24 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1913–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Buiegreen2 sentences2020Defendant also argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into the alleged breakdown of the attorney-client relationship. “[A] complete breakdown of the attorney-client relationship or disagreement over whether a particular line of defense should be pursued may justify appointing new counsel.” Buie (On Remand), 298 Mich App at 67 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2019Although the record demonstrates that defendant and his counsel did not have an entirely amicable relationship, defendant did not establish good cause for the appointment of new counsel. “[A] complete breakdown of the attorney-client relationship or disagreement over whether a particular line of defense should be pursued may justify appointing new counsel.” Buie (On Remand), 298 Mich App at 67 (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 2 | 4 |
People v. Blevinsgreen2 sentences2024While defendant maintains that expert testimony regarding his state of mind would have strengthened this line of defense, he has offered nothing to substantiate this position or the notion that counsel performed deficiently by not -9- presenting such an expert at trial.9 See, e.g., People v Blevins, 314 Mich App 339, 351 ; 886 NW2d 456 (2016) (“Although defendant believes that additionally presenting an expert . . . would have been helpful, and defendant may even be right, that counsel could conceivably have done more, or that a particular trial strategy failed, does not mean counsel’s perform 2024While defendant maintains that expert testimony regarding his state of mind would have strengthened this line of defense, he has offered nothing to substantiate this position or the notion that counsel performed deficiently by not -9- presenting such an expert at trial.9 See, e.g., People v Blevins, 314 Mich App 339, 351 ; 886 NW2d 456 (2016) (“Although defendant believes that additionally presenting an expert . . . would have been helpful, and defendant may even be right, that counsel could conceivably have done more, or that a particular trial strategy failed, does not mean counsel’s perform | 1 | 1 |
People v. Petrigreen1 sentence2024See Petri, 279 Mich App at 413 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ericksengreen1 sentence2019As noted, in conjunction with other claims by defendant of having not been afforded the effective assistance of counsel, “[f]ailing to advance a meritless argument or raise a futile objection does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Ericksen, 288 Mich App at 201 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rochowiakgreen2 sentences1990See People v Rochowiak, supra, 247-248 . 1990See People v Rochowiak, supra, 247-248 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. O'BRIEN
neutral
2 sentences2018This Court has recognized that “ ‘[a] complete breakdown of the attorney-client relationship or disagreement over whether a particular line of defense should be pursued may justify appointing new counsel.’ ” Buie (On Remand), 298 Mich App at 67 , quoting People v O’Brien, 89 Mich App 704, 708 ; 282 NW2d 190 (1979). 2018This Court has recognized that “ ‘[a] complete breakdown of the attorney-client relationship or disagreement over whether a particular line of defense should be pursued may justify appointing new counsel.’ ” Buie (On Remand), 298 Mich App at 67 , quoting People v O’Brien, 89 Mich App 704, 708 ; 282 NW2d 190 (1979). | 2 | 2012–2018 |
People v. Burns
green
2 sentences2017“A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” People v Burns, 494 Mich 104, 110 ; 832 NW2d 738 (2013). 2017“A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” People v Burns, 494 Mich 104, 110 ; 832 NW2d 738 (2013). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Cox
green
2 sentences2024To establish a Brady violation, however, a defendant must show: (1) that the state possessed evidence favorable to the defendant; (2) that the defendant did not possess the evidence nor could the defendant have obtained it with any reasonable diligence; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. [People v Cox, 268 Mich App 440, 448 ; 709 NW2d 152 (2005).] Defendant does not argue the elements of a Brady violation, and it is 2024To establish a Brady violation, however, a defendant must show: (1) that the state possessed evidence favorable to the defendant; (2) that the defendant did not possess the evidence nor could the defendant have obtained it with any reasonable diligence; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. [People v Cox, 268 Mich App 440, 448 ; 709 NW2d 152 (2005).] Defendant does not argue the elements of a Brady violation, and it is | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2023In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” [Hinton v Alabama, 571 US 263, 274 ; 134 S Ct 1081 ; 188 L Ed 2d 1 (2014), quoting Strickland, 466 US at 690-691 .] The majority’s analysis suggests that it was Rountree’s burden to figure out how to prove permission, and to then supply Goldstein with a path to the evidence. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Hinton v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2023In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” [Hinton v Alabama, 571 US 263, 274 ; 134 S Ct 1081 ; 188 L Ed 2d 1 (2014), quoting Strickland, 466 US at 690-691 .] The majority’s analysis suggests that it was Rountree’s burden to figure out how to prove permission, and to then supply Goldstein with a path to the evidence. 2023In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” [Hinton v Alabama, 571 US 263, 274 ; 134 S Ct 1081 ; 188 L Ed 2d 1 (2014), quoting Strickland, 466 US at 690-691 .] The majority’s analysis suggests that it was Rountree’s burden to figure out how to prove permission, and to then supply Goldstein with a path to the evidence. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Oregon v. Kennedy
green
1 sentence2020Most such objections are undoubtedly curable by simply refusing to allow the proffered evidence to be admitted, or in the case of a particular line of inquiry taken by counsel with a witness, by an admonition to desist from a particular line of inquiry. [Id. at 674-675.] The Supreme Court stated that “[o]nly where the governmental conduct in question is intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion.” Id. at 676 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Ginther
green
2 sentences2020“When a defendant asserts that his assigned lawyer is not adequate or diligent or asserts, as here, that his lawyer is disinterested, the judge should hear his claim and, if there is a factual dispute, take testimony and state his findings and conclusion.” People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 441-442 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 2020“When a defendant asserts that his assigned lawyer is not adequate or diligent or asserts, as here, that his lawyer is disinterested, the judge should hear his claim and, if there is a factual dispute, take testimony and state his findings and conclusion.” People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 441-442 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Tyson
green
2 sentences2020In People v Tyson, 423 Mich 357 ; 377 NW2d 738 (1985), the prosecutor was questioning the officer in charge about the defendant’s demeanor “to discredit [the] defendant’s insanity defense by eliciting testimony that he was ‘putting on sort of an act.’ ” Id. at 360-361 . 2020In People v Tyson, 423 Mich 357 ; 377 NW2d 738 (1985), the prosecutor was questioning the officer in charge about the defendant’s demeanor “to discredit [the] defendant’s insanity defense by eliciting testimony that he was ‘putting on sort of an act.’ ” Id. at 360-361 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Meyers
green
2 sentences2012In Meyers, 124 Mich App at 165 , the defendant requested substitute trial counsel because the defendant was having difficulty communicating with his counsel. “[The defendant] informed the [trial] court that he objected to his attorney because he was not the attorney of the defendant’s choice, that he and his attorney disagreed about the case,» and that he did not like the language his defense attorney used toward him.” Id. at 166 . 2012In Meyers, 124 Mich App at 165 , the defendant requested substitute trial counsel because the defendant was having difficulty communicating with his counsel. “[The defendant] informed the [trial] court that he objected to his attorney because he was not the attorney of the defendant’s choice, that he and his attorney disagreed about the case,» and that he did not like the language his defense attorney used toward him.” Id. at 166 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Sucoe v. Oakwood Hospital Corp.
neutral
2 sentences1992Sucoe v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 185 Mich App 484 ; 462 NW2d 780 (1990). 1992Sucoe v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 185 Mich App 484 ; 462 NW2d 780 (1990). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Flanagan
green
2 sentences1984People v Flanagan, 129 Mich App 786, 793-794 ; 342 NW2d 609 (1983). 1984People v Flanagan, 129 Mich App 786, 793-794 ; 342 NW2d 609 (1983). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
People v. Hooper
neutral
2 sentences1979People v Hooper, 82 Mich App 713 ; 267 NW2d 162 (1978) (disagreement over alibi defense), People v Wilson, 43 Mich App 459 ; 204 NW2d 269 (1972), lv den 393 Mich 813 (1975) (communication between attorney and client had ceased). 1979People v Hooper, 82 Mich App 713 ; 267 NW2d 162 (1978) (disagreement over alibi defense), People v Wilson, 43 Mich App 459 ; 204 NW2d 269 (1972), lv den 393 Mich 813 (1975) (communication between attorney and client had ceased). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
People v. Wilson
green
2 sentences1979People v Hooper, 82 Mich App 713 ; 267 NW2d 162 (1978) (disagreement over alibi defense), People v Wilson, 43 Mich App 459 ; 204 NW2d 269 (1972), lv den 393 Mich 813 (1975) (communication between attorney and client had ceased). 1979People v Hooper, 82 Mich App 713 ; 267 NW2d 162 (1978) (disagreement over alibi defense), People v Wilson, 43 Mich App 459 ; 204 NW2d 269 (1972), lv den 393 Mich 813 (1975) (communication between attorney and client had ceased). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Wilbur v. Flood
green
1 sentence1975Defendant contends that this line of inquiry constituted an impermissible use of prior bad acts or misconduct for impeachment citing Wilbur v Flood, 16 Mich 40 ; 93 AD 203 (1867), and People v Hatt, 384 Mich 302 ; 181 NW2d 912 (1970). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
People v. Dye
green
2 sentences1975Clearly, the trial court has broad discretion in exercising its judgment whether a particular line of inquiry or argument is to be allowed before the jury. 5 People v Dye, 356 Mich 271, 277 ; 96 NW2d 788 (1959). 1975Clearly, the trial court has broad discretion in exercising its judgment whether a particular line of inquiry or argument is to be allowed before the jury. 5 People v Dye, 356 Mich 271, 277 ; 96 NW2d 788 (1959). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
People v. Hatt
green
2 sentences1975Defendant contends that this line of inquiry constituted an impermissible use of prior bad acts or misconduct for impeachment citing Wilbur v Flood, 16 Mich 40 ; 93 AD 203 (1867), and People v Hatt, 384 Mich 302 ; 181 NW2d 912 (1970). 1975Defendant contends that this line of inquiry constituted an impermissible use of prior bad acts or misconduct for impeachment citing Wilbur v Flood, 16 Mich 40 ; 93 AD 203 (1867), and People v Hatt, 384 Mich 302 ; 181 NW2d 912 (1970). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
People v. La Londe
neutral
2 sentences1975This line of inquiry was allowed by our Supreme Court in People v LaLonde, 197 Mich 76 ; 163 NW 490 (1917), as affecting the credibility of the witness. 1975This line of inquiry was allowed by our Supreme Court in People v LaLonde, 197 Mich 76 ; 163 NW 490 (1917), as affecting the credibility of the witness. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
People v. Nixon
neutral
1 sentence1971This indicates recognition on the part of trial judges of the impolicy of this line of inquiry; in this very case the judge indicated his doubt about this line of inquiry but by then the damage had been done. 17 See People v. Foote (1892), 93 Mich 38, 40 ; People v. Nixon (1928), 243 Mich 630, 631 ; People v. Statkiewicz (1929), 247 Mich 260, 267 . 18 People v. Liggett (1967), 378 Mich 706, 717 . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
People v. Statkiewicz
green
1 sentence1971This indicates recognition on the part of trial judges of the impolicy of this line of inquiry; in this very case the judge indicated his doubt about this line of inquiry but by then the damage had been done. 17 See People v. Foote (1892), 93 Mich 38, 40 ; People v. Nixon (1928), 243 Mich 630, 631 ; People v. Statkiewicz (1929), 247 Mich 260, 267 . 18 People v. Liggett (1967), 378 Mich 706, 717 . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
People v. Foote
green
1 sentence1971This indicates recognition on the part of trial judges of the impolicy of this line of inquiry; in this very case the judge indicated his doubt about this line of inquiry but by then the damage had been done. 17 See People v. Foote (1892), 93 Mich 38, 40 ; People v. Nixon (1928), 243 Mich 630, 631 ; People v. Statkiewicz (1929), 247 Mich 260, 267 . 18 People v. Liggett (1967), 378 Mich 706, 717 . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
People v. Liggett
green
1 sentence1971This indicates recognition on the part of trial judges of the impolicy of this line of inquiry; in this very case the judge indicated his doubt about this line of inquiry but by then the damage had been done. 17 See People v. Foote (1892), 93 Mich 38, 40 ; People v. Nixon (1928), 243 Mich 630, 631 ; People v. Statkiewicz (1929), 247 Mich 260, 267 . 18 People v. Liggett (1967), 378 Mich 706, 717 . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Mitts v. Williams
green
1 sentence1962Counsel for defendants objected to the line of inquiry on the ground that said statements, or at least some of them, were self-serving and that, in consequence, the testimony of the witness was incompetent under the holdings of this Coui’t in Mitts v. Williams, 319 Mich 417 , and Pence v. Wessels, 320 Mich 195 . | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Pence v. Wessels
green
1 sentence1962Counsel for defendants objected to the line of inquiry on the ground that said statements, or at least some of them, were self-serving and that, in consequence, the testimony of the witness was incompetent under the holdings of this Coui’t in Mitts v. Williams, 319 Mich 417 , and Pence v. Wessels, 320 Mich 195 . | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Soper v. Soper neutral | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Johnson v. Johnson neutral | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Minde v. Minde green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Cooper v. Cooper green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Bennett v. Bennett
neutral
1 sentence1927Dec. 182 ) ; Bennett v. Bennett, 24 Mich. 482 ; Soper v. Soper, 29 Mich. 305 ; Johnson v. Johnson, 49 Mich. 639 ; Minde v. Minde, 65 Mich. 633 ; Reichert v. Reichert, 124 Mich. 694 ; Murnan v. Murnan, 128 Mich. 680 ; Downey v. Downey, 135 Mich. 265 ; Bowen v. Bowen, 179 Mich. 574 (51 L. | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Reichert v. Reichert
neutral
1 sentence1927Dec. 182 ) ; Bennett v. Bennett, 24 Mich. 482 ; Soper v. Soper, 29 Mich. 305 ; Johnson v. Johnson, 49 Mich. 639 ; Minde v. Minde, 65 Mich. 633 ; Reichert v. Reichert, 124 Mich. 694 ; Murnan v. Murnan, 128 Mich. 680 ; Downey v. Downey, 135 Mich. 265 ; Bowen v. Bowen, 179 Mich. 574 (51 L. | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Murnan v. Murnan neutral | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Downey v. Downey neutral | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Bowen v. Bowen neutral | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Yanelli v. Littlejohn neutral | 1 | 1919–1919 |
| Jennings v. Sheldon neutral | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.