correctness rule in Oklahoma

1954In State v. Young, 20 Okl.Cr. 383, 392 , 203 P. 484 , 487 this court said': “We find no reason to doubt the correctness of the rule announced in the Moody Case.” And in the companion case of State v. Young, 20 Okl.Cr. 397 , 203 P. 489 , we held: “Under the constitutional provisions [Const. Art. 7 § 12], the district court, and not the county court, has jurisdiction to try an indictment charging misconduct in office.” This principle of law has just recently been affirmed in the case of Hisel v. State, Okl.Cr., 264 P.2d 375 .

1936Cr. 383 , 203 Pac. 484, 487 , this court said: “We find no reason to doubt the correctness of the rule announced in the Moody Case.” In our opinion the holding of this court in Warner v. Mathews, 11 Okla.

1927We do not concur in the doctrine announced in Needham v. Needham (Idaho) 200 Pac. 346 , viz.: “That an administrator who is also a lawyer is required to exercise his professional skill * * * without extra compensation.” We do not subscribe to the correctness of this doctrine, in the absence of a statute to that effect, and in the absence of some provision in the will from which it can be reasonably inferred that the executor was named because of his being a lawyer, and that he was named in contemplation of his professional services being rendered.

1927We do not concur in the doctrine announced in Needham v. Needham (Idaho) 200 P. 346 , viz.: "That an administrator who is also a lawyer is required to exercise his professional skill * * * without extra compensation." We do not subscribe to the correctness of this doctrine, in the absence of a statute to that effect, and in the absence of some provision in the will from which it can be reasonably inferred that the executor was named because of his being a lawyer, and that he was named in contemplation of his professional services being rendered.

1968In order to subject one to liability to a husband for illness or bodily harm done to his wife, all the elements of tort action in the wife must exist, including the tortious conduct of the actor, the resulting harm to the wife and the latter’s freedom from such fault as would bar a recovery by her, as for example, her contributory negligence.” And in Peters v. Bodin, 242 Minn. 489 , 65 N.W.2d 917, 922 , where the court was determining the correctness of an instruction advising the jury that a finding of contributory negligence on the part of the wife would prevent the husband from recovering f

1968In order to subject one to liability to a husband for illness or bodily harm done to his wife, all the elements of tort action in the wife must exist, including the tortious conduct of the actor, the resulting harm to the wife and the latter’s freedom from such fault as would bar a recovery by her, as for example, her contributory negligence.” And in Peters v. Bodin, 242 Minn. 489 , 65 N.W.2d 917, 922 , where the court was determining the correctness of an instruction advising the jury that a finding of contributory negligence on the part of the wife would prevent the husband from recovering f

1968In order to subject one to liability to a husband for illness or bodily harm done to his wife, all the elements of tort action in the wife must exist, including the tortious conduct of the actor, the resulting harm to the wife and the latter’s freedom from such fault as would bar a recovery by her, as for example, her contributory negligence.” And in Peters v. Bodin, 242 Minn. 489 , 65 N.W.2d 917, 922 , where the court was determining the correctness of an instruction advising the jury that a finding of contributory negligence on the part of the wife would prevent the husband from recovering f

1968In order to subject one to liability to a husband for illness or bodily harm done to his wife, all the elements of tort action in the wife must exist, including the tortious conduct of the actor, the resulting harm to the wife and the latter’s freedom from such fault as would bar a recovery by her, as for example, her contributory negligence.” And in Peters v. Bodin, 242 Minn. 489 , 65 N.W.2d 917, 922 , where the court was determining the correctness of an instruction advising the jury that a finding of contributory negligence on the part of the wife would prevent the husband from recovering f

1968In order to subject one to liability to a husband for illness or bodily harm done to his wife, all the elements of tort action in the wife must exist, including the tortious conduct of the actor, the resulting harm to the wife and the latter’s freedom from such fault as would bar a recovery by her, as for example, her contributory negligence.” And in Peters v. Bodin, 242 Minn. 489 , 65 N.W.2d 917, 922 , where the court was determining the correctness of an instruction advising the jury that a finding of contributory negligence on the part of the wife would prevent the husband from recovering f

1968In order to subject one to liability to a husband for illness or bodily harm done to his wife, all the elements of tort action in the wife must exist, including the tortious conduct of the actor, the resulting harm to the wife and the latter’s freedom from such fault as would bar a recovery by her, as for example, her contributory negligence.” And in Peters v. Bodin, 242 Minn. 489 , 65 N.W.2d 917, 922 , where the court was determining the correctness of an instruction advising the jury that a finding of contributory negligence on the part of the wife would prevent the husband from recovering f

1968In order to subject one to liability to a husband for illness or bodily harm done to his wife, all the elements of tort action in the wife must exist, including the tortious conduct of the actor, the resulting harm to the wife and the latter’s freedom from such fault as would bar a recovery by her, as for example, her contributory negligence.” And in Peters v. Bodin, 242 Minn. 489 , 65 N.W.2d 917, 922 , where the court was determining the correctness of an instruction advising the jury that a finding of contributory negligence on the part of the wife would prevent the husband from recovering f

1968In order to subject one to liability to a husband for illness or bodily harm done to his wife, all the elements of tort action in the wife must exist, including the tortious conduct of the actor, the resulting harm to the wife and the latter’s freedom from such fault as would bar a recovery by her, as for example, her contributory negligence.” And in Peters v. Bodin, 242 Minn. 489 , 65 N.W.2d 917, 922 , where the court was determining the correctness of an instruction advising the jury that a finding of contributory negligence on the part of the wife would prevent the husband from recovering f

1954In State v. Young, 20 Okl.Cr. 383, 392 , 203 P. 484 , 487 this court said': “We find no reason to doubt the correctness of the rule announced in the Moody Case.” And in the companion case of State v. Young, 20 Okl.Cr. 397 , 203 P. 489 , we held: “Under the constitutional provisions [Const. Art. 7 § 12], the district court, and not the county court, has jurisdiction to try an indictment charging misconduct in office.” This principle of law has just recently been affirmed in the case of Hisel v. State, Okl.Cr., 264 P.2d 375 .

1954In State v. Young, 20 Okl.Cr. 383, 392 , 203 P. 484 , 487 this court said': “We find no reason to doubt the correctness of the rule announced in the Moody Case.” And in the companion case of State v. Young, 20 Okl.Cr. 397 , 203 P. 489 , we held: “Under the constitutional provisions [Const. Art. 7 § 12], the district court, and not the county court, has jurisdiction to try an indictment charging misconduct in office.” This principle of law has just recently been affirmed in the case of Hisel v. State, Okl.Cr., 264 P.2d 375 .

1954In State v. Young, 20 Okl.Cr. 383, 392 , 203 P. 484 , 487 this court said': “We find no reason to doubt the correctness of the rule announced in the Moody Case.” And in the companion case of State v. Young, 20 Okl.Cr. 397 , 203 P. 489 , we held: “Under the constitutional provisions [Const. Art. 7 § 12], the district court, and not the county court, has jurisdiction to try an indictment charging misconduct in office.” This principle of law has just recently been affirmed in the case of Hisel v. State, Okl.Cr., 264 P.2d 375 .

1954In State v. Young, 20 Okl.Cr. 383, 392 , 203 P. 484 , 487 this court said': “We find no reason to doubt the correctness of the rule announced in the Moody Case.” And in the companion case of State v. Young, 20 Okl.Cr. 397 , 203 P. 489 , we held: “Under the constitutional provisions [Const. Art. 7 § 12], the district court, and not the county court, has jurisdiction to try an indictment charging misconduct in office.” This principle of law has just recently been affirmed in the case of Hisel v. State, Okl.Cr., 264 P.2d 375 .

1954Counsel for respondent cites the case of Cox v. State, 33 Okl.Cr. 436 , 244 P. 206 , where the defendant was convicted in the county court of Woods county on a charge of extortion under color of official right and sentenced to pay a fine of $1, and appealed to this court, where the conviction was affirmed.

1954Counsel for respondent cites the case of Cox v. State, 33 Okl.Cr. 436 , 244 P. 206 , where the defendant was convicted in the county court of Woods county on a charge of extortion under color of official right and sentenced to pay a fine of $1, and appealed to this court, where the conviction was affirmed.

1952Defendant concedes the correctness of the rule announced in these cases, but contends *634 that testimony of intention was properly admitted, citing White v. Wester, 170 Okla. 250 , 39 P. 2d 22 , and 56 Am.

1952Defendant concedes the correctness of the rule announced in these cases, but contends *634 that testimony of intention was properly admitted, citing White v. Wester, 170 Okla. 250 , 39 P. 2d 22 , and 56 Am.

1949In Sparks v. Gallagher, supra, we quoted with approval the rule announced in James v. Germania Iron Co., 107 Fed. 597 , as follows: “A party who institutes and conducts a litigation in another’s name is as conclusively estopped by the decision and judgment therein from again litigating the same issues with his adversary as is the party in whose name he carries on the contest.” Plaintiff apparently concedes the correctness of this rule, but argues that the evidence does not establish its complete supervision and control of the first action.

1949Co. v. Canady, 196 Okla. 105 , 163 P. 2d 221 , in which we held that knowledge received and acted upon by the soliciting agent of an insurer in connection with applications taken by him was binding upon the insurer.

1949Co. v. Canady, 196 Okla. 105 , 163 P. 2d 221 , in which we held that knowledge received and acted upon by the soliciting agent of an insurer in connection with applications taken by him was binding upon the insurer.

1944The plaintiff admits the correctness of the rule established by these cases, but contends that it has no application here, because there was competent evidence reasonably tending to establish the plaintiff’s cause of action alleged in the petition and supporting the verdict, citing in support thereof, Helmerich & Payne, Inc., v. Green, 183 Okla. 164 , 80 P. 2d 573 ; Greis, Trustee, et al. v. Mitchell, 185 Okla. 136 , 90 P. 2d 894 ; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bartmess, 181 Okla. 501 , 76 P. 2d 352 .

1944The plaintiff admits the correctness of the rule established by these cases, but contends that it has no application here, because there was competent evidence reasonably tending to establish the plaintiff’s cause of action alleged in the petition and supporting the verdict, citing in support thereof, Helmerich & Payne, Inc., v. Green, 183 Okla. 164 , 80 P. 2d 573 ; Greis, Trustee, et al. v. Mitchell, 185 Okla. 136 , 90 P. 2d 894 ; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bartmess, 181 Okla. 501 , 76 P. 2d 352 .

1944The plaintiff admits the correctness of the rule established by these cases, but contends that it has no application here, because there was competent evidence reasonably tending to establish the plaintiff’s cause of action alleged in the petition and supporting the verdict, citing in support thereof, Helmerich & Payne, Inc., v. Green, 183 Okla. 164 , 80 P. 2d 573 ; Greis, Trustee, et al. v. Mitchell, 185 Okla. 136 , 90 P. 2d 894 ; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bartmess, 181 Okla. 501 , 76 P. 2d 352 .

1944The plaintiff admits the correctness of the rule established by these cases, but contends that it has no application here, because there was competent evidence reasonably tending to establish the plaintiff’s cause of action alleged in the petition and supporting the verdict, citing in support thereof, Helmerich & Payne, Inc., v. Green, 183 Okla. 164 , 80 P. 2d 573 ; Greis, Trustee, et al. v. Mitchell, 185 Okla. 136 , 90 P. 2d 894 ; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bartmess, 181 Okla. 501 , 76 P. 2d 352 .

1944The plaintiff admits the correctness of the rule established by these cases, but contends that it has no application here, because there was competent evidence reasonably tending to establish the plaintiff’s cause of action alleged in the petition and supporting the verdict, citing in support thereof, Helmerich & Payne, Inc., v. Green, 183 Okla. 164 , 80 P. 2d 573 ; Greis, Trustee, et al. v. Mitchell, 185 Okla. 136 , 90 P. 2d 894 ; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bartmess, 181 Okla. 501 , 76 P. 2d 352 .

1944The plaintiff admits the correctness of the rule established by these cases, but contends that it has no application here, because there was competent evidence reasonably tending to establish the plaintiff’s cause of action alleged in the petition and supporting the verdict, citing in support thereof, Helmerich & Payne, Inc., v. Green, 183 Okla. 164 , 80 P. 2d 573 ; Greis, Trustee, et al. v. Mitchell, 185 Okla. 136 , 90 P. 2d 894 ; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bartmess, 181 Okla. 501 , 76 P. 2d 352 .

1940The case of Lyons v. State, 68 Okla.

1938Cas. 1914B. 620) to show that, where an act is susceptible of two., constructions, the court will give it the most reasonable one: that, if following the plain language of an act would produce absurd results, and a different construction render it free from such consequences, the court will give such act a construction free from absurd consequences; that, where there is doubt or ambiguity. the court will give an act that interpretation which is most reasonable: that statutes will receive a sensible construction so as to avoid absurd and unjust conse- *301 quenees, etc. While the correctness of

1938Cas. 1914B. 620) to show that, where an act is susceptible of two., constructions, the court will give it the most reasonable one: that, if following the plain language of an act would produce absurd results, and a different construction render it free from such consequences, the court will give such act a construction free from absurd consequences; that, where there is doubt or ambiguity. the court will give an act that interpretation which is most reasonable: that statutes will receive a sensible construction so as to avoid absurd and unjust conse- *301 quenees, etc. While the correctness of

1938Stat. 1921, contemplates an appropriation for the current expenses of the county and an appropriation for the aid of common schools; that the various items of appropriation should be totaled and 10 per cent, added for delinquent taxes; that there should be deducted therefrom the surplus revenue of the county on hand at the end of the fiscal year and the estimated income from sources other than ad valorem tax; * * * but the surplus in the common school fund and the estimated income of that fund from sources other than ad valorem tax should not be considered as surplus revenue of the county or e

1938Stat. 1921, contemplates an appropriation for the current expenses of the county and an appropriation for the aid of common schools; that the various items of appropriation should be totaled and 10 per cent, added for delinquent taxes; that there should be deducted therefrom the surplus revenue of the county on hand at the end of the fiscal year and the estimated income from sources other than ad valorem tax; * * * but the surplus in the common school fund and the estimated income of that fund from sources other than ad valorem tax should not be considered as surplus revenue of the county or e

1937Defendant Phillips Petroleum' Company relies upon the rule announced in Stumpf v. Montgomery, 101 Okla. 257 , 226 P. 65 , 32 A. L.

1937Defendant Phillips Petroleum' Company relies upon the rule announced in Stumpf v. Montgomery, 101 Okla. 257 , 226 P. 65 , 32 A. L.

1936Cr. 383 , 203 Pac. 484, 487 , this court said: “We find no reason to doubt the correctness of the rule announced in the Moody Case.” In our opinion the holding of this court in Warner v. Mathews, 11 Okla.

1936Cr. 122 , 143 Pac. 516 , and McDaniel v. Brown, 16 Okla.

1936Cr. 122 , 143 Pac. 516 , and McDaniel v. Brown, 16 Okla.

1931Co., 219 Mo. 524 , 118 S. W. 41 , the court held: “Where a new statute deals with procedure only prima facie, it applies to all actions — those which have accrued or are pending as well as future actions” —and said: “The general rule that statutes will be construed to be prospective in operation does not apply to statutes affecting procedure or a legal remedy.” The defendants must concede the correctness of this rule and the application thereof to the facts in this case, for they rely on the Harreld-Hastings Act, 44 Stat. 239 , as a basis of their claim that the rights of the cross-petitioners

1931Those softening circumstances about which we spealc were long ago considered by this court in a county seat election case wherein it was held that the citizens there received the money “ostensibly for their day’s work, but really for their votes.” Incorporated Town of Ryan v. Town of Waurika, 29 Okla. 655 , 119 Pac. 220 .

1931Those softening circumstances about which we spealc were long ago considered by this court in a county seat election case wherein it was held that the citizens there received the money “ostensibly for their day’s work, but really for their votes.” Incorporated Town of Ryan v. Town of Waurika, 29 Okla. 655 , 119 Pac. 220 .

1926If the language of a contract is such as to clearly show the intent of the parties, then there is no need to apply any technical rulen of construction, 'or where there is no doubt, there is no room for construction.’-’ They also cite Wolf v. Blackwell Oil Co., 77 Okla. 81 , 186 Pac. 484 , holding that: “The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit and does not. involve an absurdity, and the whole of such contract is to be taken together so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the others

1926If the language of a contract is such as to clearly show the intent of the parties, then there is no need to apply any technical rulen of construction, 'or where there is no doubt, there is no room for construction.’-’ They also cite Wolf v. Blackwell Oil Co., 77 Okla. 81 , 186 Pac. 484 , holding that: “The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit and does not. involve an absurdity, and the whole of such contract is to be taken together so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the others

1926The defendant, in its brief, cites the case of O’Neil Engineering Co. v. Incorporated Town of Ryan, 32 Okla. 738 , 124 Pac. 19 , in support of its theory.

1926The defendant, in its brief, cites the case of O’Neil Engineering Co. v. Incorporated Town of Ryan, 32 Okla. 738 , 124 Pac. 19 , in support of its theory.

1926In support of this contention defendant cites and relies on the case of Commonwealth Cotton Co. v. Hudson et al., 62 Okla. 23 , 161 Pac. 535 , where this court stated the rule, now firmly established in this state, as follows: ‘‘A defendant win* has objected to the jurisdiction of the court over his person may, after his objection has been overruled, in any manner defend against the action without waiving his objection; but, if he does more, and, aside from his defense, voluntarily demands affirmative relief in the same action, and thus invokes the jurisdiction of the court in a matter unneces

1926In support of this contention defendant cites and relies on the case of Commonwealth Cotton Co. v. Hudson et al., 62 Okla. 23 , 161 Pac. 535 , where this court stated the rule, now firmly established in this state, as follows: ‘‘A defendant win* has objected to the jurisdiction of the court over his person may, after his objection has been overruled, in any manner defend against the action without waiving his objection; but, if he does more, and, aside from his defense, voluntarily demands affirmative relief in the same action, and thus invokes the jurisdiction of the court in a matter unneces

1924Producing & Refining Co. v. Freeman, 88 Okla. 166 , 212 Pac. 742 ; Cooney v. Schoor Cigar Co., 92 Okla 27, 217 Pac. 206 .

1924Producing & Refining Co. v. Freeman, 88 Okla. 166 , 212 Pac. 742 ; Cooney v. Schoor Cigar Co., 92 Okla 27, 217 Pac. 206 .