soundness principle in Pennsylvania

1927If his right to the exemption be doubtful, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the State or the municipality in obedience to that fundamental principle of government which requires that the burden of taxation be equally borne by all: Cooley on Taxation, 146; Academy of Fine Arts v. Philadelphia, 22 Pa. 496 ; Com. v. Cover, 29 Pa. Superior Ct. 409 .” The very earnest argument of counsel for the defendant has failed to convince us that his defence to plaintiff’s claim for the municipal improvement is free from doubt, in which event the doubt must be resolved in favor of the municipality — the

1912If his right to the exemption be doubtful, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the state or the municipality in obedience to that fundamental principle of government which requires that the burdens of taxation be equally borne by all: Cooley on Taxation, 146; Academy of Fine Arts v. Philadelphia, 22 Pa. 496 ; Com. v. Cover, 29 Pa. Superior Ct. 409 .

1927If his right to the exemption be doubtful, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the State or the municipality in obedience to that fundamental principle of government which requires that the burden of taxation be equally borne by all: Cooley on Taxation, 146; Academy of Fine Arts v. Philadelphia, 22 Pa. 496 ; Com. v. Cover, 29 Pa. Superior Ct. 409 .” The very earnest argument of counsel for the defendant has failed to convince us that his defence to plaintiff’s claim for the municipal improvement is free from doubt, in which event the doubt must be resolved in favor of the municipality — the

1912If his right to the exemption be doubtful, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the state or the municipality in obedience to that fundamental principle of government which requires that the burdens of taxation be equally borne by all: Cooley on Taxation, 146; Academy of Fine Arts v. Philadelphia, 22 Pa. 496 ; Com. v. Cover, 29 Pa. Superior Ct. 409 .

1886So in D’Arras v. Keyser, 2 Casey, 252, Mr. Justice Woodward, referring with approval to Gore v. Kinney, supra, says: “There can bo no question about the soundness of the principle that, in an equitable action of ejectment, the plaintiff, to be entitled to recover, must not only tender the money before suit brought, but must also have it in court ready to be paid in the event of a verdict in his favor.” This rule, as stated, is restricted in its application, however, to cases where the defendant’s possession is a lawful one, for, in the case last cited, it was held, that if the vendee is once f

1856The principle on which the court ruled the case was, that in an equitable action of ejectment the plaintiff, to be entitled to recover, must not only tender the money before suit brought, but must also have it in court, ready to be paid in the event of a verdict in his favour; and there is no question about the soundness of that principle: Gore v. Kinney, 10 Watts 139 , and the cases cited.

1975It is to be noted, however, that the recent decision of this Court in Commonwealth v. Graves, 461 Pa. 118 , 334 A.2d 661 (1975) effectively overrules Tarver to the extent that Tarver reaffirmed the proposition that evidence of voluntary intoxication is not relevant in felony-murder cases.

1975It is to be noted, however, that the recent decision of this Court in Commonwealth v. Graves, 461 Pa. 118 , 334 A.2d 661 (1975) effectively overrules Tarver to the extent that Tarver reaffirmed the proposition that evidence of voluntary intoxication is not relevant in felony-murder cases.

1961Hensel v. Cahill, 179 Pa. Superior Ct. 114 , 116 A. 2d 99 (1955).

1961Hensel v. Cahill, 179 Pa. Superior Ct. 114 , 116 A. 2d 99 (1955).

1957The soundness of the doctrine which jealously seeks to maintain peace, harmony and good will in the family relation can no longer be questioned. ...” The appellants urge that Minkin (et al,, Appellant) v. Minkin, 336 Pa. 49 , 7 A. 2d 461 , supports their position.

1957The soundness of the doctrine which jealously seeks to maintain peace, harmony and good will in the family relation can no longer be questioned. ...” The appellants urge that Minkin (et al,, Appellant) v. Minkin, 336 Pa. 49 , 7 A. 2d 461 , supports their position.

1947The leading case in this State is Duffy v. Duffy, 117 Pa. Superior Ct. 500 , 178 A. 165 , in which Judge Baldrige, speaking for this Court, referred to the decisions in other states, where the general rule-has been followed with almost complete unanimity, and unequivocally held that an action may not be main-' tained by a parent against an unemancipated child for injuries of the parent, resulting from the child’s negligence.

1947The leading case in this State is Duffy v. Duffy, 117 Pa. Superior Ct. 500 , 178 A. 165 , in which Judge Baldrige, speaking for this Court, referred to the decisions in other states, where the general rule-has been followed with almost complete unanimity, and unequivocally held that an action may not be main-' tained by a parent against an unemancipated child for injuries of the parent, resulting from the child’s negligence.

1933Co. v. Hazen, 110 Pa. 530 , appeared to recognize the soundness of the rule that if the partnership property, insured to the two partners, “was burned by one of the parties plaintiff” (see page 531 for a statement of the defenses set up), this would be a defense to an action brought upon the policy by the partners as such.

1925No useful purpose will be served by a discussion of the question raised by the learned counsel for appellee, to wit, the soundness of the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court, that the payment of a tax and the securing of a license is a condition precedent to the lawful transaction of business by a real estate broker; that he cannot have the aid of the courts to recover commissions which were earned before he had paid his tax and received a license: Luce v. Cook, 227 Pa. 224 ; Meyer v. Wiest, 250 Pa. 573 .

1925No useful purpose will be served by a discussion of the question raised by the learned counsel for appellee, to wit, the soundness of the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court, that the payment of a tax and the securing of a license is a condition precedent to the lawful transaction of business by a real estate broker; that he cannot have the aid of the courts to recover commissions which were earned before he had paid his tax and received a license: Luce v. Cook, 227 Pa. 224 ; Meyer v. Wiest, 250 Pa. 573 .

1922And, again, as is said by Judge Head in Mount Oliver Borough v. First German Evangelical Lutheran Congregation, 51 Pa. Superior Ct. 343 , at page 346: “In determining the soundness of such claim for exemption, the statute creating an exempt class must be strictly construed against the claimant.

1915It is entirely too late now to question either the rule or the exception......The interest of Tracy, Benton & Co. in the profits being, by the terms of the agreement, ‘a commission upon the sale of the merchandise consigned to them, equal to one-half of thé net profits upon such sale,’ did not make them partners, nor attach to them either the rights or the responsibilities of such partners.” In Ryder v. Jacobs, 182 Pa. 624, 629 , Mr. Justice Dean speaking for the court said: “This court, since Miller v. Bartlet, 15 S. & R. 137, decided in 1826, and Dunham v. Rogers, 1 Pa. 255 , decided in 1845

1915It is entirely too late now to question either the rule or the exception......The interest of Tracy, Benton & Co. in the profits being, by the terms of the agreement, ‘a commission upon the sale of the merchandise consigned to them, equal to one-half of thé net profits upon such sale,’ did not make them partners, nor attach to them either the rights or the responsibilities of such partners.” In Ryder v. Jacobs, 182 Pa. 624, 629 , Mr. Justice Dean speaking for the court said: “This court, since Miller v. Bartlet, 15 S. & R. 137, decided in 1826, and Dunham v. Rogers, 1 Pa. 255 , decided in 1845

1915It is entirely too late now to question either the rule or the exception......The interest of Tracy, Benton & Co. in the profits being, by the terms of the agreement, ‘a commission upon the sale of the merchandise consigned to them, equal to one-half of thé net profits upon such sale,’ did not make them partners, nor attach to them either the rights or the responsibilities of such partners.” In Ryder v. Jacobs, 182 Pa. 624, 629 , Mr. Justice Dean speaking for the court said: “This court, since Miller v. Bartlet, 15 S. & R. 137, decided in 1826, and Dunham v. Rogers, 1 Pa. 255 , decided in 1845

1913And in the same opinion, after . presenting an analysis of the decision in Earp’s Appeal, and comparing it with the decisions in Moss’s App., 83 Pa. 264 ; Biddle’s App., 99 Pa. 278 ; McKeen’s App., 42 Pa. 479 ; Vinton’s App., 99 Pa. 434 ; Oliver’s Est., 136 Pa. 43 ; Wiltbank’s App., 64 Pa. 256 , Mr. Justice Clark said (p. 355) that this rule has “for more than the third of a century, been steadily maintained, without modification or change; in no subsequent case, we believe, has its authority been doubted, its practicability questioned, or the soundness of its doctrine impeached.

1913And in the same opinion, after . presenting an analysis of the decision in Earp’s Appeal, and comparing it with the decisions in Moss’s App., 83 Pa. 264 ; Biddle’s App., 99 Pa. 278 ; McKeen’s App., 42 Pa. 479 ; Vinton’s App., 99 Pa. 434 ; Oliver’s Est., 136 Pa. 43 ; Wiltbank’s App., 64 Pa. 256 , Mr. Justice Clark said (p. 355) that this rule has “for more than the third of a century, been steadily maintained, without modification or change; in no subsequent case, we believe, has its authority been doubted, its practicability questioned, or the soundness of its doctrine impeached.

1913And in the same opinion, after . presenting an analysis of the decision in Earp’s Appeal, and comparing it with the decisions in Moss’s App., 83 Pa. 264 ; Biddle’s App., 99 Pa. 278 ; McKeen’s App., 42 Pa. 479 ; Vinton’s App., 99 Pa. 434 ; Oliver’s Est., 136 Pa. 43 ; Wiltbank’s App., 64 Pa. 256 , Mr. Justice Clark said (p. 355) that this rule has “for more than the third of a century, been steadily maintained, without modification or change; in no subsequent case, we believe, has its authority been doubted, its practicability questioned, or the soundness of its doctrine impeached.

1913And in the same opinion, after . presenting an analysis of the decision in Earp’s Appeal, and comparing it with the decisions in Moss’s App., 83 Pa. 264 ; Biddle’s App., 99 Pa. 278 ; McKeen’s App., 42 Pa. 479 ; Vinton’s App., 99 Pa. 434 ; Oliver’s Est., 136 Pa. 43 ; Wiltbank’s App., 64 Pa. 256 , Mr. Justice Clark said (p. 355) that this rule has “for more than the third of a century, been steadily maintained, without modification or change; in no subsequent case, we believe, has its authority been doubted, its practicability questioned, or the soundness of its doctrine impeached.

1913And in the same opinion, after . presenting an analysis of the decision in Earp’s Appeal, and comparing it with the decisions in Moss’s App., 83 Pa. 264 ; Biddle’s App., 99 Pa. 278 ; McKeen’s App., 42 Pa. 479 ; Vinton’s App., 99 Pa. 434 ; Oliver’s Est., 136 Pa. 43 ; Wiltbank’s App., 64 Pa. 256 , Mr. Justice Clark said (p. 355) that this rule has “for more than the third of a century, been steadily maintained, without modification or change; in no subsequent case, we believe, has its authority been doubted, its practicability questioned, or the soundness of its doctrine impeached.

1913And in the same opinion, after . presenting an analysis of the decision in Earp’s Appeal, and comparing it with the decisions in Moss’s App., 83 Pa. 264 ; Biddle’s App., 99 Pa. 278 ; McKeen’s App., 42 Pa. 479 ; Vinton’s App., 99 Pa. 434 ; Oliver’s Est., 136 Pa. 43 ; Wiltbank’s App., 64 Pa. 256 , Mr. Justice Clark said (p. 355) that this rule has “for more than the third of a century, been steadily maintained, without modification or change; in no subsequent case, we believe, has its authority been doubted, its practicability questioned, or the soundness of its doctrine impeached.

1912Co., 1 Pears. 298 .” After a careful examination of a number of objections advanced to the soundness of the principle enunciated, the learned judge thus states the results of his examination of the general question under consideration: “It thus seems to be clear (1) that a railway company occupying streets in a city is, at common law, hable to repair the space covered by its right of way thereon, when out of repair, in a manner corresponding with the pavement of the rest of the street, etc.” A judgment in favor of the city and against the traction company for the cost of the repairs made by th

1912This language is quoted with approval by Mr. Justice Sharswood in McClintock v. Rush, 63 Pa. 203 , and in many later cases.

1909A leading case is Norris Bros. v. Commonwealth, 27 Pa. 494 , wherein Black, J., said: “A dealer, in the popular, and therefore in the statutory sense of the word, is not one who buys to keep, or makes to sell, but one who buys to sell again.

1897Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago Railroad Company v. Hinds, 53 Pa. 512 , cited by the appellee, was an action against a common carrier of passengers, for an injury to a passenger by one of a mob of drunken men who suddenly invaded a car.

1891Now, the difference betwixt that case and the present is that here the feme was married at the time of the gift, and there she was not; but the effect of it is only that she had in our case an unquestionable separate use during the first coverture.” These cases were followed and re-affirmed in Harrison v. Brolaskey, 20 Pa. 299 ; Steacy v. Rice, 27 Pa. 75 ; Bush’s App., 38 Pa. 85 ; McKee v. McKinley, 33 Pa. 92 ; Nice’s App., 50 Pa. 143 ; Freyvogle v. Hughes, 56 Pa. 228 ; Koenig’s App., 57 Pa. 352 .

1891Now, the difference betwixt that case and the present is that here the feme was married at the time of the gift, and there she was not; but the effect of it is only that she had in our case an unquestionable separate use during the first coverture.” These cases were followed and re-affirmed in Harrison v. Brolaskey, 20 Pa. 299 ; Steacy v. Rice, 27 Pa. 75 ; Bush’s App., 38 Pa. 85 ; McKee v. McKinley, 33 Pa. 92 ; Nice’s App., 50 Pa. 143 ; Freyvogle v. Hughes, 56 Pa. 228 ; Koenig’s App., 57 Pa. 352 .

1891Now, the difference betwixt that case and the present is that here the feme was married at the time of the gift, and there she was not; but the effect of it is only that she had in our case an unquestionable separate use during the first coverture.” These cases were followed and re-affirmed in Harrison v. Brolaskey, 20 Pa. 299 ; Steacy v. Rice, 27 Pa. 75 ; Bush’s App., 38 Pa. 85 ; McKee v. McKinley, 33 Pa. 92 ; Nice’s App., 50 Pa. 143 ; Freyvogle v. Hughes, 56 Pa. 228 ; Koenig’s App., 57 Pa. 352 .

1891Now, the difference betwixt that case and the present is that here the feme was married at the time of the gift, and there she was not; but the effect of it is only that she had in our case an unquestionable separate use during the first coverture.” These cases were followed and re-affirmed in Harrison v. Brolaskey, 20 Pa. 299 ; Steacy v. Rice, 27 Pa. 75 ; Bush’s App., 38 Pa. 85 ; McKee v. McKinley, 33 Pa. 92 ; Nice’s App., 50 Pa. 143 ; Freyvogle v. Hughes, 56 Pa. 228 ; Koenig’s App., 57 Pa. 352 .

1891Now, the difference betwixt that case and the present is that here the feme was married at the time of the gift, and there she was not; but the effect of it is only that she had in our case an unquestionable separate use during the first coverture.” These cases were followed and re-affirmed in Harrison v. Brolaskey, 20 Pa. 299 ; Steacy v. Rice, 27 Pa. 75 ; Bush’s App., 38 Pa. 85 ; McKee v. McKinley, 33 Pa. 92 ; Nice’s App., 50 Pa. 143 ; Freyvogle v. Hughes, 56 Pa. 228 ; Koenig’s App., 57 Pa. 352 .