soundness rule in Michigan

2013In People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214 ; 612 NW2d 144 (2000), our Supreme Court noted the soundness of the principle that, in order to discourage counsel from harboring error as an appellate parachute, issues for appeal must be preserved in the record by notation of one’s objection.

2013In People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214 ; 612 NW2d 144 (2000), our Supreme Court noted the soundness of the principle that, in order to discourage counsel from harboring error as an appellate parachute, issues for appeal must be preserved in the record by notation of one’s objection.

1906Other rules are as well established as this, viz.: That a statute ‘ must be construed with reference not only to its language, but its object, as gathered from its various parts.’ Washburn v. People, 10 Mich. 372, 384 .

1901Other rules are as well established as this, viz.: That a statute “must be construed with reference not only to its language, but its object, as-gathered from its various parts.” Washburn v. People, 10 Mich. 372, 384 .

2001Carter, supra at 214 , citing People v Pollick, 448 Mich 376, 387 ; 531 NW2d 159 (1995).

2001Carter, supra at 214 , citing People v Pollick, 448 Mich 376, 387 ; 531 NW2d 159 (1995).

2001Citing People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 762-765 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999), the Court noted the soundness of the rule requiring preservation of issues for appeal by notation on the record, and then reiterated the long-held rule that counsel may not harbor error as an appellate parachute.

2001Citing People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 762-765 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999), the Court noted the soundness of the rule requiring preservation of issues for appeal by notation on the record, and then reiterated the long-held rule that counsel may not harbor error as an appellate parachute.

1987Indeed, as noted by the California Supreme Court, "[i]t is unnecessary to attempt to separate the legal theories or to catalog their limitations." Walters v Sloan, 20 Cal 3d 199, 204; 142 Cal Rptr 152; 571 P2d 609 (1977).

1987Indeed, as noted by the California Supréme Court, "[i]t is unnecessary to attempt to separate the legal theories or to catalog their limitations.” Walters v Sloan, 20 Cal 3d 199, 204; 142 Cal Rptr 152; 571 P2d 609 (1977).

1976With all due respect to the Fifth Circuit, we question the soundness of this rule in light of the Federal labor law policy we have analyzed supra. *608 The Fifth Circuit substantiates its "finality rule” by citing the first case of the Steelworkers trilogy, American Mfg Co, supra, where the Supreme Court recognized congressional policy as stated in § 203(d) of the LMRA: "Section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat 154, 29 USC 173(d), states, 'Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance

1936Dikeman v. Arnold, 78 Mich. 455 ; Cleveland Refining Co. v. Dunning, 115 Mich. 238 ; Ada Dairy Ass’n v. Mears, 123 Mich. 470 ; Hodge v. Smith, 130 Wis. 326 ( 110 N. W. 192 ).” Appellant admits the soundness of the rule, but contends that it does not apply to “a contract which on its face states that there is no condition resting in parol.” The writing itself does not malee this statement.

1936Dikeman v. Arnold, 78 Mich. 455 ; Cleveland Refining Co. v. Dunning, 115 Mich. 238 ; Ada Dairy Ass’n v. Mears, 123 Mich. 470 ; Hodge v. Smith, 130 Wis. 326 ( 110 N. W. 192 ).” Appellant admits the soundness of the rule, but contends that it does not apply to “a contract which on its face states that there is no condition resting in parol.” The writing itself does not malee this statement.

1936Dikeman v. Arnold, 78 Mich. 455 ; Cleveland Refining Co. v. Dunning, 115 Mich. 238 ; Ada Dairy Ass’n v. Mears, 123 Mich. 470 ; Hodge v. Smith, 130 Wis. 326 ( 110 N. W. 192 ).” Appellant admits the soundness of the rule, but contends that it does not apply to “a contract which on its face states that there is no condition resting in parol.” The writing itself does not malee this statement.

1936Dikeman v. Arnold, 78 Mich. 455 ; Cleveland Refining Co. v. Dunning, 115 Mich. 238 ; Ada Dairy Ass’n v. Mears, 123 Mich. 470 ; Hodge v. Smith, 130 Wis. 326 ( 110 N. W. 192 ).” Appellant admits the soundness of the rule, but contends that it does not apply to “a contract which on its face states that there is no condition resting in parol.” The writing itself does not malee this statement.

1936Dikeman v. Arnold, 78 Mich. 455 ; Cleveland Refining Co. v. Dunning, 115 Mich. 238 ; Ada Dairy Ass’n v. Mears, 123 Mich. 470 ; Hodge v. Smith, 130 Wis. 326 ( 110 N. W. 192 ).” Appellant admits the soundness of the rule, but contends that it does not apply to “a contract which on its face states that there is no condition resting in parol.” The writing itself does not malee this statement.

1911Coming to the third point urged by respondent’s counsel, wherein he contends that the act in question is unconstitutional, and that the case at bar comes within the interstate commerce laws, and is governed by the case of People v. Bunker, 128 Mich. 160 ( 87 N. W. 90 ), we are of opinion that this statute, which has been sustained in numerous cases, is not unconstitutional for the reasons stated; and that, while we recognize the soundness of the doctrine announced in People v. Bunker, supra, we do not think it governs this case.

1911Coming to the third point urged by respondent’s counsel, wherein he contends that the act in question is unconstitutional, and that the case at bar comes within the interstate commerce laws, and is governed by the case of People v. Bunker, 128 Mich. 160 ( 87 N. W. 90 ), we are of opinion that this statute, which has been sustained in numerous cases, is not unconstitutional for the reasons stated; and that, while we recognize the soundness of the doctrine announced in People v. Bunker, supra, we do not think it governs this case.

1906In Hatch v. Calhoun Circuit Judge, 127 Mich. 174 , we said: “ The soundness of this rule * * * is not questioned.

1903I am unable to see the soundness of the principle in which five of the judges concurred in the Parish Will Case [ 25 N. Y. 9 ], that the question in every case is, ‘ Had the testator, as compos mentis, capacity to make a will ? ’ not, ‘ Had he the capacity to make the will produced ? ’ Men do not make wills in the abstract, but some particular will; and the question should, I think, always relate to the capacity to understand and make the will in controversy.

1895Stein v. Hermann, 23 Wis. 132 ;, Butts v. Peacock, Id. 359.

1891The soundness of the doctrine there laid down has not been since questioned, but has been recognized and approved in Attorney General v. Lothrop, 24 Mich. 235 ; Hubbard v. Township Board, 25 Id. 153; Commissioners v. Common Council, 28 Id. 228; Attorney General v. Common Council, 29 Id. 108; Allor v. Auditors, 43 Id. 76; Attorney General v. Common Council, 58 Id. 213; and Lawrence v. Hanley, 84 Id. 399.