iied claim in Oregon

2008Cf. Dalby v. Sisters of Providence, 125 Or.App. 149 , 865 P.2d 391 (1993) (IIED claim alleged by false accusation of theft where the defendant encouraged police investigation and arrest for theft charge in retaliation for the plaintiff's complaint that the defendant failed to comply with drug inventory rules); Woods, 102 Or.

2008Cf. Dalby v. Sisters of Providence, 125 Or.App. 149 , 865 P.2d 391 (1993) (IIED claim alleged by false accusation of theft where the defendant encouraged police investigation and arrest for theft charge in retaliation for the plaintiff's complaint that the defendant failed to comply with drug inventory rules); Woods, 102 Or.

2025The court later denied plaintiff’s motion to file her proposed (fourth) amended complaint, and the case was subsequently Cite as 340 Or App 21 (2025) 27 Challenging the dismissal of the IIED claim, plain- tiff renews her arguments from below and contends that she “presented the court with direct, circumstantial, and infer- ential evidence from which an objectively reasonable juror could find that McGee’s accusations were a fiction he knew with substantial certainty would cause severe distress to Buckmeyer[.]” She asks us to reverse the judgment as to the IIED claim only.

2025The court later denied plaintiff’s motion to file her proposed (fourth) amended complaint, and the case was subsequently Cite as 340 Or App 21 (2025) 27 Challenging the dismissal of the IIED claim, plain- tiff renews her arguments from below and contends that she “presented the court with direct, circumstantial, and infer- ential evidence from which an objectively reasonable juror could find that McGee’s accusations were a fiction he knew with substantial certainty would cause severe distress to Buckmeyer[.]” She asks us to reverse the judgment as to the IIED claim only.

2023Here, the statements in defendant’s letter and unfiled Cite as 327 Or App 197 (2023) 217 complaint had some relation to her proposed lawsuit against plaintiff and were therefore absolutely privileged.9 We therefore conclude, under the totality of the cir- cumstances, that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that defendant’s conduct exceeds “any reasonable limit of social toleration.” Accordingly, plaintiff failed to meet his burden as to his IIED claim.

2023Here, the statements in defendant’s letter and unfiled Cite as 327 Or App 197 (2023) 217 complaint had some relation to her proposed lawsuit against plaintiff and were therefore absolutely privileged.9 We therefore conclude, under the totality of the cir- cumstances, that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that defendant’s conduct exceeds “any reasonable limit of social toleration.” Accordingly, plaintiff failed to meet his burden as to his IIED claim.

2023Cite as 328 Or App 46 (2023) 47 48 Ricard v. Klamath Falls Forest Estates HOA SHORR, P. J.

2023Klamath County Circuit Court 18CV25995; A176668 536 P3d 1013 Plaintiffs appeal from a civil judgment of dismissal.

2010See ORCP 25 A (“In all cases where part of a pleading is ordered stricken, the pleading shall be amended in accordance with Rule 23 D.”); ORCP 23 D (an amendment “shall be done by filing a new pleading” or by “interlineation [or] deletion” and the “amended pleading shall be complete in itself, without reference to the original or any preceding amended one”); Olson v. Howard, 237 Or App 256, 261-64 , 239 P3d 510 (2010) (where the court granted a motion striking portions of the pleading and the plaintiff refused to replead, a judgment dismissing the case was proper because no functioning complai

2010See ORCP 25 A (“In all cases where part of a pleading is ordered stricken, the pleading shall be amended in accordance with Rule 23 D.”); ORCP 23 D (an amendment “shall be done by filing a new pleading” or by “interlineation [or] deletion” and the “amended pleading shall be complete in itself, without reference to the original or any preceding amended one”); Olson v. Howard, 237 Or App 256, 261-64 , 239 P3d 510 (2010) (where the court granted a motion striking portions of the pleading and the plaintiff refused to replead, a judgment dismissing the case was proper because no functioning complai

2008An example of where the intent element for an IIED claim could be proved based on the nature of the conduct itself is found in Rockhill v. Pollard, 259 Or. 54 , 485 P.2d 28 (1971), *743 where a physician forced an injured child to wait outside his office in a freezing temperature with clothing and a blanket wet with vomit until someone came to pick the child up.

2008An example of where the intent element for an IIED claim could be proved based on the nature of the conduct itself is found in Rockhill v. Pollard, 259 Or. 54 , 485 P.2d 28 (1971), *743 where a physician forced an injured child to wait outside his office in a freezing temperature with clothing and a blanket wet with vomit until someone came to pick the child up.

2015In fact, the lack of such a relationship generally defeats a conclusion that the conduct is actionable through an IIED claim.” Delaney, 180 Or App at 130 .

2015In fact, the lack of such a relationship generally defeats a conclusion that the conduct is actionable through an IIED claim.” Delaney, 180 Or App at 130 .

2009Although defendants styled their motions as motions to dismiss plaintiffs IIED claim and to strike plaintiffs request for emotional distress damages, it is well settled that “a motion is controlled by its substance, not its caption.” Welker v. TSPC, 332 Or 306, 312 , 27 P3d 1038 (2001).

2009Although defendants styled their motions as motions to dismiss plaintiffs IIED claim and to strike plaintiffs request for emotional distress damages, it is well settled that “a motion is controlled by its substance, not its caption.” Welker v. TSPC, 332 Or 306, 312 , 27 P3d 1038 (2001).

2008Stores, 292 Or. 131, 139 , 637 P.2d 126 (1981) (holding that a security supervisor's accusations made regardless of an actual belief as to guilt or innocence that accused the plaintiff of stealing money and threatened her with prosecution and imprisonment in a manner designed to frighten her were actionable in the context of an IIED claim).

2008Stores, 292 Or. 131, 139 , 637 P.2d 126 (1981) (holding that a security supervisor's accusations made regardless of an actual belief as to guilt or innocence that accused the plaintiff of stealing money and threatened her with prosecution and imprisonment in a manner designed to frighten her were actionable in the context of an IIED claim).

2008In Shay v. Paulson, 131 Or.App. 270 , 884 P.2d 870 (1994), we upheld dismissal of an IIED claim based on harassment through forged magazine subscriptions.

2008In Shay v. Paulson, 131 Or.App. 270 , 884 P.2d 870 (1994), we upheld dismissal of an IIED claim based on harassment through forged magazine subscriptions.

2008Tenold v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 127 Or.App. 511, 517 , 873 P.2d 413 (1994), rev. dismissed, 321 Or. 561 , 901 P.2d 859 (1995); see also Pakos v. Clark, 253 Or. 113, 132 , 453 P.2d 682 (1969) ("It was for the trial court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendants' conduct may be reasonably regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery.").

2008Tenold v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 127 Or.App. 511, 517 , 873 P.2d 413 (1994), rev. dismissed, 321 Or. 561 , 901 P.2d 859 (1995); see also Pakos v. Clark, 253 Or. 113, 132 , 453 P.2d 682 (1969) ("It was for the trial court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendants' conduct may be reasonably regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery.").

2008York, 159 Or App at 349 .

2008York, 159 Or App at 349 .

2008Madani v. Kendall Ford, Inc., 312 Or. 198, 204 , 818 P.2d 930 (1991).

2008Madani v. Kendall Ford, Inc., 312 Or. 198, 204 , 818 P.2d 930 (1991).

2003On appeal, we affirmed the dismissal of the IIED claim against the defendant lawyer on the ground that her actions were shielded by the absolute privilege: “In Troutman v. Erlandson, 286 Or 3, 6 , 593 P2d 793 (1979), the Supreme Court stated that it had ‘recognized the absolute privilege accorded communications made by attorneys in judicial proceedings.’ * * * Although the absolute attorney privilege question most frequently arises in defamation actions, this court has held that it applies to the ‘publication of any matter that is an invasion of privacy.’ Lee[ ], 65 Or App at 542 .

2003On appeal, we affirmed the dismissal of the IIED claim against the defendant lawyer on the ground that her actions were shielded by the absolute privilege: “In Troutman v. Erlandson, 286 Or 3, 6 , 593 P2d 793 (1979), the Supreme Court stated that it had ‘recognized the absolute privilege accorded communications made by attorneys in judicial proceedings.’ * * * Although the absolute attorney privilege question most frequently arises in defamation actions, this court has held that it applies to the ‘publication of any matter that is an invasion of privacy.’ Lee[ ], 65 Or App at 542 .

2003Franson, 84 Or App at 719 . 10 Our opinion in Wollam did refer to an earlier opinion in the epic Troutman v. Erlandson saga — Troutman, 286 Or at 7 — see Wollam, 154 Or App at 162 .

2003Franson, 84 Or App at 719 . 10 Our opinion in Wollam did refer to an earlier opinion in the epic Troutman v. Erlandson saga — Troutman, 286 Or at 7 — see Wollam, 154 Or App at 162 .

2003On appeal, we affirmed the dismissal of the IIED claim against the defendant lawyer on the ground that her actions were shielded by the absolute privilege: “In Troutman v. Erlandson, 286 Or 3, 6 , 593 P2d 793 (1979), the Supreme Court stated that it had ‘recognized the absolute privilege accorded communications made by attorneys in judicial proceedings.’ * * * Although the absolute attorney privilege question most frequently arises in defamation actions, this court has held that it applies to the ‘publication of any matter that is an invasion of privacy.’ Lee[ ], 65 Or App at 542 .

2003On appeal, we affirmed the dismissal of the IIED claim against the defendant lawyer on the ground that her actions were shielded by the absolute privilege: “In Troutman v. Erlandson, 286 Or 3, 6 , 593 P2d 793 (1979), the Supreme Court stated that it had ‘recognized the absolute privilege accorded communications made by attorneys in judicial proceedings.’ * * * Although the absolute attorney privilege question most frequently arises in defamation actions, this court has held that it applies to the ‘publication of any matter that is an invasion of privacy.’ Lee[ ], 65 Or App at 542 .

2003Again, nothing in the lengthy correspondence between plaintiffs former attorneys and defendant indicated, even remotely, that plaintiff intended to assert an IIED claim or other claim against defendant based on the circumstances ultimately relied on by petitioner in asserting that claim.” Flug, 170 Or App at 671-72 . *552 Plaintiff argues that the Court of Appeals decision requires that a notice of claim specifically forecast each legal theory that a plaintiff ultimately intends to assert and that any such requirement is inconsistent with the wording and overall purpose of the notice statute.

2003Again, nothing in the lengthy correspondence between plaintiffs former attorneys and defendant indicated, even remotely, that plaintiff intended to assert an IIED claim or other claim against defendant based on the circumstances ultimately relied on by petitioner in asserting that claim.” Flug, 170 Or App at 671-72 . *552 Plaintiff argues that the Court of Appeals decision requires that a notice of claim specifically forecast each legal theory that a plaintiff ultimately intends to assert and that any such requirement is inconsistent with the wording and overall purpose of the notice statute.

2001Plaintiffs reliance on Spiess v. Johnson, 89 Or App 289 , 748 P2d 1020 , aff'd by equally divided court 307 Or 242 , 765 P2d 811 (1988), is misplaced. 3 In Spiess , the plaintiff sued a psychiatrist for IIED, among other claims, because the psychiatrist had an extramarital relationship with the plaintiffs wife.

2001Plaintiffs reliance on Spiess v. Johnson, 89 Or App 289 , 748 P2d 1020 , aff'd by equally divided court 307 Or 242 , 765 P2d 811 (1988), is misplaced. 3 In Spiess , the plaintiff sued a psychiatrist for IIED, among other claims, because the psychiatrist had an extramarital relationship with the plaintiffs wife.