79 Texas opinions name it 5 courts 1879–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp.green2 sentences2025“An injunction plaintiff need not establish the correctness of his claim to obtain temporary relief, but must show only a likelihood of success on the merits.” DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 686 (Tex. 1990). 2025“An injunction plaintiff need not establish the correctness of his claim to obtain temporary relief, but must show only a likelihood of success on the merits.” DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 686 (Tex. 1990). | 10 | 12 |
Airborne Freight Corp. v. CRB Marketing, Inc.green2 sentences2014Airborne Freight Corp. v. CRB Mktg., Inc., 566 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1978). 2005Airborne Freight Corp. v. CRB Marketing, Inc., 566 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex.1978). | 2 | 2 |
El Tacaso, Inc. v. Jireh Star, Inc.green1 sentence2018The trial court found that “Select ha[d] shown a probable right to relief at trial” and would suffer a “probable, imminent, and irreparable injury.” However, the reasons provided in a temporary injunction order “must be specific and legally sufficient, and not mere conclusory statements.” Collins, 261 S.W.3d at 795 ; see El Tacaso, Inc. v. Jireh Star, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 740 , 7 Select argues that it offered “uncontroverted evidence that Good Shepherd breached the express warranty of quiet enjoyment in the Lease.” It also argues that Good Shepherd breached the contract by developing and participa | 1 | 1 |
Intercontinental Terminals Co. v. Vopak North America, Inc.green2 sentences2016Nor does a finding of probable right of recovery indicate a trial court’s evaluation of the probability that the applicant will prevail at trial.” Id. (citing Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211 (demonstrating probable right to relief does not require establishing that applicant will prevail on final trial)); see DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 686 (Tex.1990) (injunction plaintiff “need not establish the correctness of his claim to obtain temporary relief’). 2016“Instead, to show a probable right of recovery, the applicant must plead a cause of action and present some evidence that tends to sustain it,” meaning that “[t]he evidence must be sufficient to raise a bona fide issue as to the applicant’s right to ultimate relief.” Intercontinental Terminals, 354 S.W.3d at 897 (first citing Camp v. Shannon, 162 Tex. 515 , 348 S.W.2d 517, 519 (1961), then citing T-N-T Motorsports, Inc. v. Hennessey Motorsports, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 18, 23-24 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. dism’d), then citing 183/620 Group Joint Venture v. SPF Joint Venture, 765 S.W.2d | 1 | 1 |
T-N-T Motorsports, Inc. v. Hennessey Motorsports, Inc.green1 sentence2016“Instead, to show a probable right of recovery, the applicant must plead a cause of action and present some evidence that tends to sustain it,” meaning that “[t]he evidence must be sufficient to raise a bona fide issue as to the applicant’s right to ultimate relief.” Intercontinental Terminals, 354 S.W.3d at 897 (first citing Camp v. Shannon, 162 Tex. 515 , 348 S.W.2d 517, 519 (1961), then citing T-N-T Motorsports, Inc. v. Hennessey Motorsports, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 18, 23-24 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. dism’d), then citing 183/620 Group Joint Venture v. SPF Joint Venture, 765 S.W.2d | 1 | 1 |
Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co.green1 sentence2016Nor does a finding of probable right of recovery indicate a trial court’s evaluation of the probability that the applicant will prevail at trial.” Id. (citing Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211 (demonstrating probable right to relief does not require establishing that applicant will prevail on final trial)); see DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 686 (Tex.1990) (injunction plaintiff “need not establish the correctness of his claim to obtain temporary relief’). | 1 | 1 |
183/620 Group Joint Venture v. SPF Joint Venturegreen1 sentence2016“Instead, to show a probable right of recovery, the applicant must plead a cause of action and present some evidence that tends to sustain it,” meaning that “[t]he evidence must be sufficient to raise a bona fide issue as to the applicant’s right to ultimate relief.” Intercontinental Terminals, 354 S.W.3d at 897 (first citing Camp v. Shannon, 162 Tex. 515 , 348 S.W.2d 517, 519 (1961), then citing T-N-T Motorsports, Inc. v. Hennessey Motorsports, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 18, 23-24 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. dism’d), then citing 183/620 Group Joint Venture v. SPF Joint Venture, 765 S.W.2d | 1 | 1 |
Camp v. Shannongreen2 sentences2016“Instead, to show a probable right of recovery, the applicant must plead a cause of action and present some evidence that tends to sustain it,” meaning that “[t]he evidence must be sufficient to raise a bona fide issue as to the applicant’s right to ultimate relief.” Intercontinental Terminals, 354 S.W.3d at 897 (first citing Camp v. Shannon, 162 Tex. 515 , 348 S.W.2d 517, 519 (1961), then citing T-N-T Motorsports, Inc. v. Hennessey Motorsports, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 18, 23-24 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. dism’d), then citing 183/620 Group Joint Venture v. SPF Joint Venture, 765 S.W.2d 2016“Instead, to show a probable right of recovery, the applicant must plead a cause of action and present some evidence that tends to sustain it,” meaning that “[t]he evidence must be sufficient to raise a bona fide issue as to the applicant’s right to ultimate relief.” Intercontinental Terminals, 354 S.W.3d at 897 (first citing Camp v. Shannon, 162 Tex. 515 , 348 S.W.2d 517, 519 (1961), then citing T-N-T Motorsports, Inc. v. Hennessey Motorsports, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 18, 23-24 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. dism’d), then citing 183/620 Group Joint Venture v. SPF Joint Venture, 765 S.W.2d | 1 | 1 |
ARGYLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. v. Wolfgreen1 sentence2015Bd. of Trustees v. Wolf, 234 S.W.3d 229 , 236 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.); see also DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 686 (Tex. 1990) (“An injunction plaintiff need not establish the correctness of his claim to obtain temporary relief, but must show only a likelihood of success on the merits.”). | 1 | 1 |
Solano v. SYNDICATED OFFICE SYSTEMSgreen1 sentence2011P. 185); Solano v. Syndicated Office Sys. , 225 S.W.3d 64, 67 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005) (“The failure to follow Rule 185 precludes the defendant from raising a fact issue and from disputing the receipt of the items or services rendered or the correctness of the claim. | 1 | 1 |
Stahl v. Stategreen2 sentences2010In the first instance, the prosecutor agreed with the correctness of an instruction to disregard and, in the second, he did not attempt to justify Ms. Sawyer’s outburst.118 The trial judge immediately instructed the jury to disregard 113 Id. at 828 . 114 Id. at 828-29 . 115 Id. at 830 (“The persistent appeals in the face of adverse rulings speak loudly of the prosecutor’s desire to use the outburst for inflammatory purposes.”). 116 Id. at 830-31 . 117 Id. at 826-27 . 118 Ms. Sawyer could charitably be called a “feisty” witness, and both the prosecutor and defense had difficulty controlling her 2010In the first instance, the prosecutor agreed with the correctness of an instruction to disregard and, in the second, he did not attempt to justify Ms. Sawyer’s outburst.118 The trial judge immediately instructed the jury to disregard 113 Id. at 828 . 114 Id. at 828-29 . 115 Id. at 830 (“The persistent appeals in the face of adverse rulings speak loudly of the prosecutor’s desire to use the outburst for inflammatory purposes.”). 116 Id. at 830-31 . 117 Id. at 826-27 . 118 Ms. Sawyer could charitably be called a “feisty” witness, and both the prosecutor and defense had difficulty controlling her | 1 | 1 |
Janus Films, Inc. v. City of Fort Worthgreen2 sentences2004App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, no writ) (same); Rattikin Title Co. v. Grievance Committee of the State Bar of Texas, 272 S.W.2d 948, 955 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1954, no writ) (same). [15] 358 S.W.2d at 589, 590 . [16] Id. at 590. [17] 873 S.W.2d 765 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ dism'd w.o.j.). [18] Id. at 767-768 . [19] Id. at 768 . [20] Id. at 769 . [21] See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 686 (Tex.1990) ("An injunction plaintiff need not establish the correctness of his claim to obtain temporary relief, but must show only a likelihood of success on the merits."). [22] See a 2004App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, no writ) (same); Rattikin Title Co. v. Grievance Committee of the State Bar of Texas, 272 S.W.2d 948, 955 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1954, no writ) (same). [15] 358 S.W.2d at 589, 590 . [16] Id. at 590. [17] 873 S.W.2d 765 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ dism'd w.o.j.). [18] Id. at 767-768 . [19] Id. at 768 . [20] Id. at 769 . [21] See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 686 (Tex.1990) ("An injunction plaintiff need not establish the correctness of his claim to obtain temporary relief, but must show only a likelihood of success on the merits."). [22] See a | 1 | 1 |
Rattikin Title Co. v. Grievance Committee of State Bar of Texasgreen1 sentence2004App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, no writ) (same); Rattikin Title Co. v. Grievance Committee of the State Bar of Texas, 272 S.W.2d 948, 955 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1954, no writ) (same). [15] 358 S.W.2d at 589, 590 . [16] Id. at 590. [17] 873 S.W.2d 765 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ dism'd w.o.j.). [18] Id. at 767-768 . [19] Id. at 768 . [20] Id. at 769 . [21] See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 686 (Tex.1990) ("An injunction plaintiff need not establish the correctness of his claim to obtain temporary relief, but must show only a likelihood of success on the merits."). [22] See a | 1 | 1 |
| Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Mitchellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lyles v. State
green
2 sentences1911App., 549, this court said: “There can be no doubt at this day as to the rule, or the correctness of the rule in proper cases, as now established in this State, that where two are jointly indicted, and one is tried and convicted, and subsequently the other is tried and acquitted, a new trial will be granted the former to -obtain the testimony of the latter, where it appears that the new evidence is legal and competent and material to his defense.” Lyles v. The State, 41 Texas, 172 ; Rich v. State, 1 Texas Crim. 1911In the case of Rucker v. State, 7 Tex. App. 549, this court said: "There can be no doubt at this day as to the rule, or the correctness of the rule in proper cases, as now established in this state, that where two are jointly indicted, and one is tried and convicted, and subsequently the other is tried and acquitted, a new trial will be granted the former to obtain the testimony of the latter, where it appears that the new evidence is legal and competent and material to his defense.” Lyles v. State, 41 Tex. 172 , 19 Am. | 6 | 1880–1913 |
Western Assurance Co. of Toronto, Canada v. Kemendo
neutral
2 sentences1927In determining the purpose of this provision our Supreme Court, speaking through Judge Brown, in the case of Western Assurance Co. v. Kemendo, 94 Tex. 367 , 60 S. W. 661 , uses this language: “The object of having the inventory made was not to ascertain the gross value of the property insured, but to ascertain the different articles which went to make up the stock, in order that the insurance company might test the correctness of the claim in two respects: (1) Whether the articles of which the stock was composed all belonged to the classes of property covered by the policy; and (2) whether the 1927In determining the purpose of this provision our Supreme Court, speaking through Judge Brown, in the case of Western Assurance Co. v. Kemendo, 94 Tex. 367 , 60 S. W. 661 , uses this language: “The object of having the inventory made was not to ascertain the gross value of the property insured, but to ascertain the different articles which went to make up the stock, in order that the insurance company might test the correctness of the claim in two respects: (1) Whether the articles of which the stock was composed all belonged to the classes of property covered by the policy; and (2) whether the | 4 | 1910–1937 |
Roberts, Willis & Taylor Co. v. Sun Mutual Insurance
neutral
2 sentences1937The writer cannot believe that the learned justice who wrote that opinion had any idea that his language would be so interpreted. *Page 987 The opinion of Justice Graves in the case just cited, in reference to the inventory presented to the company after the fire, which in all essentials is similar to the one presented by appellants in this case, as set out in the opinion, says: "Concerning the itemized inventories provided for, to constitute even a substantial compliance, there must be `an itemized list, or an enumeration, article by article, of the property,' to the end `that the insurance c 1922Concerning the itemized inventories provided for, to constitute even a substantial compliance, there must be “an itemized list, or an enumeration, article by article, of the property,” to the end “that the insurance company may test the correctness of the claim in two respects: (1) Whether the ar-tides of which the stock was composed all belonged to the classes of property covered by the policy; and (2) whether the valuation attached to the different items and which went to make up the total sum expressed, was reasonable.” Roberts et al. v. Insurance Co., 19 Tex. Civ. | 4 | 1902–1937 |
Ortiz v. State
green
2 sentences1932Ortiz v. State, 68 Texas Crim. 1932Ortiz v. State, 68 Texas Crim. | 3 | 1931–1932 |
First Nat. Bank of Giddings v. Lee County Cotton Oil Co.
green
2 sentences1943The correctness of that rule is not controverted, snd it is unnecessary to cite auth- orities in support of its" Ws quote from the case of First National Bank v. Lee County Cot- ton Oil Company, 274 S.W. 127 , as followsr ". e . 1939Bank of Giddings v. Lee County Cotton Oil Co. et al., Tex.Com.App., 274 S.W. 127, 130 . | 2 | 1939–1943 |
City of San Antonio v. Pizzini
neutral
2 sentences1937App. 338 , 48 S.W. 559 ; North British Mercantile Insurance Co. v. Kemendo, 94 Tex. 367 , 61 S.W. 1102 ." A number of other cases are cited which fully sustain Justice Graves' opinion. 1922App. 338 , 48 S. W. 559 ; Insurance Co. v. Kemendo, 94 Tex. 367 , 61 S. W. 1102 . | 2 | 1922–1937 |
Hill v. Tucker
green
2 sentences1925The distinction, as regards privity between administrators appointed by law under different political jurisdictions and privity between testamentary executors, is clearly drawn in Hill v. Tucker, 13 How. 458 , 14 L. 1925The distinction, as regards privity between administrators appointed by law under different political jurisdictions and privity between testamentary executors, is clearly drawn in Hill v. Tucker, 13 How. 458 , 14 L. | 2 | 1921–1925 |
Independent Capital Management, L.L.C. v. Collins
green
1 sentence2018The trial court found that “Select ha[d] shown a probable right to relief at trial” and would suffer a “probable, imminent, and irreparable injury.” However, the reasons provided in a temporary injunction order “must be specific and legally sufficient, and not mere conclusory statements.” Collins, 261 S.W.3d at 795 ; see El Tacaso, Inc. v. Jireh Star, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 740 , 7 Select argues that it offered “uncontroverted evidence that Good Shepherd breached the express warranty of quiet enjoyment in the Lease.” It also argues that Good Shepherd breached the contract by developing and participa | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda
green
1 sentence2017Gov’t Code § 143.057(j). 19 City of Pasadena, 292 S.W.3d at 21 . 20 See, e.g., Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226 . 5 examiner’s acts were “not authorized by the Act or are contrary to it” or “invade the policy-setting realm protected by the nondelegation doctrine.”21 In support of their plea to the jurisdiction, appellees submitted evidence, which the district court considered in deciding the plea, demonstrating that Hopkins’s suit was merely an attempt to relitigate issues already decided by the hearing examiner—i.e., complaints regarding the correctness of the hearing examiner’s decision. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
City of Pasadena v. Smith
green
1 sentence2017Gov’t Code § 143.057(j). 19 City of Pasadena, 292 S.W.3d at 21 . 20 See, e.g., Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226 . 5 examiner’s acts were “not authorized by the Act or are contrary to it” or “invade the policy-setting realm protected by the nondelegation doctrine.”21 In support of their plea to the jurisdiction, appellees submitted evidence, which the district court considered in deciding the plea, demonstrating that Hopkins’s suit was merely an attempt to relitigate issues already decided by the hearing examiner—i.e., complaints regarding the correctness of the hearing examiner’s decision. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Ramirez Co. v. Housing Authority of City of Houston
neutral
1 sentence2013In Ramirez Co. v. Housing Authority of City of Houston, we described the different types of contracts, saying, "[T]here is the implied[-]in[-]fact contract, called quantum me-ruit, wherein there is no express agreement but the conduct of the parties implies an agreement to contract from which an obligation in contract exists.” 777 S.W.2d 167 , 173 n. 12 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
City of Arlington v. City of Fort Worth
green
2 sentences2004App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, no writ) (same); Rattikin Title Co. v. Grievance Committee of the State Bar of Texas, 272 S.W.2d 948, 955 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1954, no writ) (same). [15] 358 S.W.2d at 589, 590 . [16] Id. at 590. [17] 873 S.W.2d 765 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ dism'd w.o.j.). [18] Id. at 767-768 . [19] Id. at 768 . [20] Id. at 769 . [21] See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 686 (Tex.1990) ("An injunction plaintiff need not establish the correctness of his claim to obtain temporary relief, but must show only a likelihood of success on the merits."). [22] See a 2004App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, no writ) (same); Rattikin Title Co. v. Grievance Committee of the State Bar of Texas, 272 S.W.2d 948, 955 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1954, no writ) (same). [15] 358 S.W.2d at 589, 590 . [16] Id. at 590. [17] 873 S.W.2d 765 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ dism'd w.o.j.). [18] Id. at 767-768 . [19] Id. at 768 . [20] Id. at 769 . [21] See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 686 (Tex.1990) ("An injunction plaintiff need not establish the correctness of his claim to obtain temporary relief, but must show only a likelihood of success on the merits."). [22] See a | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Tanenbaum v. Economics Laboratory, Inc.
green
1 sentence1989Id. at 28-29 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Turner v. General Motors Corp.
green
1 sentence1985This type of question was first considered by this court in Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.1979). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Johnson v. American General Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1983Id. at 86 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Butler v. State
neutral
2 sentences1978Sanders, 107 S.W. 840 . 1978Sanders, 107 S.W. 840 . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Universal Life & Accident Insurance v. Sanders
green
2 sentences1978Co. v. Sanders, 129 Tex. 344 , 102 S.W.2d 405 (1937). 1978Co. v. Sanders, 129 Tex. 344 , 102 S.W.2d 405 (1937). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Hogue v. Wilkinson green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Dublin Fruit Co. v. Neely green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Land Title Bank & Trust Co. v. Witherspoon neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Merchants' & Planters' Nat. Bank of Mt. Vernon v. Jones neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Lindsay v. Clayman green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Dakan v. Dakan green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Howard green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Hickman v. Durham neutral | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Wintermann v. McDonald green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Tarrant County v. Shannon neutral | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Benat v. Dallas County green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Swidan v. State green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Milliman v. State neutral | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Forrester v. State green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Arnold v. State green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| Brown v. Peters green | 1 | 1945–1945 |
| Stockyards National Bank v. Maples green | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| United States v. Lee green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| City of Waco v. Rook green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Pearson v. State green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Pelton v. State green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Dorroh-Kelly Mercantile Co. v. Orient Insurance green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Oberthier v. Stroud neutral | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.