credibility defense in New Jersey

2025"However, [it is] not improper for a prosecutor to comment on the credibility of a defense witness's testimony." Ibid.

2012They may comment on facts in the record and draw reasonable inferences from them, id. at 178 , 770 A.2d 255 (citation omitted), and may remark on the credibility of a defense witness’ testimony, State v. Munoz, 340 N.J.Super. 204, 218 , 774 A.2d 515 (App.Div.), certif. denied sub nom.

2002They may not, in ways that are excessive, "directly demean[ ] the credibility of a defense witness." Smith, supra, 167 N.J. at 178 , 770 A. 2d 255 (citing State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454 , 548 A. 2d 1058 (1988)).

2002They may not, in ways that are excessive, "directly demean[ ] the credibility of a defense witness." Smith, supra, 167 N.J. at 178 , 770 A. 2d 255 (citing State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454 , 548 A. 2d 1058 (1988)).

2020State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158, 177-78 (2001); Frost, 158 N.J. at 85 - 86.

2019Ibid. (citing State v. Robinson, 157 N.J. Super. 118, 120 (App. Div. 1978)).

2009Applying those principles, the Appellate Division found that “the trial judge questioned both prosecution and defense witnesses when he perceived an ambiguity in the witness’ testimony.” It further found that “|t]he judge also made a point of reminding the jury members that they were not to give any additional weight to the questions he asked and that they remained the sole finders of fact in the case[,J” observing that “Ltjhe trial judge intervened a total of four times during defendant’s six-day trial.” After reviewing the record at length—and without divining from the record the arbitrary a

2009Applying those principles, the Appellate Division found that “the trial judge questioned both prosecution and defense witnesses when he perceived an ambiguity in the witness’ testimony.” It further found that “|t]he judge also made a point of reminding the jury members that they were not to give any additional weight to the questions he asked and that they remained the sole finders of fact in the case[,J” observing that “Ltjhe trial judge intervened a total of four times during defendant’s six-day trial.” After reviewing the record at length—and without divining from the record the arbitrary a

2009Applying those principles, the Appellate Division found that “the trial judge questioned both prosecution and defense witnesses when he perceived an ambiguity in the witness’ testimony.” It further found that “|t]he judge also made a point of reminding the jury members that they were not to give any additional weight to the questions he asked and that they remained the sole finders of fact in the case[,J” observing that “Ltjhe trial judge intervened a total of four times during defendant’s six-day trial.” After reviewing the record at length—and without divining from the record the arbitrary a

2009Applying those principles, the Appellate Division found that “the trial judge questioned both prosecution and defense witnesses when he perceived an ambiguity in the witness’ testimony.” It further found that “|t]he judge also made a point of reminding the jury members that they were not to give any additional weight to the questions he asked and that they remained the sole finders of fact in the case[,J” observing that “Ltjhe trial judge intervened a total of four times during defendant’s six-day trial.” After reviewing the record at length—and without divining from the record the arbitrary a

2007The Court concluded that each document was “material to the claim, and to have enhanced the credibility of the claim, and to have exacerbated [the insurer’s] exposure to potential liability.” Id. at 440 , 599 A.2d 1256 .

2007The Court concluded that each document was “material to the claim, and to have enhanced the credibility of the claim, and to have exacerbated [the insurer’s] exposure to potential liability.” Id. at 440 , 599 A.2d 1256 .

2004See, e.g., State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 , 724 A. 2d 234 (1999); State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161-62 , 199 A. 2d 809 (1964).

2004See, e.g., State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 , 724 A. 2d 234 (1999); State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161-62 , 199 A. 2d 809 (1964).

2001State v. Robinson, 157 N.J.Super. 118, 120 , 384 A. 2d 569 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 77 N.J. 484 , 391 A. 2d 498 (1978).

2001State v. Robinson, 157 N.J.Super. 118, 120 , 384 A. 2d 569 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 77 N.J. 484 , 391 A. 2d 498 (1978).

1997Defendant’s limited interpretation of Zola and Rose is belied by the Court’s distinction between the “mechanical” factual determination made at the guilt phase with the “normative [penalty-phase] judgment that death is ‘the fitting and appropriate punishment.’ ” Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 162, 548 A.2d 887 (quoting Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 316 n. 80, 524 A.2d 188 ).

1997Defendant’s limited interpretation of Zola and Rose is belied by the Court’s distinction between the “mechanical” factual determination made at the guilt phase with the “normative [penalty-phase] judgment that death is ‘the fitting and appropriate punishment.’ ” Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 162, 548 A.2d 887 (quoting Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 316 n. 80, 524 A.2d 188 ).

1997Defendant’s limited interpretation of Zola and Rose is belied by the Court’s distinction between the “mechanical” factual determination made at the guilt phase with the “normative [penalty-phase] judgment that death is ‘the fitting and appropriate punishment.’ ” Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 162, 548 A.2d 887 (quoting Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 316 n. 80, 524 A.2d 188 ).

1997Defendant's limited interpretation of Zola and Rose is belied by the Court's distinction between the "mechanical" factual determination made at the guilt phase with the "normative [penalty-phase] judgment that death is `the fitting and appropriate punishment.'" Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 162, 548 A. 2d 887 (quoting Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 316 n. 80, 524 A. 2d 188 ).