18 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dunklin v. Stategreen1 sentence2022E.g., Dunklin v. State, 194 S.W.3d 14, 20 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2006, no pet.) (noting that U.S. Supreme Court and Texas courts of appeal have rejected constitutional challenges to rule 606(b)); Glover v. State, 110 S.W.3d 549, 552 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, pet. ref’d) (concluding that rule 606(b) did not violate defendant’s “constitutional rights to due process”); Richardson v. State, 83 S.W.3d 332, 362 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref’d) (determining that rule 606(b) did not violate defendant’s right to –5– fair and impartial jury); Hines v. State, 3 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, | 1 | 1 |
Hines v. Stategreen1 sentence2022E.g., Dunklin v. State, 194 S.W.3d 14, 20 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2006, no pet.) (noting that U.S. Supreme Court and Texas courts of appeal have rejected constitutional challenges to rule 606(b)); Glover v. State, 110 S.W.3d 549, 552 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, pet. ref’d) (concluding that rule 606(b) did not violate defendant’s “constitutional rights to due process”); Richardson v. State, 83 S.W.3d 332, 362 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref’d) (determining that rule 606(b) did not violate defendant’s right to –5– fair and impartial jury); Hines v. State, 3 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, | 1 | 1 |
Glover v. Stategreen1 sentence2022E.g., Dunklin v. State, 194 S.W.3d 14, 20 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2006, no pet.) (noting that U.S. Supreme Court and Texas courts of appeal have rejected constitutional challenges to rule 606(b)); Glover v. State, 110 S.W.3d 549, 552 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, pet. ref’d) (concluding that rule 606(b) did not violate defendant’s “constitutional rights to due process”); Richardson v. State, 83 S.W.3d 332, 362 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref’d) (determining that rule 606(b) did not violate defendant’s right to –5– fair and impartial jury); Hines v. State, 3 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, | 1 | 1 |
Richardson v. Stategreen1 sentence2022E.g., Dunklin v. State, 194 S.W.3d 14, 20 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2006, no pet.) (noting that U.S. Supreme Court and Texas courts of appeal have rejected constitutional challenges to rule 606(b)); Glover v. State, 110 S.W.3d 549, 552 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, pet. ref’d) (concluding that rule 606(b) did not violate defendant’s “constitutional rights to due process”); Richardson v. State, 83 S.W.3d 332, 362 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref’d) (determining that rule 606(b) did not violate defendant’s right to –5– fair and impartial jury); Hines v. State, 3 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, | 1 | 1 |
Sanders v. Stategreen1 sentence2022E.g., Dunklin v. State, 194 S.W.3d 14, 20 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2006, no pet.) (noting that U.S. Supreme Court and Texas courts of appeal have rejected constitutional challenges to rule 606(b)); Glover v. State, 110 S.W.3d 549, 552 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, pet. ref’d) (concluding that rule 606(b) did not violate defendant’s “constitutional rights to due process”); Richardson v. State, 83 S.W.3d 332, 362 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref’d) (determining that rule 606(b) did not violate defendant’s right to –5– fair and impartial jury); Hines v. State, 3 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, | 1 | 1 |
Boykin v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Accordingly, under Boykin v. State, the interpretation of Rule 43.6 can stop here because the plain meaning of “Other Orders” prohibits the court’s reliance on that rule in this case, and this reading does not lead to an absurd result. 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Otto v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Otto v. State, 95 S.W.3d 282, 284 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
City Of Charleston v. Public Service Commission Of West Virginiagreen1 sentence2015See City of Charleston, 57 F.3d at 392-93 (noting that the reliance analysis turns in part on whether the contract “indicated that the abridged term was subject to impairment by the legislature”). | 1 | 1 |
Field v. Mansgreen1 sentence2015E.g., Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 71 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Southmark Corporation v. Life Investors, Inc., and Uslico Corporationgreen2 sentences2015See Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 770 (5th Cir. 1988). 2015See Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d at 770 . | 1 | 1 |
Gleason v. Taubgreen1 sentence2010See Gleason v. Taub, 180 S.W.3d 711, 713 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied); Senn v. Texaco, Inc., 55 S.W.3d 222, 226 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2001, pet. denied); Lay v. Aetna Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Senn v. Texaco, Inc.green1 sentence2010See Gleason v. Taub, 180 S.W.3d 711, 713 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied); Senn v. Texaco, Inc., 55 S.W.3d 222, 226 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2001, pet. denied); Lay v. Aetna Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Hawkins Construction Co. v. Matthews Co., Inc.green2 sentences2004Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546 , 209 N.W.2d 643, 654-55 (1973) (sale of scaffolding; express warranty created even if buyer did not rely on statements in seller’s brochure), overruled on other grounds by Nat’l Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782 , 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983); Daughtrey v. Ashe, 243 Va. 73 , 413 S.E.2d 336, 338-39 (1992) (“basis of the bargain” does not establish “a buyer’s reliance requirement”; “We conclude from the language used in Code § 8.2-313 and the Official Comment thereto that the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code intended to modify the traditional requ 2004Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546 , 209 N.W.2d 643, 654-55 (1973) (sale of scaffolding; express warranty created even if buyer did not rely on statements in seller’s brochure), overruled on other grounds by Nat’l Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782 , 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983); Daughtrey v. Ashe, 243 Va. 73 , 413 S.E.2d 336, 338-39 (1992) (“basis of the bargain” does not establish “a buyer’s reliance requirement”; “We conclude from the language used in Code § 8.2-313 and the Official Comment thereto that the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code intended to modify the traditional requ | 1 | 1 |
Daughtrey v. Ashegreen2 sentences2004Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546 , 209 N.W.2d 643, 654-55 (1973) (sale of scaffolding; express warranty created even if buyer did not rely on statements in seller’s brochure), overruled on other grounds by Nat’l Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782 , 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983); Daughtrey v. Ashe, 243 Va. 73 , 413 S.E.2d 336, 338-39 (1992) (“basis of the bargain” does not establish “a buyer’s reliance requirement”; “We conclude from the language used in Code § 8.2-313 and the Official Comment thereto that the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code intended to modify the traditional requ 2004Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546 , 209 N.W.2d 643, 654-55 (1973) (sale of scaffolding; express warranty created even if buyer did not rely on statements in seller’s brochure), overruled on other grounds by Nat’l Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782 , 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983); Daughtrey v. Ashe, 243 Va. 73 , 413 S.E.2d 336, 338-39 (1992) (“basis of the bargain” does not establish “a buyer’s reliance requirement”; “We conclude from the language used in Code § 8.2-313 and the Official Comment thereto that the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code intended to modify the traditional requ | 1 | 1 |
Marin v. Stategreen1 sentence2001Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 280 (“The rule [now 33.1] does not apply to rights which are waivable only or to absolute systemic requirements, the violation of which may still be raised for the first time on appeal.”).Thus, the majority’s reliance on rule 33.1 to support its holding that E.M.R. waived his section 52.02(b) claim is misplaced. | 1 | 1 |
American Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Grinnellgreen1 sentence1998American Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 436 (Tex.1997). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Peltier Enterprises, Inc. v. Hilton
green
2 sentences2002The argument is a different flavor of the reliance claim and is based on Peltier Enter., Inc. v. Hilton, 51 S.W.3d 616 (Tex.App.- *405 Tyler 2000, pet. denied). 2002The argument is a different flavor of the reliance claim and is based on Peltier Enter., Inc. v. Hilton , 51 S.W.3d 616 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, pet. denied). | 2 | 2002–2002 |
United States v. Bobby Gene Gaddis and Billy Sunday Birt
green
1 sentence2015They are: "[(1}] the she had lived and resided in a residence there in a house which had four (4} walls, a ceiling, floor, Petitioner entered the house without breaking; (2} that he entered by breaking with intent to commit doors and windows ... ;" { 506 F.2d 352 ) and since Officer Mikel is stipulated to have testified that he B05_11CS B05_11CS 6 i) 2015 Matthew Bender& Company. lnc .. a member of the LexisNcxis Group. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In Re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.
green
1 sentence2008Id. at 741 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Smith v. City of Jackson
green
2 sentences2007Id. 2007Id. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co.
green
2 sentences2004Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546 , 209 N.W.2d 643, 654-55 (1973) (sale of scaffolding; express warranty created even if buyer did not rely on statements in seller’s brochure), overruled on other grounds by Nat’l Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782 , 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983); Daughtrey v. Ashe, 243 Va. 73 , 413 S.E.2d 336, 338-39 (1992) (“basis of the bargain” does not establish “a buyer’s reliance requirement”; “We conclude from the language used in Code § 8.2-313 and the Official Comment thereto that the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code intended to modify the traditional requ 2004Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546 , 209 N.W.2d 643, 654-55 (1973) (sale of scaffolding; express warranty created even if buyer did not rely on statements in seller’s brochure), overruled on other grounds by Nat’l Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782 , 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983); Daughtrey v. Ashe, 243 Va. 73 , 413 S.E.2d 336, 338-39 (1992) (“basis of the bargain” does not establish “a buyer’s reliance requirement”; “We conclude from the language used in Code § 8.2-313 and the Official Comment thereto that the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code intended to modify the traditional requ | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Price v. State
green
2 sentences2003In criticizing the State's reliance on the exception in that case, we noted that the "police did not see appellant engaged in the act of destroying evidence, nor had they witnessed any specific acts suggesting that destruction was imminent." Id. 2003In criticizing the State’s reliance on the exception in that case, we noted that the "police did not see appellant engaged in the act of destroying evidence, nor had they witnessed any specific acts suggesting that destruction was imminent.” Id. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Davis v. State
green
1 sentence1984From the above facts, alone, it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant saw the seized films or knew their “obscene content and character” as required by Davis, supra. The record reflects that the State’s case was based on the circumstantial evidence that appellant exhibited the film, and the statutory presumption of his knowledge of the film’s contents in order to prove appellant’s “knowledge.” The State’s reliance on the presumption becomes readily appar ent during the State’s closing argument. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Sanders v. Harder
green
2 sentences1978Sanders v. Harder, 148 Tex. 593 , 227 S.W.2d 206 (1950); Rule 324, T.R.C.P.; Rule 301, T.R.C.P. 1978Sanders v. Harder, 148 Tex. 593 , 227 S.W.2d 206 (1950); Rule 324, T.R.C.P.; Rule 301, T.R.C.P. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Hester v. Ross
green
2 sentences1978In Hester v. Ross, Banks, May, Cron & Cavin, 492 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Civ.App.Waco 1973, no writ), the court stated: "The rule is that a surety or guarantor is discharged by a material alteration or modification of the contract between the debtor and creditor, without such surety or guarantor's consent. 1978In Hester v. Ross, Banks, May, Cron & Cavin, 492 S.W.2d 378 (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco 1973, no writ), the court stated: “The rule is that a surety or guarantor is discharged by a material alteration or modification of the contract between the debtor and creditor, without such surety or guarantor’s consent. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Old Colony Insurance Company v. City of Quitman
green
2 sentences1978In Old Colony Insurance Company v. City of Quitman, 163 Tex. 144 , 352 S.W.2d 452 (1961), the court found the contract alterations prejudiced the rights of the surety as a matter of law. 1978In Old Colony Insurance Company v. City of Quitman, 163 Tex. 144 , 352 S.W.2d 452 (1961), the court found the contract alterations prejudiced the rights of the surety as a matter of law. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.