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16 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 2014–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Roberts v. Auto-Owners Insurancegreen2 sentences2026The trial court erroneously interpreted Roberts to reach the conclusion that testimony regarding plaintiff’s alleged economic exploitation “shall not be heard by the jury in attempt to support an [IIED] claim” because economic exploitation or the failure to fulfill a financial obligation “can never be a basis for such claim.” But the Roberts court did not state that financial malfeasance is never relevant to an IIED claim—it explicitly acknowledged that additional evidence of “egregious conduct” might qualify as “extreme and outrageous.” Id. 2026The trial court erroneously interpreted Roberts to reach the conclusion that testimony regarding plaintiff’s alleged economic exploitation “shall not be heard by the jury in attempt to support an [IIED] claim” because economic exploitation or the failure to fulfill a financial obligation “can never be a basis for such claim.” But the Roberts court did not state that financial malfeasance is never relevant to an IIED claim—it explicitly acknowledged that additional evidence of “egregious conduct” might qualify as “extreme and outrageous.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
B P 7 v. Bureau of State Lotterygreen1 sentence2024See B P 7, 231 Mich App at 359 (“As a general rule, an appellate court will not decide moot issues.”). | 1 | 1 |
Campos v. General Motors Corp.green2 sentences2020See Campos v Oldsmobile Div, Gen Motors Corp, 71 Mich App 23, 26 ; 246 NW2d 352 (1976) (“Only those allegations which charge an intentional interference with plaintiff’s own mental well-being, as distinguished from other’s reactions to the charges, are not barred by the one-year statute of limitations of M.C.L.A. s 600.5805(6).”). 2020See Campos v Oldsmobile Div, Gen Motors Corp, 71 Mich App 23, 26 ; 246 NW2d 352 (1976) (“Only those allegations which charge an intentional interference with plaintiff’s own mental well-being, as distinguished from other’s reactions to the charges, are not barred by the one-year statute of limitations of M.C.L.A. s 600.5805(6).”). | 1 | 1 |
Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 25green2 sentences2014In Farmer, to determine whether a state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) was exempt from NLRA preemption, the Court focused on whether the NLRA’s prohibitions protected the plaintiff from the same 32 Farmer, 430 US at 296-297 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 33 See, generally, notes 50-58 of this opinion and accompanying text. 34 Farmer, 430 US 290 . 11 complained-of conduct as the state-law IIED claim.35 The Court contrasted the plaintiff’s IIED claim, which protected the plaintiff from conduct that no reasonable person in civilized society should be re 2014In Farmer, to determine whether a state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) was exempt from NLRA preemption, the Court focused on whether the NLRA’s prohibitions protected the plaintiff from the same 32 Farmer, 430 US at 296-297 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 33 See, generally, notes 50-58 of this opinion and accompanying text. 34 Farmer, 430 US 290 . 11 complained-of conduct as the state-law IIED claim.35 The Court contrasted the plaintiff’s IIED claim, which protected the plaintiff from conduct that no reasonable person in civilized society should be re | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Doe v. Mills
green
2 sentences2026“Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” Doe v Mills, 212 Mich App 73, 91 ; 536 NW2d 824 (1995). 2026“Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” Doe v Mills, 212 Mich App 73, 91 ; 536 NW2d 824 (1995). | 5 | 2016–2026 |
Lucas v. Awaad
green
2 sentences2025The elements of an IIED claim are “(1) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) the defendant’s intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4) the severe emotional distress of the plaintiff.” Lucas v Awaad, 299 Mich App 345, 359 ; 830 NW2d 141 (2013) (citation omitted). 2025The elements of an IIED claim are “(1) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) the defendant’s intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4) the severe emotional distress of the plaintiff.” Lucas v Awaad, 299 Mich App 345, 359 ; 830 NW2d 141 (2013) (citation omitted). | 3 | 2016–2025 |
Hayley v. Allstate Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences2026An IIED claim requires “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4) severe emotional distress.” Hayley v Allstate Ins Co, 262 Mich App 571, 577 ; 686 NW2d 273 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2026An IIED claim requires “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4) severe emotional distress.” Hayley v Allstate Ins Co, 262 Mich App 571, 577 ; 686 NW2d 273 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 2 | 2023–2026 |
Hayley v. Allstate Insurance
green
2 sentences2026An IIED claim requires “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4) severe emotional distress.” Hayley v Allstate Ins Co, 262 Mich App 571, 577 ; 686 NW2d 273 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2026An IIED claim requires “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4) severe emotional distress.” Hayley v Allstate Ins Co, 262 Mich App 571, 577 ; 686 NW2d 273 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 2 | 2023–2026 |
Walsh v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2014Although an IIED claim predicated on a false arrest cannot be established if there existed probable cause to arrest, Walsh v Taylor, 263 Mich App 618, 634 ; 689 NW2d 506 (2004), a review of the first amended complaint reflects that it was not specifically based on a false arrest -7- but upon the allegedly deplorable and abusive treatment received by plaintiff as recounted in several general allegations and adopted by reference in the IIED count. 2014Although an IIED claim predicated on a false arrest cannot be established if there existed probable cause to arrest, Walsh v Taylor, 263 Mich App 618, 634 ; 689 NW2d 506 (2004), a review of the first amended complaint reflects that it was not specifically based on a false arrest -7- but upon the allegedly deplorable and abusive treatment received by plaintiff as recounted in several general allegations and adopted by reference in the IIED count. | 2 | 2014–2022 |
Odom v. Wayne County
green
2 sentences2017Shavers contendeds that she is entitled to governmental immunity with respect to this count, and thus, entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).6 Because IIED is an intentional tort, Shavers is entitled to immunity if: (a) The acts were undertaken during the course of employment and the employee was acting, or reasonably believed that [s]he was acting, within the scope of [her] authority, (b) the acts were undertaken in good faith, or were not undertaken with malice, and (c) the acts were discretionary, as opposed to ministerial. [Odom v Wayne Co, 482 Mich 459, 480 ; 760 NW2d 217 2017Shavers contendeds that she is entitled to governmental immunity with respect to this count, and thus, entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).6 Because IIED is an intentional tort, Shavers is entitled to immunity if: (a) The acts were undertaken during the course of employment and the employee was acting, or reasonably believed that [s]he was acting, within the scope of [her] authority, (b) the acts were undertaken in good faith, or were not undertaken with malice, and (c) the acts were discretionary, as opposed to ministerial. [Odom v Wayne Co, 482 Mich 459, 480 ; 760 NW2d 217 | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Moore v. City of Detroit
green
2 sentences2025“The elements of IIED are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intent or recklessness; (3) causation; and (4) severe emotional distress.” Moore v Detroit, 252 Mich App 384, 389 ; 652 NW2d 688 (2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 2025“The elements of IIED are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intent or recklessness; (3) causation; and (4) severe emotional distress.” Moore v Detroit, 252 Mich App 384, 389 ; 652 NW2d 688 (2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Three Lakes Ass'n v. Whiting
green
2 sentences2025Just as a party “ ‘may not shift ground on appeal . . . after being unsuccessful on the one presented in the trial court,’ ” Webster v Osguthorpe, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket Nos. 166627 and 166678); slip op at 7 n 5, citing Three Lakes Ass’n v Whiting, 75 Mich App 564, 581 ; 255 NW2d 686 (1977), plaintiff here may not argue for the first time on appeal that the claim he defended as IIED in the trial court was NIED all along. 2025Just as a party “ ‘may not shift ground on appeal . . . after being unsuccessful on the one presented in the trial court,’ ” Webster v Osguthorpe, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket Nos. 166627 and 166678); slip op at 7 n 5, citing Three Lakes Ass’n v Whiting, 75 Mich App 564, 581 ; 255 NW2d 686 (1977), plaintiff here may not argue for the first time on appeal that the claim he defended as IIED in the trial court was NIED all along. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Lewis v. LeGrow
green
2 sentences2022“Liability attaches only when a plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Lewis v LeGrow, 258 Mich App 175, 196 ; 670 NW2d 675 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[M]ere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities” cannot support an IIED claim. 2022“Liability attaches only when a plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Lewis v LeGrow, 258 Mich App 175, 196 ; 670 NW2d 675 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[M]ere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities” cannot support an IIED claim. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Lisecki v. Taco Bell Restaurants, Inc
green
2 sentences2021This Court has recognized that an IIED claim may occur when defendant abuses a relationship in which it is “in a position of actual or apparent authority over plaintiff or gives defendant power to affect plaintiff’s interests” or “where defendant acts notwithstanding the knowledge that plaintiff is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress because of defendant’s actions[.]” Lisecki v Taco Bell Restaurants, Inc, 150 Mich App 749, 753 ; 389 NW2d 173 (1986) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2021This Court has recognized that an IIED claim may occur when defendant abuses a relationship in which it is “in a position of actual or apparent authority over plaintiff or gives defendant power to affect plaintiff’s interests” or “where defendant acts notwithstanding the knowledge that plaintiff is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress because of defendant’s actions[.]” Lisecki v Taco Bell Restaurants, Inc, 150 Mich App 749, 753 ; 389 NW2d 173 (1986) (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Kewin v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company
green
2 sentences2021Kewin v Massachusetts Mut Life Ins Co, 409 Mich 401, 420-421 ; 295 NW2d 50 (1980). 2021Kewin v Massachusetts Mut Life Ins Co, 409 Mich 401, 420-421 ; 295 NW2d 50 (1980). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Harbaugh v. Citizens Telephone Co.
green
2 sentences2021We disagree. 3 While Sheri appears to argue that Harbaugh v Citizens Tel Co, 190 Mich 421, 428 ; 157 NW 32 (1916), establishes that a defendant engaging in “unlawful acts” can support a claim for exemplary damages, this argument is without merit. 2021We disagree. 3 While Sheri appears to argue that Harbaugh v Citizens Tel Co, 190 Mich 421, 428 ; 157 NW 32 (1916), establishes that a defendant engaging in “unlawful acts” can support a claim for exemplary damages, this argument is without merit. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Haverbush v. Powelson
green
2 sentences2018A plaintiff may establish the second element of an IIED claim by a showing that the defendant specifically intended to cause the plaintiff emotional harm, or that a defendant’s conduct was so reckless that “ ‘any reasonable person would know emotional distress would result.’ ” Haverbush v Powelson, 217 Mich App 228, 236-237 ; 551 NW2d 206 (1996). 2018A plaintiff may establish the second element of an IIED claim by a showing that the defendant specifically intended to cause the plaintiff emotional harm, or that a defendant’s conduct was so reckless that “ ‘any reasonable person would know emotional distress would result.’ ” Haverbush v Powelson, 217 Mich App 228, 236-237 ; 551 NW2d 206 (1996). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon
green
2 sentences2014Courts adjudicating NLRA preemption are rightfully 60 Compare Farmer, 430 US at 304 , which held that the plaintiff’s IIED claim was not preempted because the state court would not have to reach the “merits of the underlying labor dispute.” (Quotation marks omitted.) In this case, the WPA wrongful-discharge claim jeopardizes the NLRB’s exclusive jurisdiction over labor disputes because of the risk that the WPA would adjudicate the same, federally protected and prohibited conduct differently. 61 Garmon, 359 US at 244-245 . 18 concerned about circumvention, which would undermine the NLRB’s exclu 2014Courts adjudicating NLRA preemption are rightfully 60 Compare Farmer, 430 US at 304 , which held that the plaintiff’s IIED claim was not preempted because the state court would not have to reach the “merits of the underlying labor dispute.” (Quotation marks omitted.) In this case, the WPA wrongful-discharge claim jeopardizes the NLRB’s exclusive jurisdiction over labor disputes because of the risk that the WPA would adjudicate the same, federally protected and prohibited conduct differently. 61 Garmon, 359 US at 244-245 . 18 concerned about circumvention, which would undermine the NLRB’s exclu | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.