reliance rule in Massachusetts

2025See generally Clark, supra at 14-15 (where defendant told one officer that he had been alone at time of fatal shooting, but later told other officers that he had picked up hitchhikers that night, later statements not admissible under doctrine of verbal completeness because they were neither part of earlier conversation nor necessary to provide context for earlier statement).

2025See Commonwealth v Gilday, 409 Mass. 45 , 46 n.3 (1991).

2019This factual problem necessarily looks to what the police were doing and what motivated them to take the action they did"); State v. Lange, 158 Wis. 2d 609, 626-627 (App. Ct. 1990) (reviewing officer's testimony about his subjective intent to determine whether first prong was satisfied). 2 I disagree with the majority's reliance on defense counsel's statements at oral argument to conclude that the defendant did not preserve the issue.

2017See Commonwealth v. Triplett, 398 Mass. 561, 567 (1986) ("The fact finder, not the witness, must determine the weight and credibility of testimony"). 14 accessory after the fact.10 He contends that the principal crime was an inducement to part with property under false pretenses, see G.

2006See Synder v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 368 Mass. 433, 446 (1975) (“if the seller’s representations are such as to induce the buyer not to undertake an independent examination of the pertinent facts, lulling him into placing confidence in the seller’s assurances, his failure to ascertain the truth through investigation does not preclude recovery”); Zimmerman v. Kent, 31 Mass.App.Ct. 72, 81 (1991) (citing same Restatement section).

2006See also cases cited in note 12, supra. The Commonwealth invokes the “collective knowledge” doctrine, or “fellow officer” doctrine, pursuant to which the knowledge of one officer is imputed to others, see Richardson v. Boston, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 206 (2001), in an effort to establish that Trooper Young’s observation as communicated to Trooper Coletti was sufficient to justify the search. 17 The Commonwealth’s reliance on that doctrine is misplaced.

2006In Yorke v. Taylor, 332 Mass. 368, 373-74 (1955), the Supreme Judicial Court reformed the reliance requirement: “But whatever our rule has been formerly on the subject of diligence — and it is not easy to reconcile all that has been said — we prefer the rule of the Restatement that The recipient in a business transaction of a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact is justified in relying on its truth, although he might have ascertained the falsity of the representation had he made an investigation.’ Restatement: Torts, §540.” Id. (“No rogue should enjoy his ill-gotten plunder for the simple reas

2006See Synder v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 368 Mass. 433, 446 (1975) (“if the seller’s representations are such as to induce the buyer not to undertake an independent examination of the pertinent facts, lulling him into placing confidence in the seller’s assurances, his failure to ascertain the truth through investigation does not preclude recovery”); Zimmerman v. Kent, 31 Mass.App.Ct. 72, 81 (1991) (citing same Restatement section).

2002Id. at 56 , quoting People v. Hickey, 103 Mich. App. 350, 353 (1981). 9 As such, the judge’s reliance on rule 27 (b) as authority for the taking of partial verdicts in this case is at odds with the wording of the rule and this court’s decision in A Juvenile, supra. b.

1997See Commissioner of Revenue v. Marr Scaffolding Co., supra at 494-495; John S. Lane & Son v. Commissioner of Revenue, 396 Mass. 137, 141-142 (1985).

1994See Commonwealth v. Tuitt, 393 Mass. 801, 809 (1985). 3 In Commonwealth v. Ruffen, 399 Mass. 811, 813-814 (1987), on which the defendant relies for support, the court stated that “the curative admissibility doctrine allows a party harmed by incompetent evidence to rebut that evidence only if the original evidence created significant prejudice.” Without a showing that some evidence presented was incompetent, the defendant’s reliance on this doctrine is misguided. 4 The defense request for a consciousness of guilt instruction included the following: “In considering whether evidence that the defe

1994See Commonwealth v. Tuitt, 393 Mass. 801, 809 (1985). 3 In Commonwealth v. Ruffen, 399 Mass. 811, 813-814 (1987), on which the defendant relies for support, the court stated that “the curative admissibility doctrine allows a party harmed by incompetent evidence to rebut that evidence only if the original evidence created significant prejudice.” Without a showing that some evidence presented was incompetent, the defendant’s reliance on this doctrine is misguided. 4 The defense request for a consciousness of guilt instruction included the following: “In considering whether evidence that the defe