soundness rule in Kansas

2024In a quiet title action: "To prevail, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own title, and not the weakness of his adversary's title." Ford v. Willits, 9 Kan.

1980As stated in Carpenter I: *126 “Second-degree murder is clearly a lesser included offense under first-degree murder since all of the elements of second-degree murder are included in the elements required to establish murder in the first degree.” 215 Kan. at 579 .

1974The same rule was applied in State v. Uhls, 121 Kan. 377 , 247 Pac. 1050 , and in State v. Bigler, 138 Kan. 13 , 23 P. 2d 598 .

1974The same rule was applied in State v. Uhls, 121 Kan. 377 , 247 Pac. 1050 , and in State v. Bigler, 138 Kan. 13 , 23 P. 2d 598 .

1974The same rule was applied in State v. Uhls, 121 Kan. 377 , 247 Pac. 1050 , and in State v. Bigler, 138 Kan. 13 , 23 P. 2d 598 .

1974The same rule was applied in State v. Uhls, 121 Kan. 377 , 247 Pac. 1050 , and in State v. Bigler, 138 Kan. 13 , 23 P. 2d 598 .

1956The instant action to vacate and set aside, not being commenced within six months from the date of confirmation of the sale, was brought too late.” (pp. 167, 8, 9.) In the third Shell case (Shell Oil Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 171 Kan. 595 , 237 P. 2d 257 ), we said: “Further consideration of this question convinces us of the soundness of the rule laid down in our original opinion, namely, that in proceedings governed by the tax foreclosure act (G.

1956The instant action to vacate and set aside, not being commenced within six months from the date of confirmation of the sale, was brought too late.” (pp. 167, 8, 9.) In the third Shell case (Shell Oil Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 171 Kan. 595 , 237 P. 2d 257 ), we said: “Further consideration of this question convinces us of the soundness of the rule laid down in our original opinion, namely, that in proceedings governed by the tax foreclosure act (G.

1953Notwithstanding criticism of the soundness of the rule, as heretofore indicated, and that some courts may have discarded it (see e.g. comment in Wood v. McKeever, 141 Kan. 323, 325 , 41 P.2d 989 ), we are not now called upon to hold that in a mutual combat case, and this is not one, that it should not be followed.

1953Notwithstanding criticism of the soundness of the rule, as heretofore indicated, and that some courts may have discarded it (see e.g. comment in Wood v. McKeever, 141 Kan. 323, 325 , 41 P.2d 989 ), we are not now called upon to hold that in a mutual combat case, and this is not one, that it should not be followed.

1933In Coffman v. Security Benefit Association, 131 Kan. 328 , 291 Pac. 753 , it was said: “It (the rule stated in the Obrist case) is not applicable where the statute and charter of the society prescribe the classes of persons to whom benefits mas' be paid.” (p. 332.) And in Slovenska Narodna Podporna Jednota v. Zupancic, 135 Kan. 692, 694 , 11 P. 2d 1026 , the soundness of the rule stated so broadly in the Obrist case was questioned, and it was pointed out that care must be used in its application.

1933In Coffman v. Security Benefit Association, 131 Kan. 328 , 291 Pac. 753 , it was said: “It (the rule stated in the Obrist case) is not applicable where the statute and charter of the society prescribe the classes of persons to whom benefits mas' be paid.” (p. 332.) And in Slovenska Narodna Podporna Jednota v. Zupancic, 135 Kan. 692, 694 , 11 P. 2d 1026 , the soundness of the rule stated so broadly in the Obrist case was questioned, and it was pointed out that care must be used in its application.

1933In Coffman v. Security Benefit Association, 131 Kan. 328 , 291 Pac. 753 , it was said: “It (the rule stated in the Obrist case) is not applicable where the statute and charter of the society prescribe the classes of persons to whom benefits mas' be paid.” (p. 332.) And in Slovenska Narodna Podporna Jednota v. Zupancic, 135 Kan. 692, 694 , 11 P. 2d 1026 , the soundness of the rule stated so broadly in the Obrist case was questioned, and it was pointed out that care must be used in its application.

1933In Coffman v. Security Benefit Association, 131 Kan. 328 , 291 Pac. 753 , it was said: “It (the rule stated in the Obrist case) is not applicable where the statute and charter of the society prescribe the classes of persons to whom benefits mas' be paid.” (p. 332.) And in Slovenska Narodna Podporna Jednota v. Zupancic, 135 Kan. 692, 694 , 11 P. 2d 1026 , the soundness of the rule stated so broadly in the Obrist case was questioned, and it was pointed out that care must be used in its application.

1931Typical of many cases cited by appellant in support of this rule is Pellette v. Mann, 116 Kan. 16 , 225 Pac. 1067 , where a dealer in motor vehicles who sold an automobile represented it to be the latest model, believing it to be such although it was in fact a model of the previous year, was held liable to the purchaser for the misrepresentation.

1931Typical of many cases cited by appellant in support of this rule is Pellette v. Mann, 116 Kan. 16 , 225 Pac. 1067 , where a dealer in motor vehicles who sold an automobile represented it to be the latest model, believing it to be such although it was in fact a model of the previous year, was held liable to the purchaser for the misrepresentation.

1917The appellee concedes the soundness of the rule in this state as declared in the following language from the opinion in Life Assurance Society v. Welch, as Sup’t, &c., 26 Kan. 632 : “Now whatever may be the rule in other states, it is well settled in this state that third parties not privy to a contract, nor privy to the consideration thereof, may sue upon the contract to enforce any stipulations made for their special benefit and interest.” (p. 641.) It is upon the limitations to this rule as stated in the opinion in Burton v. Larkin, 36 Kan. 246 , 13 Pac. 398 , that appellee bases the conten

1917The appellee concedes the soundness of the rule in this state as declared in the following language from the opinion in Life Assurance Society v. Welch, as Sup’t, &c., 26 Kan. 632 : “Now whatever may be the rule in other states, it is well settled in this state that third parties not privy to a contract, nor privy to the consideration thereof, may sue upon the contract to enforce any stipulations made for their special benefit and interest.” (p. 641.) It is upon the limitations to this rule as stated in the opinion in Burton v. Larkin, 36 Kan. 246 , 13 Pac. 398 , that appellee bases the conten

1917The appellee concedes the soundness of the rule in this state as declared in the following language from the opinion in Life Assurance Society v. Welch, as Sup’t, &c., 26 Kan. 632 : “Now whatever may be the rule in other states, it is well settled in this state that third parties not privy to a contract, nor privy to the consideration thereof, may sue upon the contract to enforce any stipulations made for their special benefit and interest.” (p. 641.) It is upon the limitations to this rule as stated in the opinion in Burton v. Larkin, 36 Kan. 246 , 13 Pac. 398 , that appellee bases the conten

1907Rep. 142 ; Farnham v. Benedict, 107 N. Y. 159 , 13 N. E. 784 ; Decker v. Matthews, 12 N. Y. 313 .) Where the note has been negotiated before maturity for value, as in this case, there would seem to be no doubt as to the soundness of the doctrine; and when the note is still in the hands of the original party, the defendant, but is not due when the action is brought, the rule ought to be and is the same.

1907Rep. 142 ; Farnham v. Benedict, 107 N. Y. 159 , 13 N. E. 784 ; Decker v. Matthews, 12 N. Y. 313 .) Where the note has been negotiated before maturity for value, as in this case, there would seem to be no doubt as to the soundness of the doctrine; and when the note is still in the hands of the original party, the defendant, but is not due when the action is brought, the rule ought to be and is the same.

1907Rep. 142 ; Farnham v. Benedict, 107 N. Y. 159 , 13 N. E. 784 ; Decker v. Matthews, 12 N. Y. 313 .) Where the note has been negotiated before maturity for value, as in this case, there would seem to be no doubt as to the soundness of the doctrine; and when the note is still in the hands of the original party, the defendant, but is not due when the action is brought, the rule ought to be and is the same.

1907(Thayer v. Manley, 73 N. Y. 305 .) Neither does the fact that the maker might restrain the negotiation of such a note, and compel its surrender in an equitable action, affect his right to maintain an action at law for damages.

1898In the case of Crim v. Fleming, 101 Ind. 154 , commenting on the conflict of authorities as to the soundness of the rule declared in Philbrooks v. McEwen, supra, it was said : “But the case in hand is not within that rule, for here there was an express agreement to collect, and this makes an essential difference, for a breach of an agreement cannot be justly regarded as inaction or passive neglect.” In the case of Lang v. Brevard, supra, strongly relied on by counsel for plaintiff in error, it is said : “For acts of mere passive sufferance, omission, and delay, the surety will not be discharge

1898In the case of Crim v. Fleming, 101 Ind. 154 , commenting on the conflict of authorities as to the soundness of the rule declared in Philbrooks v. McEwen, supra, it was said : “But the case in hand is not within that rule, for here there was an express agreement to collect, and this makes an essential difference, for a breach of an agreement cannot be justly regarded as inaction or passive neglect.” In the case of Lang v. Brevard, supra, strongly relied on by counsel for plaintiff in error, it is said : “For acts of mere passive sufferance, omission, and delay, the surety will not be discharge