75 California opinions name it 2 courts 1964–2026 31 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Tobacco II Casesgreen2 sentences2016The appellate court held, “[a] consumer’s burden of pleading causation in a UCL action should hinge on the nature of the alleged wrongdoing rather than the specific prong of the UCL the consumer invokes.” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1363.) It cited the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 , 207 P.3d 20 ], which held Business and Professions Code section 17204’s “ ‘as a result of’ ” requirement ‘“imposes an actual reliance requirement on plaintiffs prosecuting a private enforcement action under the 2016The appellate court held, “[a] consumer’s burden of pleading causation in a UCL action should hinge on the nature of the alleged wrongdoing rather than the specific prong of the UCL the consumer invokes.” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1363.) It cited the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 , 207 P.3d 20 ], which held Business and Professions Code section 17204’s “ ‘as a result of’ ” requirement ‘“imposes an actual reliance requirement on plaintiffs prosecuting a private enforcement action under the | 4 | 10 |
People v. Watsongreen2 sentences2023If the answer to this question is ‘yes,’ then the defendant has not suffered prejudice from the court’s reliance on factors not 8 found true by a jury in selecting the upper term.” (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 467, fn. 11.) If, however, the answer to the question is “no,” then we apply the harmlessness standard in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson), to the trial court’s reliance on impermissible factors. 2023If the answer to this question is ‘yes,’ then the defendant has not suffered prejudice from the court’s reliance on factors not found true by a jury in selecting the upper term.” (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 467, fn. 11.) The Lopez court further stated that if the answer to the first question is “no,” this court must “then consider the second question, which is whether a reviewing court can be certain, to the degree required by People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , that the trial court would nevertheless have exercised its discretion to select the upper term if it had recognized | 2 | 23 |
Burchard v. Garaygreen2 sentences2023(See Jane J. v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 894, 907 [“It is certainly true that one of the key factors the court should address as grounds for modifying custody is the custodial parent’s deliberate efforts to impair the children’s frequent and continuing contacts with the noncustodial 16 parent”]; Burchard v. Garay, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 540 [“A custody determination must be based upon a true assessment of the emotional bonds between parent and child”].) Mother does not dispute that the trial court properly relied on several factors in determining that it was not in the children’s 2023(See Jane J. v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 894, 907 [“It is certainly true that one of the key factors the court should address as grounds for modifying custody is the custodial parent’s deliberate efforts to impair the children’s frequent and continuing contacts with the noncustodial 16 parent”]; Burchard v. Garay, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 540 [“A custody determination must be based upon a true assessment of the emotional bonds between parent and child”].) Mother does not dispute that the trial court properly relied on several factors in determining that it was not in the children’s | 2 | 2 |
Jane J. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2023(See Jane J. v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 894, 907 [“It is certainly true that one of the key factors the court should address as grounds for modifying custody is the custodial parent’s deliberate efforts to impair the children’s frequent and continuing contacts with the noncustodial 16 parent”]; Burchard v. Garay, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 540 [“A custody determination must be based upon a true assessment of the emotional bonds between parent and child”].) Mother does not dispute that the trial court properly relied on several factors in determining that it was not in the children’s 2023(See Jane J. v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 894, 907 [“It is certainly true that one of the key factors the court should address as grounds for modifying custody is the custodial parent’s deliberate efforts to impair the children’s frequent and continuing contacts with the noncustodial 16 parent”]; Burchard v. Garay, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 540 [“A custody determination must be based upon a true assessment of the emotional bonds between parent and child”].) Mother does not dispute that the trial court properly relied on several factors in determining that it was not in the children’s | 2 | 2 |
Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2016(See Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 325 [“If a party has alleged or proven a personal, individualized loss of money or property in any nontrivial amount, he or she has also alleged or proven injury in fact.”].) Medrazo has been criticized by some federal district courts because we stated that “an actual reliance requirement does not apply to UCL actions 14 that are not based upon a fraud theory. [Citation.]” (Medrazo, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 12 .) (See, e.g., Kane v. Chobani, Inc. (N.D. 2016(See Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 325 [‘“If a party has alleged or proven a personal, individualized loss of money or property in any nontrivial amount, he or she has also alleged or proven injury in fact.”].) Medrazo has been criticized by some federal district courts because we stated that ‘“an actual reliance requirement does not apply to UCL actions that are not based upon a fraud theory. [Citation.]” ( Medrazo, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 12.) (See, e.g., Kane v. Chobani, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2014) 973 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1131 , vacated on other grounds in Kane v. Chobani, LLC (9th Cir. 2016) | 2 | 2 |
Cunningham v. Californiagreen2 sentences2024(Black II, at pp. 814–815; see Sandoval, at pp. 850–851.) This court decided Black II and Sandoval in the wake of Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. 270 , in which the high court held that California’s original DSL violated the Sixth Amendment. 2007On January 22, 2007, after the filing of the reply brief in this case, Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. ___ [ 166 L.Ed.2d 856 , 127 S.Ct. 856 ] ( Cunningham ), held that imposing an upper term pursuant to California's former determinate sentencing law (DSL) 6 violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, unless the sentencing court relied on (1) a fact found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) a fact admitted by the defendant, or (3) a prior conviction. ( Cunningham , at p. ___ [ 127 S.Ct. at p. 860 ]; cf. Black II, supra , 41 Cal.4th 799 , 816 .) In so doing, the court over | 1 | 3 |
Medrazo v. Honda of North Hollywoodgreen2 sentences2016(See Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 325 [“If a party has alleged or proven a personal, individualized loss of money or property in any nontrivial amount, he or she has also alleged or proven injury in fact.”].) Medrazo has been criticized by some federal district courts because we stated that “an actual reliance requirement does not apply to UCL actions 14 that are not based upon a fraud theory. [Citation.]” (Medrazo, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 12 .) (See, e.g., Kane v. Chobani, Inc. (N.D. 2016(See Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 325 [‘“If a party has alleged or proven a personal, individualized loss of money or property in any nontrivial amount, he or she has also alleged or proven injury in fact.”].) Medrazo has been criticized by some federal district courts because we stated that ‘“an actual reliance requirement does not apply to UCL actions that are not based upon a fraud theory. [Citation.]” ( Medrazo, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 12.) (See, e.g., Kane v. Chobani, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2014) 973 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1131 , vacated on other grounds in Kane v. Chobani, LLC (9th Cir. 2016) | 1 | 3 |
Durell v. Sharp Healthcaregreen2 sentences2016(See Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1363 [the reliance requirement “applies equally to the ‘unlawful’ prong of the UCL when . . . the predicate unlawfulness is misrepresentation and deception.”].) However, in the instant case, the evidence raises a triable issue whether plaintiffs’ reliance on the allegedly deceptive advertising resulted in their economic loss. 2016(See Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1363 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 682 ] [the reliance requirement “applies equally to the ‘unlawful’ prong of the UCL when ... the predicate unlawfulness is misrepresentation and deception.”].) However, in the instant case, the evidence raises a triable issue whether plaintiffs’ reliance on the allegedly deceptive advertising resulted in their economic loss. | 1 | 2 |
People v. W.B.green2 sentences2024(Id. at pp. 91-96.) And In re W.B. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30 invalidated a rule that required juvenile courts to apply ICWA to all delinquency proceedings; the rule conflicted with legislative intent because by statute ICWA applied to delinquency proceedings “if the child is at risk of entering foster care or is in foster care.” (Id. at p. 53 (italics omitted); see id. at pp. 53-58 & fn. 17.) The statute did not say “only if.” 16 For all of these reasons, we are not persuaded by the claim that because section 224.2(b) begins with the word “if” instead of the words “only if,” section 224.2(b) impose 2024(Id. at pp. 91-96.) And In re W.B. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30 invalidated a rule that required juvenile courts to apply ICWA to all delinquency proceedings; the rule conflicted with legislative intent because by statute ICWA applied to delinquency proceedings “if the child is at risk of entering foster care or is in foster care.” (Id. at p. 53 (italics omitted); see id. at pp. 53-58 & fn. 17.) The statute did not say “only if.” 16 For all of these reasons, we are not persuaded by the claim that because section 224.2(b) begins with the word “if” instead of the words “only if,” section 224.2(b) impose | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estradagreen1 sentence2022(See In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744-745 [absent evidence of contrary legislative intent, ameliorative criminal statutes apply to all cases not final when the statute takes effect]; see also People v. Woods (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1080, 1090-1091 .) In light of the trial court’s reliance on factors in aggravation that were neither admitted by defendant nor found true beyond a reasonable doubt, we must vacate the sentence and remand the matter for resentencing. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Woodsgreen1 sentence2022(See In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744-745 [absent evidence of contrary legislative intent, ameliorative criminal statutes apply to all cases not final when the statute takes effect]; see also People v. Woods (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1080, 1090-1091 .) In light of the trial court’s reliance on factors in aggravation that were neither admitted by defendant nor found true beyond a reasonable doubt, we must vacate the sentence and remand the matter for resentencing. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hernandezgreen2 sentences2017However, its remarks were, at most, post hoc justifications for adhering to a generic policy. ( Ibid . ) This reliance on a standard policy was an abuse of discretion but reversal was not required because the error was harmless under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 299 P.2d 243 . ( Hernandez , at pp. 744, 746, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 103 , 247 P.3d 167 .) Here, the court devoted considerable time and attention to the issue. 2017However, its remarks were, at most, post hoc justifications for adhering to a generic policy. ( Ibid . ) This reliance on a standard policy was an abuse of discretion but reversal was not required because the error was harmless under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 299 P.2d 243 . ( Hernandez , at pp. 744, 746, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 103 , 247 P.3d 167 .) Here, the court devoted considerable time and attention to the issue. | 1 | 1 |
Buller v. Sutter Healthgreen2 sentences2014(Wilson v. Hynek, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1008 .) D The fraud prong of the UCL may be shown if members of the public are “ ‘ “likely to be deceived.” ’ ” (Buller v. Sutter Health (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 981, 986 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 47 ].) However, “ ‘[a]bsent a duty to disclose, the failure to do so does not support a claim under the fraudulent *614 prong of the UCL.’ ” (Id. at p. 987.) Additionally, the UCL “imposes an actual reliance requirement on plaintiffs prosecuting a private enforcement action under the UCL’s fraud prong.” (In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 326 [ 93 Cal.Rp 2014(Wilson v. Hynek, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1008 .) D The fraud prong of the UCL may be shown if members of the public are “ ‘ “likely to be deceived.” ’ ” (Buller v. Sutter Health (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 981, 986 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 47 ].) However, “ ‘[a]bsent a duty to disclose, the failure to do so does not support a claim under the fraudulent *614 prong of the UCL.’ ” (Id. at p. 987.) Additionally, the UCL “imposes an actual reliance requirement on plaintiffs prosecuting a private enforcement action under the UCL’s fraud prong.” (In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 326 [ 93 Cal.Rp | 1 | 1 |
| San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Mary M.green | 1 | 1 |
| In re Shaputisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Milton v. H. C. Stone Lumber Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Durkee v. Chino Land and Water Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Panopulos v. Maderisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Coopergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Outboard Marine Corp. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nagel v. Twin Laboratories, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| PEOPLR v. Albrittongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ginns v. Savagegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Quinn v. State of Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Pricegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lesny Development Co. v. Kendallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Puritan Leasing Co. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. McDonaldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Warnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Caudillored | 1 | 1 |
| Billings v. Edwardsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hocharian v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Winters v. New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Perezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Snydergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rand v. American National Insurance
green
2 sentences2015As plaintiffs have argued, inserting a reliance requirement in this setting would have subverted the purpose of the law and encourage rather than “‘suppress the mischief at which [the statute] is directed.’” (Rand, supra, 717 F.Supp.2d at p. 957 .) The same situation does not exist here, however. 2015As plaintiffs have argued, inserting a reliance requirement in this setting would have subverted the purpose of the law and encourage rather than “‘suppress the mischief at which [the statute] is directed.’” (Rand, supra, 717 F.Supp.2d at p. 957 .) The same situation does not exist here, however. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Cattie v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
green
2 sentences2010This is a case in which the “concept of reliance” unequivocally applies (Tobacco II, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 325, fn. 17 ), and omitting an actual reliance requirement when the defendant’s alleged misrepresentation has not deceived the plaintiff “would blunt Proposition 64’s intended reforms” (Cattie v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (S.D.Cal. 2007) 504 F.Supp.2d 939, 948 ). 2008Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their UCL and [false advertising law] claims.” (Ibid.) In Cattie v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (S.D.Cal. 2007) 504 F.Supp.2d 939, 948 , the district court concluded that omitting a reliance requirement for standing to bring a UCL claim would “undermine Proposition 64’s reform purposes.” The plaintiff’s UCL claim alleged the thread count of the bed linens she purchased from the defendants’ Web site was lower than advertised. ( 504 F.Supp.2d at p. 941 .) The plaintiff purchased one set of bedsheets 11 days before filing the lawsuit and did not allege she relied on an | 2 | 2008–2010 |
Johnson v. United States
green
2 sentences1965In Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 [ 63 S.Ct. 549 , 87 L.Ed. 704 ], the court held that comment on the defendant's reliance on his privilege against self- incrimination was error, but failed to reverse because the error had been waived. 1965In Johnson v. United States, supra, 318 U.S. 189 , the court held that comment on the defendant’s reliance on his privilege against self-incrimination was error, but failed to reverse because the error had been waived. | 2 | 1965–1965 |
Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance
green
1 sentence2026(See Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1995) 10 Cal.4th 866 , 907–908 [it is a violation of the canons of judicial ethics for a judge to help litigants prepare their cases].) This is so even though Mother was not represented by counsel at the hearing. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
San Francisco Apartment Ass'n v. City & County of San Francisco
green
1 sentence2025(See ibid. [discussing San Francisco Apartment, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 472 ].) Although the appellate court disposed of the challenge by concluding the organization did not fail the associational interest test, City of Pomona does not stand for the affirmative proposition that to merit public interest standing an organization must show its members satisfy the requirements for associational standing. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Citizens for Amending Proposition v. City of Pomona
green
1 sentence2025(See ibid. [discussing San Francisco Apartment, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 472 ].) Although the appellate court disposed of the challenge by concluding the organization did not fail the associational interest test, City of Pomona does not stand for the affirmative proposition that to merit public interest standing an organization must show its members satisfy the requirements for associational standing. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Alvarez v. Seaside Transp. Servs. LLC
green
1 sentence2023(Alvarez, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 644 .) This rationale applies regardless of whether the complaint pleads the existence of an exception to Privette or the plaintiff’s reliance on an exception is revealed in subsequent discovery responses. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Chapman v. California
red
1 sentence2022If the answer to both of these questions is ‘no,’ then it is clear that remand to the trial court for resentencing is necessary.” (Ibid.) 15 In Dunn, the court agreed “with Lopez on the majority of the standard it articulated,” but concluded only “one aggravating circumstance must be reviewed pursuant to [Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 ].” (Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 408, 409.) It held, “the remaining aggravating circumstances involve only a state-created right to a jury trial that must be reviewed pursuant to Watson.” (Ibid.) Likewise, in Zabelle, the court agreed with Lopez | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Peoples
green
1 sentence2020In arguing in favor of a transfer to Sonoma County, the Attorney General relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia
green
1 sentence2017It declared the trial court's decision "untenable," and held that law of the case barred the defendants from contending Barquis was wrongly decided. ( Id . at p. 310, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 516 .) The court reasoned that its first opinion had "necessarily determined that the Yus had stated a cause of action for abuse of process, and that Barquis remained good law." ( Ibid . ) The Yu court rejected the defendants' reliance on the rule that law of the case does not extend to issues that might have been but were not raised on a prior appeal. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Kane v. Chobani, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016Cal. 2014) 973 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1131 , vacated on other grounds by Kane v. Chobani, LLC (9th Cir. 2016) 645 Fed.Appx. 593 [“Medrazo contains no discussion of Kwikset’s statement that the actual reliance requirement applies to claims under the unlawful prong of the UCL where the alleged unlawful conduct is based on a statute that prohibits specific types of misrepresentations.”]; De Keczer v. Tetley USA, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2016(See Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 325 [‘“If a party has alleged or proven a personal, individualized loss of money or property in any nontrivial amount, he or she has also alleged or proven injury in fact.”].) Medrazo has been criticized by some federal district courts because we stated that ‘“an actual reliance requirement does not apply to UCL actions that are not based upon a fraud theory. [Citation.]” ( Medrazo, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 12.) (See, e.g., Kane v. Chobani, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2014) 973 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1131 , vacated on other grounds in Kane v. Chobani, LLC (9th Cir. 2016) | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Katie Kane v. Chobani, LLC
green
2 sentences2016Cal. 2014) 973 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1131 , vacated on other grounds by Kane v. Chobani, LLC (9th Cir. 2016) 645 Fed.Appx. 593 [“Medrazo contains no discussion of Kwikset’s statement that the actual reliance requirement applies to claims under the unlawful prong of the UCL where the alleged unlawful conduct is based on a statute that prohibits specific types of misrepresentations.”]; De Keczer v. Tetley USA, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2016(See Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 325 [‘“If a party has alleged or proven a personal, individualized loss of money or property in any nontrivial amount, he or she has also alleged or proven injury in fact.”].) Medrazo has been criticized by some federal district courts because we stated that ‘“an actual reliance requirement does not apply to UCL actions that are not based upon a fraud theory. [Citation.]” ( Medrazo, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 12.) (See, e.g., Kane v. Chobani, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2014) 973 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1131 , vacated on other grounds in Kane v. Chobani, LLC (9th Cir. 2016) | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP
green
1 sentence2016Also, as discussed above, the UCL’s fraud prong generally “‘require[s] . . . a showing that members of the public are likely to be deceived.’” (Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 49, 81 .) To establish a private party’s 18 standing to maintain a UCL cause of action under the fraud prong In re Tobacco II Cases, supra, 46 Cal.4th 298 , held the phrase “as a result of” appearing in Business and Professions Code section 17204 “imposes an actual reliance requirement on plaintiffs prosecuting a private enforcement action under the UCL’s fraud prong.” (In re Tobacco II Case | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Cadlo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015(Belasco, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 424 ; Cadlo, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 519 .) “ ‘Several courts have held that class certification is inappropriate where a putative class representative is subject to unique defenses which threaten to become the focus of the litigation.’ ” (Seastrom v. Neways, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1502 .) Because plaintiff knew he had been the victim of identity theft and knew he did not owe a fine, it appears plaintiff may be subject to a reliance defense that is “unavailable or less available against other class members.” (Id. at p. 1503.) We need not a 2015(Belasco, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 424 ; Cadlo, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 519 .) “ ‘Several courts have held that class certification is inappropriate where a putative class representative is subject to unique defenses which threaten to become the focus of the litigation.’ ” (Seastrom v. Neways, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1502 .) Because plaintiff knew he had been the victim of identity theft and knew he did not owe a fine, it appears plaintiff may be subject to a reliance defense that is “unavailable or less available against other class members.” (Id. at p. 1503.) We need not a | 1 | 2015–2015 |
SEASTROM v. Neways, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015(Belasco, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 424 ; Cadlo, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 519 .) “ ‘Several courts have held that class certification is inappropriate where a putative class representative is subject to unique defenses which threaten to become the focus of the litigation.’ ” (Seastrom v. Neways, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1502 .) Because plaintiff knew he had been the victim of identity theft and knew he did not owe a fine, it appears plaintiff may be subject to a reliance defense that is “unavailable or less available against other class members.” (Id. at p. 1503.) We need not a | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Belasco v. Wells
green
1 sentence2015(Belasco, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 424 ; Cadlo, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 519 .) “ ‘Several courts have held that class certification is inappropriate where a putative class representative is subject to unique defenses which threaten to become the focus of the litigation.’ ” (Seastrom v. Neways, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1502 .) Because plaintiff knew he had been the victim of identity theft and knew he did not owe a fine, it appears plaintiff may be subject to a reliance defense that is “unavailable or less available against other class members.” (Id. at p. 1503.) We need not a | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Wilson v. Hynek
green
1 sentence2014(Wilson v. Hynek, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1008 .) D The fraud prong of the UCL may be shown if members of the public are “ ‘ “likely to be deceived.” ’ ” (Buller v. Sutter Health (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 981, 986 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 47 ].) However, “ ‘[a]bsent a duty to disclose, the failure to do so does not support a claim under the fraudulent *614 prong of the UCL.’ ” (Id. at p. 987.) Additionally, the UCL “imposes an actual reliance requirement on plaintiffs prosecuting a private enforcement action under the UCL’s fraud prong.” (In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 326 [ 93 Cal.Rp | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Kowis v. Howard green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Pacific Coast Engineering Company, a Corporation v. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corporation, a Corporation green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Milton v. H. C. Stone Lumber Co. neutral | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. Black red | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Vasquez v. Superior Court red | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Anunziato v. eMachines, Inc. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Black green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Nagel v. Twin Laboratories, Inc. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Ramos green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| People v. Smith green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Abdul-Majeed v. Emory University Hospital green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| People v. Wandick green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Sonbergh v. MacQuarrie green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| People v. Cole green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Bolton green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| People v. Johnson green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.