soundness doctrine in New Mexico

1944The question of the court’s communication with the jury, after it had retired to deliberate upon its verdict, was before this court in State v. Costales, 37 N.M. 115 , 19 P.2d 189, 191 , wherein it is said: “ * * * ‘No record was made of the incident or any exception taken, and the Court considered it quite harmless at the time. * * *' “The high character of the trial judge is an adequate guaranty against any conscious act of unfairness, but his suggestion that the absence of a record would be a sufficient answer to the point is potent in its persuasiveness of the soundness of the doctrine tha

1944The question of the court’s communication with the jury, after it had retired to deliberate upon its verdict, was before this court in State v. Costales, 37 N.M. 115 , 19 P.2d 189, 191 , wherein it is said: “ * * * ‘No record was made of the incident or any exception taken, and the Court considered it quite harmless at the time. * * *' “The high character of the trial judge is an adequate guaranty against any conscious act of unfairness, but his suggestion that the absence of a record would be a sufficient answer to the point is potent in its persuasiveness of the soundness of the doctrine tha

2015Co., 40 F.3d 796 , 801 n.7 (6th Cir.1994) (stating “[w]e have serious misgivings about the soundness of a test which imposes a more onerous standard for plaintiffs who are white or male than for their non-white or female counterparts”). {38} Proponents of the heightened standard fear that abandoning the background circumstances test will “stifle legitimate employment decisions to diversify and correct the historical imbalance for which Title VII was enacted[,]” and undermine the legislative intent of Title VII.

1944Attention is called to White v. New Mexico Highway Comm., 1938, 42 N.M. 626 , 83 P.2d 457 , decided since the 1937 amendment where, although this precise question was not before the court or decided, it must have been assumed that there was no repeal of the section.

1944Attention is called to White v. New Mexico Highway Comm., 1938, 42 N.M. 626 , 83 P.2d 457 , decided since the 1937 amendment where, although this precise question was not before the court or decided, it must have been assumed that there was no repeal of the section.

1944The question of the court’s communication with the jury, after it had retired to deliberate upon its verdict, was before this court in State v. Costales, 37 N.M. 115 , 19 P.2d 189, 191 , wherein it is said: “ * * * ‘No record was made of the incident or any exception taken, and the Court considered it quite harmless at the time. * * *' “The high character of the trial judge is an adequate guaranty against any conscious act of unfairness, but his suggestion that the absence of a record would be a sufficient answer to the point is potent in its persuasiveness of the soundness of the doctrine tha

1944The question of the court’s communication with the jury, after it had retired to deliberate upon its verdict, was before this court in State v. Costales, 37 N.M. 115 , 19 P.2d 189, 191 , wherein it is said: “ * * * ‘No record was made of the incident or any exception taken, and the Court considered it quite harmless at the time. * * *' “The high character of the trial judge is an adequate guaranty against any conscious act of unfairness, but his suggestion that the absence of a record would be a sufficient answer to the point is potent in its persuasiveness of the soundness of the doctrine tha

1943In the case of Horvath v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 1942, 58 Wyo. 211 , 131 P.2d 315 , it was held that in view of the provisions of the Wyoming statute, Rev.St.1931, § 124-110, to the effect that “no contract * * * shall operate to relieve the employer, in whole or in part, from any liability created” by the act, an agreement on the part of the workman to surrender his right to reopen a workman’s compensation award theretofore made, in consideration of a contract for employment, could not be sustained because there was no consideration for the contract-—that the law prohibited any such forbe

1943In the case of Horvath v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 1942, 58 Wyo. 211 , 131 P.2d 315 , it was held that in view of the provisions of the Wyoming statute, Rev.St.1931, § 124-110, to the effect that “no contract * * * shall operate to relieve the employer, in whole or in part, from any liability created” by the act, an agreement on the part of the workman to surrender his right to reopen a workman’s compensation award theretofore made, in consideration of a contract for employment, could not be sustained because there was no consideration for the contract-—that the law prohibited any such forbe

1937State v. Sullinger, 36 N.M. 148 , 9 P.(2d) 689; State v. Loveless, 39 N.M. 142 , 42 P.(2d) 211.

1937State v. Sullinger, 36 N.M. 148 , 9 P.(2d) 689; State v. Loveless, 39 N.M. 142 , 42 P.(2d) 211.

1936Co., 220 Ala. 6 , 123 So. 271 ; Schwemmer v. Supreme Council C.

1936Co., 220 Ala. 6 , 123 So. 271 ; Schwemmer v. Supreme Council C.

1934R. 471; Sharp v. State, 175 Ark. 1083 , 8 S.W.(2d) 23 ; State v. Phinney, 13 Idaho, 307 , 89 P. 634 , 12 Ann.

1934R. 471; Sharp v. State, 175 Ark. 1083 , 8 S.W.(2d) 23 ; State v. Phinney, 13 Idaho, 307 , 89 P. 634 , 12 Ann.

1934“The weight of judicial opinion seems to favor the conclusion we have reached, but we base it, not upon authority, but upon the soundness of the principle that the defendant should not be allowed to derive an advantage from an error from which she suffered no injury, but, on the contrary, derived a benefit.” Other cases supporting the doctrine approved in the Yargus Case, supra, are Lindsey v. State, 69 Ohio St. 215 , 69 N. E. 126 ; State v. Allison, 330 Mo. 773 , 51 S.W.(2d) 51 , 85 A. L.

1934“The weight of judicial opinion seems to favor the conclusion we have reached, but we base it, not upon authority, but upon the soundness of the principle that the defendant should not be allowed to derive an advantage from an error from which she suffered no injury, but, on the contrary, derived a benefit.” Other cases supporting the doctrine approved in the Yargus Case, supra, are Lindsey v. State, 69 Ohio St. 215 , 69 N. E. 126 ; State v. Allison, 330 Mo. 773 , 51 S.W.(2d) 51 , 85 A. L.

1934R. 471; Sharp v. State, 175 Ark. 1083 , 8 S.W.(2d) 23 ; State v. Phinney, 13 Idaho, 307 , 89 P. 634 , 12 Ann.

1928The matters set forth in this affidavit, if we could consider the same, might suggest that the jury had arrived at their verdict in an improper manner; but as was said in Goldenberg v. Law, 17 N. M. 546, 131 P. 499 : “It has been settled upon sound consideration of public policy that the testimony of jurors is inadmissible' in support of a motion to set aside a verdict on the ground of misconduct of the jury.” Appellant admits'the soundness of this doctrine, but thinks that the verdict itself indicates that it was arrived at in an improper manner.

1912The appellant cites the case of Dyer v. Morse, 10 Wash. 492 , 39 Pac. 138 , as supporting the construction for which he contends.

1912The appellant cites the case of Dyer v. Morse, 10 Wash. 492 , 39 Pac. 138 , as supporting the construction for which he contends.