iied claim in New Mexico

2010Id. {21} Finally, as to the third element, we explained that IIED should be limited in the marital context because of the unique nature of the injuries that must be proved to prevail on an IIED claim.

2010Id. {21} Finally, as to the third element, we explained that IIED should be limited in the marital context because of the unique nature of the injuries that must be proved to prevail on an IIED claim.

2016See id. 9 “Accordingly, the mere fact that an actor knows that his conduct is insulting, or will 10 deeply hurt another’s feelings is insufficient to establish liability.” Padwa v. Hadley, 11 1999-NMCA-067, ¶ 11 , 127 N.M. 416 , 981 P.2d 1234 . 12 {9} This case simply does not resemble the types of cases in which our courts have 13 determined that a defendant’s conduct was so outrageous as to permit an IIED claim. 14 For example, in Baldonado, a gas explosion resulted in a fireball and killed twelve 15 members of an extended family. 2008-NMSC-005, ¶ 3 .

2016See id. 9 “Accordingly, the mere fact that an actor knows that his conduct is insulting, or will 10 deeply hurt another’s feelings is insufficient to establish liability.” Padwa v. Hadley, 11 1999-NMCA-067, ¶ 11 , 127 N.M. 416 , 981 P.2d 1234 . 12 {9} This case simply does not resemble the types of cases in which our courts have 13 determined that a defendant’s conduct was so outrageous as to permit an IIED claim. 14 For example, in Baldonado, a gas explosion resulted in a fireball and killed twelve 15 members of an extended family. 2008-NMSC-005, ¶ 3 .

2016See id. 9 “Accordingly, the mere fact that an actor knows that his conduct is insulting, or will 10 deeply hurt another’s feelings is insufficient to establish liability.” Padwa v. Hadley, 11 1999-NMCA-067, ¶ 11 , 127 N.M. 416 , 981 P.2d 1234 . 12 {9} This case simply does not resemble the types of cases in which our courts have 13 determined that a defendant’s conduct was so outrageous as to permit an IIED claim. 14 For example, in Baldonado, a gas explosion resulted in a fireball and killed twelve 15 members of an extended family. 2008-NMSC-005, ¶ 3 .

2016See id. 9 “Accordingly, the mere fact that an actor knows that his conduct is insulting, or will 10 deeply hurt another’s feelings is insufficient to establish liability.” Padwa v. Hadley, 11 1999-NMCA-067, ¶ 11 , 127 N.M. 416 , 981 P.2d 1234 . 12 {9} This case simply does not resemble the types of cases in which our courts have 13 determined that a defendant’s conduct was so outrageous as to permit an IIED claim. 14 For example, in Baldonado, a gas explosion resulted in a fireball and killed twelve 15 members of an extended family. 2008-NMSC-005, ¶ 3 .

2016See id. 9 “Accordingly, the mere fact that an actor knows that his conduct is insulting, or will 10 deeply hurt another’s feelings is insufficient to establish liability.” Padwa v. Hadley, 11 1999-NMCA-067, ¶ 11 , 127 N.M. 416 , 981 P.2d 1234 . 12 {9} This case simply does not resemble the types of cases in which our courts have 13 determined that a defendant’s conduct was so outrageous as to permit an IIED claim. 14 For example, in Baldonado, a gas explosion resulted in a fireball and killed twelve 15 members of an extended family. 2008-NMSC-005, ¶ 3 .

2016See id. 9 “Accordingly, the mere fact that an actor knows that his conduct is insulting, or will 10 deeply hurt another’s feelings is insufficient to establish liability.” Padwa v. Hadley, 11 1999-NMCA-067, ¶ 11 , 127 N.M. 416 , 981 P.2d 1234 . 12 {9} This case simply does not resemble the types of cases in which our courts have 13 determined that a defendant’s conduct was so outrageous as to permit an IIED claim. 14 For example, in Baldonado, a gas explosion resulted in a fireball and killed twelve 15 members of an extended family. 2008-NMSC-005, ¶ 3 .

2016See In re 7 1 Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMSC-024 , ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764 , 676 P.2d 1329 .

2016See In re 7 1 Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMSC-024 , ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764 , 676 P.2d 1329 .

2008The Farmer Court limited the IIED exception to preemption by requiring that “the state tort be either unrelated to employment discrimination or a function of the particularly abusive manner in which the discrimination is accomplished or threatened rather than a function of the actual or threatened discrimination itself.” Id.; see Viestenz v. Fleming Cos., 681 F.2d 699, 703-04 (10th Cir.1982).

2008The Farmer Court limited the IIED exception to preemption by requiring that “the state tort be either unrelated to employment discrimination or a function of the particularly abusive manner in which the discrimination is accomplished or threatened rather than a function of the actual or threatened discrimination itself.” Id.; see Viestenz v. Fleming Cos., 681 F.2d 699, 703-04 (10th Cir.1982).

2008Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress {10} In Farmer, the United States Supreme Court applied the preemption exception analysis to a state-law IIED claim and held that a union member’s claim of IIED was not necessarily preempted by the NLRA. 430 U.S. at 302-05 , 97 S.Ct. 1056 .

2008Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress {10} In Farmer, the United States Supreme Court applied the preemption exception analysis to a state-law IIED claim and held that a union member’s claim of IIED was not necessarily preempted by the NLRA. 430 U.S. at 302-05 , 97 S.Ct. 1056 .

2004Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress {15} The federal district court, citing Corrigan, 982 F.2d at 1482, ruled that “insofar as Plaintiffs IIED claim is based on Defendant’s actions in conducting its investigation or in adhering to its termination policies, it is likewise preempted by § 301.” As Plaintiff points out, however, the court went on to state that Plaintiffs IIED claim was not preempted to the extent that it was associated with his retaliatory discharge claim. {16} On appeal, Defendants argue only that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the requirements for an IIED claim, and Plaintiff

2004See Carrigan, 982 F.2d at 1482 (stating that claims requiring an analysis of what a CBA permitted were preempted). {18} Accordingly, we do not reach the issue of whether there was evidence to support each element of an IIED claim.

2004See Silva II, 2001-NMSC-038, ¶12 , 131 N.M. 364 , 37 P.3d 81 ; Silva I, 106 N.M. at 21 , 738 P.2d at 515 (stating that the principle that the tort of retaliatory discharge is “ ‘unnecessary and inapplicable’ when the employee is protected from wrongful discharge by an employment contract”).

2004See Silva II, 2001-NMSC-038, ¶12 , 131 N.M. 364 , 37 P.3d 81 ; Silva I, 106 N.M. at 21 , 738 P.2d at 515 (stating that the principle that the tort of retaliatory discharge is “ ‘unnecessary and inapplicable’ when the employee is protected from wrongful discharge by an employment contract”).

2004See Silva II, 2001-NMSC-038, ¶12 , 131 N.M. 364 , 37 P.3d 81 ; Silva I, 106 N.M. at 21 , 738 P.2d at 515 (stating that the principle that the tort of retaliatory discharge is “ ‘unnecessary and inapplicable’ when the employee is protected from wrongful discharge by an employment contract”).

2004See Silva II, 2001-NMSC-038, ¶12 , 131 N.M. 364 , 37 P.3d 81 ; Silva I, 106 N.M. at 21 , 738 P.2d at 515 (stating that the principle that the tort of retaliatory discharge is “ ‘unnecessary and inapplicable’ when the employee is protected from wrongful discharge by an employment contract”).