16 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1881–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Quezadagreen1 sentence2006See People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 844 (Colo.1991) ("Just as a trial court's application of an erroneous legal standard in resolving a suppression motion is subject to correction on appeal, so also is an ultimate legal conclusion of constitutional law that is inconsistent with or unsupported by evidentiary findings."); see also People v. Valdez, 969 P.2d 208, 211 (Colo.1998) ("When the controlling facts are undisputed, the legal effect of those facts constitutes a question of law which is subject to de novo review."). *365 In this jurisdiction, we first had occasion to articulate this disti | 1 | 1 |
People v. Valdezgreen2 sentences2006See People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 844 (Colo.1991) ("Just as a trial court's application of an erroneous legal standard in resolving a suppression motion is subject to correction on appeal, so also is an ultimate legal conclusion of constitutional law that is inconsistent with or unsupported by evidentiary findings."); see also People v. Valdez, 969 P.2d 208, 211 (Colo.1998) ("When the controlling facts are undisputed, the legal effect of those facts constitutes a question of law which is subject to de novo review."). *365 In this jurisdiction, we first had occasion to articulate this disti 2006See People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 844 (Colo.1991) (“Just as a trial court’s application of an erroneous legal standard in resolving a suppression motion is subject to correction on appeal, so also is an ultimate legal conclusion of constitutional law that is inconsistent with or unsupported by evidentiary findings.”); see also People v. Valdez, 969 P.2d 208, 211 (Colo.1998) (“When the controlling facts are undisputed, the legal effect of those facts constitutes a question of law which is subject to de novo review.”). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Genningsgreen2 sentences2006See People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 844 (Colo.1991) ("Just as a trial court's application of an erroneous legal standard in resolving a suppression motion is subject to correction on appeal, so also is an ultimate legal conclusion of constitutional law that is inconsistent with or unsupported by evidentiary findings."); see also People v. Valdez, 969 P.2d 208, 211 (Colo.1998) ("When the controlling facts are undisputed, the legal effect of those facts constitutes a question of law which is subject to de novo review."). *365 In this jurisdiction, we first had occasion to articulate this disti 2006See People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 844 (Colo.1991) (“Just as a trial court’s application of an erroneous legal standard in resolving a suppression motion is subject to correction on appeal, so also is an ultimate legal conclusion of constitutional law that is inconsistent with or unsupported by evidentiary findings.”); see also People v. Valdez, 969 P.2d 208, 211 (Colo.1998) (“When the controlling facts are undisputed, the legal effect of those facts constitutes a question of law which is subject to de novo review.”). | 1 | 1 |
Scheer v. Cromwellgreen2 sentences1984C.R.C.P. 51 states, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll instructions shall be submitted to the parties, who shall make all objections thereto before they are given to the jury,” and that “[ojnly the grounds so specified shall be considered on motion for a new trial or on appeal or certiorari.” The purpose of this requirement is to “enable trial judges to clarify or correct misleading or *587 erroneous instructions before they are given to the jury, and thereby prevent costs of retrials necessitated by obvious and prejudicial error.” Scheer v. Cromwell, 158 Colo. 427, 429 , 407 P.2d 344, 345 (1965). 1984C.R.C.P. 51 states, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll instructions shall be submitted to the parties, who shall make all objections thereto before they are given to the jury,” and that “[ojnly the grounds so specified shall be considered on motion for a new trial or on appeal or certiorari.” The purpose of this requirement is to “enable trial judges to clarify or correct misleading or *587 erroneous instructions before they are given to the jury, and thereby prevent costs of retrials necessitated by obvious and prejudicial error.” Scheer v. Cromwell, 158 Colo. 427, 429 , 407 P.2d 344, 345 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Merlogreen2 sentences1979Compare, Commonwealth v. Merlo, 242 Pa. Super. 517 , 364 A.2d 391 (1976). 1979Compare, Commonwealth v. Merlo, 242 Pa. Super. 517 , 364 A.2d 391 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Boulder v. Boulder & White Rock Ditch & Reservoir Co.
green
2 sentences1931The court found that in disposing of this water as it did defendant acted lawfully under the modified civil law doctrine of dominant and servient estates as approved by this court in City of Boulder v. Ditch Co., 73 Colo. 426 , 216 Pac. 553 , 36 A. L. 1931The court found that in disposing of this water as it did defendant acted lawfully under the modified civil law doctrine of dominant and servient estates as approved by this court in City of Boulder v. Ditch Co., 73 Colo. 426 , 216 Pac. 553 , 36 A. L. | 2 | 1925–1931 |
Love v. Tomlinson
neutral
2 sentences1899This question received an examination at the hands of this court in the case of Love v. Tomlison, 1 Colo. App. 516 . 1899This question received an examination at the hands of this court in the case of Love v. Tomlison, 1 Colo. App. 516 . | 2 | 1899–1899 |
Central City Opera House Ass'n v. Brown
green
1 sentence1992Central City Opera House Ass’n v. Brown, 191 Colo. 372 , 553 P.2d 64 (1976) (if the trial court found that the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case, it follows that the court of necessity was ruling that plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the evidence). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
CENTRAL CITY OPERA HOUSE ASSOCIATION v. Brown
green
1 sentence1992Central City Opera House Ass’n v. Brown, 191 Colo. 372 , 553 P.2d 64 (1976) (if the trial court found that the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case, it follows that the court of necessity was ruling that plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the evidence). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Moore v. Skiles
green
2 sentences1988Id., 130 Colo. at 200 , 274 P.2d at 315 . 1988Id., 130 Colo. at 200 , 274 P.2d at 315 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose
green
2 sentences1986Id. at 587 . 1986Id. at 587 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Kendall v. Hargrave
green
2 sentences1984E.g., Kendall v. Hargrave, 142 Colo. 120 , 349 P.2d 993 (1960); Warner v. Barnard, 134 Colo. 337 , 304 P.2d 898 (1956); Carr v. Boyd, 123 Colo. 350 , 229 P.2d 659 (1951). 1984E.g., Kendall v. Hargrave, 142 Colo. 120 , 349 P.2d 993 (1960); Warner v. Barnard, 134 Colo. 337 , 304 P.2d 898 (1956); Carr v. Boyd, 123 Colo. 350 , 229 P.2d 659 (1951). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Carr v. Boyd
green
2 sentences1984E.g., Kendall v. Hargrave, 142 Colo. 120 , 349 P.2d 993 (1960); Warner v. Barnard, 134 Colo. 337 , 304 P.2d 898 (1956); Carr v. Boyd, 123 Colo. 350 , 229 P.2d 659 (1951). 1984E.g., Kendall v. Hargrave, 142 Colo. 120 , 349 P.2d 993 (1960); Warner v. Barnard, 134 Colo. 337 , 304 P.2d 898 (1956); Carr v. Boyd, 123 Colo. 350 , 229 P.2d 659 (1951). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Warner v. Barnard
green
2 sentences1984E.g., Kendall v. Hargrave, 142 Colo. 120 , 349 P.2d 993 (1960); Warner v. Barnard, 134 Colo. 337 , 304 P.2d 898 (1956); Carr v. Boyd, 123 Colo. 350 , 229 P.2d 659 (1951). 1984E.g., Kendall v. Hargrave, 142 Colo. 120 , 349 P.2d 993 (1960); Warner v. Barnard, 134 Colo. 337 , 304 P.2d 898 (1956); Carr v. Boyd, 123 Colo. 350 , 229 P.2d 659 (1951). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Orth v. Bauer
green
2 sentences1982The principle expressed in Parrish, supra, is applicable only where the street or roadway is in such a state that “changing conditions would not permit orderly travel under established rules.” Curtis v. Lawley, 140 Colo. 476 , 346 P.2d 579 (1959), quoting Parrish v. Smith, supra. See Orth v. Bauer, 163 Colo. 136 , 429 P.2d 279 (1967) (snowslide, and mountain road conditions warranted trial court’s refusal to instruct jury that driving on the wrong side of the road was negligence per se). 1982The principle expressed in Parrish, supra, is applicable only where the street or roadway is in such a state that “changing conditions would not permit orderly travel under established rules.” Curtis v. Lawley, 140 Colo. 476 , 346 P.2d 579 (1959), quoting Parrish v. Smith, supra. See Orth v. Bauer, 163 Colo. 136 , 429 P.2d 279 (1967) (snowslide, and mountain road conditions warranted trial court’s refusal to instruct jury that driving on the wrong side of the road was negligence per se). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Curtis v. Lawley
green
2 sentences1982The principle expressed in Parrish, supra, is applicable only where the street or roadway is in such a state that “changing conditions would not permit orderly travel under established rules.” Curtis v. Lawley, 140 Colo. 476 , 346 P.2d 579 (1959), quoting Parrish v. Smith, supra. See Orth v. Bauer, 163 Colo. 136 , 429 P.2d 279 (1967) (snowslide, and mountain road conditions warranted trial court’s refusal to instruct jury that driving on the wrong side of the road was negligence per se). 1982The principle expressed in Parrish, supra, is applicable only where the street or roadway is in such a state that “changing conditions would not permit orderly travel under established rules.” Curtis v. Lawley, 140 Colo. 476 , 346 P.2d 579 (1959), quoting Parrish v. Smith, supra. See Orth v. Bauer, 163 Colo. 136 , 429 P.2d 279 (1967) (snowslide, and mountain road conditions warranted trial court’s refusal to instruct jury that driving on the wrong side of the road was negligence per se). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Dougherty v. People
green
1 sentence1940The language of the instruction is taken verbatim from the opinion in Dougherty v. People, 1 Colo. 514, 518 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Schwalbe v. Postle
neutral
2 sentences1927To the giving of this instruction counsel for plaintiff in error made a general objection. " *58 We said, in Schwalbe v. Postle, 80 Colo. 1 , 249 Pac. 495 : ‘ ‘ Our established practice requires a party to make specific objections to an instruction in the trial court to entitle him to assign error on review. 1927To the giving of this instruction counsel for plaintiff in error made a general objection. " *58 We said, in Schwalbe v. Postle, 80 Colo. 1 , 249 Pac. 495 : ‘ ‘ Our established practice requires a party to make specific objections to an instruction in the trial court to entitle him to assign error on review. | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Gilette v. Young
green
1 sentence1917To support this contention they cite Gilette v. Young, 45 Colo. 562 , 101 Pac. 766 , wherein the syllabi states: “Where the defendant himself gives the evidence which warrants an estoppel upon him, without in any respect restricting it to any particular issue, he will not be heard to complain that the estoppel was not pleaded.” In the body of the opinion, it is said: “We think the court was right in withdrawing this question from the jury. | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Denver Consolidated Electric Co. v. Lawrence
neutral
1 sentence1906The defendant complains bitterly because the instruction tendered by it was refused and the other given,* and relies on the case of The Denver Electric Co. v. Lawrence, 31 Colo. 301 , in which it appears that an instruction similar to the one requested by defendant had been requested at the trial and was refused, and this court held that the propositions stated were in effect given in instruction No. 7 offered by defendant in that case, without expressing an opinion as to the correctness of the instruction; but, On page 311 of vol. 31, in discussing the. duty of the electric company, we said: | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Denver Consolidated Electric Co. v. Simpson
green
1 sentence1906The defendant complains bitterly because the instruction tendered by it was refused and the other given,* and relies on the case of The Denver Electric Co. v. Lawrence, 31 Colo. 301 , in which it appears that an instruction similar to the one requested by defendant had been requested at the trial and was refused, and this court held that the propositions stated were in effect given in instruction No. 7 offered by defendant in that case, without expressing an opinion as to the correctness of the instruction; but, On page 311 of vol. 31, in discussing the. duty of the electric company, we said: | 1 | 1906–1906 |
The People v. . Devlin
green
1 sentence1881The Vermont and Pennsylvania cases cited above, go no further than this upon the questions considered, and even the New York case of the People v. Devlin, supra, admits the correctness of this rule. | 1 | 1881–1881 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.