soundness rule in South Carolina

2023In Eiserhardt v. State Agricultural & Mechanical Society of South Carolina, 235 S.C. at 311–12, 111 S.E.2d at 571–72, the court reaffirmed the defense of charitable immunity though it refused to extend immunity to activities outside the scope of the charitable organization's mission.

2023In Eiserhardt v. State Agricultural & Mechanical Society of South Carolina, 235 S.C. at 311–12, 111 S.E.2d at 571–72, the court reaffirmed the defense of charitable immunity though it refused to extend immunity to activities outside the scope of the charitable organization's mission.

2023However, the Bush court reiterated the Caughman court, stating "the writer desires to repeat the observation made in Caughman[], to the effect that he seriously doubts the soundness of the rule giving charitable institutions immunity from tort liability." Id. at 451 , 85 S.E.2d at 720 .

2023However, the Bush court reiterated the Caughman court, stating "the writer desires to repeat the observation made in Caughman[], to the effect that he seriously doubts the soundness of the rule giving charitable institutions immunity from tort liability." Id. at 451 , 85 S.E.2d at 720 .

1973In the case of City of Miami v. Ford, 252 So. (2d) 228 (Fla.), the court, by a four to three vote, and without any re-examination of the soundness thereof, actually applied the rule stated by way of dictum in Martin.

1973In the case of City of Miami v. Ford , 252 So. (2d) 228 (Fla.), the court, by a four to three vote, and without any re-examination of the soundness thereof, actually applied the rule stated by way of dictum in Martin.

1955A., supra, 212 S. C. 337, 47 S. E. (2d) 788 , to the effect that he seriously doubts the soundness of the rule giving charitable institutions immunity from tort liability.

1952State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S. C. 50; Coosaw Mining Co. v. State of South Carolina, 144 U. S. 550 , 12 S. Ct. 689 , 36 L.

1952State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S. C. 50; Coosaw Mining Co. v. State of South Carolina, 144 U. S. 550 , 12 S. Ct. 689 , 36 L.

1952State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S. C. 50; Coosaw Mining Co. v. State of South Carolina, 144 U. S. 550 , 12 S. Ct. 689 , 36 L.

1952Wates v. Fairfield Forest Products Co., Inc., 210 S. C. 319, 42 S. E. (2d) 529 ; Schroder v. Antipas, 215 S. C. 552, 56 S. E. (2d) 354 ; Power v. Power., 219 S. C. 56, 64 S. E. (2d) 14 .

1952Wates v. Fairfield Forest Products Co., Inc., 210 S. C. 319, 42 S. E. (2d) 529 ; Schroder v. Antipas, 215 S. C. 552, 56 S. E. (2d) 354 ; Power v. Power., 219 S. C. 56, 64 S. E. (2d) 14 .

1952Wates v. Fairfield Forest Products Co., Inc., 210 S. C. 319, 42 S. E. (2d) 529 ; Schroder v. Antipas, 215 S. C. 552, 56 S. E. (2d) 354 ; Power v. Power., 219 S. C. 56, 64 S. E. (2d) 14 .

1922JUSTICE McIVER (since Chief Justice) in his dissenting opinion upon the continuing effect of the presumption, recognizing the soundness of the rule, discusses the foundation upon which it rests as follows: "It is founded upon * * * necessity. * * * Indeed, it would be difficult to find any other foundation upon which it could rest. * * * The authorities clearly show that this rule was founded on the necessity of the case, arising from the fact that where animals are killed by a railroad train, the owner of such animals is rarely able to produce witnesses to prove the circumstances under which

1922JUSTICE McIVER (since Chief Justice) in his dissenting opinion upon the continuing effect of the presumption, recognizing the soundness of the rule, discusses the foundation upon which it rests as follows: "It is founded upon * * * necessity. * * * Indeed, it would be difficult to find any other foundation upon which it could rest. * * * The authorities clearly show that this rule was founded on the necessity of the case, arising from the fact that where animals are killed by a railroad train, the owner of such animals is rarely able to produce witnesses to prove the circumstances under which

1922A like necessity caused a change in the rules of evidence, where cattle were killed by a railroad train, as will be seen by the case of Danner v. Ry. , 4 Rich., 329 , in which it was held that there was a presumption of negligence arising from the mere act of killing the stock." *Page 463 In Moorer v. Railway Co. , 103 S.C. 280 , 88 S.E., 15 , the rule is characterized as one "of necessity." Considering then the rule and the foundation of it, under the principle, "Ratione cessante lex ipsa cessat," it cannot be made applicable except to those cases whose peculiar circumstances develop the cond

1922A like necessity caused a change in the rules of evidence, where cattle were killed by a railroad train, as will be seen by the case of Danner v. Ry. , 4 Rich., 329 , in which it was held that there was a presumption of negligence arising from the mere act of killing the stock." *Page 463 In Moorer v. Railway Co. , 103 S.C. 280 , 88 S.E., 15 , the rule is characterized as one "of necessity." Considering then the rule and the foundation of it, under the principle, "Ratione cessante lex ipsa cessat," it cannot be made applicable except to those cases whose peculiar circumstances develop the cond

1916It has been frequently applied to our decisions, as will be seen by reference to a few of the most recent cases: Jennings v. Talbert, 77 S. C. 457, 58 S. E. 420 ; Walker v. Alverson, 87 S. C. 55, 68 S. E. 966 , 30 L.

1916It has been frequently applied to our decisions, as will be seen by reference to a few of the most recent cases: Jennings v. Talbert, 77 S. C. 457, 58 S. E. 420 ; Walker v. Alverson, 87 S. C. 55, 68 S. E. 966 , 30 L.