line inquiry in Oklahoma

1947Co. v. Gaines, 176 Okla. 576 , 56 P. 2d 869 , and quotes therefrom as follows: “ ‘A party to litigation, who elicits information concerning transactions or communications with a deceased person from a witness incompetent to testify as to the same,.cannot thereafter successfully object to his adversary pursuing the same line of inquiry on cross-examination ... of the state witness.” Also see Hinds v. Atlas Acceptance Corp., 178 Okla. 474 , 63 P 2d 29 .

1947Co. v. Gaines, 176 Okla. 576 , 56 P. 2d 869 , and quotes therefrom as follows: “ ‘A party to litigation, who elicits information concerning transactions or communications with a deceased person from a witness incompetent to testify as to the same,.cannot thereafter successfully object to his adversary pursuing the same line of inquiry on cross-examination ... of the state witness.” Also see Hinds v. Atlas Acceptance Corp., 178 Okla. 474 , 63 P 2d 29 .

2004We find that under these circumstances, (1) the trial court’s ruling in limine was proper, as the particulars of the prior offense were admissible under § 2608(B)(1) of the Evidence Code to impeach Appellant’s credibility; (2) defense counsel waived any error by choosing to broach the subject on direct examination, thereby avoiding the “sting” of having them first revealed by the prosecutor on cross-examination, see Jones v. State, 1976 OK CR 207, ¶ 21 , 554 P.2d 830, 834-35 ; 5 and (3) because Appellant’s criminal record was essential to his explanation, on the witness stand, of why he lied t

2004We find that under these circumstances, (1) the trial court’s ruling in limine was proper, as the particulars of the prior offense were admissible under § 2608(B)(1) of the Evidence Code to impeach Appellant’s credibility; (2) defense counsel waived any error by choosing to broach the subject on direct examination, thereby avoiding the “sting” of having them first revealed by the prosecutor on cross-examination, see Jones v. State, 1976 OK CR 207, ¶ 21 , 554 P.2d 830, 834-35 ; 5 and (3) because Appellant’s criminal record was essential to his explanation, on the witness stand, of why he lied t

2004We find that under these circumstances, (1) the trial court’s ruling in limine was proper, as the particulars of the prior offense were admissible under § 2608(B)(1) of the Evidence Code to impeach Appellant’s credibility; (2) defense counsel waived any error by choosing to broach the subject on direct examination, thereby avoiding the “sting” of having them first revealed by the prosecutor on cross-examination, see Jones v. State, 1976 OK CR 207, ¶ 21 , 554 P.2d 830, 834-35 ; 5 and (3) because Appellant’s criminal record was essential to his explanation, on the witness stand, of why he lied t

2004We find that under these circumstances, (1) the trial court’s ruling in limine was proper, as the particulars of the prior offense were admissible under § 2608(B)(1) of the Evidence Code to impeach Appellant’s credibility; (2) defense counsel waived any error by choosing to broach the subject on direct examination, thereby avoiding the “sting” of having them first revealed by the prosecutor on cross-examination, see Jones v. State, 1976 OK CR 207, ¶ 21 , 554 P.2d 830, 834-35 ; 5 and (3) because Appellant’s criminal record was essential to his explanation, on the witness stand, of why he lied t

1988While the evidence of the appellant’s guilt in this case is not as overwhelming as in Kreijanovsky v. State, 706 P.2d 541 (Okl.Cr.1985), we are still not convinced that the trial court’s error in failing to sustain the appellant’s objection to the prosecutor’s impropriety rises to the level in Dungan, supra. Considering all the facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude that although it was error to allow this line of inquiry to be heard by the jury, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

1988While the evidence of the appellant’s guilt in this case is not as overwhelming as in Kreijanovsky v. State, 706 P.2d 541 (Okl.Cr.1985), we are still not convinced that the trial court’s error in failing to sustain the appellant’s objection to the prosecutor’s impropriety rises to the level in Dungan, supra. Considering all the facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude that although it was error to allow this line of inquiry to be heard by the jury, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

1980Zaekery v. State, Okl.Cr., 572 P.2d 580 (1977).

1972Because of the holdings of the United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, Jackson v. Georgia, Branch v. Texas, 408 U.S. 238 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 , wherein it was held that the im position and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the judgment and sentence is accordingly modified from death by electrocution to Life imprisonment, and as so modified, is affirmed.

1972Because of the holdings of the United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, Jackson v. Georgia, Branch v. Texas, 408 U.S. 238 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 , wherein it was held that the im position and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the judgment and sentence is accordingly modified from death by electrocution to Life imprisonment, and as so modified, is affirmed.

1947We are of the' opinion the rule announced in Grison Oil Corp. v. Lewis, 175 Okla. 597 , 54 P. 2d 386 , is conclusive of the question presented by this appeal.

1947We are of the' opinion the rule announced in Grison Oil Corp. v. Lewis, 175 Okla. 597 , 54 P. 2d 386 , is conclusive of the question presented by this appeal.

1947Co. v. Gaines, 176 Okla. 576 , 56 P. 2d 869 , and quotes therefrom as follows: “ ‘A party to litigation, who elicits information concerning transactions or communications with a deceased person from a witness incompetent to testify as to the same,.cannot thereafter successfully object to his adversary pursuing the same line of inquiry on cross-examination ... of the state witness.” Also see Hinds v. Atlas Acceptance Corp., 178 Okla. 474 , 63 P 2d 29 .

1947Co. v. Gaines, 176 Okla. 576 , 56 P. 2d 869 , and quotes therefrom as follows: “ ‘A party to litigation, who elicits information concerning transactions or communications with a deceased person from a witness incompetent to testify as to the same,.cannot thereafter successfully object to his adversary pursuing the same line of inquiry on cross-examination ... of the state witness.” Also see Hinds v. Atlas Acceptance Corp., 178 Okla. 474 , 63 P 2d 29 .

1927Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U. S. 464 , 9 Sup. Ct. 125, 32 L.

1927When Mrs. Blackburn entered upon a line of defense which involved what transpired between herself and Mr. 'Weatherford, and respecting which she testified, she waived her right to object to his giving his own account of the matter.” In Lansburgh v. McCormick, 224 Fed. 874 -881, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit said: “In the meeting the charge that Flournoy and his associates had betrayed the trust which as counsel they owed to Lansburgh, all communications written .and oral between them and Lansburgh or his counsel in Washington were clearly admissible in their

1909This rule is announced by Joyce on indictments, § 242, and was' observed in the case t>f Wingard v. State, 13 Ga. 396 .