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12 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023“It may therefore explain, avoid, or qualify the new substantive facts or impeachment matters elicited by the cross examiner.” Rose v. United States, 879 A.2d 986 , 993 n.3 (D.C. 2005) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Brown v. United States, 763 A.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C. 2000)). | 1 | 1 |
Murphy v. Bonannogreen1 sentence1997See Murphy v. Bonanno, 663 A.2d 505 , 508 n. 5 (D.C.1995) (in a new trial granted on other grounds, appellant would be free to pursue a line of inquiry on cross-examination supported by settled authority cited on appeal, even though the trial court barred the inquiry at the first trial and, by not then objecting, appellant waived any right to a new trial on that ground). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Luciusgreen1 sentence1997See Murphy v. Bonanno, 663 A.2d 605 , 508 n. 5 (D.C.1995) (in a new trial granted on other grounds, appellant would be free to pursue a line of inquiry on cross-examination supported by settled authority cited on appeal, even though the trial court barred the inquiry at the first trial and, by not then objecting, appellant waived any right to a new trial on that ground). | 1 | 1 |
Evans v. Greyhound Corporationgreen1 sentence1995See Lawrence v. United States, 482 A.2d 374, 377-78 (D.C.1984) (in prosecution for carnal knowledge and indecent liberties with a minor, cross-examination of victim’s relative on whether relative had made prior allegations of sexual abuse within the family was “essential to an assessment of [the relativej’s credibility as a government witness”; reversing convictions because of curtailment of this line of inquiry); Manes v. Dowling, 375 A.2d 221, 223 (D.C.1977) (“[i]n this jurisdiction, it has been held permissible to introduce evidence on prior accidents and claims”); Evans v. Greyhound Corp., | 1 | 1 |
Mintz v. Premier Cab Ass'ngreen2 sentences1995See Lawrence v. United States, 482 A.2d 374, 377-78 (D.C.1984) (in prosecution for carnal knowledge and indecent liberties with a minor, cross-examination of victim’s relative on whether relative had made prior allegations of sexual abuse within the family was “essential to an assessment of [the relativej’s credibility as a government witness”; reversing convictions because of curtailment of this line of inquiry); Manes v. Dowling, 375 A.2d 221, 223 (D.C.1977) (“[i]n this jurisdiction, it has been held permissible to introduce evidence on prior accidents and claims”); Evans v. Greyhound Corp., 1995See Lawrence v. United States, 482 A.2d 374, 377-78 (D.C.1984) (in prosecution for carnal knowledge and indecent liberties with a minor, cross-examination of victim’s relative on whether relative had made prior allegations of sexual abuse within the family was “essential to an assessment of [the relativej’s credibility as a government witness”; reversing convictions because of curtailment of this line of inquiry); Manes v. Dowling, 375 A.2d 221, 223 (D.C.1977) (“[i]n this jurisdiction, it has been held permissible to introduce evidence on prior accidents and claims”); Evans v. Greyhound Corp., | 1 | 1 |
Lawrence v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1995See Lawrence v. United States, 482 A.2d 374, 377-78 (D.C.1984) (in prosecution for carnal knowledge and indecent liberties with a minor, cross-examination of victim’s relative on whether relative had made prior allegations of sexual abuse within the family was “essential to an assessment of [the relativej’s credibility as a government witness”; reversing convictions because of curtailment of this line of inquiry); Manes v. Dowling, 375 A.2d 221, 223 (D.C.1977) (“[i]n this jurisdiction, it has been held permissible to introduce evidence on prior accidents and claims”); Evans v. Greyhound Corp., | 1 | 1 |
Patricia Ann Hemphill v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authoritygreen2 sentences1995Area Transit Auth., 299 U.S.App.D.C. 184, 185-86 , 982 F.2d 572, 574-75 (1993) (applying District of Columbia law) (Ruth Bader Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment). 1995Area Transit Auth., 299 U.S.App.D.C. 184, 185-86 , 982 F.2d 572, 574-75 (1993) (applying District of Columbia law) (Ruth Bader Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment). | 1 | 1 |
Manes v. Dowlinggreen1 sentence1995See Lawrence v. United States, 482 A.2d 374, 377-78 (D.C.1984) (in prosecution for carnal knowledge and indecent liberties with a minor, cross-examination of victim’s relative on whether relative had made prior allegations of sexual abuse within the family was “essential to an assessment of [the relativej’s credibility as a government witness”; reversing convictions because of curtailment of this line of inquiry); Manes v. Dowling, 375 A.2d 221, 223 (D.C.1977) (“[i]n this jurisdiction, it has been held permissible to introduce evidence on prior accidents and claims”); Evans v. Greyhound Corp., | 1 | 1 |
Van Ness v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1992Id. at 1087 (Schwelb, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 1992Id. at 1087 (Schwelb, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Larry Edward Fowlergreen2 sentences1990See Jones v. United States , 516 A.2d 513 , 517 (D.C. 1986); United States v. Fowler , 151 U.S.App.D.C. 79, 81 , 465 F.2d 664 , 666 (1972). 1990See Jones v. United States , 516 A.2d 513 , 517 (D.C. 1986); United States v. Fowler , 151 U.S.App.D.C. 79, 81 , 465 F.2d 664 , 666 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1990See Jones v. United States , 516 A.2d 513 , 517 (D.C. 1986); United States v. Fowler , 151 U.S.App.D.C. 79, 81 , 465 F.2d 664 , 666 (1972). 1990See Jones v. United States, 516 A.2d 513, 517 (D.C.1986); United States v. Fowler, 151 U.S.App.D.C. 79, 81 , 465 F.2d 664, 666 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
Dyson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1986Under the doctrine of curative admissibility, “the introduction of incompetent or irrelevant evidence by a party opens the door to admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence ‘only to the extent necessary to remove any unfair prejudice which might otherwise have ensued from the original evidence.’ ” Dyson v. United States, 450 A.2d 432, 442 (D.C.1982) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Villaroman v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1978It is undisputed that among the appropriate objectives of cross-examination is the impeachment of a witness by demonstrating bias. 9 It has been stated that bias of a witness is “always relevant.” Best v. United States, D.C.App., 328 A.2d 378, 381 (1974), quoting Villaroman v. United States, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 240, 241 , 184 F.2d 261, 262 (1950). 1978It is undisputed that among the appropriate objectives of cross-examination is the impeachment of a witness by demonstrating bias. 9 It has been stated that bias of a witness is “always relevant.” Best v. United States, D.C.App., 328 A.2d 378, 381 (1974), quoting Villaroman v. United States, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 240, 241 , 184 F.2d 261, 262 (1950). | 1 | 1 |
Best v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1978It is undisputed that among the appropriate objectives of cross-examination is the impeachment of a witness by demonstrating bias. 9 It has been stated that bias of a witness is “always relevant.” Best v. United States, D.C.App., 328 A.2d 378, 381 (1974), quoting Villaroman v. United States, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 240, 241 , 184 F.2d 261, 262 (1950). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Doyle v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2000Relying on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), however, Roberts now asserts that the trial judge committed plain error by not intervening, sua sponte, and by failing to prohibit the cross-examination and closing argument of which Roberts now complains. 2000Relying on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), however, Roberts now asserts that the trial judge committed plain error by not intervening, sua sponte, and by failing to prohibit the cross-examination and closing argument of which Roberts now complains. | 2 | 1999–2000 |
Singletary v. United States
green
1 sentence2023We conclude that the trial court erred in permitting the line of inquiry into Gooney Mooney on re-direct because it was 41 outside the scope of cross-examination. 16 However, the error was ultimately harmless. “[T]he scope of the redirect examination is limited to matters which were first raised on cross-examination, to which the opposing party is merely responding.” Green v. United States, 209 A.3d 738 , 741 (D.C. 2019) (quoting Singletary v. United States, 383 A. 2d 1064 , 1073 (D.C. 1978)). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Rose v. United States
green
1 sentence2023“It may therefore explain, avoid, or qualify the new substantive facts or impeachment matters elicited by the cross examiner.” Rose v. United States, 879 A.2d 986 , 993 n.3 (D.C. 2005) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Brown v. United States, 763 A.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C. 2000)). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Green v. United States
green
1 sentence2023We conclude that the trial court erred in permitting the line of inquiry into Gooney Mooney on re-direct because it was 41 outside the scope of cross-examination. 16 However, the error was ultimately harmless. “[T]he scope of the redirect examination is limited to matters which were first raised on cross-examination, to which the opposing party is merely responding.” Green v. United States, 209 A.3d 738 , 741 (D.C. 2019) (quoting Singletary v. United States, 383 A. 2d 1064 , 1073 (D.C. 1978)). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Delaware v. Van Arsdall
green
2 sentences1992(Citations omitted.) Whether the curtailment of a single line of inquiry going to the issue of underlying crime is of "constitutional dimension" requires a "showing that [appellant] was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby `to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.'" Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at 680 , 106 S.Ct. at 1436 (citing Davis v. Alaska, supra, 415 U.S. at 318 , 94 S.Ct. at 1111 ) 1992(Citations omitted.) Whether the curtailment of a single line of inquiry going to the issue of underlying crime is of "constitutional dimension" requires a "showing that [appellant] was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby `to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.'" Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at 680 , 106 S.Ct. at 1436 (citing Davis v. Alaska, supra, 415 U.S. at 318 , 94 S.Ct. at 1111 ) | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Davis v. Alaska
green
2 sentences1992(Citations omitted.) Whether the curtailment of a single line of inquiry going to the issue of underlying crime is of "constitutional dimension" requires a "showing that [appellant] was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby `to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.'" Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at 680 , 106 S.Ct. at 1436 (citing Davis v. Alaska, supra, 415 U.S. at 318 , 94 S.Ct. at 1111 ) 1992(Citations omitted.) Whether the curtailment of a single line of inquiry going to the issue of underlying crime is of "constitutional dimension" requires a "showing that [appellant] was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby `to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.'" Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at 680 , 106 S.Ct. at 1436 (citing Davis v. Alaska, supra, 415 U.S. at 318 , 94 S.Ct. at 1111 ) | 1 | 1992–1992 |
United States v. Charles H. Carter
green
1 sentence1979Id., 157 U.S.App. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Chambers v. Maroney
green
2 sentences1978On this appeal, the government seeks to sustain the denial of suppression on four grounds: (1) a police officer, having probable cause to search an automobile on the scene where it is stopped, may constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); (2) the bag was examined during a proper inventory of the automobile in police custody, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); (3) the search was incident to a lawful arrest, McGee v. United States, D.C 1978On this appeal, the government seeks to sustain the denial of suppression on four grounds: (1) a police officer, having probable cause to search an automobile on the scene where it is stopped, may constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); (2) the bag was examined during a proper inventory of the automobile in police custody, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); (3) the search was incident to a lawful arrest, McGee v. United States, D.C | 1 | 1978–1978 |
South Dakota v. Opperman
green
2 sentences1978On this appeal, the government seeks to sustain the denial of suppression on four grounds: (1) a police officer, having probable cause to search an automobile on the scene where it is stopped, may constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); (2) the bag was examined during a proper inventory of the automobile in police custody, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); (3) the search was incident to a lawful arrest, McGee v. United States, D.C 1978On this appeal, the government seeks to sustain the denial of suppression on four grounds: (1) a police officer, having probable cause to search an automobile on the scene where it is stopped, may constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); (2) the bag was examined during a proper inventory of the automobile in police custody, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); (3) the search was incident to a lawful arrest, McGee v. United States, D.C | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.