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57 California opinions name it 2 courts 1895–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Finnell v. Finnellgreen2 sentences1970It is not necessary that the payment should have been coerced by actual legal proceedings; the mere existence of the legal liability is sufficient.’ [Citation.]” To the same effect is Page v. Podol, 4 Cal.App.2d 229 [ 41 P.2d 167 ], containing a quotation at page 231 from Finnell v. Finnell, 159 Cal. 535, 539 [ 114 P. 820 ]: “The soundness of this doctrine has been upheld by innumerable decisions of courts of the highest authority in many jurisdictions, and it is so obviously just and reasonable that it is matter of wonder that it should ever have been called in question.” *444 Im the instant 1970It is not necessary that the payment should have been coerced by actual legal proceedings; the mere existence of the legal liability is sufficient.’ [Citation.]” To the same effect is Page v. Podol, 4 Cal.App.2d 229 [ 41 P.2d 167 ], containing a quotation at page 231 from Finnell v. Finnell, 159 Cal. 535, 539 [ 114 P. 820 ]: “The soundness of this doctrine has been upheld by innumerable decisions of courts of the highest authority in many jurisdictions, and it is so obviously just and reasonable that it is matter of wonder that it should ever have been called in question.” *444 Im the instant | 3 | 3 |
Leaf v. City of San Mateogreen2 sentences1994(E.g., City of Long Beach v. Sten (1929) 206 Cal. 473 [ 274 P. 968 ].) However, in Renfrew v. Loysen (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1107-1110 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 413 ] the court, relying on dictum in CLAM, questioned the soundness of the rule and held that an attorney prosecuting his own contractual claim pro se is entitled to attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717 (pp. 1109-1110; see Hambrose Reserve, Ltd. v. Faitz (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 129, 131 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 638 ]; Leaf v. City of San Mateo (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 1184, 1187-1189 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 447 ].) Plaintiff acknowledges that Renfrew invo 1994(E.g., City of Long Beach v. Sten (1929) 206 Cal. 473 [ 274 P. 968 ].) However, in Renfrew v. Loysen (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1107-1110 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 413 ] the court, relying on dictum in CLAM, questioned the soundness of the rule and held that an attorney prosecuting his own contractual claim pro se is entitled to attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717 (pp. 1109-1110; see Hambrose Reserve, Ltd. v. Faitz (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 129, 131 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 638 ]; Leaf v. City of San Mateo (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 1184, 1187-1189 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 447 ].) Plaintiff acknowledges that Renfrew invo | 2 | 2 |
O'CONNELL v. Zimmermangreen2 sentences1992(City of Long Beach v. Sten (1929) 206 Cal. 473 [ 274 P. 968 ]; Patterson v. Donner (1874) 48 Cal. 369, 380 ; O’Connell v. Zimmerman (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 330, 337 [ 321 P.2d 161 ]; City of Los Angeles v. Hunt (1935) 8 Cal.App.2d 401, 403-404 [ 47 P.2d 1075 ]; cf. Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 891, 915, fn. 13 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 124 , 603 P.2d 41 ].) In Renfrew v. Loysen (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1105 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 447 ], the court, relying on dictum in Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies, supra, questioning the soundness of the rule, held an attorney p 1992(City of Long Beach v. Sten (1929) 206 Cal. 473 [ 274 P. 968 ]; Patterson v. Donner (1874) 48 Cal. 369, 380 ; O’Connell v. Zimmerman (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 330, 337 [ 321 P.2d 161 ]; City of Los Angeles v. Hunt (1935) 8 Cal.App.2d 401, 403-404 [ 47 P.2d 1075 ]; cf. Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 891, 915, fn. 13 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 124 , 603 P.2d 41 ].) In Renfrew v. Loysen (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1105 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 447 ], the court, relying on dictum in Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies, supra, questioning the soundness of the rule, held an attorney p | 2 | 2 |
Collison v. Thomasgreen2 sentences1966As stated in Collison v. Thomas, 55 Cal.2d 490, 498 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 555 , 360 P.2d 51 ] : '“A party cannot permit an issue to be litigated and on appeal escape the consequences by claiming that such issue was not pleaded.” [Citations.] While the pretrial order now frames the issues remaining in dispute [citation] and in this respect supersedes the pleading [citation], the quoted rule should be equally applicable however the issues are framed.’ [Citation.] “The soundness of this principle is manifest in this case. 1966As stated in Collison v. Thomas, 55 Cal.2d 490, 498 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 555 , 360 P.2d 51 ] : '“A party cannot permit an issue to be litigated and on appeal escape the consequences by claiming that such issue was not pleaded.” [Citations.] While the pretrial order now frames the issues remaining in dispute [citation] and in this respect supersedes the pleading [citation], the quoted rule should be equally applicable however the issues are framed.’ [Citation.] “The soundness of this principle is manifest in this case. | 2 | 2 |
East Bay Municipal Utility District v. City of Lodigreen2 sentences1936(East Bay Municipal Utilities Dist. v. Lodi, 120 Cal. App. 740, 748 [ 8 Pac. (2d) 532 ]; Sternes v. Sutter Butte Canal Co., 61 Cal. App. 737 [ 216 Pac. 66 ]; Lewis on Eminent Domain, 1313.) While the soundness of the rule may not be questioned, and while the converse of this rule relied upon by respondent is also well established, to the effect that damages not necessarily included in the issues in the condemnation action may be recovered in a subsequent action, neither rule is helpful in determining what claims are barred and what are not barred by the judgment of condemnation. 1936(East Bay Municipal Utilities Dist. v. Lodi, 120 Cal. App. 740, 748 [ 8 Pac. (2d) 532 ]; Sternes v. Sutter Butte Canal Co., 61 Cal. App. 737 [ 216 Pac. 66 ]; Lewis on Eminent Domain, 1313.) While the soundness of the rule may not be questioned, and while the converse of this rule relied upon by respondent is also well established, to the effect that damages not necessarily included in the issues in the condemnation action may be recovered in a subsequent action, neither rule is helpful in determining what claims are barred and what are not barred by the judgment of condemnation. | 2 | 2 |
Renfrew v. Loysengreen2 sentences1994(E.g., City of Long Beach v. Sten (1929) 206 Cal. 473 [ 274 P. 968 ].) However, in Renfrew v. Loysen (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1107-1110 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 413 ] the court, relying on dictum in CLAM, questioned the soundness of the rule and held that an attorney prosecuting his own contractual claim pro se is entitled to attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717 (pp. 1109-1110; see Hambrose Reserve, Ltd. v. Faitz (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 129, 131 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 638 ]; Leaf v. City of San Mateo (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 1184, 1187-1189 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 447 ].) Plaintiff acknowledges that Renfrew invo 1994(E.g., City of Long Beach v. Sten (1929) 206 Cal. 473 [ 274 P. 968 ].) However, in Renfrew v. Loysen (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1107-1110 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 413 ] the court, relying on dictum in CLAM, questioned the soundness of the rule and held that an attorney prosecuting his own contractual claim pro se is entitled to attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717 (pp. 1109-1110; see Hambrose Reserve, Ltd. v. Faitz (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 129, 131 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 638 ]; Leaf v. City of San Mateo (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 1184, 1187-1189 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 447 ].) Plaintiff acknowledges that Renfrew invo | 1 | 2 |
People v. Ansaldogreen1 sentence2013(People v. Ansaldo (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1196 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two] [declining to follow La Fontaine and questioning the soundness of its rule in light of the state Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 658 ]; People v. Herman, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1387 [concluding, “[w]e do not believe the categorical rule adopted in La Fontaine is sound in its own right or constitutes a correct statement of California law”].) Indeed, since La Fontaine was decided in 1978, the state Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that there is no set standard for distingui | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hermangreen1 sentence2013(People v. Ansaldo (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1196 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two] [declining to follow La Fontaine and questioning the soundness of its rule in light of the state Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 658 ]; People v. Herman, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1387 [concluding, “[w]e do not believe the categorical rule adopted in La Fontaine is sound in its own right or constitutes a correct statement of California law”].) Indeed, since La Fontaine was decided in 1978, the state Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that there is no set standard for distingui | 1 | 1 |
In Re Lucasgreen2 sentences2007(See In re Lucas (2004) 33 Cal.4th 682, 720, 719 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 , 94 P.3d 477 ] [suggesting that to rebut “evidence of institutional failure and positive character traits,” the prosecution could introduce evidence “that from a very early age, petitioner demonstrated lack of conscience, a propensity for violence, and defiance of authority that did not respond to psychotherapy and that he committed criminal offenses as a juvenile, was subject to temper tantrums and uncontrollable rages as a child, was destructive, and sought only to please himself’].) With regard to argument, as noted, it 2007(See In re Lucas (2004) 33 Cal.4th 682, 720, 719 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 , 94 P.3d 477 ] [suggesting that to rebut “evidence of institutional failure and positive character traits,” the prosecution could introduce evidence “that from a very early age, petitioner demonstrated lack of conscience, a propensity for violence, and defiance of authority that did not respond to psychotherapy and that he committed criminal offenses as a juvenile, was subject to temper tantrums and uncontrollable rages as a child, was destructive, and sought only to please himself’].) With regard to argument, as noted, it | 1 | 1 |
Schweitzer v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'ngreen2 sentences1994Because another person might bear the very name assumed by the impostor and might have *805 some contractual relationships with the impostor does not subject to a loss the drawee bank when it has paid the check to the person intended as the payee.” (Schweitzer v. Bank of America (1941) 42 Cal.App.2d 536, 540 [ 109 P.2d 441 ]. 1994Because another person might bear the very name assumed by the impostor and might have *805 some contractual relationships with the impostor does not subject to a loss the drawee bank when it has paid the check to the person intended as the payee.” (Schweitzer v. Bank of America (1941) 42 Cal.App.2d 536, 540 [ 109 P.2d 441 ]. | 1 | 1 |
Hambrose Reserve, Ltd. v. Faitzgreen2 sentences1994(E.g., City of Long Beach v. Sten (1929) 206 Cal. 473 [ 274 P. 968 ].) However, in Renfrew v. Loysen (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1107-1110 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 413 ] the court, relying on dictum in CLAM, questioned the soundness of the rule and held that an attorney prosecuting his own contractual claim pro se is entitled to attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717 (pp. 1109-1110; see Hambrose Reserve, Ltd. v. Faitz (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 129, 131 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 638 ]; Leaf v. City of San Mateo (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 1184, 1187-1189 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 447 ].) Plaintiff acknowledges that Renfrew invo 1994(E.g., City of Long Beach v. Sten (1929) 206 Cal. 473 [ 274 P. 968 ].) However, in Renfrew v. Loysen (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1107-1110 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 413 ] the court, relying on dictum in CLAM, questioned the soundness of the rule and held that an attorney prosecuting his own contractual claim pro se is entitled to attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717 (pp. 1109-1110; see Hambrose Reserve, Ltd. v. Faitz (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 129, 131 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 638 ]; Leaf v. City of San Mateo (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 1184, 1187-1189 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 447 ].) Plaintiff acknowledges that Renfrew invo | 1 | 1 |
City of Los Angeles v. Huntgreen2 sentences1992(City of Long Beach v. Sten (1929) 206 Cal. 473 [ 274 P. 968 ]; Patterson v. Donner (1874) 48 Cal. 369, 380 ; O’Connell v. Zimmerman (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 330, 337 [ 321 P.2d 161 ]; City of Los Angeles v. Hunt (1935) 8 Cal.App.2d 401, 403-404 [ 47 P.2d 1075 ]; cf. Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 891, 915, fn. 13 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 124 , 603 P.2d 41 ].) In Renfrew v. Loysen (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1105 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 447 ], the court, relying on dictum in Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies, supra, questioning the soundness of the rule, held an attorney p 1992(City of Long Beach v. Sten (1929) 206 Cal. 473 [ 274 P. 968 ]; Patterson v. Donner (1874) 48 Cal. 369, 380 ; O’Connell v. Zimmerman (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 330, 337 [ 321 P.2d 161 ]; City of Los Angeles v. Hunt (1935) 8 Cal.App.2d 401, 403-404 [ 47 P.2d 1075 ]; cf. Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 891, 915, fn. 13 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 124 , 603 P.2d 41 ].) In Renfrew v. Loysen (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1105 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 447 ], the court, relying on dictum in Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies, supra, questioning the soundness of the rule, held an attorney p | 1 | 1 |
Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Commissiongreen2 sentences1992(City of Long Beach v. Sten (1929) 206 Cal. 473 [ 274 P. 968 ]; Patterson v. Donner (1874) 48 Cal. 369, 380 ; O’Connell v. Zimmerman (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 330, 337 [ 321 P.2d 161 ]; City of Los Angeles v. Hunt (1935) 8 Cal.App.2d 401, 403-404 [ 47 P.2d 1075 ]; cf. Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 891, 915, fn. 13 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 124 , 603 P.2d 41 ].) In Renfrew v. Loysen (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1105 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 447 ], the court, relying on dictum in Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies, supra, questioning the soundness of the rule, held an attorney p 1992(City of Long Beach v. Sten (1929) 206 Cal. 473 [ 274 P. 968 ]; Patterson v. Donner (1874) 48 Cal. 369, 380 ; O’Connell v. Zimmerman (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 330, 337 [ 321 P.2d 161 ]; City of Los Angeles v. Hunt (1935) 8 Cal.App.2d 401, 403-404 [ 47 P.2d 1075 ]; cf. Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 891, 915, fn. 13 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 124 , 603 P.2d 41 ].) In Renfrew v. Loysen (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1105 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 447 ], the court, relying on dictum in Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies, supra, questioning the soundness of the rule, held an attorney p | 1 | 1 |
| Moore v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Solgaard v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Gonzalesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| County of Placer v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Vesci v. Ingrimgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wilson v. Wilsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Estate of Adamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kruckow v. Lessergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sweeley v. Sweeleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gouanillou v. Industrial Accident Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ex parte Sticegreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Bermangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Overend v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Long Beach v. Sten
green
2 sentences1994(E.g., City of Long Beach v. Sten (1929) 206 Cal. 473 [ 274 P. 968 ].) However, in Renfrew v. Loysen (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1107-1110 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 413 ] the court, relying on dictum in CLAM, questioned the soundness of the rule and held that an attorney prosecuting his own contractual claim pro se is entitled to attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717 (pp. 1109-1110; see Hambrose Reserve, Ltd. v. Faitz (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 129, 131 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 638 ]; Leaf v. City of San Mateo (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 1184, 1187-1189 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 447 ].) Plaintiff acknowledges that Renfrew invo 1994(E.g., City of Long Beach v. Sten (1929) 206 Cal. 473 [ 274 P. 968 ].) However, in Renfrew v. Loysen (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1107-1110 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 413 ] the court, relying on dictum in CLAM, questioned the soundness of the rule and held that an attorney prosecuting his own contractual claim pro se is entitled to attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717 (pp. 1109-1110; see Hambrose Reserve, Ltd. v. Faitz (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 129, 131 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 638 ]; Leaf v. City of San Mateo (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 1184, 1187-1189 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 447 ].) Plaintiff acknowledges that Renfrew invo | 2 | 1992–1994 |
Patterson v. Donner
green
2 sentences1992(City of Long Beach v. Sten (1929) 206 Cal. 473 [ 274 P. 968 ]; Patterson v. Donner (1874) 48 Cal. 369, 380 ; O’Connell v. Zimmerman (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 330, 337 [ 321 P.2d 161 ]; City of Los Angeles v. Hunt (1935) 8 Cal.App.2d 401, 403-404 [ 47 P.2d 1075 ]; cf. Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 891, 915, fn. 13 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 124 , 603 P.2d 41 ].) In Renfrew v. Loysen (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1105 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 447 ], the court, relying on dictum in Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies, supra, questioning the soundness of the rule, held an attorney p 1985We do not think that the stipulation in the mortgage sued on, for counsel fee, can apply where no counsel fee was paid by the plaintiff.” (Patterson v. Donner, supra, at p. 380 .) The rule thus emerged: “When an attorney represents himself in an action he may not recover the reasonable value of his fee, for he has paid no fee nor has he incurred any liability to pay an attorney fee.” (O’Connell v. Zimmerman (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 330, 337 [ 321 P.2d 161 ].) However, the soundness of this rule has been seriously questioned by the California Supreme Court in a case involving the right of an indiv | 2 | 1985–1992 |
Kline v. San Francisco Unified School District
green
2 sentences1957School Dist., 37 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 99 P.2d 314 ]; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54 [ 53 P.2d 952 ]; Johnson v. City of Glendale, supra, [ 12 Cal.App.2d 389 ( 55 P.2d 580 )]; Thompson v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App. 73 [ 35 P.2d 185 ]; Kahrs v. County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal.App.2d 46 [ 82 P.2d 29 ]; Strath v. City of Santa Rosa, 19 Cal.App.2d 382 [ 65 P.2d 894 ]; Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267 [ 49 P.2d 320 ]; Young v. County of Ventura, 39 Cal.App.2d 732 [ 104 P.2d 102 ]; Kline v. San Francisco U. School Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174 [ 104 P.2d 661 ]; Kelso v. Board of E 1957School Dist., 37 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 99 P.2d 314 ]; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54 [ 53 P.2d 952 ]; Johnson v. City of Glendale, supra, [ 12 Cal.App.2d 389 ( 55 P.2d 580 )]; Thompson v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App. 73 [ 35 P.2d 185 ]; Kahrs v. County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal.App.2d 46 [ 82 P.2d 29 ]; Strath v. City of Santa Rosa, 19 Cal.App.2d 382 [ 65 P.2d 894 ]; Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267 [ 49 P.2d 320 ]; Young v. County of Ventura, 39 Cal.App.2d 732 [ 104 P.2d 102 ]; Kline v. San Francisco U. School Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174 [ 104 P.2d 661 ]; Kelso v. Board of E | 2 | 1941–1957 |
Kahrs v. County of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences1957School Dist., 37 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 99 P.2d 314 ]; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54 [ 53 P.2d 952 ]; Johnson v. City of Glendale, supra, [ 12 Cal.App.2d 389 ( 55 P.2d 580 )]; Thompson v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App. 73 [ 35 P.2d 185 ]; Kahrs v. County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal.App.2d 46 [ 82 P.2d 29 ]; Strath v. City of Santa Rosa, 19 Cal.App.2d 382 [ 65 P.2d 894 ]; Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267 [ 49 P.2d 320 ]; Young v. County of Ventura, 39 Cal.App.2d 732 [ 104 P.2d 102 ]; Kline v. San Francisco U. School Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174 [ 104 P.2d 661 ]; Kelso v. Board of E 1957School Dist., 37 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 99 P.2d 314 ]; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54 [ 53 P.2d 952 ]; Johnson v. City of Glendale, supra, [ 12 Cal.App.2d 389 ( 55 P.2d 580 )]; Thompson v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App. 73 [ 35 P.2d 185 ]; Kahrs v. County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal.App.2d 46 [ 82 P.2d 29 ]; Strath v. City of Santa Rosa, 19 Cal.App.2d 382 [ 65 P.2d 894 ]; Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267 [ 49 P.2d 320 ]; Young v. County of Ventura, 39 Cal.App.2d 732 [ 104 P.2d 102 ]; Kline v. San Francisco U. School Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174 [ 104 P.2d 661 ]; Kelso v. Board of E | 2 | 1941–1957 |
Kelso v. Board of Education
green
2 sentences1957School Dist., 37 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 99 P.2d 314 ]; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54 [ 53 P.2d 952 ]; Johnson v. City of Glendale, supra, [ 12 Cal.App.2d 389 ( 55 P.2d 580 )]; Thompson v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App. 73 [ 35 P.2d 185 ]; Kahrs v. County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal.App.2d 46 [ 82 P.2d 29 ]; Strath v. City of Santa Rosa, 19 Cal.App.2d 382 [ 65 P.2d 894 ]; Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267 [ 49 P.2d 320 ]; Young v. County of Ventura, 39 Cal.App.2d 732 [ 104 P.2d 102 ]; Kline v. San Francisco U. School Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174 [ 104 P.2d 661 ]; Kelso v. Board of E 1957School Dist., 37 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 99 P.2d 314 ]; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54 [ 53 P.2d 952 ]; Johnson v. City of Glendale, supra, [ 12 Cal.App.2d 389 ( 55 P.2d 580 )]; Thompson v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App. 73 [ 35 P.2d 185 ]; Kahrs v. County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal.App.2d 46 [ 82 P.2d 29 ]; Strath v. City of Santa Rosa, 19 Cal.App.2d 382 [ 65 P.2d 894 ]; Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267 [ 49 P.2d 320 ]; Young v. County of Ventura, 39 Cal.App.2d 732 [ 104 P.2d 102 ]; Kline v. San Francisco U. School Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174 [ 104 P.2d 661 ]; Kelso v. Board of E | 2 | 1941–1957 |
Thompson v. County of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences1957School Dist., 37 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 99 P.2d 314 ]; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54 [ 53 P.2d 952 ]; Johnson v. City of Glendale, supra, [ 12 Cal.App.2d 389 ( 55 P.2d 580 )]; Thompson v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App. 73 [ 35 P.2d 185 ]; Kahrs v. County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal.App.2d 46 [ 82 P.2d 29 ]; Strath v. City of Santa Rosa, 19 Cal.App.2d 382 [ 65 P.2d 894 ]; Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267 [ 49 P.2d 320 ]; Young v. County of Ventura, 39 Cal.App.2d 732 [ 104 P.2d 102 ]; Kline v. San Francisco U. School Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174 [ 104 P.2d 661 ]; Kelso v. Board of E 1957School Dist., 37 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 99 P.2d 314 ]; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54 [ 53 P.2d 952 ]; Johnson v. City of Glendale, supra, [ 12 Cal.App.2d 389 ( 55 P.2d 580 )]; Thompson v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App. 73 [ 35 P.2d 185 ]; Kahrs v. County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal.App.2d 46 [ 82 P.2d 29 ]; Strath v. City of Santa Rosa, 19 Cal.App.2d 382 [ 65 P.2d 894 ]; Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267 [ 49 P.2d 320 ]; Young v. County of Ventura, 39 Cal.App.2d 732 [ 104 P.2d 102 ]; Kline v. San Francisco U. School Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174 [ 104 P.2d 661 ]; Kelso v. Board of E | 2 | 1941–1957 |
Spencer v. City of Calipatria
green
2 sentences1957School Dist., 37 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 99 P.2d 314 ]; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54 [ 53 P.2d 952 ]; Johnson v. City of Glendale, supra, [ 12 Cal.App.2d 389 ( 55 P.2d 580 )]; Thompson v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App. 73 [ 35 P.2d 185 ]; Kahrs v. County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal.App.2d 46 [ 82 P.2d 29 ]; Strath v. City of Santa Rosa, 19 Cal.App.2d 382 [ 65 P.2d 894 ]; Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267 [ 49 P.2d 320 ]; Young v. County of Ventura, 39 Cal.App.2d 732 [ 104 P.2d 102 ]; Kline v. San Francisco U. School Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174 [ 104 P.2d 661 ]; Kelso v. Board of E 1957School Dist., 37 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 99 P.2d 314 ]; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54 [ 53 P.2d 952 ]; Johnson v. City of Glendale, supra, [ 12 Cal.App.2d 389 ( 55 P.2d 580 )]; Thompson v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App. 73 [ 35 P.2d 185 ]; Kahrs v. County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal.App.2d 46 [ 82 P.2d 29 ]; Strath v. City of Santa Rosa, 19 Cal.App.2d 382 [ 65 P.2d 894 ]; Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267 [ 49 P.2d 320 ]; Young v. County of Ventura, 39 Cal.App.2d 732 [ 104 P.2d 102 ]; Kline v. San Francisco U. School Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174 [ 104 P.2d 661 ]; Kelso v. Board of E | 2 | 1941–1957 |
Strath v. City of Santa Rosa
neutral
2 sentences1957School Dist., 37 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 99 P.2d 314 ]; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54 [ 53 P.2d 952 ]; Johnson v. City of Glendale, supra, [ 12 Cal.App.2d 389 ( 55 P.2d 580 )]; Thompson v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App. 73 [ 35 P.2d 185 ]; Kahrs v. County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal.App.2d 46 [ 82 P.2d 29 ]; Strath v. City of Santa Rosa, 19 Cal.App.2d 382 [ 65 P.2d 894 ]; Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267 [ 49 P.2d 320 ]; Young v. County of Ventura, 39 Cal.App.2d 732 [ 104 P.2d 102 ]; Kline v. San Francisco U. School Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174 [ 104 P.2d 661 ]; Kelso v. Board of E 1957School Dist., 37 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 99 P.2d 314 ]; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54 [ 53 P.2d 952 ]; Johnson v. City of Glendale, supra, [ 12 Cal.App.2d 389 ( 55 P.2d 580 )]; Thompson v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App. 73 [ 35 P.2d 185 ]; Kahrs v. County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal.App.2d 46 [ 82 P.2d 29 ]; Strath v. City of Santa Rosa, 19 Cal.App.2d 382 [ 65 P.2d 894 ]; Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267 [ 49 P.2d 320 ]; Young v. County of Ventura, 39 Cal.App.2d 732 [ 104 P.2d 102 ]; Kline v. San Francisco U. School Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174 [ 104 P.2d 661 ]; Kelso v. Board of E | 2 | 1941–1957 |
Young v. County of Ventura
green
2 sentences1957School Dist., 37 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 99 P.2d 314 ]; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54 [ 53 P.2d 952 ]; Johnson v. City of Glendale, supra, [ 12 Cal.App.2d 389 ( 55 P.2d 580 )]; Thompson v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App. 73 [ 35 P.2d 185 ]; Kahrs v. County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal.App.2d 46 [ 82 P.2d 29 ]; Strath v. City of Santa Rosa, 19 Cal.App.2d 382 [ 65 P.2d 894 ]; Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267 [ 49 P.2d 320 ]; Young v. County of Ventura, 39 Cal.App.2d 732 [ 104 P.2d 102 ]; Kline v. San Francisco U. School Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174 [ 104 P.2d 661 ]; Kelso v. Board of E 1957School Dist., 37 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 99 P.2d 314 ]; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54 [ 53 P.2d 952 ]; Johnson v. City of Glendale, supra, [ 12 Cal.App.2d 389 ( 55 P.2d 580 )]; Thompson v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App. 73 [ 35 P.2d 185 ]; Kahrs v. County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal.App.2d 46 [ 82 P.2d 29 ]; Strath v. City of Santa Rosa, 19 Cal.App.2d 382 [ 65 P.2d 894 ]; Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267 [ 49 P.2d 320 ]; Young v. County of Ventura, 39 Cal.App.2d 732 [ 104 P.2d 102 ]; Kline v. San Francisco U. School Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174 [ 104 P.2d 661 ]; Kelso v. Board of E | 2 | 1941–1957 |
Norton v. City of Pomona
green
2 sentences1957School Dist., 37 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 99 P.2d 314 ]; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54 [ 53 P.2d 952 ]; Johnson v. City of Glendale, supra, [ 12 Cal.App.2d 389 ( 55 P.2d 580 )]; Thompson v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App. 73 [ 35 P.2d 185 ]; Kahrs v. County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal.App.2d 46 [ 82 P.2d 29 ]; Strath v. City of Santa Rosa, 19 Cal.App.2d 382 [ 65 P.2d 894 ]; Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267 [ 49 P.2d 320 ]; Young v. County of Ventura, 39 Cal.App.2d 732 [ 104 P.2d 102 ]; Kline v. San Francisco U. School Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174 [ 104 P.2d 661 ]; Kelso v. Board of E 1957School Dist., 37 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 99 P.2d 314 ]; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54 [ 53 P.2d 952 ]; Johnson v. City of Glendale, supra, [ 12 Cal.App.2d 389 ( 55 P.2d 580 )]; Thompson v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App. 73 [ 35 P.2d 185 ]; Kahrs v. County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal.App.2d 46 [ 82 P.2d 29 ]; Strath v. City of Santa Rosa, 19 Cal.App.2d 382 [ 65 P.2d 894 ]; Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267 [ 49 P.2d 320 ]; Young v. County of Ventura, 39 Cal.App.2d 732 [ 104 P.2d 102 ]; Kline v. San Francisco U. School Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174 [ 104 P.2d 661 ]; Kelso v. Board of E | 2 | 1941–1957 |
Wicklund v. Plymouth Elementary School District
green
2 sentences1957School Dist., 37 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 99 P.2d 314 ]; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54 [ 53 P.2d 952 ]; Johnson v. City of Glendale, supra, [ 12 Cal.App.2d 389 ( 55 P.2d 580 )]; Thompson v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App. 73 [ 35 P.2d 185 ]; Kahrs v. County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal.App.2d 46 [ 82 P.2d 29 ]; Strath v. City of Santa Rosa, 19 Cal.App.2d 382 [ 65 P.2d 894 ]; Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267 [ 49 P.2d 320 ]; Young v. County of Ventura, 39 Cal.App.2d 732 [ 104 P.2d 102 ]; Kline v. San Francisco U. School Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174 [ 104 P.2d 661 ]; Kelso v. Board of E 1957School Dist., 37 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 99 P.2d 314 ]; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54 [ 53 P.2d 952 ]; Johnson v. City of Glendale, supra, [ 12 Cal.App.2d 389 ( 55 P.2d 580 )]; Thompson v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App. 73 [ 35 P.2d 185 ]; Kahrs v. County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal.App.2d 46 [ 82 P.2d 29 ]; Strath v. City of Santa Rosa, 19 Cal.App.2d 382 [ 65 P.2d 894 ]; Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267 [ 49 P.2d 320 ]; Young v. County of Ventura, 39 Cal.App.2d 732 [ 104 P.2d 102 ]; Kline v. San Francisco U. School Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174 [ 104 P.2d 661 ]; Kelso v. Board of E | 2 | 1941–1957 |
Sternes v. Sutter Butte Canal Co.
green
2 sentences1936(East Bay Municipal Utilities Dist. v. Lodi, 120 Cal. App. 740, 748 [ 8 Pac. (2d) 532 ]; Sternes v. Sutter Butte Canal Co., 61 Cal. App. 737 [ 216 Pac. 66 ]; Lewis on Eminent Domain, 1313.) While the soundness of the rule may not be questioned, and while the converse of this rule relied upon by respondent is also well established, to the effect that damages not necessarily included in the issues in the condemnation action may be recovered in a subsequent action, neither rule is helpful in determining what claims are barred and what are not barred by the judgment of condemnation. 1936(East Bay Municipal Utilities Dist. v. Lodi, 120 Cal. App. 740, 748 [ 8 Pac. (2d) 532 ]; Sternes v. Sutter Butte Canal Co., 61 Cal. App. 737 [ 216 Pac. 66 ]; Lewis on Eminent Domain, 1313.) While the soundness of the rule may not be questioned, and while the converse of this rule relied upon by respondent is also well established, to the effect that damages not necessarily included in the issues in the condemnation action may be recovered in a subsequent action, neither rule is helpful in determining what claims are barred and what are not barred by the judgment of condemnation. | 2 | 1935–1936 |
People v. Memro
green
2 sentences2013(People v. Ansaldo (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1196 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two] [declining to follow La Fontaine and questioning the soundness of its rule in light of the state Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 658 ]; People v. Herman, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1387 [concluding, “[w]e do not believe the categorical rule adopted in La Fontaine is sound in its own right or constitutes a correct statement of California law”].) Indeed, since La Fontaine was decided in 1978, the state Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that there is no set standard for distingui 2013(People v. Ansaldo (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1196 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two] [declining to follow La Fontaine and questioning the soundness of its rule in light of the state Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 658 ]; People v. Herman, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1387 [concluding, “[w]e do not believe the categorical rule adopted in La Fontaine is sound in its own right or constitutes a correct statement of California law”].) Indeed, since La Fontaine was decided in 1978, the state Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that there is no set standard for distingui | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Blackwell v. American Film Co.
green
2 sentences2013(Id. at p. 693.) Mrs. Blackwell then brought a wrongful death action and recovered $10,000. ( Blackwell, supra, 189 Cal. at pp. 692-693.) On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in refusing to give two instructions to the effect that the jury, in estimating damages, “could consider the physical condition of [the] decedent immediately prior to his last operation, in determining the probable amount of financial assistance he would have rendered to his widow and children.” (Id. at p. 702, italics added.) The court rejected the defendant’s argument because the jury had been inst 2013(Ibid.) The court said, “The question in this case was what pecuniary loss was suffered by respondent and her children by reason of the loss of decedent in his crippled condition.” (Id. at p. 697.) The court added, “[A]s already pointed out, decedent was fully compensated for the injuries sustained by him and for his resulting physical incapacity and in estimating the pecuniary loss resulting to [Mrs. Blackwell] by virtue of his death it was necessary to take into consideration his crippled condition.” (Id. at p. 702.) Philip Morris concludes from Blackwell, supra, 189 Cal. 689 , that “where t | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Lyle v. WARNER BROTHERS TELEVISION PRODUCTION
green
1 sentence2007(See In re Lucas (2004) 33 Cal.4th 682, 720, 719 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 , 94 P.3d 477 ] [suggesting that to rebut “evidence of institutional failure and positive character traits,” the prosecution could introduce evidence “that from a very early age, petitioner demonstrated lack of conscience, a propensity for violence, and defiance of authority that did not respond to psychotherapy and that he committed criminal offenses as a juvenile, was subject to temper tantrums and uncontrollable rages as a child, was destructive, and sought only to please himself’].) With regard to argument, as noted, it | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Smith
green
1 sentence2007(See People v. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th 581, 635 .) f. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences1984(State v. Brown (N.D. 1983) supra, 337 N.W.2d 138, 149 .) The soundness of an exception for prehypnotic evidence has already been questioned in the scientific community. 46 The proposed exception has also been vigorously attacked in the scholarly literature. 1984Indeed, one of those opinions itself criticizes the proposed exception for prehypnotic evidence as "difficult to reconcile" with the rule barring the testimony of a witness who has been subjected to pretrial hypnosis. ( State v. Brown (N.D. 1983) supra, 337 N.W.2d 138, 149 .) The soundness of an exception for prehypnotic evidence has already been questioned in the scientific community. [46] The proposed exception has also been vigorously attacked in the scholarly literature. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Page v. Podol green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| In Re Anderson green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Foley v. Martin green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Falk v. Falk green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Kollert v. Cundiff green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Johnson v. City of Glendale green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Estate of McSweeney green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| In Re Estate of Wineteer green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| People v. Settles green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| People v. Vasquez green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| People v. Roe green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Douillard v. Woodd green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Pearson v. Parsons green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Estate of Emerson green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Kester v. McNear green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| State ex rel. Brison v. Lingo neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Searcy v. Grow green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Jeffers v. Easton, Eldridge & Co. green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Fresno Investment Co. v. Brandon green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Huddleston v. Washington green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Barr Lumber Co. v. Perkins neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Stamford Extract Manufacturing Co. v. Stamford Rolling Mills Co. green | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| McDonough v. Russell-Miller Milling Co. green | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.