reliance doctrine in Pennsylvania

2017Although I question the Majority’s reliance on the analysis contained in a two paragraph footnote in Jubelirer v. Pennsylvania Dept. of [J-29-2017] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 4 State, 859 A.2d 874 , 877 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), I conclude, as explained below, that other sections of the Constitution support the Majority’s holding that a Section 15 Adjournment is not limited to an adjournment sine die.

2017Although I question the Majority’s reliance on the analysis contained in a two paragraph footnote in Jubelirer v. Pennsylvania Dept. of State, 859 A.2d 874 , 877 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), I conclude, as explained below, that other sections of the Constitution support the Majority’s holding that a Section 15 Adjournment is not limited to an adjournment sine die.

2004With respect to the application of the “entrapment by estoppel” doctrine, or “reliance doctrine”, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently considered its application within the context of a criminal prosecution in Commonwealth v. Kratsas, 564 Pa. 36 , 764 A.2d 20 (2001). 15 Regard *67 ing the elements that must be shown to successfully invoke the reliance doctrine as a defense, the Supreme Court stated the following: First, in order to support invocation of the doctrine, most jurisdictions require that there be an affirmative representation that certain conduct is legal.

2004With respect to the application of the “entrapment by estoppel” doctrine, or “reliance doctrine”, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently considered its application within the context of a criminal prosecution in Commonwealth v. Kratsas, 564 Pa. 36 , 764 A.2d 20 (2001). 15 Regard *67 ing the elements that must be shown to successfully invoke the reliance doctrine as a defense, the Supreme Court stated the following: First, in order to support invocation of the doctrine, most jurisdictions require that there be an affirmative representation that certain conduct is legal.

2019Id.

2017It was not, so this is all speculation. 3 The reliance by defense on Commonwealth v. Caban, 60 A.3d 120 (Pa.Super. 2012) is specious, as the case sub judice does not involve a police encounter with persons in a vehicle, but rather an incident investigation into a reported disabled vehicle left in a neighborhood, which made a non-law enforcement community resident concerned enough about the circumstances of the vehicle's abandonment and the individual's exodus to call the police.

2014The Commonwealth states, “Common sense dictates the same as merely pressing a button requires no special intelligence, knowledge, memory, or dexterity.” Id. -4- J-A21028-14 The “standard of review applied in cases involving petitions for forfeiture and motions for the return of property is for an abuse of discretion.” Beaston v. Ebersole, 986 A.2d 876 (Pa. Super. 2009).

2009See also Commonwealth v. Snyder, 870 A.2d 336 (Pa.Super.2005) (citing Anderson for the proposition that “[a] central inquiry of a merger analysis is whether the crimes are greater and lesser included offenses”); Commonwealth v. Goins, 867 A.2d 526 (Pa.Super.2004) (noting this Court’s reliance on the standard set forth in Anderson); Commonwealth v. Allen, 856 A.2d 1251 (Pa.Super.2004) (after citing the principles of merger announced in Anderson and followed in Duffy , holding that when each crime has an additional element not included in the other, neither is a lesser-included offense and, thus

2009Initially, I agree with Justice Saylor’s concurring opinion that the Majority’s reliance on the analysis allowing for the enforcement of household exclusions in Prudential Insurance v. Colbert, 572 Pa. 82 , 813 A.2d 747 (2002), and Eichelman v. Nationwide Insurance, 551 Pa. 558 , 711 A.2d 1006 (1998), is misplaced because those cases considered whether a household exclusion violated general public policy and did not address the interaction between the household exclusion and the specific language of § 1738.

2009Initially, I agree with Justice Saylor’s concurring opinion that the Majority’s reliance on the analysis allowing for the enforcement of household exclusions in Prudential Insurance v. Colbert, 572 Pa. 82 , 813 A.2d 747 (2002), and Eichelman v. Nationwide Insurance, 551 Pa. 558 , 711 A.2d 1006 (1998), is misplaced because those cases considered whether a household exclusion violated general public policy and did not address the interaction between the household exclusion and the specific language of § 1738.

2009Initially, I agree with Justice Saylor’s concurring opinion that the Majority’s reliance on the analysis allowing for the enforcement of household exclusions in Prudential Insurance v. Colbert, 572 Pa. 82 , 813 A.2d 747 (2002), and Eichelman v. Nationwide Insurance, 551 Pa. 558 , 711 A.2d 1006 (1998), is misplaced because those cases considered whether a household exclusion violated general public policy and did not address the interaction between the household exclusion and the specific language of § 1738.

2009Initially, I agree with Justice Saylor’s concurring opinion that the Majority’s reliance on the analysis allowing for the enforcement of household exclusions in Prudential Insurance v. Colbert, 572 Pa. 82 , 813 A.2d 747 (2002), and Eichelman v. Nationwide Insurance, 551 Pa. 558 , 711 A.2d 1006 (1998), is misplaced because those cases considered whether a household exclusion violated general public policy and did not address the interaction between the household exclusion and the specific language of § 1738.

2009See also Commonwealth v. Snyder, 870 A.2d 336 (Pa.Super.2005) (citing Anderson for the proposition that “[a] central inquiry of a merger analysis is whether the crimes are greater and lesser included offenses”); Commonwealth v. Goins, 867 A.2d 526 (Pa.Super.2004) (noting this Court’s reliance on the standard set forth in Anderson); Commonwealth v. Allen, 856 A.2d 1251 (Pa.Super.2004) (after citing the principles of merger announced in Anderson and followed in Duffy , holding that when each crime has an additional element not included in the other, neither is a lesser-included offense and, thus

2002Id.

2001See, e.g., United *59 States v. Ramirez-Valencia, 202 F.3d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 892 , 121 S.Ct. 218 , 148 L.Ed.2d 154 (2000); West Indies Transport, 127 F.3d at 313 ; United States v. Aquino-Chacon, 109 F.3d 936, 939 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 931 , 118 S.Ct. 335 , 139 L.Ed.2d 260 (1997); United States v. Nichols, 21 F.3d 1016, 1018 (10th Cir.)(doctrine rejected because government agent had spoken ambiguously, rather than inaccurately), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1005 , 115 S.Ct. 523 , 130 L.Ed.2d 428 (1994); United States v. Corso, 20 F.3d 521, 528 (2nd Cir.1994);

2001See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Benchino, 399 Pa.Super. 521, 526 , 582 A.2d 1067, 1069 (1990)(discussing due process implications of government involvement in a crime), cited with approval in Commonwealth v. Mance, 539 Pa. 282, 290 , 652 A.2d 299, 303 (1995). *50 Similarly, the reliance doctrine emerged from the trilogy of United States Supreme Court decisions cited by the trial court: Raley, 360 U.S. at 423 , 79 S.Ct. at 1257 , Cox, 379 U.S. at 559 , 85 S.Ct. at 476 , and PICCO, 411 U.S. at 655 , 93 S.Ct. at 1804 .

2001See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Benchino, 399 Pa.Super. 521, 526 , 582 A.2d 1067, 1069 (1990)(discussing due process implications of government involvement in a crime), cited with approval in Commonwealth v. Mance, 539 Pa. 282, 290 , 652 A.2d 299, 303 (1995). *50 Similarly, the reliance doctrine emerged from the trilogy of United States Supreme Court decisions cited by the trial court: Raley, 360 U.S. at 423 , 79 S.Ct. at 1257 , Cox, 379 U.S. at 559 , 85 S.Ct. at 476 , and PICCO, 411 U.S. at 655 , 93 S.Ct. at 1804 .

2001See, e.g., United States v. Spires, 79 F.3d 464, 466 (5th Cir.1996); United States v. Bruscantini, 761 F.2d 640, 642 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 904 , 106 S.Ct. 271 , 88 L.Ed.2d 233 (1985).

2001See, e.g., United *59 States v. Ramirez-Valencia, 202 F.3d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 892 , 121 S.Ct. 218 , 148 L.Ed.2d 154 (2000); West Indies Transport, 127 F.3d at 313 ; United States v. Aquino-Chacon, 109 F.3d 936, 939 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 931 , 118 S.Ct. 335 , 139 L.Ed.2d 260 (1997); United States v. Nichols, 21 F.3d 1016, 1018 (10th Cir.)(doctrine rejected because government agent had spoken ambiguously, rather than inaccurately), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1005 , 115 S.Ct. 523 , 130 L.Ed.2d 428 (1994); United States v. Corso, 20 F.3d 521, 528 (2nd Cir.1994);

2001Mariani v. United States, 513 U.S. 1128 , 115 S.Ct. 939 , 130 L.Ed.2d 884 (1995); United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 956 (D.C.Cir.1976) (Merhige, J., concurring)("[t]he reasonableness of reliance may dissipate if one depends on nonenforceable advisory opinions of minor officials”); Conley, 859 F.Supp. at 936 ("[r]eliance upon the ambiguous conduct of local officials in enforcing an otherwise clear statute of state-wide application is not reasonable”); id. at 935 (“corruption of government officials— federal, state or local — certainly does not raise Due Process concerns about prosecuting a