line inquiry in New York

2001However, such testimony is permitted when the defendant opens the door to this line of inquiry (see, People v Bolden, 58 NY2d 741 ; People v Grate, supra).

1996However, such testimony is permitted when the defendant opens the door to this line of inquiry (see, People v Bolden, 58 NY2d 741 )” (People v Grate, 122 AD2d 853, 854 ).

2017A trial court has "broad latitude to preclude or limit cross-examination" ( People v Smith , 27 NY3d 652 , 662 [2016]) and the court properly exercised its discretion in limiting defendant's cross-examination about an uncalibrated portable breath test administered at the scene, since the results of the test were not admitted into evidence, and this line of inquiry was collateral and likely to cause confusion and speculation on the part of the jury ( see People v Smith , 303 AD2d 206 [2003] , lv denied 100 NY2d 543 [2003]; People v Tejada , 249 AD2d 208 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 906 [1998]).

2003The court properly exercised its discretion in precluding defendant from cross-examining a police witness about the absence of fingerprint evidence, since this line of inquiry was collateral, unsupported by any evidence, and likely to cause confusion and speculation on the part of the jury (see People v Tejada, 249 AD2d 208 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 906 [1998]).

2013Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in limiting her testimony on redirect examination (see Ingebretsen v Manha, 218 AD2d at 784 ; cf. Chabica v Schneider, 213 AD2d 579, 581 [1995]), and in terminating a line of inquiry during the cross examination of one of the City’s witnesses, where the plaintiffs counsel repeatedly asked questions which had already been answered, or which were not relevant (see generally Prendergast v Patel, 301 AD2d 508, 509 [2003]; Chase Manhattan Bank v Bekerus, 276 AD2d 461 [2000]; Farahmandpour v Singer, 247 AD2

2013Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in limiting her testimony on redirect examination (see Ingebretsen v Manha, 218 AD2d at 784 ; cf. Chabica v Schneider, 213 AD2d 579, 581 [1995]), and in terminating a line of inquiry during the cross examination of one of the City’s witnesses, where the plaintiffs counsel repeatedly asked questions which had already been answered, or which were not relevant (see generally Prendergast v Patel, 301 AD2d 508, 509 [2003]; Chase Manhattan Bank v Bekerus, 276 AD2d 461 [2000]; Farahmandpour v Singer, 247 AD2

2013Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in limiting her testimony on redirect examination (see Ingebretsen v Manha, 218 AD2d at 784 ; cf. Chabica v Schneider, 213 AD2d 579, 581 [1995]), and in terminating a line of inquiry during the cross examination of one of the City’s witnesses, where the plaintiffs counsel repeatedly asked questions which had already been answered, or which were not relevant (see generally Prendergast v Patel, 301 AD2d 508, 509 [2003]; Chase Manhattan Bank v Bekerus, 276 AD2d 461 [2000]; Farahmandpour v Singer, 247 AD2

2013Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in limiting her testimony on redirect examination (see Ingebretsen v Manha, 218 AD2d at 784 ; cf. Chabica v Schneider, 213 AD2d 579, 581 [1995]), and in terminating a line of inquiry during the cross examination of one of the City’s witnesses, where the plaintiffs counsel repeatedly asked questions which had already been answered, or which were not relevant (see generally Prendergast v Patel, 301 AD2d 508, 509 [2003]; Chase Manhattan Bank v Bekerus, 276 AD2d 461 [2000]; Farahmandpour v Singer, 247 AD2

2012Accordingly, we find that defendant was denied effective assistance and is entitled to a new trial (see People v Fleming, 58 AD3d 527 [1st Dept 2009]; People v Logan, 263 AD2d 397, 398 [1st Dept 1999], lv withdrawn 94 NY2d 798 [1999]; see also People v Butler, 94 AD2d 726 [2d Dept 1983]).

2012Accordingly, we find that defendant was denied effective assistance and is entitled to a new trial (see People v Fleming, 58 AD3d 527 [1st Dept 2009]; People v Logan, 263 AD2d 397, 398 [1st Dept 1999], lv withdrawn 94 NY2d 798 [1999]; see also People v Butler, 94 AD2d 726 [2d Dept 1983]).

2012In that regard, the record establishes that this line of inquiry was not being pursued by defendant to establish that the victim had a history of filing false complaints regarding allegations of sexual assault or that defendant sought to raise any question regarding his identity as the perpetrator of the crimes charged in the indictment (see People v Segarra, 46 AD3d 363 , 364 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 816 [2008]).

2012In that regard, the record establishes that this line of inquiry was not being pursued by defendant to establish that the victim had a history of filing false complaints regarding allegations of sexual assault or that defendant sought to raise any question regarding his identity as the perpetrator of the crimes charged in the indictment (see People v Segarra, 46 AD3d 363 , 364 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 816 [2008]).

2002The trial court providently exercised its discretion to preclude this line of inquiry since it was speculative and lacked a good-faith basis (see, People v Williams, 222 AD2d 469 ; People v Rodriguez, 191 AD2d 723 ).

1995The trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in limiting the line of inquiry on the ground that it lacked a good-faith basis (see, People v George, 197 AD2d 588, 589 ; People v Rodriguez, 191 AD2d 723, 724 ).

2002Were we to review this claim, we would find that the People had a good faith basis for this line of inquiry (see, People v Sorge, 301 NY 198 ), since they were in possession of extensive evidence linking defendant to the uncharged crimes.

1961The prosecution was entitled to show prexdous vicious or criminal acts on defendant’s part (People v. Sorge, 301 N. Y. 198, 200 ), even though this line of inquiry might have elicited proof that defendant was guilty of other offenses (People v. Buchalter, 289 N. Y. 181, 217, 218 ).

2001However, such testimony is permitted when the defendant opens the door to this line of inquiry (see, People v Bolden, 58 NY2d 741 ; People v Grate, supra).

1996However, such testimony is permitted when the defendant opens the door to this line of inquiry (see, People v Bolden, 58 NY2d 741 )” (People v Grate, 122 AD2d 853, 854 ).

2001The court properly exercised its discretion in precluding cross-examination of the undercover officer as to whether she had discussed the agency defense with the prosecutor in trial preparation, since defendant presented no good faith basis for such a line of inquiry (see, People v George, 197 AD2d 588 , lv denied 82 NY2d 925 ).

1995The trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in limiting the line of inquiry on the ground that it lacked a good-faith basis (see, People v George, 197 AD2d 588, 589 ; People v Rodriguez, 191 AD2d 723, 724 ).

2001We reject defendant’s argument that the People opened the door to this line of inquiry (see, People v Melendez, 55 NY2d 445 ).

1993While such testimony ordinarily might constitute improper hearsay or bolstering (see, People v Trowbridge, 305 NY 471 ; Richardson, Evidence § 200 [Prince 10th ed]), here defense counsel clearly opened the door to this line of inquiry (see generally, People v Melendez, 55 NY2d 445, 451 ; People v Bolden, 58 NY2d 741 ).

1997In any event, the defendant opened the door to this line of inquiry, as he had presented himself on direct examination as, inter alia, a responsible individual and a successful entrepreneur, whose self-owned business was expanding into foreign markets, so that he would have had no reason to smuggle drugs into the country (see, People v Chaitin, 61 NY2d 683 ; People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241 , cert denied 396 US 846 ; see also, Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 6-303, at 379-380 [Farrell 11th ed]).

1994The prejudicial effect of this line of inquiry clearly outweighed any probative value it may have possessed in assessing defendant’s credibility as a witness (see, People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 247-248 , cert denied 396 US 846 ).

1997In any event, the defendant opened the door to this line of inquiry, as he had presented himself on direct examination as, inter alia, a responsible individual and a successful entrepreneur, whose self-owned business was expanding into foreign markets, so that he would have had no reason to smuggle drugs into the country (see, People v Chaitin, 61 NY2d 683 ; People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241 , cert denied 396 US 846 ; see also, Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 6-303, at 379-380 [Farrell 11th ed]).

1994The prejudicial effect of this line of inquiry clearly outweighed any probative value it may have possessed in assessing defendant’s credibility as a witness (see, People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 247-248 , cert denied 396 US 846 ).

1995Were we to reach the issue in the interest of justice, we would find it to be without merit inasmuch as the prosecutor laid the proper foundation for such inquiry by demonstrating that the witness knew about the robbery charge two months before trial, was sufficiently knowledgeable as to how to relay this information to the proper authorities, had been friendly with defendant, and was aware that she possessed exculpatory information (People v Dawson, 50 NY2d 311, 321 ).

1991(People v Conyers, 49 NY2d 174 ; cf., People v Dawson, 50 NY2d 311 [a defense witness’s prior silence may be used to impeach his trial testimony].) That it was cocounsel and not the prosecutor who engaged in this line of inquiry did not mitigate its prejudicial effect.

2025Moreover, any error was harmless because there is no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted defendant had the court permitted testimony about the store detective's disciplinary record ( see People v Watson , 163 AD3d 855, 861 [2d Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1009 [2018]).

2025Moreover, any error was harmless because there is no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted defendant had the court permitted testimony about the store detective's disciplinary record ( see People v Watson , 163 AD3d 855, 861 [2d Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1009 [2018]).

2023We further conclude that defendant did not set forth how the counseling records that he sought might be employed in a line of inquiry "beyond that of general credibility impeachment" ( Gissendanner , 48 NY2d at 550 ) or "point to specific facts demonstrating a reasonable likelihood . . . that [he was] not engaged in a fishing expedition" ( People v Kozlowski , 11 NY3d 223, 242 [2008], rearg denied 11 NY3d 904 [2009], cert denied 556 US 1282 [2009]).

2023Thus, defendant's application for a subpoena was "supported solely by speculation" ( People v Reddick , 43 AD3d 1334 , 1335 [4th Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 815 [2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]) and the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's application ( see Gissendanner , 48 NY2d at 550 ).