8 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Orton v. Cartergreen1 sentence2006Because we uphold the trial court’s decision on other grounds, the trial court's reliance on rule 37(f) is harmless error. "[A]n appellate court may affirm a judgment, order, or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record,’ even though that ground or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its ruling.” Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998) (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass’n, 23 Utah 2d 222 , 461 P.2d 290 , 293 n. 2 (1969)). . | 1 | 1 |
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.green2 sentences1996Second, our decision is consistent with federal courts' refusal to hold that section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, the federal analog to section 61-1-22, contains a reliance requirement. [7] See, e.g., Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 116 (10th Cir.1959); see also Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 115 S.Ct. 1061, 1070 , 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995) (recognizing "Congress' decision in § 12(2) to grant buyers a right to rescind without proof of reliance"); Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 889 (1988) (noting that reliance is not element of section 12(2) cause of action) 1996Second, our decision is consistent with federal courts' refusal to hold that section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, the federal analog to section 61-1-22, contains a reliance requirement. [7] See, e.g., Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 116 (10th Cir.1959); see also Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 115 S.Ct. 1061, 1070 , 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995) (recognizing "Congress' decision in § 12(2) to grant buyers a right to rescind without proof of reliance"); Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 889 (1988) (noting that reliance is not element of section 12(2) cause of action) | 1 | 1 |
Woodward v. Wrightgreen2 sentences1996Second, our decision is consistent with federal courts' refusal to hold that section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, the federal analog to section 61-1-22, contains a reliance requirement. [7] See, e.g., Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 116 (10th Cir.1959); see also Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 115 S.Ct. 1061, 1070 , 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995) (recognizing "Congress' decision in § 12(2) to grant buyers a right to rescind without proof of reliance"); Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 889 (1988) (noting that reliance is not element of section 12(2) cause of action) 1996Second, our decision is consistent with federal courts’ refusal to hold that section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, the federal analog to section 61-1-22, contains a reliance requirement. 7 See, e.g., Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 116 (10th Cir.1959); see also Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 1061, 1070 , 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995) (recognizing “Congress’ decision in § 12(2) to grant buyers a right to rescind without proof of reliance”); Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 889 (1988) (noting that reliance is not element of section 12(2) cause of action). | 1 | 1 |
American Coal Co. v. Sandstromgreen2 sentences1996See American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984) ("Where the legislature amends a portion of a statute, leaving other portions unamended,... absent substantial evidence to the contrary, the legislature is presumed to have been satisfied with prior judicial constructions of the unaltered portions of the statute and to have adopted those constructions as consistent with its own intent."). 1996See American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984) (“Where the legislature amends a portion of a statute, leaving other portions unamended, ... absent substantial evidence to the contrary, the legislature is presumed to have been satisfied with prior judicial constructions of the unaltered portions of the statute and to have adopted those constructions as consistent with its own intent.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Nelson-Waggoner
green
2 sentences2011We do not consider issues raised " 'for the first time on appeal unless the [district] court committed plain error or exceptional circumstances exist.'" State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ¶ 45 , 114 P.3d 551 (quoting State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ¶ 16 , 94 P.3d 186 ). 2011We do not consider issues raised " 'for the first time on appeal unless the [district] court committed plain error or exceptional circumstances exist.'" State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ¶ 45 , 114 P.3d 551 (quoting State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ¶ 16 , 94 P.3d 186 ). | 2 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Pinder
green
2 sentences2011We do not consider issues raised " 'for the first time on appeal unless the [district] court committed plain error or exceptional circumstances exist.'" State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ¶ 45 , 114 P.3d 551 (quoting State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ¶ 16 , 94 P.3d 186 ). 2011We do not consider issues raised " 'for the first time on appeal unless the [district] court committed plain error or exceptional circumstances exist.'" State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ¶ 45 , 114 P.3d 551 (quoting State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ¶ 16 , 94 P.3d 186 ). | 2 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Camara
green
1 sentence2026Wrapping things up, the majority insisted that “the dissent’s reliance on rule 47(l) [was] misplaced,” and it instead said that “[w]hen deciding whether a juror contact with an outsider triggers the rebuttable presumption of prejudice, we do not apply rule 47(l).” Id. ¶ 61. 20220502-CA 25 2026 UT App 5 State v. Camara ¶60 Despite all this, the separate opinion seems to assume that while the Soto majority did not think that rule 47(l) should be used as part of the three-part test, rule 47(l) should be used when assessing the initial question of whether there was an impermissible “contact.” But | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Eldridge v. Johndrow
green
2 sentences2018This leaves us with the reliance inquiry. ¶31 No legitimate reliance interests are at stake : This factor concerns itself with "the extent to which people's reliance on the precedent would create injustice or hardship if it were overturned." Eldridge , 2015 UT 21 , ¶ 35, 345 P.3d 553 . 2018This leaves us with the reliance inquiry. ¶31 No legitimate reliance interests are at stake : This factor concerns itself with "the extent to which people's reliance on the precedent would create injustice or hardship if it were overturned." Eldridge , 2015 UT 21 , ¶ 35, 345 P.3d 553 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Association
green
2 sentences2006Because we uphold the trial court’s decision on other grounds, the trial court's reliance on rule 37(f) is harmless error. "[A]n appellate court may affirm a judgment, order, or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record,’ even though that ground or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its ruling.” Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998) (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass’n, 23 Utah 2d 222 , 461 P.2d 290 , 293 n. 2 (1969)). . 2006Because we uphold the trial court’s decision on other grounds, the trial court's reliance on rule 37(f) is harmless error. "[A]n appellate court may affirm a judgment, order, or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record,’ even though that ground or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its ruling.” Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998) (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass’n, 23 Utah 2d 222 , 461 P.2d 290 , 293 n. 2 (1969)). . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Baggs v. Anderson
green
2 sentences1997As we stated in Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974), the reliance requirement “is not satisfied by the mere fact that he indulged in the pleasant and euphoric assumption that he would not have to meet his obligations and that he bought a more expensive car and moved to a more expensive apartment.” Id. at 144 . 1997As we stated in Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974), the reliance requirement “is not satisfied by the mere fact that he indulged in the pleasant and euphoric assumption that he would not have to meet his obligations and that he bought a more expensive car and moved to a more expensive apartment.” Id. at 144 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
S & F SUPPLY COMPANY v. Hunter
green
2 sentences1996They argue (i) that in S & F Supply Co. v. Hunter, 527 P.2d 217 (Utah 1974), this court interpreted the pre-1990 *564 version of section 61-1-22 as requiring purchaser reliance and the legislature manifested its intent to adopt S & F Supply 's interpretation when it amended section 61-1-22 in 1990 but left intact the portion of the statute upon which the S & F Supply court relied in inferring a reliance requirement; and alternatively (ii) that section 61-1-22's express private cause of action for violation of section 61-1-1(2) should be interpreted as including the same elements as the federal 1996They argue (i) that in S & F Supply Co. v. Hunter, 527 P.2d 217 (Utah 1974), this court interpreted the pre- 1990 version of section 61-1-22 as requiring purchaser reliance and the legislature manifested its intent to adopt S & F Supply’s interpretation when it amended section 61-1-22 in 1990 but left intact the portion of the statute upon which the S & F Supply court relied in inferring a reliance requirement; and alternatively (ii) that section 61-1-22’s express private cause of action for violation of section 61-1-1(2) should be interpreted as including the same elements as the federal impl | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Basic Inc. v. Levinson
green
2 sentences1996In Basic Inc., the United States Supreme Court noted, "Reliance provides the requisite causal connection between a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiff's injury." Id. 1996In Basic Inc., the United States Supreme Court noted, “Reliance provides the requisite causal connection between a defendant’s misrepresentation and a plaintifPs injury.” Id. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc.
green
1 sentence1995Second, we determine whether “second party” Calder “had a pecuniary interest in the transaction,” id. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.