty to interpose and either by suggestions to counsel or an examination conducted by himself avoid the miscarriage of justice.” (People v. Franceschini (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 126, 132 , 169 N.E.2d 244 ; People v. Bolton (1927), 324 Ill. 322, 329 , 155 N.E. 310 ; People v. Lurie (1917), 276 Ill. 630, 641 , 115 N.E. 130 .) Thus, the trial judge “may act to ensure that ev

1990To the contrary, “[i]t is the judge’s duty to see that justice is done, and where justice is liable to fail because a certain fact has not been developed or a certain line of inquiry has not been pursued it is his duty to interpose and either by suggestions to counsel or an examination conducted by himself avoid the miscarriage of justice[.]” (People v. Franeeschini (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 126, 132 , 169 N.E.2d 244 ; People v. Bolton (1927), 324 Ill. 322, 329 , 155 N.E. 310 ; People v. Lurie (1917), 276 Ill. 630, 641 , 115 N.E. 130 .) Thus, the trial judge “may act to ensure that evidence essential

1990Where defendant is asked repeatedly whether the witnesses for the State lied in their testimony against him, this line of inquiry is improper because the questions invaded the province of the trier of fact, who is charged with determining witness credibility (People v. Riley (1978), 63 Ill.

1982App. 3d 176 , 379 N.E.2d 746 .) Such a line of inquiry is improper because it invades the province of the jury to determine which witnesses, whose testimony was conflicting, were telling the truth.

1987App. 3d 175, 183 , 423 N.E.2d 1217 ; People v. Saulsbury (1977), 55 Ill.

1981(People v. Saulsbury (1977), 55 Ill.

1987(See People v. Brockman (Colo. 1985), 699 P.2d 1339 .) Although the court should admit into evidence the testimony to rebut a charge of recent fabrication (Waller v. People (1904), 209 Ill. 284, 286 , 70 N.E. 681 ), the determination of whether a particular line of inquiry in rehabilitation of a witness is proper lies largely within the discretion of the trial court, which is in the best position to weigh the effect of both the impeachment and the attempted rehabilitation (People v. Moore (1980), 92 Ill.

1987(See People v. Brockman (Colo. 1985), 699 P.2d 1339 .) Although the court should admit into evidence the testimony to rebut a charge of recent fabrication (Waller v. People (1904), 209 Ill. 284, 286 , 70 N.E. 681 ), the determination of whether a particular line of inquiry in rehabilitation of a witness is proper lies largely within the discretion of the trial court, which is in the best position to weigh the effect of both the impeachment and the attempted rehabilitation (People v. Moore (1980), 92 Ill.

1927(O’Shea v. People, 218 Ill. 352 ; People v. Bernstein, 250 id. 63; People v. Lurie, 276 id. 630.) There was no intimation to the jury in the suggestion made by the trial judge that he thought plaintiff in error guilty of the crime charged.

1917(O’Shea v. People, 218 Ill. 352 ; People v. Bernstein, 250 id. 63; Jones on Evidence,—2d ed.—sec. 815.) Rarely, if ever, is a trial judge called upon to comment on the evidence during the trial of a case except when necessary in ruling as to the admissibility of certain evidence, and then his remarks should be of such nature as to show only whether he thinks the evidence is admissible for the jury to consider for what it is worth, expressing no opinion himself as to its truth or falsity.

1908In Dimick v. Downs, 82 Ill. 570 , we said: ‘Although this, strictly, should have been rebutting, yet when its materiality was foreshadowed by the line of the defense, it was within the discretion of the court to admit it in advance of the evidence which it was to rebut.’ .How far the plaintiff should proceed in his proof in anticipation of the defense is regulated by the discretion of the judge, according to the circumstances of the case.” Where this discretion is abused and injury to the opposite party results from the admission of evidence out of its logical order it would constitute reversi

1899In Dimick, v. Downs, 82 Ill. 570 , we said: “Although this, strictly, should have been rebutting, yet, when its materiality was foreshadowed by the line of the defense, it was within the discretion of the court to admit it in advance of the evidence which it was to rebut.” How far the plaintiff should proceed in his proof in anticipation of the defense, is regulated by the discretion of the judge, according" to the circumstances of the case. (1 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 74; Dunn v. People, 29 N. Y. 523 ; York v. Pease, 2 Gray, 282 ; 1 Thompson on Trials, sec. 345).