soundness rule in Florida

1965“The conclusion we have reached harmonizes, we think, with the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in the case of Capital Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, Fla.App., 105 So.2d 899 .” 8 From the foregoing decisions by both the Third District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in the Ferry Street Motor Sales case, it appears without question that whether the holder of a motor vehicle lien duly recorded in a foreign state will be permitted to enforce that lien under the rule of comity against an innocent purchaser of the vehicle in Florida is

1962The conclusion we have reached harmonizes, we think, with the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in the case of Capital Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, Fla.App., 105 So.2d 899 .

1971Co., 53 Fla. 832 , 44 South. 351 , 13 Ann.Cas. 18; 5 Cyc. 911; 8 R.C.L. § 18.” Appellant, while recognizing the soundness of the rule of law stated above, contends that the same is inapplicable to the facts in the case at bar.

1967However, even in Crowe, supra, at page 754, we recognized the soundness of the principle of law stated in Williams v. Town of Dunnellon, 125 Fla. 114 , 169 So. 631 , holding that: “ * * * the illegal, improper, or extravagant use of funds legally borrowed for, or otherwise acquired for, public purposes or uses may be enjoined or redressed by due course of judicial proceedings.” The Williams decision was simply not applied by this court in Crowe, supra, because it had no application to the facts at hand.

1967However, even in Crowe, supra, at page 754, we recognized the soundness of the principle of law stated in Williams v. Town of Dunnellon, 125 Fla. 114 , 169 So. 631 , holding that: “ * * * the illegal, improper, or extravagant use of funds legally borrowed for, or otherwise acquired for, public purposes or uses may be enjoined or redressed by due course of judicial proceedings.” The Williams decision was simply not applied by this court in Crowe, supra, because it had no application to the facts at hand.

1967However, even in Crowe, supra, at page 754, we recognized the soundness of the principle of law stated in Williams v. Town of Dunnellon, 125 Fla. 114 , 169 So. 631 , holding that: “ * * * the illegal, improper, or extravagant use of funds legally borrowed for, or otherwise acquired for, public purposes or uses may be enjoined or redressed by due course of judicial proceedings.” The Williams decision was simply not applied by this court in Crowe, supra, because it had no application to the facts at hand.

1967However, even in Crowe, supra, at page 754, we recognized the soundness of the principle of law stated in Williams v. Town of Dunnellon, 125 Fla. 114 , 169 So. 631 , holding that: “ * * * the illegal, improper, or extravagant use of funds legally borrowed for, or otherwise acquired for, public purposes or uses may be enjoined or redressed by due course of judicial proceedings.” The Williams decision was simply not applied by this court in Crowe, supra, because it had no application to the facts at hand.

1966Mr. Justice Terrell, in speaking for the Florida Supreme Court, in Everglade Cypress Company v. Tunnicliffe, 1933, 107 Fla. 675 , 148 So. 192, 194 , expounded the general rule that interest may not be allowed on trust funds, but pointed out the exception to the rule and the rationale behind it, in the following language: “The soundness of this rule cannot be controverted, though it is not without its exceptions.

1966Mr. Justice Terrell, in speaking for the Florida Supreme Court, in Everglade Cypress Company v. Tunnicliffe, 1933, 107 Fla. 675 , 148 So. 192, 194 , expounded the general rule that interest may not be allowed on trust funds, but pointed out the exception to the rule and the rationale behind it, in the following language: “The soundness of this rule cannot be controverted, though it is not without its exceptions.

1964As was stated in Application of Knight, 176 Misc. 635 , 28 N.Y.S.2d 353 , 355: “Public confidence in its law enforcement officers is of prime importance; the petitioner having broadcast his charges, it would be unreasonable for the court to hold that his failure to substantiate such charges should not be made a matter of public record.” Accordingly, we deem the factual situation in this case to be such as comes within the exception to the majority view. 2 Concluding as we have that the order appealed is without error, the same is hereby affirmed.

1964As was stated in Application of Knight, 176 Misc. 635 , 28 N.Y.S.2d 353 , 355: “Public confidence in its law enforcement officers is of prime importance; the petitioner having broadcast his charges, it would be unreasonable for the court to hold that his failure to substantiate such charges should not be made a matter of public record.” Accordingly, we deem the factual situation in this case to be such as comes within the exception to the majority view. 2 Concluding as we have that the order appealed is without error, the same is hereby affirmed.

1963Wallace v. Luxmoore, Fla. 1945, 156 Fla. 725 , 24 So.2d 302 ; Universal Const. Co. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla. 1953, 68 So.2d 366 .

1963Wallace v. Luxmoore, Fla. 1945, 156 Fla. 725 , 24 So.2d 302 ; Universal Const. Co. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla. 1953, 68 So.2d 366 .

1963Wallace v. Luxmoore, Fla. 1945, 156 Fla. 725 , 24 So.2d 302 ; Universal Const. Co. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla. 1953, 68 So.2d 366 .

1959This court in the case of Nashville v. Webb, 114 Tenn. 432 , 85 S.W. 404 , 4 Ann.Cas. 1169, speaking through the present Chief Justice, said: "`It is a misnomer, a misapplication of terms, to speak of an action against such a body as transitory, no matter what the ground may be on which the right of action rests.

1958The appellant has urged the application of the rule in Kanter v. Safran, Fla.1953, 68 So.2d 553, 557 , and Fla.1955, 82 So.2d 508 , wherein it is stated: “Of course, the parties may mutually agree to a surrender and acceptance of the leasehold estate without further liability on the part of the lessee, in which event there can be no recovery by the lessor of damages for the loss of future rents nor any damages other than those existing at the time of the termination of the lease.” We are in accord with the soundness of the principle enunciated but find that it has no application to the facts i

1958The appellant has urged the application of the rule in Kanter v. Safran, Fla.1953, 68 So.2d 553, 557 , and Fla.1955, 82 So.2d 508 , wherein it is stated: “Of course, the parties may mutually agree to a surrender and acceptance of the leasehold estate without further liability on the part of the lessee, in which event there can be no recovery by the lessor of damages for the loss of future rents nor any damages other than those existing at the time of the termination of the lease.” We are in accord with the soundness of the principle enunciated but find that it has no application to the facts i

1895Rogers, 105 Ill. 318 , cited by counsel for appellee, that the doctrine of estoppel in pais, or equitable estoppels, is based upon a fraudulent purpose and á fraudulent result.