23 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Logginsgreen2 sentences2016See People v. Loggins , 981 P.2d 630, 636 (Colo. App. 1998). 2016See People v. Loggins, 981 P.2d 630, 636 (Colo.App.1998). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Munizgreen2 sentences2002See People v. Cobb, 962 P.2d 944, 953 (Colo.1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting: finding a distinction but characterizing it as "a slippery one," based in part on the collateral versus direct nature of the evidence); People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125, 132 (Colo.1986) (Vollack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: relying on People v. Vollentine, 643 P.2d 800 (Colo.App.1982), distinguishing "rebuttal testimony" that is introduced to "refute a defense," from "rebuttal testimony" that is "introduced solely to impeach"); People v. Muniz, 622 P.2d 100, 102-03 (Colo.App.1980) (distinguishing "rebut 2002See People v. Cobb, 962 P.2d 944, 953 (Colo.1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting: finding a distinction but characterizing it as "a slippery one," based in part on the collateral versus direct nature of the evidence); People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125, 132 (Colo.1986) (Vollack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: relying on People v. Vollentine, 643 P.2d 800 (Colo.App.1982), distinguishing "rebuttal testimony" that is introduced to "refute a defense," from "rebuttal testimony" that is "introduced solely to impeach"); People v. Muniz, 622 P.2d 100, 102-03 (Colo.App.1980) (distinguishing "rebut | 2 | 3 |
People v. Villagreen2 sentences2020See Villa, 240 P.3d at 358 . ¶ 62 As a result, we cannot say that the prosecutor’s tailoring argument was “flagrantly, glaringly, or tremendously improper,” Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1053 (quoting Avila, 944 P.2d at 676 ), and “so undermine[d] the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the jury’s verdict,” id. 2014See People v. Villa, 240 P.3d 343, 358-59 (Colo.App.2009) (Under some cireumstances similar to those in the present case, court concluded that plain error was not occasioned by prosecutor's remarks that "[wlhat [the victim] said happened to her is the truth" and "this three-year-old child was telling the truth."); cf. Crider v. People, 186 P.3d 39, 42-43 (Colo.2008) (prosecutor's improper characterizations of defendant as lying or as having lied, and of portions of defendant's testimony as being lies, were harmless where, because each characterization was directly related to specific physical | 2 | 2 |
Elliott J. Forgette v. The People of the State of Colorado.green1 sentence2026See Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶¶ 16-18 (holding that possible juror misconduct, like sleeping or inattentiveness, does not implicate a defendant’s right to a jury of twelve); People v. Daley, 2021 COA 85, ¶ 67 (allegation of inattentive or drowsy jurors did not rise to the level of constitutional juror misconduct). ¶ 38 Third, while we agree that a cold record is a poor substitute for live testimony, the juror here did not rely solely on a cold record to assess Flores’s credibility because she was able to assess Flores’s demeanor throughout his testimony. | 1 | 1 |
v. Daleygreen1 sentence2026See Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶¶ 16-18 (holding that possible juror misconduct, like sleeping or inattentiveness, does not implicate a defendant’s right to a jury of twelve); People v. Daley, 2021 COA 85, ¶ 67 (allegation of inattentive or drowsy jurors did not rise to the level of constitutional juror misconduct). ¶ 38 Third, while we agree that a cold record is a poor substitute for live testimony, the juror here did not rely solely on a cold record to assess Flores’s credibility because she was able to assess Flores’s demeanor throughout his testimony. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lumangreen1 sentence2026But those remarks were either equivocal, inconsistent with his statements favoring law enforcement, or in response to the prosecutor’s leading questions. 10 See id. at ¶ 22 n.2 (answers to leading questions during voir dire are viewed with suspicion); People v. Luman, 994 P.2d 432, 436 (Colo. App. 1999) (reversing convictions because “there was no rehabilitation . . . containing unequivocal statements by the juror of [their] commitment to fairness that might support the trial court’s conclusion”). | 1 | 1 |
Estep v. Hardemangreen1 sentence2025In Estate of Elliott, the judge, at the outset of a contempt proceeding, told the contemnor, “[I]t’s my belief that you may have stolen property from th[e] estate, and we are going to recover the property,” and then warned the contemnor that she was “in an awful lot of trouble” with the court, and would be “in an awful lot of trouble with the District Attorney’s office” if she did not cooperate. 993 P.2d at 476 ; see also Estep v. Hardeman, 705 P.2d 523, 525 (Colo. 1985) (on interlocutory appeal of denial of a disqualification motion, supreme court ordered the judge to recuse from future proce | 1 | 1 |
Domingo-Gomez v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2020See Villa, 240 P.3d at 358 . ¶ 62 As a result, we cannot say that the prosecutor’s tailoring argument was “flagrantly, glaringly, or tremendously improper,” Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1053 (quoting Avila, 944 P.2d at 676 ), and “so undermine[d] the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the jury’s verdict,” id. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Avilagreen2 sentences2020See Villa, 240 P.3d at 358 . ¶ 62 As a result, we cannot say that the prosecutor’s tailoring argument was “flagrantly, glaringly, or tremendously improper,” Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1053 (quoting Avila, 944 P.2d at 676 ), and “so undermine[d] the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the jury’s verdict,” id. 2020See Villa, 240 P.3d at 358 . ¶ 62 As a result, we cannot say that the prosecutor’s tailoring argument was “flagrantly, glaringly, or tremendously improper,” Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1053 (quoting Avila, 944 P.2d at 676 ), and “so undermine[d] the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the jury’s verdict,” id. | 1 | 1 |
Noe v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2016See, e.g. , Noe v. United States , 601 F.3d 784, 790-91 (8th Cir. 2010) (plausible alternative was not objectively reasonable because it would have undermined the credibility of defense witnesses); Pegg v. United States , 253 F.3d 1274 , 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (There was no adverse effect when, “[a]lthough there was a clear alternative to the chosen defense strategy,” the alternative was not reasonable because it “would have been devastating” to defendant’s case.). ¶ 36 The supreme court expressly warned that the objectively reasonable analysis should not be “deferential to counsel’s subjective | 1 | 1 |
Crider v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2014See People v. Villa, 240 P.3d 343, 358-59 (Colo.App.2009) (Under some cireumstances similar to those in the present case, court concluded that plain error was not occasioned by prosecutor's remarks that "[wlhat [the victim] said happened to her is the truth" and "this three-year-old child was telling the truth."); cf. Crider v. People, 186 P.3d 39, 42-43 (Colo.2008) (prosecutor's improper characterizations of defendant as lying or as having lied, and of portions of defendant's testimony as being lies, were harmless where, because each characterization was directly related to specific physical | 1 | 1 |
People v. Brunnergreen1 sentence2011See Montalvo-Lopez, 215 P.3d at 1145 ; People v. Brunner, 797 P.2d 788, 790 (Colo.App.1990). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Constantgreen2 sentences2005And “[c]ounsel can with propriety comment on how well and in what manner a witness measures up to the tests of credibility set forth in the instruction.” People v. Constant, 645 P.2d 843, 845-46 (Colo.1982). 2005And "[c]ounsel can with propriety comment on how well and in what manner a witness measures up to the tests of credibility set forth in the instruction." People v. Constant, 645 P.2d 843, 845-46 (Colo.1982). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cobbgreen2 sentences2002See People v. Cobb, 962 P.2d 944, 953 (Colo.1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting: finding a distinction but characterizing it as "a slippery one," based in part on the collateral versus direct nature of the evidence); People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125, 132 (Colo.1986) (Vollack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: relying on People v. Vollentine, 643 P.2d 800 (Colo.App.1982), distinguishing "rebuttal testimony" that is introduced to "refute a defense," from "rebuttal testimony" that is "introduced solely to impeach"); People v. Muniz, 622 P.2d 100, 102-03 (Colo.App.1980) (distinguishing "rebut 2002See People v. Cobb, 962 P.2d 944, 953 (Colo.1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting: finding a distinction but characterizing it as "a slippery one," based in part on the collateral versus direct nature of the evidence); People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125, 132 (Colo.1986) (Vollack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: relying on People v. Vollentine, 643 P.2d 800 (Colo.App.1982), distinguishing "rebuttal testimony" that is introduced to "refute a defense," from "rebuttal testimony" that is "introduced solely to impeach"); People v. Muniz, 622 P.2d 100, 102-03 (Colo.App.1980) (distinguishing "rebut | 1 | 1 |
People v. Terrygreen2 sentences2002See People v. Cobb, 962 P.2d 944, 953 (Colo.1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting: finding a distinction but characterizing it as "a slippery one," based in part on the collateral versus direct nature of the evidence); People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125, 132 (Colo.1986) (Vollack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: relying on People v. Vollentine, 643 P.2d 800 (Colo.App.1982), distinguishing "rebuttal testimony" that is introduced to "refute a defense," from "rebuttal testimony" that is "introduced solely to impeach"); People v. Muniz, 622 P.2d 100, 102-03 (Colo.App.1980) (distinguishing "rebut 2002See People v. Cobb, 962 P.2d 944, 953 (Colo.1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting: finding a distinction but characterizing it as "a slippery one," based in part on the collateral versus direct nature of the evidence); People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125, 132 (Colo.1986) (Vollack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: relying on People v. Vollentine, 643 P.2d 800 (Colo.App.1982), distinguishing "rebuttal testimony" that is introduced to "refute a defense," from "rebuttal testimony" that is "introduced solely to impeach"); People v. Muniz, 622 P.2d 100, 102-03 (Colo.App.1980) (distinguishing "rebut | 1 | 1 |
Palmer v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2002See People v. Cobb, 962 P.2d 944, 953 (Colo.1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting: finding a distinction but characterizing it as "a slippery one," based in part on the collateral versus direct nature of the evidence); People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125, 132 (Colo.1986) (Vollack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: relying on People v. Vollentine, 643 P.2d 800 (Colo.App.1982), distinguishing "rebuttal testimony" that is introduced to "refute a defense," from "rebuttal testimony" that is "introduced solely to impeach"); People v. Muniz, 622 P.2d 100, 102-03 (Colo.App.1980) (distinguishing "rebut 2002See People v. Cobb, 962 P.2d 944, 953 (Colo.1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting: finding a distinction but characterizing it as "a slippery one," based in part on the collateral versus direct nature of the evidence); People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125, 132 (Colo.1986) (Vollack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: relying on People v. Vollentine, 643 P.2d 800 (Colo.App.1982), distinguishing "rebuttal testimony" that is introduced to "refute a defense," from "rebuttal testimony" that is "introduced solely to impeach"); People v. Muniz, 622 P.2d 100, 102-03 (Colo.App.1980) (distinguishing "rebut | 1 | 1 |
People v. in the Interest of T.C.green1 sentence2002See People v. T.C., 898 P.2d 20, 27 (Colo.1995). | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wilsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2018In light of the court's findings regarding the implausibility of the alternate theory of mitigation now advanced by the defendant, the credibility of defense counsel's explanation about his own reasoning, and especially the deference to which such strategic choices by defense counsel are entitled, id. at 681 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , it can hardly be said that counsel's choice of defense fell below the level of reasonable competence. ¶ 36 With regard to the second, or prejudice, prong of the Strickland standard, even if the postconviction court had not been dissuaded from crediting the defense expert 2018In light of the court's findings regarding the implausibility of the alternate theory of mitigation now advanced by the defendant, the credibility of defense counsel's explanation about his own reasoning, and especially the deference to which such strategic choices by defense counsel are entitled, id. at 681 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , it can hardly be said that counsel's choice of defense fell below the level of reasonable competence. ¶ 36 With regard to the second, or prejudice, prong of the Strickland standard, even if the postconviction court had not been dissuaded from crediting the defense expert | 3 | 2003–2018 |
Crane v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences2016Id. at 688-89 . ¶68 Manyik argues that the credibility instruction given by the court applied by its terms only to testifying witnesses and nothing in the instruction suggested that the jury should apply it to a non-testifying defendant’s out-of-court statements. 2016Id. at 688-89 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 . ¶ 68 Manyik argues that the credibility instruction given by the court applied by its terms only to testifying witnesses and nothing in the instruction suggested .that the jury should apply it to a non-testifying defendant’s out-of-court statements. | 3 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Vollentine
green
2 sentences2002See People v. Cobb, 962 P.2d 944, 953 (Colo.1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting: finding a distinction but characterizing it as "a slippery one," based in part on the collateral versus direct nature of the evidence); People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125, 132 (Colo.1986) (Vollack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: relying on People v. Vollentine, 643 P.2d 800 (Colo.App.1982), distinguishing "rebuttal testimony" that is introduced to "refute a defense," from "rebuttal testimony" that is "introduced solely to impeach"); People v. Muniz, 622 P.2d 100, 102-03 (Colo.App.1980) (distinguishing "rebut 2002See People v. Cobb, 962 P.2d 944, 953 (Colo.1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting: finding a distinction but characterizing it as "a slippery one," based in part on the collateral versus direct nature of the evidence); People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125, 132 (Colo.1986) (Vollack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: relying on People v. Vollentine, 643 P.2d 800 (Colo.App.1982), distinguishing "rebuttal testimony" that is introduced to "refute a defense," from "rebuttal testimony" that is "introduced solely to impeach"); People v. Muniz, 622 P.2d 100, 102-03 (Colo.App.1980) (distinguishing "rebut | 3 | 1986–2002 |
James v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2021Id. at 320 , 110 S.Ct. 648 . 2021Id. at 320 . | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Massaro v. United States
green
2 sentences2003At least where the defendant was able to identify "seemingly unusual or misguided action" by his counsel, Massaro, - U.S. --, 1283 S.Ct. 1690 , 155 L.Ed.2d 714 , and "plausible options," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , for the defense of his client that counsel did not pursue, the defendant could not be deprived of an opportunity to prove those choices lacked any sound strategic motive, unless the existing record clearly established otherwise or those choices could not have been prejudicial in any event. 2003At least where the defendant was able to identify "seemingly unusual or misguided action" by his counsel , Massaro , ___ U.S. ___ , 123 S.Ct. 1690 , 155 L.Ed.2d 714 , and "plausible options," Strickland , 466 U.S. at 690 -91 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , for the defense of his client that counsel did not pursue, the defendant could not be deprived of an opportunity to prove those choices lacked any sound strategic motive, unless the existing record clearly established otherwise or those choices could not have been prejudicial in any event. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
In Re the Estate of Elliott
green
1 sentence2025In Estate of Elliott, the judge, at the outset of a contempt proceeding, told the contemnor, “[I]t’s my belief that you may have stolen property from th[e] estate, and we are going to recover the property,” and then warned the contemnor that she was “in an awful lot of trouble” with the court, and would be “in an awful lot of trouble with the District Attorney’s office” if she did not cooperate. 993 P.2d at 476 ; see also Estep v. Hardeman, 705 P.2d 523, 525 (Colo. 1985) (on interlocutory appeal of denial of a disqualification motion, supreme court ordered the judge to recuse from future proce | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Smith v. District Court for the Fourth Judicial District, State of Colorado, Division 6
green
1 sentence2025For that reason, we find Smith v. District Court, 629 P.2d 1055 (Colo. 1981), more instructive. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Joe Harry Pegg v. United States
green
1 sentence2016See, e.g. , Noe v. United States , 601 F.3d 784, 790-91 (8th Cir. 2010) (plausible alternative was not objectively reasonable because it would have undermined the credibility of defense witnesses); Pegg v. United States , 253 F.3d 1274 , 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (There was no adverse effect when, “[a]lthough there was a clear alternative to the chosen defense strategy,” the alternative was not reasonable because it “would have been devastating” to defendant’s case.). ¶ 36 The supreme court expressly warned that the objectively reasonable analysis should not be “deferential to counsel’s subjective | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Ingles v. People
green
2 sentences2002See People v. Cobb, 962 P.2d 944, 953 (Colo.1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting: finding a distinction but characterizing it as "a slippery one," based in part on the collateral versus direct nature of the evidence); People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125, 132 (Colo.1986) (Vollack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: relying on People v. Vollentine, 643 P.2d 800 (Colo.App.1982), distinguishing "rebuttal testimony" that is introduced to "refute a defense," from "rebuttal testimony" that is "introduced solely to impeach"); People v. Muniz, 622 P.2d 100, 102-03 (Colo.App.1980) (distinguishing "rebut 2002See People v. Cobb, 962 P.2d 944, 953 (Colo.1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting: finding a distinction but characterizing it as "a slippery one," based in part on the collateral versus direct nature of the evidence); People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125, 132 (Colo.1986) (Vollack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: relying on People v. Vollentine, 643 P.2d 800 (Colo.App.1982), distinguishing "rebuttal testimony" that is introduced to "refute a defense," from "rebuttal testimony" that is "introduced solely to impeach"); People v. Muniz, 622 P.2d 100, 102-03 (Colo.App.1980) (distinguishing "rebut | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Schreiner v. People
neutral
2 sentences2002See People v. Cobb, 962 P.2d 944, 953 (Colo.1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting: finding a distinction but characterizing it as "a slippery one," based in part on the collateral versus direct nature of the evidence); People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125, 132 (Colo.1986) (Vollack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: relying on People v. Vollentine, 643 P.2d 800 (Colo.App.1982), distinguishing "rebuttal testimony" that is introduced to "refute a defense," from "rebuttal testimony" that is "introduced solely to impeach"); People v. Muniz, 622 P.2d 100, 102-03 (Colo.App.1980) (distinguishing "rebut 2002See People v. Cobb, 962 P.2d 944, 953 (Colo.1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting: finding a distinction but characterizing it as "a slippery one," based in part on the collateral versus direct nature of the evidence); People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125, 132 (Colo.1986) (Vollack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: relying on People v. Vollentine, 643 P.2d 800 (Colo.App.1982), distinguishing "rebuttal testimony" that is introduced to "refute a defense," from "rebuttal testimony" that is "introduced solely to impeach"); People v. Muniz, 622 P.2d 100, 102-03 (Colo.App.1980) (distinguishing "rebut | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Hamrick
green
2 sentences2002See People v. Cobb, 962 P.2d 944, 953 (Colo.1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting: finding a distinction but characterizing it as "a slippery one," based in part on the collateral versus direct nature of the evidence); People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125, 132 (Colo.1986) (Vollack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: relying on People v. Vollentine, 643 P.2d 800 (Colo.App.1982), distinguishing "rebuttal testimony" that is introduced to "refute a defense," from "rebuttal testimony" that is "introduced solely to impeach"); People v. Muniz, 622 P.2d 100, 102-03 (Colo.App.1980) (distinguishing "rebut 2002See People v. Cobb, 962 P.2d 944, 953 (Colo.1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting: finding a distinction but characterizing it as "a slippery one," based in part on the collateral versus direct nature of the evidence); People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125, 132 (Colo.1986) (Vollack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: relying on People v. Vollentine, 643 P.2d 800 (Colo.App.1982), distinguishing "rebuttal testimony" that is introduced to "refute a defense," from "rebuttal testimony" that is "introduced solely to impeach"); People v. Muniz, 622 P.2d 100, 102-03 (Colo.App.1980) (distinguishing "rebut | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Hamrick v. People
green
2 sentences2002See People v. Cobb, 962 P.2d 944, 953 (Colo.1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting: finding a distinction but characterizing it as "a slippery one," based in part on the collateral versus direct nature of the evidence); People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125, 132 (Colo.1986) (Vollack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: relying on People v. Vollentine, 643 P.2d 800 (Colo.App.1982), distinguishing "rebuttal testimony" that is introduced to "refute a defense," from "rebuttal testimony" that is "introduced solely to impeach"); People v. Muniz, 622 P.2d 100, 102-03 (Colo.App.1980) (distinguishing "rebut 2002See People v. Cobb, 962 P.2d 944, 953 (Colo.1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting: finding a distinction but characterizing it as "a slippery one," based in part on the collateral versus direct nature of the evidence); People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125, 132 (Colo.1986) (Vollack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: relying on People v. Vollentine, 643 P.2d 800 (Colo.App.1982), distinguishing "rebuttal testimony" that is introduced to "refute a defense," from "rebuttal testimony" that is "introduced solely to impeach"); People v. Muniz, 622 P.2d 100, 102-03 (Colo.App.1980) (distinguishing "rebut | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. LeMasters
green
2 sentences1998In People v. LeMasters, 666 P.2d 573 (Colo.App.1983), a dissenting opinion of the court of appeals stated: Impeachment, in the evidentiary context, has been traditionally defined as the adducing of proof that a witness who has testified in a cause is unworthy of credit or belief. 1998In People v. LeMasters, 666 P.2d 573 (Colo.App.1983), a dissenting opinion of the court of appeals stated: Impeachment, in the evidentiary context, has been traditionally defined as the adducing of proof that a witness who has testified in a cause is unworthy of credit or belief. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Gillman green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Stull v. People red | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.