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14 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Segerman v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2024Nevertheless, because the trial judge’s ruling makes clear that he agreed on the merits with the motions court’s earlier ruling on proximate causation and because we conclude, as a matter of law, that that ruling was correct, the court’s reliance on this doctrine as an alternative basis for its ruling made no difference in the outcome. 18 “While proximate cause – both cause-in-fact and legal cause – analysis [ordinarily] is reserved for the trier of fact ‘it becomes a question of law in cases where reasoning minds cannot differ.’” Id. at 253 (quoting Segerman v. Jones, 256 Md. 109, 135 (1969)) 2024Nevertheless, because the trial judge’s ruling makes clear that he agreed on the merits with the motions court’s earlier ruling on proximate causation and because we conclude, as a matter of law, that that ruling was correct, the court’s reliance on this doctrine as an alternative basis for its ruling made no difference in the outcome. 18 “While proximate cause – both cause-in-fact and legal cause – analysis [ordinarily] is reserved for the trier of fact ‘it becomes a question of law in cases where reasoning minds cannot differ.’” Id. at 253 (quoting Segerman v. Jones, 256 Md. 109, 135 (1969)) | 2 | 2 |
Knight v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Factors relevant to the reliance analysis include the amount of time that elapsed between the improper inducement and the confession, Winder, 362 Md. at 312 , 765 A.2d at 117 ; whether any intervening factors, other than the officer’s statement, could have caused the confession, see id., 765 A.2d at 117 ; and the testimony of the accused at the suppression hearing related to the interrogation, see Knight, 381 Md. at 535 , 850 A.2d at 1189-90 . 2011Factors relevant to the reliance analysis include the amount of time that elapsed between the improper inducement and the confession, Winder, 362 Md. at 312 , 765 A.2d at 117 ; whether any intervening factors, other than the officer’s statement, could have caused the confession, see id., 765 A.2d at 117 ; and the testimony of the accused at the suppression hearing related to the interrogation, see Knight, 381 Md. at 535 , 850 A.2d at 1189-90 . | 1 | 1 |
Moye v. Stategreen2 sentences2004Standard of Review Our opinion in Moye v. State, 369 Md. 2, 12-13 , 796 A.2d 821, 827 (2002) sets out the appropriate standard of review in the instant case: The standard of review for appellate review of evidentiary sufficiency is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. 2004Standard of Review Our opinion in Moye v. State, 369 Md. 2, 12-13 , 796 A.2d 821, 827 (2002) sets out the appropriate standard of review in the instant case: The standard of review for appellate review of evidentiary sufficiency is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Lavon Wilsongreen2 sentences2004See United States v. Wilson, 838 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir.1988) ("The government's reliance on the waiver of Miranda rights becomes weaker as the period of pre-arraignment detention increases. 2004See United States v. Wilson, 838 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir.1988) (“The government’s reliance on the waiver of Miranda rights becomes weaker as the period of pre-arraignment detention increases. | 1 | 1 |
Merced v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2001For example, in Merced v. City of New York, 142 Misc.2d 442 , 534 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1987), rev’d, 75 N.Y.2d 798 , 552 N.Y.S.2d 96 , 551 N.E.2d 589 (1990), a New York trial court held that the reliance requirement of New York’s special duty test must be broadened to include callers or complainants who relied on the police officers for assistance____[because] ‘but for’ this reliance upon the officers the callers ... may have *270 affirmatively given aid to the decedent.” 9 On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “the involvement of third parties did not satisfy 2001For example, in Merced v. City of New York, 142 Misc.2d 442 , 534 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1987), rev’d, 75 N.Y.2d 798 , 552 N.Y.S.2d 96 , 551 N.E.2d 589 (1990), a New York trial court held that the reliance requirement of New York’s special duty test must be broadened to include callers or complainants who relied on the police officers for assistance____[because] ‘but for’ this reliance upon the officers the callers ... may have *270 affirmatively given aid to the decedent.” 9 On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “the involvement of third parties did not satisfy | 1 | 1 |
Merced v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2001For example, in Merced v. City of New York, 142 Misc.2d 442 , 534 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1987), rev’d, 75 N.Y.2d 798 , 552 N.Y.S.2d 96 , 551 N.E.2d 589 (1990), a New York trial court held that the reliance requirement of New York’s special duty test must be broadened to include callers or complainants who relied on the police officers for assistance____[because] ‘but for’ this reliance upon the officers the callers ... may have *270 affirmatively given aid to the decedent.” 9 On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “the involvement of third parties did not satisfy 2001For example, in Merced v. City of New York, 142 Misc.2d 442 , 534 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1987), rev’d, 75 N.Y.2d 798 , 552 N.Y.S.2d 96 , 551 N.E.2d 589 (1990), a New York trial court held that the reliance requirement of New York’s special duty test must be broadened to include callers or complainants who relied on the police officers for assistance____[because] ‘but for’ this reliance upon the officers the callers ... may have *270 affirmatively given aid to the decedent.” 9 On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “the involvement of third parties did not satisfy | 1 | 1 |
White v. Beasleygreen2 sentences2001We also find an instructive debate on this question in White v. Beasley, 453 Mich. 308 , 552 N.W.2d 1 (1996), in which neighbors who heard the decedent being attacked called 911 on her behalf. 10 The majority held that the decedent did not rely on any affirmative action taken by the police, because she never contacted them and “had no knowledge of a promise [of help] on which she could rely.” Id. at 7. 2001We also find an instructive debate on this question in White v. Beasley, 453 Mich. 308 , 552 N.W.2d 1 (1996), in which neighbors who heard the decedent being attacked called 911 on her behalf. 10 The majority held that the decedent did not rely on any affirmative action taken by the police, because she never contacted them and “had no knowledge of a promise [of help] on which she could rely.” Id. at 7. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Crawfordgreen2 sentences1998See Crawford, 582 N.W.2d at 794 n. 11. ("We infer the prosecution's reliance on the doctrine of chances from his opening and closing statements," explaining the relevance of the uncharged misconduct evidence.) The doctrine of chances is based on probabilities, and is premised on the proposition that mere coincidence is less probable as the recurrence of similar events increases. 1998See Crawford, 582 N.W.2d at 794 n. 11. (“We infer the prosecution’s reliance on the doctrine of chances from his opening and closing statements,” explaining the relevance of the uncharged misconduct evidence.) The doctrine of chances is based on probabilities, and is premised on the proposition that mere coincidence is less probable as the recurrence of similar events increases. | 1 | 1 |
Fegeas v. Sherrillgreen2 sentences1969See also Fegeas v. Sherrill, 218 Md. 472 , 147 A. 2d 223 (1958); Berger v. Burkoff, 200 Md. 561 , 92 A. 2d 376 (1952). 1969See also Fegeas v. Sherrill, 218 Md. 472 , 147 A. 2d 223 (1958); Berger v. Burkoff, 200 Md. 561 , 92 A. 2d 376 (1952). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Peterson v. Orphans' Court for Queen Anne's County
green
2 sentences2024Nevertheless, because the trial judge’s ruling makes clear that he agreed on the merits with the motions court’s earlier ruling on proximate causation and because we conclude, as a matter of law, that that ruling was correct, the court’s reliance on this doctrine as an alternative basis for its ruling made no difference in the outcome. 18 “While proximate cause – both cause-in-fact and legal cause – analysis [ordinarily] is reserved for the trier of fact ‘it becomes a question of law in cases where reasoning minds cannot differ.’” Id. at 253 (quoting Segerman v. Jones, 256 Md. 109, 135 (1969)) 2024Nevertheless, because the trial judge’s ruling makes clear that he agreed on the merits with the motions court’s earlier ruling on proximate causation and because we conclude, as a matter of law, that that ruling was correct, the court’s reliance on this doctrine as an alternative basis for its ruling made no difference in the outcome. 18 “While proximate cause – both cause-in-fact and legal cause – analysis [ordinarily] is reserved for the trier of fact ‘it becomes a question of law in cases where reasoning minds cannot differ.’” Id. at 253 (quoting Segerman v. Jones, 256 Md. 109, 135 (1969)) | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Consumer Protection Division Office of the Attorney General v. Consumer Publishing Co.
green
2 sentences2022Id. at 779–81. 2022Id. at 779–81. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
In Re Wallace W.
green
2 sentences2013Noting the perimeters of the rule as enunciated in In re Wallace W., 333 Md. at 190 , 634 A.2d at 55-56 , to wit: “The doctrine of ejusdem generis applies when the following conditions exist: (1) the statute contains an enumeration by specific words; (2) the members of the enumeration suggest a class; (3) the class is not exhausted by the enumeration; (4) a general reference supplementing the enumeration, usually following it; and (5) there is not clearly manifested an intent that the general term be given a broader meaning than the doctrine requires. 2013Noting the perimeters of the rule as enunciated in In re Wallace W., 333 Md. at 190 , 634 A.2d at 55-56 , to wit: “The doctrine of ejusdem generis applies when the following conditions exist: (1) the statute contains an enumeration by specific words; (2) the members of the enumeration suggest a class; (3) the class is not exhausted by the enumeration; (4) a general reference supplementing the enumeration, usually following it; and (5) there is not clearly manifested an intent that the general term be given a broader meaning than the doctrine requires. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Winder v. State
green
2 sentences2011Factors relevant to the reliance analysis include the amount of time that elapsed between the improper inducement and the confession, Winder, 362 Md. at 312 , 765 A.2d at 117 ; whether any intervening factors, other than the officer’s statement, could have caused the confession, see id., 765 A.2d at 117 ; and the testimony of the accused at the suppression hearing related to the interrogation, see Knight, 381 Md. at 535 , 850 A.2d at 1189-90 . 2011Factors relevant to the reliance analysis include the amount of time that elapsed between the improper inducement and the confession, Winder, 362 Md. at 312 , 765 A.2d at 117 ; whether any intervening factors, other than the officer’s statement, could have caused the confession, see id., 765 A.2d at 117 ; and the testimony of the accused at the suppression hearing related to the interrogation, see Knight, 381 Md. at 535 , 850 A.2d at 1189-90 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Village Square No. 1, Inc. v. Crow-Frederick Retail Ltd. Partnership
green
2 sentences1990The State’s reliance on this rule is misplaced, however, because process is not legally issued until it has been ... placed in the hands of a person authorized to serve it with the intention of having it served, [citations omitted] We have recently referred to Preissman in Village Square v. Crow-Frederick, 77 Md.App. 552, 562 , 551 A.2d 471 (1989), saying “If the language is plain and free of ambiguity, and has a definite and sensible meaning, such is conclusively presumed to be the intent of the Legislature in enacting the statute.” The appellee declares to us that the holding in Preissman ha 1990The State’s reliance on this rule is misplaced, however, because process is not legally issued until it has been ... placed in the hands of a person authorized to serve it with the intention of having it served, [citations omitted] We have recently referred to Preissman in Village Square v. Crow-Frederick, 77 Md.App. 552, 562 , 551 A.2d 471 (1989), saying “If the language is plain and free of ambiguity, and has a definite and sensible meaning, such is conclusively presumed to be the intent of the Legislature in enacting the statute.” The appellee declares to us that the holding in Preissman ha | 1 | 1990–1990 |
United States v. Flowers
green
2 sentences1990Addressing the prosecution's reliance on the rule that inconsistent jury verdicts are tolerated, the court in Flowers, 255 F. Supp. at 487 , initially observed that, with regard to the permissibility of the reprosecution, "[i]t must be assumed that the [earlier] jury was aware of all the facts in evidence and that it logically and properly applied the instructions of the court in reaching its verdict of acquittal. 1990Addressing the prosecution’s reliance on the rule that inconsistent jury verdicts are tolerated, the court in Flowers, 255 F.Supp. at 487 , initially observed that, with regard to the permissibility of the reprosecution, “[i]t must be assumed that the [earlier] jury was aware of all the facts in evidence and that it logically and properly applied the instructions of the court in reaching its verdict of acquittal. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Sinclair v. State
green
1 sentence1979The hearing judge found expressly, “Certainly the Court is not in any way implying that there is any impropriety in the case or certainly no dishonesty here.” He based his ruling, however, on the “possible appearance of impropriety.” The reliance of the hearing judge (and of the appellee) on Sinclair v. State, 278 Md. 243 , is totally misplaced. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Allen v. Wilkinson
green
2 sentences1969We dispose of the appellants’ reliance on the doctrine of implied warranty by reference to the recent case of Allen v. Wil kinson, 250 Md. 395 , 243 A. 2d 515 (1968), wherein Judge Marbury writing for the Court said: “We recognize that as the law of this State stands today except in unusual circumstances there is no implied warranty in the sale of a completed residence * * * ” Id. at 398 . 1969We dispose of the appellants’ reliance on the doctrine of implied warranty by reference to the recent case of Allen v. Wil kinson, 250 Md. 395 , 243 A. 2d 515 (1968), wherein Judge Marbury writing for the Court said: “We recognize that as the law of this State stands today except in unusual circumstances there is no implied warranty in the sale of a completed residence * * * ” Id. at 398 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Berger v. Burkoff
neutral
2 sentences1969See also Fegeas v. Sherrill, 218 Md. 472 , 147 A. 2d 223 (1958); Berger v. Burkoff, 200 Md. 561 , 92 A. 2d 376 (1952). 1969See also Fegeas v. Sherrill, 218 Md. 472 , 147 A. 2d 223 (1958); Berger v. Burkoff, 200 Md. 561 , 92 A. 2d 376 (1952). | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.