66 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2025 14 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Morrisongreen2 sentences2011In closing argument, the prosecution may base its argument on the evidence presented or reasonable inferences therefrom [citation]; respond to those comments by defense counsel which clearly invite or provoke a response [citation]; comment on the credibility of the defense witnesses [citation]; denounce the activities of defendants and urge that justice be administered [citation]; highlight inconsistencies in defendant’s argument [citation]; and comment on defendant’s absence at trial [citation].” People v. Morrison, 137 Ill. 2011In closing argument, the prosecution may base its argument on the evidence presented or reasonable inferences therefrom [citation]; respond to those comments by defense counsel which clearly invite or provoke a response [citation]; comment on the credibility of the defense witnesses [citation]; denounce the activities of defendants and urge that justice be administered [citation]; highlight inconsistencies in defendant’s argument [citation]; and comment on defendant’s absence at trial [citation].” People v. Morrison, 137 Ill. | 4 | 6 |
Crane v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2020Moreover, even with a voluntary confession, “a defendant may still present evidence to the jury that affects its credibility or weight or that challenges its reliability or truth. [Citations.] The jury’s credibility inquiry will often turn on largely the same evidence as the judge’s voluntariness inquiry, but the two are nonetheless ‘separate inquires,’ and the latter, a factual matter, is ‘exclusively for the jury to assess.’ Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 688 (1986).” People v. James, 2017 IL App (1st) 143391, ¶ 129 . ¶ 105 To get around the fact defendant was not raising a defense to the 2020Moreover, even with a voluntary confession, - 49 - 1-17-0500 “a defendant may still present evidence to the jury that affects its credibility or weight, or that challenges its reliability or truth. [Citations.] The jury’s credibility inquiry will often turn on largely the same evidence as the judge’s voluntariness inquiry, but the two are nonetheless ‘separate inquires’; and the latter, a factual matter, is ‘exclusively for the jury to assess.’ Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 688 (1986).” People v. James, 2017 IL App (1st) 143391, ¶¶ 129-130 . ¶ 105 To get around the fact defendant was not ra | 4 | 5 |
People v. Hudsongreen2 sentences2019See Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d at 444 . ¶ 58 In challenging the credibility of the defense theory of the case, prosecutors must avoid accusing defense counsel of “any particular wrongdoing” or challenging “the motives or ethics of defense counsel.” Id. at 443 . 2019See Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d at 444 . ¶ 58 In challenging the credibility of the defense theory of the case, prosecutors must avoid accusing defense counsel of “any particular wrongdoing” or challenging “the motives or ethics of defense counsel.” Id. at 443 . | 4 | 4 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2023App. 3d at 755; see People v. Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 122745, ¶ 12 (prosecutors are allowed to comment on the evidence presented and the credibility of the defense’s theory of the case). 2023See People v. Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 122745, ¶ 12 (“[The State is] allowed to comment on the evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence, including a defendant’s credibility or the credibility of the defense’s theory of the case.”). | 3 | 7 |
People v. Popegreen2 sentences2022People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 154 (1998); People v. Pope, 284 Ill. 2000“However, a prosecutor may com ment on a witness’ credibility [citation] and challenge a defendant’s credibility and defense theory when such remarks are based on facts in evidence or reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. [Citation.]” People v. Pope, 284 Ill. | 3 | 4 |
People v. Richardsongreen2 sentences2025However, a prosecutor may comment on a witness’s credibility (People v. Richardson, 123 Ill. 2d 322, 356 (1988)), and challenge a defendant’s credibility and defense theory when such remarks are based on facts in evidence or reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. 2014Prosecutors are also free to challenge the credibility of witnesses (People v. Richardson, 123 Ill. 2d 322, 356 (1988)) and the credibility of the defense's theory of the case (Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 207 ), as long as there is evidence to support that challenge. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Kirchnergreen2 sentences2023People v. Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d 502, 549 (2000). 2019See Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d at 549 ; Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d at 443 . ¶ 59 Here, when Mudge initially told jurors that the defense threw “a bunch of crap up on the wall” for them to consider, she followed the comment with a discussion focusing on the 18 inconsistent explanations offered by the defense for Jasean’s injuries, including the statements the defendant himself gave to police. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Glaspergreen2 sentences2015Prosecutors are also free to challenge the credibility of witnesses (People v. Richardson, 123 -7- Ill. 2d 322, 356 (1988)) and the credibility of the defense’s theory of the case (Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 207 ), as long as there is evidence to support that challenge. 2014Prosecutors are also free to challenge the credibility of witnesses (People v. Richardson, 123 Ill. 2d 322, 356 (1988)) and the credibility of the defense's theory of the case (Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 207 ), as long as there is evidence to support that challenge. | 2 | 5 |
People v. Wheelergreen2 sentences2023Mr. Walker also argues that the prosecutor’s comment bolstering Mr. Thompson’s credibility because he “lives in the suburbs” added to this tactic. ¶ 95 Closing arguments “must serve a purpose beyond inflaming the emotions of the jury.” Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 128 . 2015“Misconduct in closing argument is substantial and warrants reversal and a new trial if the improper remarks constituted a material factor in a defendant’s conviction.” People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 123 (2007). ¶ 38 Defendant first contends that the State improperly argued that Starks was aware that the package contained cannabis, pointing to the following passage from the State’s closing: “Let’s talk about Latifah Starks. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Naylorgreen2 sentences2023See id. ¶ 63 (“ ‘Given these opposing versions of events, and the fact that no extrinsic evidence was presented to corroborate or contradict either version, the trial court’s finding of guilty necessarily involved the court’s assessment of the credibility of the two officers against that of defendant.’ ” (quoting People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 607 (2008))). ¶ 26 While we find that the court committed a reversible Rule 431(b) error, we must still determine, for double jeopardy purposes, whether the evidence was sufficient to convict. 2023See People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 608 (2008) (finding where the trial court relied on improper evidence in assessing the credibility of a defense witness and the case turned on two different versions of events, the evidence was closely balanced). ¶ 69 The majority admits that the evidence of Sims’s guilt was not overwhelming, but it was not so closely balanced that the trial judge’s error threatened to tip the scales of justice against him. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2006App. 3d at 178 , citing People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (2002)) and concluded that the trial court, “weighting] the credibility of defense counsel’s explanation” for defendant’s peremptory challenge, “could rationally find a motive to discriminate against African-Americans, women, or both groups simultaneously.” 348 Ill. 2006App. 3d at 178 , citing People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (2002)) and concluded that the trial court, Aweigh[ing] the credibility of defense counsel=s explanation@ for defendant=s peremptory challenge, Acould rationally find a motive to discriminate against African- Americans, women, or both groups simultaneously.@ 348 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Tollivergreen2 sentences2005People v. Tolliver, 347 Ill. 2005People v. Tolliver , 347 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Riveragreen2 sentences2006App. 3d at 178 , citing People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (2002)) and concluded that the trial court, “weighting] the credibility of defense counsel’s explanation” for defendant’s peremptory challenge, “could rationally find a motive to discriminate against African-Americans, women, or both groups simultaneously.” 348 Ill. 2006App. 3d at 178 , citing People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (2002)) and concluded that the trial court, Aweigh[ing] the credibility of defense counsel=s explanation@ for defendant=s peremptory challenge, Acould rationally find a motive to discriminate against African- Americans, women, or both groups simultaneously.@ 348 Ill. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Harrisgreen1 sentence2025Harris, 2025 IL 130351, ¶¶ 40, 44 ; Caldwell, 2023 IL App (1st) 221586, ¶ 17 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Klinergreen1 sentence2022People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 154 (1998); People v. Pope, 284 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Keenegreen2 sentences2022Setting aside the fact defendant provided no authority supporting his position in his initial brief, the authority he cites in his reply brief comes from appellate court cases which predate a supreme court case cited by the State, People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 18 , 660 N.E.2d 901, 910 (1995), which specifically found a prior consistent statement used improperly to bolster a witness’s credibility does not implicate a substantial right for purposes of review under the second prong of the plain-error doctrine. 2022Setting aside the fact defendant provided no authority supporting his position in his initial brief, the authority he cites in his reply brief comes from appellate court cases which predate a supreme court case cited by the State, People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 18 , 660 N.E.2d 901, 910 (1995), which specifically found a prior consistent statement used improperly to bolster a witness’s credibility does not implicate a substantial right for purposes of review under the second prong of the plain-error doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Halegreen2 sentences2022See People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 17 , 996 N.E.2d 607 (acknowledging a court “may dispose of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim by proceeding directly to the prejudice prong without addressing counsel’s performance”). ¶ 40 We initially reject defendant’s suggestion that the alleged improper elicitation and use of prior consistent statements to bolster a witness’s credibility is an error so serious that it affects the fairness of a defendant’s trial and challenges the integrity of the judicial process. 2022See People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 17 , 996 N.E.2d 607 (acknowledging a court “may dispose of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim by proceeding directly to the prejudice prong without addressing counsel’s performance”). ¶ 40 We initially reject defendant’s suggestion that the alleged improper elicitation and use of prior consistent statements to bolster a witness’s credibility is an error so serious that it affects the fairness of a defendant’s trial and challenges the integrity of the judicial process. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Westgreen1 sentence2021People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 432-33 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ligongreen2 sentences2009While a prosecutor may not claim that defense counsel has deliberately lied to the jury or fabricated a defense, a prosecutor may challenge a defendant’s credibility and the credibility of his defense theory (People v. Ligon, 365 Ill. 2009While a prosecutor may not claim that defense counsel has deliberately lied to the jury or fabricated a defense, a prosecutor may challenge a defendant's credibility and the credibility of his defense theory ( People v. Ligon, 365 Ill.App.3d 109, 124 , 301 Ill.Dec. 753 , 847 N.E.2d 763 (2006)), as well as the persuasiveness of the defense ( People v. Love, 377 Ill.App.3d 306, 314 , 316 Ill.Dec. 67 , 878 N.E.2d 789 (2007)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lovegreen2 sentences2009While a prosecutor may not claim that defense counsel has deliberately lied to the jury or fabricated a defense, a prosecutor may challenge a defendant's credibility and the credibility of his defense theory ( People v. Ligon, 365 Ill.App.3d 109, 124 , 301 Ill.Dec. 753 , 847 N.E.2d 763 (2006)), as well as the persuasiveness of the defense ( People v. Love, 377 Ill.App.3d 306, 314 , 316 Ill.Dec. 67 , 878 N.E.2d 789 (2007)). 2009While a prosecutor may not claim that defense counsel has deliberately lied to the jury or fabricated a defense, a prosecutor may challenge a defendant's credibility and the credibility of his defense theory ( People v. Ligon, 365 Ill.App.3d 109, 124 , 301 Ill.Dec. 753 , 847 N.E.2d 763 (2006)), as well as the persuasiveness of the defense ( People v. Love, 377 Ill.App.3d 306, 314 , 316 Ill.Dec. 67 , 878 N.E.2d 789 (2007)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Jones
green
2 sentences2016Id. 2016Id. | 3 | 2015–2016 |
People v. James
green
2 sentences2020Moreover, even with a voluntary confession, “a defendant may still present evidence to the jury that affects its credibility or weight or that challenges its reliability or truth. [Citations.] The jury’s credibility inquiry will often turn on largely the same evidence as the judge’s voluntariness inquiry, but the two are nonetheless ‘separate inquires,’ and the latter, a factual matter, is ‘exclusively for the jury to assess.’ Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 688 (1986).” People v. James, 2017 IL App (1st) 143391, ¶ 129 . ¶ 105 To get around the fact defendant was not raising a defense to the 2020Moreover, even with a voluntary confession, - 49 - 1-17-0500 “a defendant may still present evidence to the jury that affects its credibility or weight, or that challenges its reliability or truth. [Citations.] The jury’s credibility inquiry will often turn on largely the same evidence as the judge’s voluntariness inquiry, but the two are nonetheless ‘separate inquires’; and the latter, a factual matter, is ‘exclusively for the jury to assess.’ Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 688 (1986).” People v. James, 2017 IL App (1st) 143391, ¶¶ 129-130 . ¶ 105 To get around the fact defendant was not ra | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Swain v. Alabama
red
2 sentences2003Instead, the trial court followed the then-precedent of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 , 13 L. 2003Instead, the trial court followed the then-precedent of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 , 13 L. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Caldwell
green
1 sentence2025Harris, 2025 IL 130351, ¶¶ 40, 44 ; Caldwell, 2023 IL App (1st) 221586, ¶ 17 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. McDonald
green
1 sentence2024People v. McDonald, 2016 IL 118882 , ¶ 25. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Effinger
green
1 sentence2022Therefore, it was improper for the prosecutor to attribute this evidence as a defense raised by defendant when all such evidence was introduced by the State and refuted by defendant. 12 ¶ 34 Third, defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of a defense witness, Ganno. “[A] prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of a government witness or use the credibility of the State’s Attorney’s office to bolster a witness’s testimony.” People v. Effinger, 2016 IL App (3d) 140203, ¶ 24 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Herring
green
1 sentence2019We disagree and find no error. ¶ 55 "The State may challenge the credibility of the defense's theory if evidence supports that challenge, but should not suggest that defense counsel lied or suborned perjury." People v. Herring, 2018 IL App (1st) 152067, ¶ 89 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Beals
green
1 sentence1994Beals is distinguishable since, here, defense counsel’s conduct did not "destroy[ ] the credibility of the defense.” (Beals, 248 Ill. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Emerson
green
2 sentences1994Generally, a prosecutor may not personally vouch for a witness’ credibility or for the merit of the State’s case (People v. Emerson (1987), 122 Ill. 2d 411, 434 , 522 N.E.2d 1109 ), nor may she use the integrity of her office to attack the credibility of a defense witness. 1994Generally, a prosecutor may not personally vouch for a witness’ credibility or for the merit of the State’s case (People v. Emerson (1987), 122 Ill. 2d 411, 434 , 522 N.E.2d 1109 ), nor may she use the integrity of her office to attack the credibility of a defense witness. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Wilson
green
2 sentences1994(See People v. Wilson (1990), 199 Ill. 1994(See People v. Wilson (1990), 199 Ill.App.3d 792, 795 , 145 Ill.Dec. 801 , 557 N.E.2d 571 .) Although the allusion to the knowledge of the State's attorney's office was improper ( cf. Emerson, 122 Ill.2d at 433-36 , 119 Ill.Dec. 250 , 522 N.E.2d 1109 ), we do not deem it egregious enough, standing alone, to require a new trial. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Kennedy green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Mitchell green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| People v. Kraman green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Townsend green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Creamer green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. Smothers green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| The People v. Hairston green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| People v. Vriner green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| People v. Roman green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| People v. Galloway green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Daubach v. Ishihara neutral | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| People Ex Rel. De Vos v. Laurin green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| The People v. Wallenberg green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| People v. Williams green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| People v. Gilbert green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| People v. Deery green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| The PEOPLE v. Scott green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| The PEOPLE v. Franceschini green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| People v. Vasquez green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| People v. Crump green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| People v. White green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| People v. Bond green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.