cost defense in Florida

2015As Judge Ray pointed out in Harrison v. State, 146 So.3d 76, 79 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 153 So.3d 909 (Fla.2014), the commonsense argument that no notice of the accused’s right to a hearing to contest the amount of the lien is called for when the trial court imposes the statutory minimum “has appeal based on logic and sound legal reasoning.” The Harrison panel decided it was “not at liberty to recede from our case law directly on point, which requires that a defendant be given the ‘opportunity to object’ to the cost of defense, even where the mandatory, minimum amount is imposed” and co

2015See Harrison, 146 So.3d at 79 (finding where the trial court fails to give the defendant the “ ‘opportunity to object’ to the cost of defense ... we are constrained to reverse this [] cost and remand for the trial court to advise Appellant of his right to a hearing to contest the amount of the indigent legal assistance lien”); § 938.29(5), Fla. Stat.; Fla. R.

2014See § 938.29(l)(a) and (6), Fla. Stat.; Sharpe v. State, 115 So.3d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1st-DCA 2013); Colson v. State, 114 So.3d 415, 417 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Youman v. State, 112 So.3d 693, 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); DeSalvo v. State, 107 So.3d 1185, 1186-87 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

2014See, e.g., Colson v. State, 114 So.3d 415, 417 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Sharpe v. State, 115 So.3d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Youman v. State, 112 So.3d 693, 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

2014See § 938.29(l)(a) and (6), Fla. Stat.; Sharpe v. State, 115 So.3d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1st-DCA 2013); Colson v. State, 114 So.3d 415, 417 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Youman v. State, 112 So.3d 693, 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); DeSalvo v. State, 107 So.3d 1185, 1186-87 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

2014See, e.g., Colson v. State, 114 So.3d 415, 417 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Sharpe v. State, 115 So.3d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Youman v. State, 112 So.3d 693, 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

2014See § 938.29(l)(a) and (6), Fla. Stat.; Sharpe v. State, 115 So.3d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1st-DCA 2013); Colson v. State, 114 So.3d 415, 417 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Youman v. State, 112 So.3d 693, 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); DeSalvo v. State, 107 So.3d 1185, 1186-87 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

2014See, e.g., Colson v. State, 114 So.3d 415, 417 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Sharpe v. State, 115 So.3d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Youman v. State, 112 So.3d 693, 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

2025See Gutierrez, 239 So. 3d at 624 (“If a treating physician testified to a medical opinion formed for the purpose of litigation rather than treatment, then the mere fact that the physician once treated the plaintiff would not prevent that doctor from being considered an expert witness.”).

2023“The premise of [section 57.085] was that indigent inmates had abused the cost waiver [statute] by filing numerous frivolous lawsuits.” Reed v. Mims, 711 So. 2d 169, 170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).

2016See § 938.29, Fla Stat. (2012); Gilchrist v. State, 674 So.2d 847, 848 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

2014See, e.g., Hills v. State, 90 So.3d 927, 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (“The 2008 amendments to [the cost of prosecution statute] created mandatory minimum costs for the state attorney and removed the trial court’s discretion to impose these costs.”). 2 The State asserts that the trial court’s obligation under section 938.29(5) to provide “notice and an opportunity to object” is triggered only when the court exercises its discretion under section 938.29(1) to impose a “higher amount upon a showing of sufficient proof of higher fees or costs incurred.” While the State’s argument has appeal based on l

2014See, e.g., Hills v. State, 90 So.3d 927, 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (“The 2008 amendments to [the cost of prosecution statute] created mandatory minimum costs for the state attorney and removed the trial court’s discretion to impose these costs.”). 2 The State asserts that the trial court’s obligation under section 938.29(5) to provide “notice and an opportunity to object” is triggered only when the court exercises its discretion under section 938.29(1) to impose a “higher amount upon a showing of sufficient proof of higher fees or costs incurred.” While the State’s argument has appeal based on l

2014See § 938.29(l)(a) and (6), Fla. Stat.; Sharpe v. State, 115 So.3d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1st-DCA 2013); Colson v. State, 114 So.3d 415, 417 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Youman v. State, 112 So.3d 693, 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); DeSalvo v. State, 107 So.3d 1185, 1186-87 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

2005See Pagliuca v. State, 860 So.2d 1095 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) and cases cited therein.

1999Portions used for consultation with the client or other expert witnesses should not be taxed." Although we have noted that a trial court may deviate from the guidelines costs where the facts of the case or justice may require, see Madison v. Midland National Life Insurance Co., 648 So.2d 1226, 1228 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), at the cost hearing O'Neal testified only that the trial transcripts were "necessary, reasonable, and related" to H & K's preparation and trial of the County's case.

1995As this court previously recognized in Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Scott, 311 So.2d 762, 764 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert. denied, 328 So.2d 843 (Fla.1976), the standard is not whether the depositions served a useful purpose at trial, but whether they served a useful purpose at all.

1994"To hold otherwise would be to reward the insurer who refused to provide a defense for its obduracy." 791 F. Supp. at 1085, n. 9 .

1993Couch argues that the award was "clearly unnecessarily excessive to satisfy the statutory purpose of section 112.317(8)." He seizes upon language from a Federal case, Eastway Const. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), to the effect that determining sanctions and fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requires consideration of the cost of the violation to the party seeking sanctions and such mitigating factors as: (i) whether the [claimant] believed [he] was correct in taking the course [he] did; (ii) whether there was vindictiveness or a desire to punish an