iied claim in Ohio

2025See Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am, 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 375 (1983), quoting 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, § 46, Comment d (1965) (IIED requires conduct “‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community’”).

2025See Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am, 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 375 (1983), quoting 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, § 46, Comment d (1965) (IIED requires conduct “‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community’”).

2025Weidman, 2024-Ohio-2931 , at ¶ 26-27; Grover v. Bartsch, 2006-Ohio-6115, ¶ 52 (2d Dist.).

2025Weidman, 2024-Ohio-2931 , at ¶ 26-27; Grover v. Bartsch, 2006-Ohio-6115, ¶ 52 (2d Dist.).

2024The court of appeals agreed. 2022-Ohio-1708 at ¶ 37 (12th Dist.).

2024The court of appeals agreed. 2022-Ohio-1708 at ¶ 37 (12th Dist.).

2024Barry Corp., 12 Ohio St.3d 179, 183 (1984). {¶ 27} Both parties agree that because the substance of the IIED claim and the false-light-invasion-of-privacy claim are virtually identical to the defamation claim, the statute of limitations associated with the defamation claim controls.

2024Barry Corp., 12 Ohio St.3d 179 , 183 (1984). {¶ 27} Both parties agree that because the substance of the IIED claim and the false-light-invasion-of-privacy claim are virtually identical to the defamation claim, the statute of limitations associated with the defamation claim controls.

2024See Stainbrook v. Ohio Secy. of State, 2017-Ohio-1526 , ¶ 27 (10th Dist.) (holding that “a false light invasion of privacy claim[] involving allegations that would also support a defamation claim has the same statute of limitations applied to it as the defamation claim”); Boyd v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 2015-Ohio-1394 , ¶ 51 (2d Dist.) (holding that “where defamation is the basis for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the applicable one-year statute of limitations for defamation also applies to the emotional distress claim”).

2024See Stainbrook v. Ohio Secy. of State, 2017-Ohio-1526 , ¶ 27 (10th Dist.) (holding that “a false light invasion of privacy claim[] involving allegations that would also support a defamation claim has the same statute of limitations applied to it as the defamation claim”); Boyd v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 2015-Ohio-1394 , ¶ 51 (2d Dist.) (holding that “where defamation is the basis for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the applicable one-year statute of limitations for defamation also applies to the emotional distress claim”).

2002See, e.g., Lightning v. Roadway Express, Inc. (C.A.11, 1995), 60 F.3d 1551, 1556-1557 (employee’s IIED claim based upon verbal abuse by supervisors and co-workers not preempted).” Id. at 10-11.

2001See, e.g., Lightning v. Roadway Express, Inc. (C.A.11, 1995), 60 F.3d 1551 , 1556-1557 (employee's IIED claim based upon verbal abuse by supervisors and co-workers not preempted); Keehr v. Consolidated Freightways of Delaware, Inc. (C.A.7, 1987), 825 F.2d 133 , 137-138 (IIED claim based upon the particularly abusive manner adopted by employer to carry out its decision to have plaintiff fired not preempted; plaintiff alleged that defendant instructed supervisors to make crude and vulgar remarks about the plaintiff's family to provoke him into throwing a punch at his supervisor).

2025“Only the most extreme wrongs, which do great harm to the norms of a civilized society, will rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct.” Martcheva v. Dayton Bd. of Edn., 2021- Ohio-3524, ¶ 66 (2d Dist.), citing Brown v. Denny, 72 Ohio App.3d 417, 423 (2d Dist. 1997).

2025“Only the most extreme wrongs, which do great harm to the norms of a civilized society, will rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct.” Martcheva v. Dayton Bd. of Edn., 2021- Ohio-3524, ¶ 66 (2d Dist.), citing Brown v. Denny, 72 Ohio App.3d 417, 423 (2d Dist. 1997).

2025Id. at ¶ 25. “[E]xpert medical testimony can assist the judicial process in determining whether the emotional injury is, indeed, serious.” Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St.3d 72, 80 (1983).

2025Id. at ¶ 25. “[E]xpert medical testimony can assist the judicial process in determining whether the emotional injury is, indeed, serious.” Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St.3d 72, 80 (1983).

2025“Summary judgment [on an IIED claim] is appropriate when the plaintiff presents no testimony from experts or third parties as to the emotional distress suffered and where the plaintiff does not seek medical or psychological treatment for the -34- alleged injuries.” Crable v. Nestle USA, Inc., 2006-Ohio-2887, ¶ 58 (8th Dist.), citing Buckman-Peirson; Plikerd v. Mongeluzzo, 73 Ohio App.3d 115 (3d Dist. 1992); Sheets v. Rockwell Internatl.

2025“Summary judgment [on an IIED claim] is appropriate when the plaintiff presents no testimony from experts or third parties as to the emotional distress suffered and where the plaintiff does not seek medical or psychological treatment for the -34- alleged injuries.” Crable v. Nestle USA, Inc., 2006-Ohio-2887, ¶ 58 (8th Dist.), citing Buckman-Peirson; Plikerd v. Mongeluzzo, 73 Ohio App.3d 115 (3d Dist. 1992); Sheets v. Rockwell Internatl.

2024Compare State v. Rodriguez, 2024-Ohio-5832, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.), citing City of Cincinnati v. Twang, LLC, 2021-Ohio-4387, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.) (addressing the essence of the argument presented for review as sufficiency of the evidence rather than manifest weight).

2024Compare State v. Rodriguez, 2024-Ohio-5832, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.), citing City of Cincinnati v. Twang, LLC, 2021-Ohio-4387, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.) (addressing the essence of the argument presented for review as sufficiency of the evidence rather than manifest weight).

2024However, where the essential character of the IIED claim “consists of conduct that is, in substance, another tort, the statute of limitations for the other tort governs.” Id., citing Doe v. First United Methodist Church, 68 Ohio St.3d 531 , 536-537 (1994); Love v. Port Clinton, 37 Ohio St.3d 98, 99-100 (1988); Vandiver v. Morgan Adhesive Co., 126 Ohio App.3d 634, 637-638 (9th Dist. 1998).

2024However, where the essential character of the IIED claim “consists of conduct that is, in substance, another tort, the statute of limitations for the other tort governs.” Id., citing Doe v. First United Methodist Church, 68 Ohio St.3d 531 , 536-537 (1994); Love v. Port Clinton, 37 Ohio St.3d 98, 99-100 (1988); Vandiver v. Morgan Adhesive Co., 126 Ohio App.3d 634, 637-638 (9th Dist. 1998).

2024Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 144-145 (1991).

2024Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 144-145 (1991).

2024Compare State v. Rodriguez, 2024-Ohio-5832, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.), citing City of Cincinnati v. Twang, LLC, 2021-Ohio-4387, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.) (addressing the essence of the argument presented for review as sufficiency of the evidence rather than manifest weight).

2024Compare State v. Rodriguez, 2024-Ohio-5832, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.), citing City of Cincinnati v. Twang, LLC, 2021-Ohio-4387, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.) (addressing the essence of the argument presented for review as sufficiency of the evidence rather than manifest weight).

2024However, where the essential character of the IIED claim “consists of conduct that is, in substance, another tort, the statute of limitations for the other tort governs.” Id., citing Doe v. First United Methodist Church, 68 Ohio St.3d 531 , 536-537 (1994); Love v. Port Clinton, 37 Ohio St.3d 98, 99-100 (1988); Vandiver v. Morgan Adhesive Co., 126 Ohio App.3d 634, 637-638 (9th Dist. 1998).

2024However, where the essential character of the IIED claim “consists of conduct that is, in substance, another tort, the statute of limitations for the other tort governs.” Id., citing Doe v. First United Methodist Church, 68 Ohio St.3d 531 , 536-537 (1994); Love v. Port Clinton, 37 Ohio St.3d 98, 99-100 (1988); Vandiver v. Morgan Adhesive Co., 126 Ohio App.3d 634, 637-638 (9th Dist. 1998).

2022Franklin No. 19AP-533, 2020-Ohio-1346, ¶ 20-26 (finding an IIED claim and other tort claims were disguised defamation claims barred by a one-year statute of limitations). - 17 - Warren CA2021-09-084 {¶37} As the trial court correctly noted in its decision, Weidman's IIED and false light invasion of privacy claims "hinge on [Hildebrant's] publication of the 2011 email." The alleged conduct underlying Weidman's IIED and false light invasion of privacy claims cannot be separated from the virtually identical alleged conduct underlying his defamation claim.

2022Franklin No. 19AP-533, 2020-Ohio-1346, ¶ 20-26 (finding an IIED claim and other tort claims were disguised defamation claims barred by a one-year statute of limitations). - 17 - Warren CA2021-09-084 {¶37} As the trial court correctly noted in its decision, Weidman's IIED and false light invasion of privacy claims "hinge on [Hildebrant's] publication of the 2011 email." The alleged conduct underlying Weidman's IIED and false light invasion of privacy claims cannot be separated from the virtually identical alleged conduct underlying his defamation claim.