cost defense in New York

1997Such a considered policy decision would raise no constitutional objections, for the cost of the defense would simply be considered additional remuneration ( Matter of Guarino v. Anderson , supra , at pp 95-96; Mater of Duel v. Gaynor , 141 App. Div. 630 , 631-632 ).

1991Such a considered policy decision would raise no constitutional objections, for the cost of the defense would simply be considered additional remuneration ( Matter of Guarino v Anderson, supra, at pp 95-96; Matter of Deuel v Gaynor, 141 App. Div. 630 , 631-632 ).

1974Corp., 279 N. Y. 638 ; Best Bldg.

1972Corp., 279 N. Y. 638 ; Best Bldg.

1998The cross appeal of Hospital Underwriters Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter HUMIC) from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct cross appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in favor of Chubb Group Insurance Companies/Federal Insurance Company (hereinafter Federal) and against HUMIC in the principal sum of $18,639.07, representing the cost of defense of the underlying proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (see, Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248 ).

1998The Superintendent must adopt policies in a coherent and consistent manner with appropriate regard for those previously taken or must explain the reasons for variations among policies (see, Matter of Field Delivery Serv. [Roberts], 66 NY2d 516, 520 ).

1998The Superintendent must adopt policies in a coherent and consistent manner with appropriate regard for those previously taken or must explain the reasons for variations among policies ( see , Matter of Field Delivery Serv. [Roberts] , 66 N.Y.2d 516, 520 ).

1998“The requirement that an insured notify its liability carrier of a potential claim ‘as soon as practicable’ operates as a condition precedent to coverage” (White v City of New York, 81 NY2d 955, 957 ; Security Mut.

1997Corning , 48 N.Y.2d at 354 .

1996The motion court mistakenly concluded that Domestic’s contractual obligation also required it to cover the cost of defense and indemnification where the insurance company disclaimed an obligation to defend and indemnify A&P, the party for whom the insurance was procured; the parties’ contract did not impose this obligation upon Domestic (see, Murphy v University Club, 200 AD2d 532 ).

1994Rather, it requires the Attorney-General to provide such a defense and his improper failure to do so is subject to CPLR article 78 review (see, Matter of Munabi v Abrams, 199 AD2d 1037 ; Matter of Spitz v Abrams, 105 AD2d 904 , supra).

1994Rather, it requires the Attorney-General to provide such a defense and his improper failure to do so is subject to CPLR article 78 review (see, Matter of Munabi v Abrams, 199 AD2d 1037 ; Matter of Spitz v Abrams, 105 AD2d 904 , supra).

1993Co., 27 Cal 3d 359, 612 P2d 889 ).

1990Thus, we modified the requirement that police aware of a prior outstanding charge must be held to knowledge that a reasonable inquiry would have disclosed by subsequently ruling that actual knowledge of the pending charge was required before defendant’s derivative right to counsel had been violated (see, e.g., People v Bertolo, 65 NY2d 111 , 112; People v Fuschino, 59 NY2d 91, 98 ; People v Servidlo, 54 NY2d 951, 953 [no reason to believe there was deliberate oversight on part of police "even though (the charges) were pending within the same county and presumably the same department and were b

1989This was based on our finding that the Legislature had provided that the cost of article 18-B representation was to be a "county charge", and was not delegable to the defendants ( ibid .; see County Law, § 722-e ; Matter of Patricia R. v Peter W., 126 Misc.2d 87 , 89 [Family Ct, N Y Co, 1984]).

1984There are, however, two decisions, both rendered in 1981, relating to the use of an infant’s funds for the purpose of posting his bail (Matter of Rodriquez, 109 Misc 2d 1047 [granted]; Peterson v City of New York, 107 Misc 2d 1055 [denied]).

1984There are, however, two decisions, both rendered in 1981, relating to the use of an infant’s funds for the purpose of posting his bail (Matter of Rodriquez, 109 Misc 2d 1047 [granted]; Peterson v City of New York, 107 Misc 2d 1055 [denied]).

1983Family Court shall determine who should pay the cost of the test (cf. Matter ofRachelle L. v Bruce M., 89 AD2d 765 ).

1981For the proposition that an indigent person in a paternity case is legally entitled to a blood grouping test, see the recent United States Supreme Court case of Little v Streater ( 452 US 1 ) wherein it was held that a denial of a blood grouping test to a respondent who was unable to pay, under a Connecticut statute which provided that the cost of such a test had to be borne by the party requesting it, violated the due process guarantees under the Fourteenth Amendment. .

1981Assn, v County of Suffolk, 46 NY2d 613 ), the evidence presented clearly demonstrated that these additional costs existed.

1979When the representation of substituted counsel ultimately led to final dismissal of the Laverne action (Laverne v Corning, 376 F Supp 836 , affd 522 F2d 1144), plaintiffs instituted this action to recover from the village the legal fees, costs and disbursements they had incurred following their dismissal of the Nassau County Attorney.

1975They are, therefore, entitled to be educated in the schools of the School District wherein the group home is located [here East Massapequa], the cost of their instruction to be computed and borne as prescribed in the Statute.” B THE RACIAL IMBALANCE THEORY OF EXCLUSION The District also contends that the duty to act affirmatively to prevent segregation of its school system (see Brown v Board of Educ., 347 US 483 ) calls for new action in view of the tipping phenomenon; that in refusing admission to the infant petitioners it is seeking to short-circuit white flight caused by the District’s scho

1974(See Shapiro v Shapiro, 22 Misc 2d 795, 797 .) The burden of proof to establish the cost of those factors constituting plaintiff’s claimed preseparation standard of living is on the plaintiff.

1973New York’s obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment is to give each person, before depriving him of life, liberty or property, that process appropriate to the nature of the case and the values of a free society that can be characterized as due (Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 , supra).

1963(See Milone v. English, 306 F. 2d 814 and cases cited therein at p. 817.) It was said in dictum in the Milone ease (p. 817): “ The treasury of a union is not at the disposal of its officers to bear the cost of their defense against charges of fraudulently depriving the members of their rights as members Upon the retrial no restriction should be placed upon the admission of all evidence which will fully explore all issues referred to herein, notwithstanding* that much of it may well be repetitious of proof heretofore taken.

1908Johnsville v. Smith, 184 N. Y. 341 , the village authorities had constructed upon the premises of the landowner, Smith, a certain intake, water pipes and other erections wit-h relation to their proposed waterworks, prior to the attempt to condemn the same; and such work was upon the property when the application to take the property for village waterworks purposes was made.

1902It has been established that there was no defense to the claim; and turning to the case in the Court of Appeals (People v. Lee, 104 N. Y. 441 ), it would seem that the principal defense insisted upon was that the bond of 1881 was intended to be prospective in its operation only, and .that it did not. cover existing deposits at the timé it was executed and' would, therefore, be a defense for the advantage of those who had been sureties on the bonds of 1880 and 1881 and not on prior bonds.

1899Co., 6 Cow. 404 .) Only a summary of the proofs of loss is printed in the record, but it appears by this that they were “ the customary printed proof of loss, * * * containing a statement of * * * the cash value of the property, $5,741.5Q.” The witness was asked as to the cost of the bar and barroom .fixtures and the stock of liquors-; and his counsel said : “ If you cannot recollect, look at that statement (proofs of loss) and say.” The court directed the plaintiff to exhibit the proofs of loss, and they were offered and received in evidence without objection or exception.