soundness rule in Kentucky

1932To give a different effect now to the words which they used from that which they at the time understood was the legal operation of ' the contract would be to make for them a contract different from that which they themselves made; *45 for when they used words which, under the law as it had then been declared, created a certain obligation, it must be presumed that they intended to create this obligation.” Later, in Lexington Hydraulic & Manufacturing Company v. Oots, supra, the question was again reconsidered, and it was there said: “The first proposition involves the soundness of the principle

1905Of these in their order. ■ The first proposition involves the soundness of the principle first enunciated in this state in the case of the Paducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah Water Supply Co., 89 Ky., 340 , 11 R., 738 , 12 S. W., 554 , 13 S. W., 249 , 7 L.

1932To give a different effect now to the words which they used from that which they at the time understood was the legal operation of ' the contract would be to make for them a contract different from that which they themselves made; *45 for when they used words which, under the law as it had then been declared, created a certain obligation, it must be presumed that they intended to create this obligation.” Later, in Lexington Hydraulic & Manufacturing Company v. Oots, supra, the question was again reconsidered, and it was there said: “The first proposition involves the soundness of the principle

1932To give a different effect now to the words which they used from that which they at the time understood was the legal operation of ' the contract would be to make for them a contract different from that which they themselves made; *45 for when they used words which, under the law as it had then been declared, created a certain obligation, it must be presumed that they intended to create this obligation.” Later, in Lexington Hydraulic & Manufacturing Company v. Oots, supra, the question was again reconsidered, and it was there said: “The first proposition involves the soundness of the principle

1979We reaffirm the conclusion reached in those cases, namely, that a man may not make a voluntary transfer of either his real or personal estate with the intent to prevent his wife, or intended wife, from sharing in such property at his death and that the wife, on the husband’s death, may assert her marital rights in such property in the hands of the donee. 282 Ky. at 422 , 138 S.W.2d at 515 .

1979We reaffirm the conclusion reached in those cases, namely, that a man may not make a voluntary transfer of either his real or personal estate with the intent to prevent his wife, or intended wife, from sharing in such property at his death and that the wife, on the husband’s death, may assert her marital rights in such property in the hands of the donee. 282 Ky. at 422 , 138 S.W.2d at 515 .

1965In Curlin v. Ashby, Ky., 264 S.W.2d 671 , this court did review, in part, the decisions involving the reverse condemnation theory; there some doubt was expressed as to the soundness of the doctrine.

1960In addition, see Yarrington v. Freeman, 201 Ky. 135 , 255 S.W. 1034 ; Wooten’s Trustee v. Hardy, 221 Ky. 338 , 298 S.W. 963 ; and Dennis v. Shirley, 212 Ky. 114 , 278 S.W. 591 .

1960In addition, see Yarrington v. Freeman, 201 Ky. 135 , 255 S.W. 1034 ; Wooten’s Trustee v. Hardy, 221 Ky. 338 , 298 S.W. 963 ; and Dennis v. Shirley, 212 Ky. 114 , 278 S.W. 591 .

1960In addition, see Yarrington v. Freeman, 201 Ky. 135 , 255 S.W. 1034 ; Wooten’s Trustee v. Hardy, 221 Ky. 338 , 298 S.W. 963 ; and Dennis v. Shirley, 212 Ky. 114 , 278 S.W. 591 .

1960In addition, see Yarrington v. Freeman, 201 Ky. 135 , 255 S.W. 1034 ; Wooten’s Trustee v. Hardy, 221 Ky. 338 , 298 S.W. 963 ; and Dennis v. Shirley, 212 Ky. 114 , 278 S.W. 591 .

1960In Texas Co. v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 590 , 198 S.W.2d 316 , we questioned the soundness of the rule.

1960In Texas Co. v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 590 , 198 S.W.2d 316 , we questioned the soundness of the rule.

1960Prior to the Hafner decision, the settled rule in this state was thus stated in Rogers v. Burress, 199 Ky. 766, 769 , 251 S.W. 980 , 981: “We have held in an unbroken line of cases that, unless a contrary intention should be discoverable from the will, a provision for a division ‘equally,’ or ‘share and share alike,’ between or among two or more persons or groups, means a per capita and not a per stirpes distribution.” A number of cases are cited in that opinion which demonstrate the soundness of the rule.

1960Prior to the Hafner decision, the settled rule in this state was thus stated in Rogers v. Burress, 199 Ky. 766, 769 , 251 S.W. 980 , 981: “We have held in an unbroken line of cases that, unless a contrary intention should be discoverable from the will, a provision for a division ‘equally,’ or ‘share and share alike,’ between or among two or more persons or groups, means a per capita and not a per stirpes distribution.” A number of cases are cited in that opinion which demonstrate the soundness of the rule.

1960In addition, see Yarrington v. Freeman, 201 Ky. 135 , 255 S.W. 1034 ; Wooten’s Trustee v. Hardy, 221 Ky. 338 , 298 S.W. 963 ; and Dennis v. Shirley, 212 Ky. 114 , 278 S.W. 591 .

1960In addition, see Yarrington v. Freeman, 201 Ky. 135 , 255 S.W. 1034 ; Wooten’s Trustee v. Hardy, 221 Ky. 338 , 298 S.W. 963 ; and Dennis v. Shirley, 212 Ky. 114 , 278 S.W. 591 .

1957In the recent case of Aldridge-Poage, Inc., v. Parks, Ky., 297 S.W.2d 632 , we expressed serious doubt concerning the soundness of our rule which requires the plaintiff to prove negligence when his property is damaged by one engaged in the extra-hazardous activity of blasting.

1954The soundness of the rule has been recognized by this Court in the cases of Paine v. Woolley, 80 Ky. 568 , 4 Ky.Law Rep. 489, and Madden v. Madden, 169 Ky. 367 , 183 S.W. 931 , L.R.A.1916E, 892.

1954The reason for the rule is thus stated in the former case, 80 Ky. at page 578 : “Whether the collection of the judgment amoúnts to. an extinguishment of it, so that no appeal will lie, it is universally agreed by all the authorities • that it is a waiver' of the right to take the appeal, or to prosecute it after it ■' may be taken. ■ - “The appellants having elected to collect their judgment, they thereby ratified it, and should be estopped' from prosecuting this appeal any further as being inconsistent with their conduct -in collecting the judgment as a valid judgment, which they now seek to

1954The soundness of the rule has been recognized by this Court in the cases of Paine v. Woolley, 80 Ky. 568 , 4 Ky.Law Rep. 489, and Madden v. Madden, 169 Ky. 367 , 183 S.W. 931 , L.R.A.1916E, 892.

1954The soundness of the rule has been recognized by this Court in the cases of Paine v. Woolley, 80 Ky. 568 , 4 Ky.Law Rep. 489, and Madden v. Madden, 169 Ky. 367 , 183 S.W. 931 , L.R.A.1916E, 892.

1952As stated in City of Sebree v. Powell, 221 Ky. 478 , at page 481, 298 S.W. 1103 , at page 1104: “The doctrine of estoppel has no application in cases like this where the proceedings authorizing the work are invalid by reason of jurisdictional defects so far as the property owner sought to be charged is concerned.” The soundness of this principle may not be successfully challenged.

1952As stated in City of Sebree v. Powell, 221 Ky. 478 , at page 481, 298 S.W. 1103 , at page 1104: “The doctrine of estoppel has no application in cases like this where the proceedings authorizing the work are invalid by reason of jurisdictional defects so far as the property owner sought to be charged is concerned.” The soundness of this principle may not be successfully challenged.

1949We reaffirm the conclusion reached in those cases, namely, that a man may not make a voluntary transfer of either his real or personal estate with the intent to prevent his wife, or intended wife, from sharing in such property at his death and that the wife, on the husband’s death, may assert her marital rights in such property in the hands of the donee.” In the case of Anderson v. Anderson, 194 Ky. 763 , 240 S.W. 1061 , in dealing with the same question we said: “Even if the rule that a voluntary conveyance by one who had an agreement to marry is not a fraud on the intended wife in case such

1949We reaffirm the conclusion reached in those cases, namely, that a man may not make a voluntary transfer of either his real or personal estate with the intent to prevent his wife, or intended wife, from sharing in such property at his death and that the wife, on the husband’s death, may assert her marital rights in such property in the hands of the donee.” In the case of Anderson v. Anderson, 194 Ky. 763 , 240 S.W. 1061 , in dealing with the same question we said: “Even if the rule that a voluntary conveyance by one who had an agreement to marry is not a fraud on the intended wife in case such

1948Huebschmann v. Grand Co., 166 Md. 615 , 172 A. 227 ; Benton v. Kernan, 127 N. J.

1948Huebschmann v. Grand Co., 166 Md. 615 , 172 A. 227 ; Benton v. Kernan, 127 N. J.

1947The Mississippi Supreme Court in the case of Underwriters at Lloyd’s Insurance Co. v. Vicksburg Traction Co., 106 Miss. 244 , 63 So. 455, 457 , 51 L.

1947The Mississippi Supreme Court in the case of Underwriters at Lloyd’s Insurance Co. v. Vicksburg Traction Co., 106 Miss. 244 , 63 So. 455, 457 , 51 L.

1943See, also, Blair v. Russell, 14 Bush 412 ; Miller v. Howe, 245 Ky. 568 , 53 S. W. (2d) 938 ; and 21 Am.

1943See, also, Blair v. Russell, 14 Bush 412 ; Miller v. Howe, 245 Ky. 568 , 53 S. W. (2d) 938 ; and 21 Am.

1943Co. v. Schrader, 289 Ky. 469 , 158 S. W. (2d) 964 , 966, this court was asked to overrule such of its decisions as applied the occupational disability insurance rule of construction to a nonoccupational policy, but the court declined to pass upon the question as to whether or not it would overrule such decisions, since it. was found that Schrader was not entitled to recover even under the occupational insurance rule, but the court indicated a doubt as to the soundness of the rule laid down in the O’Brien case and subsequent opinions of a like nature, based on that case, pointing out that its l

1943Co., 136 S. C. 90, 134 S. E. 224 ; and McCutchen v. Pacific Mut.

1939Thomas Ex’r v. Marksbury, 249 Ky. 629 , 61 S. W. (2d) 282 ; Bowman v. Morgan, 236 Ky. 653 , 33 S. W. (2d) 703 ; Whittaker v. Fitzpatrick, 268 Ky. 120 , 103 S. W. (2d) 670 , and cases cited.

1939Thomas Ex’r v. Marksbury, 249 Ky. 629 , 61 S. W. (2d) 282 ; Bowman v. Morgan, 236 Ky. 653 , 33 S. W. (2d) 703 ; Whittaker v. Fitzpatrick, 268 Ky. 120 , 103 S. W. (2d) 670 , and cases cited.

1939Thomas Ex’r v. Marksbury, 249 Ky. 629 , 61 S. W. (2d) 282 ; Bowman v. Morgan, 236 Ky. 653 , 33 S. W. (2d) 703 ; Whittaker v. Fitzpatrick, 268 Ky. 120 , 103 S. W. (2d) 670 , and cases cited.

1939Thomas Ex’r v. Marksbury, 249 Ky. 629 , 61 S. W. (2d) 282 ; Bowman v. Morgan, 236 Ky. 653 , 33 S. W. (2d) 703 ; Whittaker v. Fitzpatrick, 268 Ky. 120 , 103 S. W. (2d) 670 , and cases cited.

1939Thomas Ex’r v. Marksbury, 249 Ky. 629 , 61 S. W. (2d) 282 ; Bowman v. Morgan, 236 Ky. 653 , 33 S. W. (2d) 703 ; Whittaker v. Fitzpatrick, 268 Ky. 120 , 103 S. W. (2d) 670 , and cases cited.

1939Thomas Ex’r v. Marksbury, 249 Ky. 629 , 61 S. W. (2d) 282 ; Bowman v. Morgan, 236 Ky. 653 , 33 S. W. (2d) 703 ; Whittaker v. Fitzpatrick, 268 Ky. 120 , 103 S. W. (2d) 670 , and cases cited.

1935In the case of People v. Equitable Trust Co., 96 N. Y. 387, the court, after holding that the state had ample power to tax trades, associations, and other associations carrying on business within the state, said: “Non-residents’ property having no legal situs here, and business not carried on here, are beyond the jurisdiction of our State and are not the subjects of taxation here.” There is no -doubt at all as to the soundness of the principle enunciated in the cases quoted, and which, as may be observed, has frequently had the sanction of this court; however, the section of the act under disc

1930This he may not now do, since he waived the error, as was expressly held under similar circumstances in the recent case of Eureka Elkhorn Coal Co., etc. v. Lawson, 195 Ky. 14 , 241 S. W. 335 .” It is therefore clear that this ground is also unavailable to appellant on this appeal.

1930This he may not now do, since he waived the error, as was expressly held under similar circumstances in the recent case of Eureka Elkhorn Coal Co., etc. v. Lawson, 195 Ky. 14 , 241 S. W. 335 .” It is therefore clear that this ground is also unavailable to appellant on this appeal.

1925Likewise in the case of Tackett v. Mayo, 210 Ky. 299 , there was a distinct recognition of the soundness of the doctrine in the other cases; but the sufficiency of the notice in that case was upheld because it required the contestee to answer ‘ ‘ on the third day after the service of this notice, ” the court pointing out in the opinion that the third day after the .service of the notice was a day certain because it involved only a simple calculation to ascertain what day was intended.

1925But counsel for appellant say that Weller v. Muenninghoff, 155 Ky. 77 , is authority for their position that the notice is sufficient.