correctness instruction in Missouri

1961Lewis v. Zagata, 350 Mo. 446 , 166 S.W.2d 541, 545 [5, 6]; Knapp v. Hanley, 153 Mo.App. 169 , 132 S.W. 747, 1748 ; Gould v. M.

1961Lewis v. Zagata, 350 Mo. 446 , 166 S.W.2d 541, 545 [5, 6]; Knapp v. Hanley, 153 Mo.App. 169 , 132 S.W. 747, 1748 ; Gould v. M.

1904But even in an action at law, if the appellant seeks a reversal on the ground that there was no evidence to support the verdict, or that a demurrer to the evidence should have been sustained, all the evidence must appear in the bill. [Knipper v. Bechtner, 32 Mo. 256 ; Routsong v. Railroad, 45 Mo. 236 ; State v. Clarkson, 96 Mo. 364 .] It often occurs that the only complaint is the admission or rejection of certain evidence; in such a case, it would be an unnecessary burden to require the whole evidence to be brought up ; therefore, it is allowable to state in a general way that evidence was ad

1904But even in an action at law, if the appellant seeks a reversal on the ground that there was no evidence to support the verdict, or that a demurrer to the evidence should have been sustained, all the evidence must appear in the bill. [Knipper v. Bechtner, 32 Mo. 255 ; Routsong v. Railroad, 45 Mo. 236 ; State v. Clarkson, 96 Mo. 364 , 9 S. W. 925 .] It often occurs that the only complaint is the omission or rejection of certain evidence; in such case it would be an unnecessary burden to require the whole evidence to be brought up; therefore, it is allowable to state in a general way that eviden

1904But even in an action at law, if the appellant seeks a reversal on the ground that there was no evidence to support the verdict, or that a demurrer to the evidence should have been sustained, all the evidence must appear in the bill. [Knipper v. Bechtner, 32 Mo. 256 ; Routsong v. Railroad, 45 Mo. 236 ; State v. Clarkson, 96 Mo. 364 .] It often occurs that the only complaint is the admission or rejection of certain evidence; in such a case, it would be an unnecessary burden to require the whole evidence to be brought up ; therefore, it is allowable to state in a general way that evidence was ad

1904But even in an action at law, if the appellant seeks a reversal on the ground that there was no evidence to support the verdict, or that a demurrer to the evidence should have been sustained, all the evidence must appear in the bill. [Knipper v. Bechtner, 32 Mo. 255 ; Routsong v. Railroad, 45 Mo. 236 ; State v. Clarkson, 96 Mo. 364 , 9 S. W. 925 .] It often occurs that the only complaint is the omission or rejection of certain evidence; in such case it would be an unnecessary burden to require the whole evidence to be brought up; therefore, it is allowable to state in a general way that eviden

1979Judge Faris, concurring in Kester , stated, 201 S.W. at 64: “I have long doubted the correctness of the rule announced in State v. Mulhall, 199 Mo. 202 , 97 S.W. 583 , 7 L.R.A., N.S., 630, 8 Ann.Cas. 781, and State v. Williamson, 203 Mo. 591 , 102 S.W. 519 , 120 Am.St.Rep. 678 , because I deem it opposed to good reasoning; to the weight of authority in other jurisdictions, and to the analogous rule in murder cases wherein the death alleged resulted from shooting at A., and striking and killing B., and wherein we say in effect that the intent follows the bullet.

1979Judge Faris, concurring in Kester , stated, 201 S.W. at 64: “I have long doubted the correctness of the rule announced in State v. Mulhall, 199 Mo. 202 , 97 S.W. 583 , 7 L.R.A., N.S., 630, 8 Ann.Cas. 781, and State v. Williamson, 203 Mo. 591 , 102 S.W. 519 , 120 Am.St.Rep. 678 , because I deem it opposed to good reasoning; to the weight of authority in other jurisdictions, and to the analogous rule in murder cases wherein the death alleged resulted from shooting at A., and striking and killing B., and wherein we say in effect that the intent follows the bullet.

1979Judge Faris, concurring in Kester , stated, 201 S.W. at 64: “I have long doubted the correctness of the rule announced in State v. Mulhall, 199 Mo. 202 , 97 S.W. 583 , 7 L.R.A., N.S., 630, 8 Ann.Cas. 781, and State v. Williamson, 203 Mo. 591 , 102 S.W. 519 , 120 Am.St.Rep. 678 , because I deem it opposed to good reasoning; to the weight of authority in other jurisdictions, and to the analogous rule in murder cases wherein the death alleged resulted from shooting at A., and striking and killing B., and wherein we say in effect that the intent follows the bullet.

1979Judge Faris, concurring in Kester , stated, 201 S.W. at 64: “I have long doubted the correctness of the rule announced in State v. Mulhall, 199 Mo. 202 , 97 S.W. 583 , 7 L.R.A., N.S., 630, 8 Ann.Cas. 781, and State v. Williamson, 203 Mo. 591 , 102 S.W. 519 , 120 Am.St.Rep. 678 , because I deem it opposed to good reasoning; to the weight of authority in other jurisdictions, and to the analogous rule in murder cases wherein the death alleged resulted from shooting at A., and striking and killing B., and wherein we say in effect that the intent follows the bullet.

1979Spritz, supra. Instruction No. 4, the defendant’s affirmative defense instruction, referred the jury to Instruction No. 5.

1967“This court has repeatedly said that when an instruction is not erroneous but does not present an issue as clearly or succinctly as a party thinks it should, he must call the matter to the attention of the trial judge by requesting a clarifying or amplifying instruction. * * * The time to obtain a better worded instruction is at the time of the trial * * *.” 374 S.W.2d 1 .c. 33-34[21], See also Lewis v. Zagata, 350 Mo. 446 , 166 S.W.2d 541, 545 [5], “The test of the correctness of an instruction is how the instruction will naturally be understood by the average men who compose our juries * * *

1966In Sandler v. Schmidt, Mo., 263 S.W.2d 35 , the judgment was for defendant and plaintiff had appealed, and an instruction substantially identical with Instruction 6 was challenged for the precise reason here presented.

1966In Sandler v. Schmidt, Mo., 263 S.W.2d 35 , the judgment was for defendant and plaintiff had appealed, and an instruction substantially identical with Instruction 6 was challenged for the precise reason here presented.

1966Cole v. Armour, 154 Mo. 333 , 55 S.W. 476 ; Martin v. Barnett, Mo.App., 208 S.W. 278 ; Weisels-Gerhardt Real Estate Co. v. Pemberton Inv.

1966Cole v. Armour, 154 Mo. 333 , 55 S.W. 476 ; Martin v. Barnett, Mo.App., 208 S.W. 278 ; Weisels-Gerhardt Real Estate Co. v. Pemberton Inv.

1966Louis Public Service Co., Mo., 249 S.W.2d 417, 420 , “ * * * An integral part of the doctrine, in the sense that it is prerequisite to its application, is that the emergency shall not have been caused or contributed to by the tortious conduct of the one asserting the emergency * * (Emphasis supplied.) We believe a jury would consider that the word “act” as used would be syn~ *108 ■onymous with “conduct” or “negligence” and would include such things as failure to keep a lookout.

1959Salmon v. Brookshire, Mo.App., 301 S.W.2d 48 .

1958The correctness of instruction No. 2 is not before us for determination, but those interested may refer to Tucker v. Blankenmeier, Mo., 315 S.W.2d 724 .

1955Lewis v. Zagata, 350 Mo. 446 , 166 S.W.2d 541 , loc. cit. 545; Mueller v. Schien, 352 Mo. 180 , 176 S.W.2d 449 , loc. cit. 453.

1955Lewis v. Zagata, 350 Mo. 446 , 166 S.W.2d 541 , loc. cit. 545; Mueller v. Schien, 352 Mo. 180 , 176 S.W.2d 449 , loc. cit. 453.

1952Respondent also cites Sappington v. Watson, 50 Mo. 83, 84 , but in that case the defendant was appellant and could not justly complain of any instruction that imposed an undue burden upon the plaintiff.

1939Louis County, was not questioned, but on the contrary was alluded to in terms of approval." Moxley v. Pike County, 276 Mo. 449 , 208 S.W. 246 , was an action for damages resulting from personal injury.

1939Louis County, was not questioned, but on the contrary was alluded to in terms of approval." Moxley v. Pike County, 276 Mo. 449 , 208 S.W. 246 , was an action for damages resulting from personal injury.

1938Sess., p. 172.]" [1] The funds collected under a levy made by authority of the above section must be paid over to the special road districts in which the funds were collected. [State ex rel. v. Burton, 283 Mo. 41 , 222 S.W. 844 ; State ex rel. v. Barry County, 302 Mo. 279 , 258 S.W. 710 .] Appellant does not dispute the correctness of this rule and we will not give it further consideration. [2] Appellant's defense was, that the county court, in fact, did not make any levy under Section 7890; that the order appearing upon the record of the county court was erroneous and not in conformity with t

1938Sess., p. 172.]" [1] The funds collected under a levy made by authority of the above section must be paid over to the special road districts in which the funds were collected. [State ex rel. v. Burton, 283 Mo. 41 , 222 S.W. 844 ; State ex rel. v. Barry County, 302 Mo. 279 , 258 S.W. 710 .] Appellant does not dispute the correctness of this rule and we will not give it further consideration. [2] Appellant's defense was, that the county court, in fact, did not make any levy under Section 7890; that the order appearing upon the record of the county court was erroneous and not in conformity with t

1938Sess., p. 172.]" [1] The funds collected under a levy made by authority of the above section must be paid over to the special road districts in which the funds were collected. [State ex rel. v. Burton, 283 Mo. 41 , 222 S.W. 844 ; State ex rel. v. Barry County, 302 Mo. 279 , 258 S.W. 710 .] Appellant does not dispute the correctness of this rule and we will not give it further consideration. [2] Appellant's defense was, that the county court, in fact, did not make any levy under Section 7890; that the order appearing upon the record of the county court was erroneous and not in conformity with t

1938Sess., p. 172.]" [1] The funds collected under a levy made by authority of the above section must be paid over to the special road districts in which the funds were collected. [State ex rel. v. Burton, 283 Mo. 41 , 222 S.W. 844 ; State ex rel. v. Barry County, 302 Mo. 279 , 258 S.W. 710 .] Appellant does not dispute the correctness of this rule and we will not give it further consideration. [2] Appellant's defense was, that the county court, in fact, did not make any levy under Section 7890; that the order appearing upon the record of the county court was erroneous and not in conformity with t

1937A. Tompkins Co. v. Catawba Mills, 82 Fed. 780 ; Cohen & Co. v. Morris & Co., 70 Ga. 313 ; Goldman Commission Co. et al. v. Williams et al., 211 Fed. 530 .] In Nieters v. Brockman, 11 Mo. App. 600 , without stating the facts of the case, the court said that a creditor need not reduce his claim to judgment before proceeding in equity to subject real estate fraudulently conveyed to the payment of his demand where there is no dispute as to the claim and where the debtor died notoriously insolvent; and that in such a case the creditor is not bound to cause letters of administration to be taken out

1937R. 555, note.] Particularly is this true where the correctness of the claim is admitted or is not denied. [Kennedy v. Creswell, 101 U. S. 641 ; D.

1937A. Tompkins Co. v. Catawba Mills, 82 Fed. 780 ; Cohen & Co. v. Morris & Co., 70 Ga. 313 ; Goldman Commission Co. et al. v. Williams et al., 211 Fed. 530 .] In Nieters v. Brockman, 11 Mo. App. 600 , without stating the facts of the case, the court said that a creditor need not reduce his claim to judgment before proceeding in equity to subject real estate fraudulently conveyed to the payment of his demand where there is no dispute as to the claim and where the debtor died notoriously insolvent; and that in such a case the creditor is not bound to cause letters of administration to be taken out

1937A. Tompkins Co. v. Catawba Mills, 82 Fed. 780 ; Cohen & Co. v. Morris & Co., 70 Ga. 313 ; Goldman Commission Co. et al. v. Williams et al., 211 Fed. 530 .] In Nieters v. Brockman, 11 Mo. App. 600 , without stating the facts of the case, the court said that a creditor need not reduce his claim to judgment before proceeding in equity to subject real estate fraudulently conveyed to the payment of his demand where there is no dispute as to the claim and where the debtor died notoriously insolvent; and that in such a case the creditor is not bound to cause letters of administration to be taken out

1930This is so not only because he could not then be said to have gone from this State into an unaccounted-for disappearance, but also because there would then be no sufficient reason to expect him, within seven years or any particular time, to return to the state of which he had ceased to be a resident. [Duff v. Duff, 156 Mo. App. 247 , l. c. 255, 237 S. W. 909 ; Bradley v. Modern Woodmen of America, 146 Mo. App. 428 , l. c. 441, 124 S. W. 69 ; Gray etc. v. McDowell, 69 Ky. 475 , l. c. 482; Supreme Ruling of Fraternal Mystic Circle v. Hoskins (Tex.), 171 S. W. 812 ; Ross v. Blount (Tex.), 60 S. W

1930This is so not only because he could not then be said to have gone from this State into an unaccounted-for disappearance, but also because there would then be no sufficient reason to expect him, within seven years or any particular time, to return to the state of which he had ceased to be a resident. [Duff v. Duff, 156 Mo. App. 247 , l. c. 255, 237 S. W. 909 ; Bradley v. Modern Woodmen of America, 146 Mo. App. 428 , l. c. 441, 124 S. W. 69 ; Gray etc. v. McDowell, 69 Ky. 475 , l. c. 482; Supreme Ruling of Fraternal Mystic Circle v. Hoskins (Tex.), 171 S. W. 812 ; Ross v. Blount (Tex.), 60 S. W

1930This is so not only because he could not then be said to have gone from this State into an unaccounted-for disappearance, but also because there would then be no sufficient reason to expect him, within seven years or any particular time, to return to the state of which he had ceased to be a resident. [Duff v. Duff, 156 Mo. App. 247 , l. c. 255, 237 S. W. 909 ; Bradley v. Modern Woodmen of America, 146 Mo. App. 428 , l. c. 441, 124 S. W. 69 ; Gray etc. v. McDowell, 69 Ky. 475 , l. c. 482; Supreme Ruling of Fraternal Mystic Circle v. Hoskins (Tex.), 171 S. W. 812 ; Ross v. Blount (Tex.), 60 S. W

1930This is so not only because he could not then be said to have gone from this State into an unaccounted-for disappearance, but also because there would then be no sufficient reason to expect him, within seven years or any particular time, to return to the state of which he had ceased to be a resident. [Duff v. Duff, 156 Mo. App. 247 , l. c. 255, 237 S. W. 909 ; Bradley v. Modern Woodmen of America, 146 Mo. App. 428 , l. c. 441, 124 S. W. 69 ; Gray etc. v. McDowell, 69 Ky. 475 , l. c. 482; Supreme Ruling of Fraternal Mystic Circle v. Hoskins (Tex.), 171 S. W. 812 ; Ross v. Blount (Tex.), 60 S. W