reliance doctrine in New York

2016While the school defendants’ lack of notice would not operate as a bar to the plaintiff’s recovery if res ipsa loquitur applied (see Levinstim v Parker, 27 AD3d 698 [2006]; Parsons v State of New York, 31 AD2d 596 [1968]), the doctrine is not applicable under the circumstances herein.

2016While the School defendants' lack of notice would not operate as a bar to the plaintiff's recovery if res ipsa loquitur applied ( see Levinstim v Parker , 27 AD3d 698 ; Parsons v State of New York , 31 AD2d 596 ), the doctrine is not applicable under the circumstances herein.

2016While the school defendants’ lack of notice would not operate as a bar to the plaintiff’s recovery if res ipsa loquitur applied (see Levinstim v Parker, 27 AD3d 698 [2006]; Parsons v State of New York, 31 AD2d 596 [1968]), the doctrine is not applicable under the circumstances herein.

2016While the School defendants' lack of notice would not operate as a bar to the plaintiff's recovery if res ipsa loquitur applied ( see Levinstim v Parker , 27 AD3d 698 ; Parsons v State of New York , 31 AD2d 596 ), the doctrine is not applicable under the circumstances herein.

2011Corp. (supra) and urged by CBS here is correct”].) Ainger clarifies that for the purposes of tort reliance the plaintiff must have “believed [the representation] to be true.

1990Corp. (supra) and urged by CBS here is correct.

2025The majority then rejects Mr. Silva Santos's request for Shock eligibility and affirms the court's reliance on the waiver because he "could have asked to withdraw his plea [but] did not do so, and he does not seek vacatur of the plea on this appeal" ( id. at &mdash).

2024Bank, 95 NY2d 24, 29 , [2000]; Connick v Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill 2d 482, 501 [1996] ["[p]laintiff's reliance is not an element of statutory consumer fraud" under the ICFA"]; In re KIND LLC "Healthy & All Natural" Litig., 627 F Supp 3d 269, 281 [SD NY 2022] [citation omitted] ["Relief under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA is available without individualized proof of 'reliance and injury, so long as the named plaintiffs demonstrate injury and causation"'].) Additionally, "reasonable inferences and common sense" dictate that the number of vegan consumers who purchased Ulta's products far exceeded minimu

2021Moreover, to the extent that the plaintiffs assert an independent cause of action for negligent spoliation, it is without merit as no such tort is recognized in New York law ( see Vargas v Crown Container Co., Inc. , 114 AD3d 762, 764 ; Hillman v Sinha , 77 AD3d 887, 888 ).

2021Moreover, to the extent that the plaintiffs assert an independent cause of action for negligent spoliation, it is without merit as no such tort is recognized in New York law ( see Vargas v Crown Container Co., Inc. , 114 AD3d 762, 764 ; Hillman v Sinha , 77 AD3d 887, 888 ).

2021Here, the plaintiffs' reliance on the doctrine of spoliation is misplaced as the law firm was never in possession or control of the restaurant, its lighting system, or its renovation ( see Burbige v Siben & Ferber , 115 AD3d 632, 633 ).

2018Socy. , 84 NY2d 544 [1994] ; Iannotti v Consolidated Rail Corp. , 74 NY2d 39 [1989]; Fenton v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. , 165 AD2d 121 [1st Dept 1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 856 [1991]).

2018Socy. , 84 NY2d 544 [1994] ; Iannotti v Consolidated Rail Corp. , 74 NY2d 39 [1989]; Fenton v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. , 165 AD2d 121 [1st Dept 1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 856 [1991]).

2018Socy. , 84 NY2d 544 [1994] ; Iannotti v Consolidated Rail Corp. , 74 NY2d 39 [1989]; Fenton v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. , 165 AD2d 121 [1st Dept 1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 856 [1991]).

2018Moreover, the evidence did not so preponderate in favor of the plaintiff that the verdict could not have been reached upon any fair interpretation of the evidence ( see Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744, 746 ).

2016Buxton’s conclusion that “[f]raud . . . may . . . exist where a false representation is made to a third party, resulting in injury to the plaintiff” (Buxton, 239 AD2d at 454 ) is based in part on this Court’s decision in Eaton Cole & Burnham Co. v Avery ( 83 NY 31 [1880]).

2016Buxton’s conclusion that “[f]raud . . . may . . . exist where a false representation is made to a third party, resulting in injury to the plaintiff” (Buxton, 239 AD2d at 454 ) is based in part on this Court’s decision in Eaton, Cole & Burnham Co. v Avery ( 83 NY 31 [1880]).

2016Buxton’s conclusion that “[f]raud . . . may . . . exist where a false representation is made to a third party, resulting in injury to the plaintiff” (Buxton, 239 AD2d at 454 ) is based in part on this Court’s decision in Eaton Cole & Burnham Co. v Avery ( 83 NY 31 [1880]).

2016Buxton’s conclusion that “[f]raud . . . may . . . exist where a false representation is made to a third party, resulting in injury to the plaintiff” (Buxton, 239 AD2d at 454 ) is based in part on this Court’s decision in Eaton, Cole & Burnham Co. v Avery ( 83 NY 31 [1880]).

2005The testing documents and testimony of the correction officer who obtained and tested petitioner’s urine sample establish that the urine sample never left the correction officer’s possession throughout the collection and testing process (see 7 NYCRR 1020.4 [e] [1] [i]; Matter of Saif Ul’Bait v Goord, 15 AD3d 703, 705 [2005]; Matter of Odome v Goord, 14 AD3d 975 [2005]).

1998In City of Buffalo (supra, at 258 ), the Court found that at the time of the de jure taking, the condemnee’s property had been devalued by the “ ‘affirmative value-depressing acts’ of the appropriating sovereign”.

1997An agreement which is “lawful on its face and which does not contemplate or necessarily entail unlawful conduct in its performance is enforcible by the promisee even though he engages in unlawful activity in the agreement’s performance” (Dodge v Richmond, 10 AD2d 4, 14 , affd 8 NY2d 829 ), provided the promisee does not require the aid of the illegal transaction to make out his case (see, McConnell v Commonwealth Pictures Corp., 7 NY2d 465, 471 ; Ferkin v Board of Educ., 278 NY 263, 268 ).

1997An agreement which is “lawful on its face and which does not contemplate or necessarily entail unlawful conduct in its performance is enforcible by the promisee even though he engages in unlawful activity in the agreement’s performance” (Dodge v Richmond, 10 AD2d 4, 14 , affd 8 NY2d 829 ), provided the promisee does not require the aid of the illegal transaction to make out his case (see, McConnell v Commonwealth Pictures Corp., 7 NY2d 465, 471 ; Ferkin v Board of Educ., 278 NY 263, 268 ).

1997An agreement which is “lawful on its face and which does not contemplate or necessarily entail unlawful conduct in its performance is enforcible by the promisee even though he engages in unlawful activity in the agreement’s performance” (Dodge v Richmond, 10 AD2d 4, 14 , affd 8 NY2d 829 ), provided the promisee does not require the aid of the illegal transaction to make out his case (see, McConnell v Commonwealth Pictures Corp., 7 NY2d 465, 471 ; Ferkin v Board of Educ., 278 NY 263, 268 ).

1997An agreement which is “lawful on its face and which does not contemplate or necessarily entail unlawful conduct in its performance is enforcible by the promisee even though he engages in unlawful activity in the agreement’s performance” (Dodge v Richmond, 10 AD2d 4, 14 , affd 8 NY2d 829 ), provided the promisee does not require the aid of the illegal transaction to make out his case (see, McConnell v Commonwealth Pictures Corp., 7 NY2d 465, 471 ; Ferkin v Board of Educ., 278 NY 263, 268 ).