correctness principle in New Jersey

2002Similar to the mandated procedure in the penalty phase of the death-penalty process, the significance of the own-conduct determination in triggering the penalty phase supports the conclusion that jurors must be instructed on the nonunanimity option. [ Id. at 518, 651 A.2d 19 .] State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1 , 716 A.2d 395 (1998), was a capital murder prosecution in which the Court addressed the correctness of an instruction in the guilt phase that directed the jury to first deliberate on whether defendant committed the charged homicide by his own conduct and, if unconvinced beyond a reasonable

2002Similar to the mandated procedure in the penalty phase of the death-penalty process, the significance of the own-conduct determination in triggering the penalty phase supports the conclusion that jurors must be instructed on the nonunanimity option. [ Id. at 518, 651 A.2d 19 .] State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1 , 716 A.2d 395 (1998), was a capital murder prosecution in which the Court addressed the correctness of an instruction in the guilt phase that directed the jury to first deliberate on whether defendant committed the charged homicide by his own conduct and, if unconvinced beyond a reasonable

2002Similar to the mandated procedure in the penalty phase of the death-penalty process, the significance of the own-conduct determination in triggering the penalty phase supports the conclusion that jurors must be instructed on the nonunanimity option. [ Id. at 518, 651 A.2d 19 .] State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1 , 716 A.2d 395 (1998), was a capital murder prosecution in which the Court addressed the correctness of an instruction in the guilt phase that directed the jury to first deliberate on whether defendant committed the charged homicide by his own conduct and, if unconvinced beyond a reasonable

1976Transit Co., Inc., supra .

1912In most cases of receiving stolen goods direct proof of guilty knowledge is difficult to produce, and therefore the offence must be, in nearly every case, established by circumstances, “and the rule is that in order to be effective as proof of guilty knowledge the circumstances must be at least such as would satisfy a man of ordinary intelligence and caution that the goods were stolen.” State v. Simon, 41 Id. 407 .

1912The only other matter argued is that the court committed an error in charging the jury as follows: “Guilty knowledge may be found by the jury where the defendant receives the goods under such circumstances as would satisfy a man of ordinary intelligence and caution that they were stolen.” This excerpt from the charge is the precise language used by the court in State v. Goldman, 36 Vroom 394 , and the correctness of the principle does not appear to be seriously questioned by the plaintiff in error in this ease, but the argument in support of this exception is based upon the statement that the

1905In Hartford Life and Annuity Co. v. Unsell, 144 U. S. 439 , it was held that “it is always open for the insured to show a waiver of the condition or a course of conduct on the part of the insurer which gave him a just and reasonable ground to infer that a forfeiture would not be exacted, and the fact that. defendant, without objection, had previously received from the insured monthly dues after the date on which by the terms of the contract they were payable, was properly left to the jury to infer waiver,” and “that a waiver may arise by express language or by acts from which an in tention to

1905In Hartford Life and Annuity Co. v. Unsell, 144 U. S. 439 , it was held that “it is always open for the insured to show a waiver of the condition or a course of conduct on the part of the insurer which gave him a just and reasonable ground to infer that a forfeiture would not be exacted, and the fact that. defendant, without objection, had previously received from the insured monthly dues after the date on which by the terms of the contract they were payable, was properly left to the jury to infer waiver,” and “that a waiver may arise by express language or by acts from which an in tention to

1902The prevailing opinion delivered in this court in the case of Wharton v. Christie, 24 Vroom 607 , turned upon a question of fact, and does not militate against the correctness of the rule of evidence stated by Mr. Justice Van Syckel in his dissenting opinion.

1879Chancellor "Walworth, on appeal, affirmed the correctness of the rule as thus stated ( 6 Paige 226 ), although he had previously, in Lindsay v. Jackson, 2 Paige 581 , said natural equity required that cross-demands [without limiting the scope of the terms] should be set-off against each other, and a recovery permitted only for the balance.

1825And the acts of such body or board evidenced by a written vote, are as completely binding upon the corporation and as complete authority to their agents as the most solemn acts done under the corporate seal.” The decisions of the American Courts on this subject are marked with great and commendable uniformity; and the liability of corporations upon contracts not under seal, and made by ‘themselves or their agents, and also on implied contracts is the settled law of Massachusetts, Heyden and another v. The Middlesex Turnpike Corporation, 10 Mass. Rep. 397 ; White v. The West Point Cotton Manufa