30 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hillgreen2 sentences1998See State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 195 , 204 . 1996Mundy, supra, 99 Ohio App.3d at 304 , 650 N.E.2d at 520 ; see, also, State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 195 , 661 N.E.2d 1068 ; State v. McCray (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 109, 120-121 , 658 N.E.2d 1076, 1082-1083 ; State v. Halley (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 71 , 637 N.E.2d 937 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Garibaldogreen1 sentence2026Notably, even if the 5:00 a.m. and 12:30 p.m. readings were the result of something other than consumption, that does not explain the 10. readings from earlier that night, and from March 1 and April 13, 2025, all of which were consistent with alcohol consumption. {¶ 32} Finally, as to the credibility of the defense witnesses’ testimony, the trial court’s determination is afforded special deference as it “has the benefit of seeing the witnesses testify, observing their facial expressions and body language, hearing their voice inflections, and discerning qualities such as hesitancy, equivocation | 1 | 1 |
State v. Crawford, 07 Ca 116 (12-2-2008)green1 sentence2025State v. Scheeler, 2023- Ohio-1130, ¶ 81 (5th Dist.); accord Crawford, 2008-Ohio-6260 at ¶ 64 (5th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Baldwingreen1 sentence2024State v. Baldwin, 2020-Ohio-699, ¶ 39 (6th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Westgreen1 sentence2022Compare Appellee's Brief at 18-25 (prosecutor's Calhoun analysis); compare also, e.g., West, 2017-Ohio-5596, at ¶ 29-40 (First District rejects ineffective assistance of counsel argument for post-sentence plea withdrawal but then analyzes actual innocence affidavit evidence pursuant to Calhoun; Alford-plea case in which movant throughout had made "constant and consistent protestations of innocence," judge who took plea was not judge who denied withdrawal motion, etc.); State v. Mynatt, 1st Dist. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Elmoregreen2 sentences2020See State v. Elmore, 111 Ohio St.3d 515 , 2006-Ohio-6207 , 857 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 60 . 2020See State v. Elmore, 111 Ohio St.3d 515 , 2006-Ohio-6207 , 857 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 60 . | 1 | 1 |
Nolan v. Nolangreen1 sentence2019Id. at ¶ 35- 36. {¶ 24} It is axiomatic that a trial court may not contradict or ignore a mandate of a reviewing court: Although the law-of-the-case doctrine generally is "a rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law," [Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3 (1984)], we have also explained that "the Ohio Constitution 'does not grant to a court of common pleas jurisdiction to review a prior mandate of a court of appeals.'" State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Abdullah, Unpublished Decision (10-17-2006)green1 sentence2013No. 05AP-1316, 2006-Ohio-5412, ¶ 36 (where the challenged cross-examination attempted to cast doubt upon the witness’s credibility but defense counsel’s strategy failed when he encountered damaging answers, the appellate court held that “an unsuccessful strategy does not render counsel’s assistance constitutionally ineffective”); State v. Broadnax, 2nd Dist. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lopezgreen2 sentences2011State v. Smith (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 180, 191 , 517 N.E.2d 933 ; see also State v. Nichols (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 65, 71 , 619 N.E.2d 80 , and State v. Lopez (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 566, 578-579 , 630 N.E.2d 32 . {¶ 60} The state contends that a general challenge to the victim’s credibility by defense counsel permits the prosecutor to introduce her prior consistent statements, citing State v. Britta, 11th Dist. 2011State v. Smith (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 180, 191 , 517 N.E.2d 933 ; see also State v. Nichols (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 65, 71 , 619 N.E.2d 80 , and State v. Lopez (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 566, 578-579 , 630 N.E.2d 32 . {¶ 60} The state contends that a general challenge to the victim’s credibility by defense counsel permits the prosecutor to introduce her prior consistent statements, citing State v. Britta, 11th Dist. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nicholsgreen2 sentences2011State v. Smith (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 180, 191 , 517 N.E.2d 933 ; see also State v. Nichols (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 65, 71 , 619 N.E.2d 80 , and State v. Lopez (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 566, 578-579 , 630 N.E.2d 32 . {¶ 60} The state contends that a general challenge to the victim’s credibility by defense counsel permits the prosecutor to introduce her prior consistent statements, citing State v. Britta, 11th Dist. 2011State v. Smith (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 180, 191 , 517 N.E.2d 933 ; see also State v. Nichols (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 65, 71 , 619 N.E.2d 80 , and State v. Lopez (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 566, 578-579 , 630 N.E.2d 32 . {¶ 60} The state contends that a general challenge to the victim’s credibility by defense counsel permits the prosecutor to introduce her prior consistent statements, citing State v. Britta, 11th Dist. | 1 | 1 |
Kendzierski v. Goodsongreen2 sentences2009See Bhatia v. Debek (2008), 287 Conn. 397, 412 , 948 A.2d 1009 , quoting Kendzierski v. Goodson (1990), 21 Conn.App. 424, 429-430 , 574 A.2d 249 (“In common usage, the term good faith has a well defined and generally understood meaning, being ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and, generally speaking, means being faithful to one’s duty or obligation. * * * Whether good faith exists is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances”); Tonka Tours, Inc. v. Chadima (Minn.1985), 372 N.W.2d 723, 728 (determi 2009See Bhatia v. Debek (2008), 287 Conn. 397, 412 , 948 A.2d 1009 , quoting Kendzierski v. Goodson (1990), 21 Conn.App. 424, 429-430 , 574 A.2d 249 (“In common usage, the term good faith has a well defined and generally understood meaning, being ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and, generally speaking, means being faithful to one’s duty or obligation. * * * Whether good faith exists is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances”); Tonka Tours, Inc. v. Chadima (Minn.1985), 372 N.W.2d 723, 728 (determi | 1 | 1 |
Bhatia v. Debekgreen2 sentences2009See Bhatia v. Debek (2008), 287 Conn. 397, 412 , 948 A.2d 1009 , quoting Kendzierski v. Goodson (1990), 21 Conn.App. 424, 429-430 , 574 A.2d 249 (“In common usage, the term good faith has a well defined and generally understood meaning, being ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and, generally speaking, means being faithful to one’s duty or obligation. * * * Whether good faith exists is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances”); Tonka Tours, Inc. v. Chadima (Minn.1985), 372 N.W.2d 723, 728 (determi 2009See Bhatia v. Debek (2008), 287 Conn. 397, 412 , 948 A.2d 1009 , quoting Kendzierski v. Goodson (1990), 21 Conn.App. 424, 429-430 , 574 A.2d 249 (“In common usage, the term good faith has a well defined and generally understood meaning, being ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and, generally speaking, means being faithful to one’s duty or obligation. * * * Whether good faith exists is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances”); Tonka Tours, Inc. v. Chadima (Minn.1985), 372 N.W.2d 723, 728 (determi | 1 | 1 |
Tonka Tours, Inc. v. Chadimagreen1 sentence2009See Bhatia v. Debek (2008), 287 Conn. 397, 412 , 948 A.2d 1009 , quoting Kendzierski v. Goodson (1990), 21 Conn.App. 424, 429-430 , 574 A.2d 249 (“In common usage, the term good faith has a well defined and generally understood meaning, being ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and, generally speaking, means being faithful to one’s duty or obligation. * * * Whether good faith exists is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances”); Tonka Tours, Inc. v. Chadima (Minn.1985), 372 N.W.2d 723, 728 (determi | 1 | 1 |
Smalygo v. Greengreen1 sentence2009See Bhatia v. Debek (2008), 287 Conn. 397, 412 , 948 A.2d 1009 , quoting Kendzierski v. Goodson (1990), 21 Conn.App. 424, 429-430 , 574 A.2d 249 (“In common usage, the term good faith has a well defined and generally understood meaning, being ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and, generally speaking, means being faithful to one’s duty or obligation. * * * Whether good faith exists is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances”); Tonka Tours, Inc. v. Chadima (Minn.1985), 372 N.W.2d 723, 728 (determi | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Northfield Homes, Inc. v. Village of Northfield
green
2 sentences2001On appeal, the father argued that the expert's testimony had "served to bolster the children's credibility in violation of the Boston holding." Id. at 262 , 690 N.E.2d at 883 -884 . 2001On appeal, the father argued that the expert's testimony had "served to bolster the children's credibility in violation of the Boston holding." Id. at 262 , 690 N.E.2d at 883 -884 . | 3 | 2000–2012 |
State v. Calhoun
green
2 sentences2022No. 2003-T-0110, 2004-Ohio-6949, ¶ 46 , that " 'a change in potential testimony of a state's witness is insufficient to withdraw a plea postsentence,' " id. at ¶ 21). {¶ 17} At least here, where the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of the plea is not now in significant dispute but a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is based on an assertion of actual innocence predicated on the complaining witness's affidavit, and the trial court discounted the credibility of that affidavit in denying the withdrawal motion without a hearing, we will take the lead of other appellate distr 2019Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d at 325 . {¶ 36} For the foregoing reasons, we hold the trial court erred when it denied appellant's petition without giving any consideration to Mullins' affidavit and without conducting the credibility analysis necessary to determine whether appellant is entitled to a hearing on his petition. | 2 | 2019–2022 |
State v. Mundy
green
2 sentences2008"It is well-established that `the prosecutor is permitted to make a fair comment on the credibility of witnesses based upon their testimony in open court." Brown , Warren App. No. CA2002-03-026, 2002-Ohio-5455 at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Mundy , 99 Ohio App.3d 275 , 304 . 1996Mundy, supra, 99 Ohio App.3d at 304 , 650 N.E.2d at 520 ; see, also, State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 195 , 661 N.E.2d 1068 ; State v. McCray (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 109, 120-121 , 658 N.E.2d 1076, 1082-1083 ; State v. Halley (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 71 , 637 N.E.2d 937 . | 2 | 1996–2008 |
March v. Statman
green
1 sentence2023Hamilton No. C-150337, 2016-Ohio-2846, ¶ 22 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Hudach, Unpublished Decision (12-17-2004)
neutral
1 sentence2022No. 2003-T-0110, 2004-Ohio-6949, ¶ 46 , that " 'a change in potential testimony of a state's witness is insufficient to withdraw a plea postsentence,' " id. at ¶ 21). {¶ 17} At least here, where the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of the plea is not now in significant dispute but a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is based on an assertion of actual innocence predicated on the complaining witness's affidavit, and the trial court discounted the credibility of that affidavit in denying the withdrawal motion without a hearing, we will take the lead of other appellate distr | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Hubbard Family Trust v. TNT Land Holdings, L.L.C.
green
1 sentence2020Pike No. 12CA833, 2014-Ohio-772, ¶ 20 . {¶23} The requirement of justifiable reliance tests the credibility of the claim that fraud induced a party to act and it is generally a question of fact. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Luck
green
2 sentences2018Hawkins further contends that the facts of this case directly compare to those in Luck, 15 Ohio St. 3d 150 , 472 N.E.2d 1097 , where the Supreme Court of Ohio held that pre-indictment delay had prejudiced the defendant. 2018Hawkins further contends that the facts of this case directly compare to those in Luck, 15 Ohio St. 3d 150 , 472 N.E.2d 1097 , where the Supreme Court of Ohio held that pre-indictment delay had prejudiced the defendant. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2014(Oct. 30, 2012), p. 171, ln. 6-9. {¶ 55} The law is clear that “[i]t is improper for an attorney to express his personal belief or opinion as to the credibility of a witness or as to the guilt of the accused.” (Citation omitted.) Smith, 14 Ohio St. 3d at 14 , 470 N.E.2d 883 . {¶ 56} While we find that the prosecutor’s comment improperly expressed his personal opinion on the credibility of the defense witnesses, we do not find that the comment amounts to plain error. 2014(Oct. 30, 2012), p. 171, ln. 6-9. {¶ 55} The law is clear that “[i]t is improper for an attorney to express his personal belief or opinion as to the credibility of a witness or as to the guilt of the accused.” (Citation omitted.) Smith, 14 Ohio St. 3d at 14 , 470 N.E.2d 883 . {¶ 56} While we find that the prosecutor’s comment improperly expressed his personal opinion on the credibility of the defense witnesses, we do not find that the comment amounts to plain error. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Whitfield, 22432 (1-23-2009)
green
1 sentence2014Montgomery No. 22432, 2009-Ohio-293, ¶ 12 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. LaMar
green
1 sentence2011Further, it is improper for the prosecutor to deliberately denigrate defense counsel, State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2002-Ohio-2128 , 767 N.E.2d 166, at ¶167 , or for the prosecutor to express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the credibility of defense witnesses, State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 53 , 2005-Ohio-5981 , 836 N.E.2d 1173 . {¶41} Here, McKinney contends the prosecutor improperly commented on the defense's failure to present evidence that Marcus had a felony record. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. LaMar
green
2 sentences2011Further, it is improper for the prosecutor to deliberately denigrate defense counsel, State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2002-Ohio-2128 , 767 N.E.2d 166, at ¶167 , or for the prosecutor to express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the credibility of defense witnesses, State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 53 , 2005-Ohio-5981 , 836 N.E.2d 1173 . {¶41} Here, McKinney contends the prosecutor improperly commented on the defense's failure to present evidence that Marcus had a felony record. 2011Further, it is improper for the prosecutor to deliberately denigrate defense counsel, State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2002-Ohio-2128 , 767 N.E.2d 166, at ¶167 , or for the prosecutor to express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the credibility of defense witnesses, State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 53 , 2005-Ohio-5981 , 836 N.E.2d 1173 . {¶41} Here, McKinney contends the prosecutor improperly commented on the defense's failure to present evidence that Marcus had a felony record. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2011Further, it is improper for the prosecutor to deliberately denigrate defense counsel, State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2002-Ohio-2128 , 767 N.E.2d 166, at ¶167 , or for the prosecutor to express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the credibility of defense witnesses, State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 53 , 2005-Ohio-5981 , 836 N.E.2d 1173 . {¶41} Here, McKinney contends the prosecutor improperly commented on the defense's failure to present evidence that Marcus had a felony record. 2011Further, it is improper for the prosecutor to deliberately denigrate defense counsel, State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2002-Ohio-2128 , 767 N.E.2d 166, at ¶167 , or for the prosecutor to express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the credibility of defense witnesses, State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 53 , 2005-Ohio-5981 , 836 N.E.2d 1173 . {¶41} Here, McKinney contends the prosecutor improperly commented on the defense's failure to present evidence that Marcus had a felony record. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2011State v. Smith (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 180, 191 , 517 N.E.2d 933 ; see also State v. Nichols (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 65, 71 , 619 N.E.2d 80 , and State v. Lopez (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 566, 578-579 , 630 N.E.2d 32 . {¶ 60} The state contends that a general challenge to the victim’s credibility by defense counsel permits the prosecutor to introduce her prior consistent statements, citing State v. Britta, 11th Dist. 2011State v. Smith (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 180, 191 , 517 N.E.2d 933 ; see also State v. Nichols (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 65, 71 , 619 N.E.2d 80 , and State v. Lopez (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 566, 578-579 , 630 N.E.2d 32 . {¶ 60} The state contends that a general challenge to the victim’s credibility by defense counsel permits the prosecutor to introduce her prior consistent statements, citing State v. Britta, 11th Dist. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Price
green
1 sentence2008Rather, the court charged the jury to consider discrepancies and weigh their significance when determining credibility." Id. at 208 . {¶ 130} Accordingly, as there was no error in the jury instruction, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to its inclusion. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Justice, Unpublished Decision (11-9-2006)
neutral
1 sentence2007He merely commented freely *Page 12 on "what the evidence has shown and what reasonable inferences may be drawn therefrom." Justice , supra. Accordingly, we do not find that the assistant county prosecutor vouched for the credibility of any witness. {¶ 31} Ferko also claims the assistant county prosecutor "improperly commented on the credibility of defense witness John Ferko and wrongly suggested that defense witnesses had fabricated their testimony." Ferko cites to the following comments in support of his argument: "John Ferko clearly, in the chain of events, clearly leads one to believe-irre | 1 | 2007–2007 |
United States v. Darryl Gordon Hickman and Fred McArthur Head
green
1 sentence2006Id. at 934-936 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. King, Unpublished Decision (1-23-2004) green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Underwood green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Long green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Strickland v. Washington green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| United States v. Edsel Griffin green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Boston green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Halley green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. McCray green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.