credibility defense in District of Columbia

2022At the outset of the July 11, 2018, hearing, the parties agreed that Therapist Lewis should be considered the treating physician. 10 Petitioner cites Johnson v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 167 A.3d 1237 (D.C. 2017), to support the proposition that Dr. Major-Lewis’s report is insufficient in part because “a DME must identify their criteria for PTSD so that a tribunal can determine if the injured worker meets it in order to weigh the credibility of the defense medical evaluation.” The facts in Johnson required the ALJ to distinguish between conflicting definitions of adjustment d

2022At the outset of the July 11, 2018, hearing, the parties agreed that Therapist Lewis should be considered the treating physician. 10 Petitioner cites Johnson v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 167 A.3d 1237 (D.C. 2017), to support the proposition that Dr. Major-Lewis’s report is insufficient in part because “a DME must identify their criteria for PTSD so that a tribunal can determine if the injured worker meets it in order to weigh the credibility of the defense medical evaluation.” The facts in Johnson required the ALJ to distinguish between conflicting definitions of adjustment d

2026First, turning to Ms. Chandler’s framing of the error as one of constitutional dimension, we will find a Sixth Amendment violation “if ‘a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of the witness’s credibility had defense counsel been permitted to pursue the proposed line of cross-examination.’” In re J.W., 258 A.3d 195 , 202 (D.C. 2021) (citation modified) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 672, 680 (1986)). 27 When the trial court denied her requests for a competency voir dire and subpoena, it simultaneously made clear that Ms. Chandler was free to cross

2019Appellant emphatically answers “No,” arguing that the October 6 burglary was “propensity evidence” introduced specifically to persuade the jury to infer his guilt of the October 13 burglary and rape a week later.16 In response, the government justifies appellant’s impeachment with the October 6 burglary for a 15 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (indicating that the trial court rejected Drew’s “identity” and “intent” exceptions). 16 See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997) (quoting Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) (admission of prior crimes in eviden

2019Appellant emphatically answers “No,” arguing that the October 6 burglary was “propensity evidence” introduced specifically to persuade the jury to infer his guilt of the October 13 burglary and rape a week later.16 In response, the government justifies appellant’s impeachment with the October 6 burglary for a 15 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (indicating that the trial court rejected Drew’s “identity” and “intent” exceptions). 16 See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997) (quoting Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) (admission of prior crimes in eviden

2002Such jury education by an expert during the prosecution’s case-in-chief is warranted by the fact that the child sexual abuse victim will display “behavior traits that may, by their very nature, create confusion in the minds of the jury.” Id. *46 Thus, the prosecution may present such evidence if “relevant and helpful to generally explain the common postincident behavior of children who are victims of sexual abuse.” Id.

2002The Supreme Court of Michigan concluded that such expert testimony is admissible during the government’s case-in-chief to generally educate the jury about the common behavior of child sexual abuse victims, absent a formal attack on the victim’s credibility by defense counsel, in order to “explain[] a victim’s specific behavior that might be incorrectly construed by the jury as inconsistent with that of an abuse victim.” Peterson, 537 N.W.2d at 868 .

1993Ford v. United States, 549 A.2d 1124, 1126 (D.C.1988) (citing Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at 678-79 , 106 S.Ct. at 1435 ).

1993Ford v. United States, 549 A.2d 1124, 1126 (D.C.1988) (citing Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at 678-79 , 106 S.Ct. at 1435 ).

1990See also Bartlett v. United States, 574 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir.1978) (holding that, absent Rule 9, thirty-five-year delay due solely to lack of education and knowledge of the law was not basis for dismissing § 2255 motion without an evi-dentiary hearing); Powers v. United States, 446 F.2d 22 (5th Cir.1971) (holding that where petitioner’s allegations, if proved, would entitle him to relief, he should be granted an evidentiary hearing, *150 notwithstanding nearly twenty-year delay in filing § 2255 motion). 18 Nor do we deem it appropriate to adopt judicially for § 23-110 the limiting standard enact

1990Id. (emphasis added), citing Reed v. United States, 485 A.2d 613, 620 (D.C.1984).

1977We begin our analysis mindful of the admonition that in reviewing the judge’s comments to the jury we should evaluate “the charge as a whole, in its totality, without isolating statements which may appear prejudicial from the context in which they were made.” United States v. Williams, 473 F.2d 507, 509 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Jacquillon, 469 F.2d 380, 386-87 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 938 , 93 S.Ct. 1400 , 35 L.Ed.2d 604 (1973); United States v. Wilkinson, 460 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1972).

1977We begin our analysis mindful of the admonition that in reviewing the judge’s comments to the jury we should evaluate “the charge as a whole, in its totality, without isolating statements which may appear prejudicial from the context in which they were made.” United States v. Williams, 473 F.2d 507, 509 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Jacquillon, 469 F.2d 380, 386-87 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 938 , 93 S.Ct. 1400 , 35 L.Ed.2d 604 (1973); United States v. Wilkinson, 460 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1972).

1977We begin our analysis mindful of the admonition that in reviewing the judge’s comments to the jury we should evaluate “the charge as a whole, in its totality, without isolating statements which may appear prejudicial from the context in which they were made.” United States v. Williams, 473 F.2d 507, 509 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Jacquillon, 469 F.2d 380, 386-87 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 938 , 93 S.Ct. 1400 , 35 L.Ed.2d 604 (1973); United States v. Wilkinson, 460 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1972).