Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
8 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 2011–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Retherford v. AT & T Communications of the Mountain States, Inc.green2 sentences2025We have also sustained a plaintiff’s IIED claim where she alleged that her apartment manager “forcefully evicted her and her children when she held the premises under lease and had tendered the rent due, that he retained all of her personal possessions without contractual or judicial sanction, and that all of this was done intentionally and with malice.” Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1985) (cleaned up) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment). ¶92 Although we have recognized that “publication of falsehoods concerning an individual could constitute extreme and outrageou 2025We have also sustained a plaintiff’s IIED claim where she alleged that her apartment manager “forcefully evicted her and her children when she held the premises under lease and had tendered the rent due, that he retained all of her personal possessions without contractual or judicial sanction, and that all of this was done intentionally and with malice.” Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1985) (cleaned up) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment). ¶92 Although we have recognized that “publication of falsehoods concerning an individual could constitute extreme and outrageou | 1 | 2 |
Gulbraa v. Corp. of the Presidentgreen2 sentences2019See Franco , 2001 UT 25 , ¶ 15, 21 P.3d 198 (holding that claims that require courts to interpret religious practices or beliefs are barred by the Establishment Clause). ¶17 This case is distinguishable from Gulbraa , in which this court allowed the plaintiff's IIED claim against a religious entity to proceed. 2007 UT App 126 , ¶ 22, 159 P.3d 392 . 2019See Franco , 2001 UT 25 , ¶ 15, 21 P.3d 198 (holding that claims that require courts to interpret religious practices or beliefs are barred by the Establishment Clause). ¶17 This case is distinguishable from Gulbraa , in which this court allowed the plaintiff's IIED claim against a religious entity to proceed. 2007 UT App 126 , ¶ 22, 159 P.3d 392 . | 1 | 2 |
Pentecost v. Harwardgreen2 sentences2025We have also sustained a plaintiff’s IIED claim where she alleged that her apartment manager “forcefully evicted her and her children when she held the premises under lease and had tendered the rent due, that he retained all of her personal possessions without contractual or judicial sanction, and that all of this was done intentionally and with malice.” Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1985) (cleaned up) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment). ¶92 Although we have recognized that “publication of falsehoods concerning an individual could constitute extreme and outrageou 2025We have also sustained a plaintiff’s IIED claim where she alleged that her apartment manager “forcefully evicted her and her children when she held the premises under lease and had tendered the rent due, that he retained all of her personal possessions without contractual or judicial sanction, and that all of this was done intentionally and with malice.” Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1985) (cleaned up) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment). ¶92 Although we have recognized that “publication of falsehoods concerning an individual could constitute extreme and outrageou | 1 | 1 |
Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saintsgreen2 sentences2019See Franco , 2001 UT 25 , ¶ 15, 21 P.3d 198 (holding that claims that require courts to interpret religious practices or beliefs are barred by the Establishment Clause). ¶17 This case is distinguishable from Gulbraa , in which this court allowed the plaintiff's IIED claim against a religious entity to proceed. 2007 UT App 126 , ¶ 22, 159 P.3d 392 . 2019See Franco , 2001 UT 25 , ¶ 15, 21 P.3d 198 (holding that claims that require courts to interpret religious practices or beliefs are barred by the Establishment Clause). ¶17 This case is distinguishable from Gulbraa , in which this court allowed the plaintiff's IIED claim against a religious entity to proceed. 2007 UT App 126 , ¶ 22, 159 P.3d 392 . | 1 | 1 |
Cabaness v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2011Co., 2002 UT 68, ¶¶ 37-40 , 56 P.3d 524 (holding that insurance company's refusal to pay benefits was not outrageous as a matter of law if the company's actions were "fairly debatable"), and Nguyen v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2010 UT App 85, ¶¶ 8-9 , 232 P.3d 529 (holding that defendants' failure to follow testing protocols for use of a ventilator on a child did not, under the circumstances of the case, "amount[] to evidence of outrageous conduct"), with Cabaness, 2010 UT 23, ¶¶ 40-45 , 232 P.3d 486 (reversing summary judgment on IIED claim where plaintiff's supervisor engaged in "an ongoing a 2011Co., 2002 UT 68, ¶¶ 37-40 , 56 P.3d 524 (holding that insurance company's refusal to pay benefits was not outrageous as a matter of law if the company's actions were "fairly debatable"), and Nguyen v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2010 UT App 85, ¶¶ 8-9 , 232 P.3d 529 (holding that defendants' failure to follow testing protocols for use of a ventilator on a child did not, under the circumstances of the case, "amount[] to evidence of outrageous conduct"), with Cabaness, 2010 UT 23, ¶¶ 40-45 , 232 P.3d 486 (reversing summary judgment on IIED claim where plaintiff's supervisor engaged in "an ongoing a | 1 | 1 |
Salt Lake City v. Lopezgreen2 sentences2011See id. at 1264 . ¶ 18 Utah cases addressing varying factual circumstances have been confusing when answering the question of when, as a matter of law, behavior is sufficiently outrageous to present a jury question on an IIED claim. 2011See id. at 1264 . ¶ 18 Utah cases addressing varying factual circumstances have been confusing when answering the question of when, as a matter of law, behavior is sufficiently outrageous to present a jury question on an IIED claim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
cluster 10863450
green
1 sentence2026Id. ¶28 The owners appealed, arguing that they “asserted distinct and palpable injuries that [were] not derivative of the harm” to the company in that (1) “they were forced to mortgage their home 20240498-CA 12 2026 UT App 82 Mountain West Towing v. West Jordan City to obtain operating funds” for the company, (2) “they had to personally guarantee some of [the company’s] business deals with suppliers and others,” and (3) the company “suffered a diminished reputation.” Id. ¶ 41. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Lomsanidze v. Musayev
neutral
2 sentences2025The complaint was ultimately amended to include all of these claims. 20231113-CA 3 2025 UT App 81 Lomsanidze v. Musayev complaint against Musayev and a complaint with the Internal Revenue Service. 3 Motion to Dismiss ¶7 Musayev and Autobuysale (collectively, Defendants) filed a motion to dismiss. 2025The complaint was ultimately amended to include all of these claims. 20231113-CA 3 2025 UT App 81 Lomsanidze v. Musayev complaint against Musayev and a complaint with the Internal Revenue Service. 3 Motion to Dismiss ¶7 Musayev and Autobuysale (collectively, Defendants) filed a motion to dismiss. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025We have also sustained a plaintiff’s IIED claim where she alleged that her apartment manager “forcefully evicted her and her children when she held the premises under lease and had tendered the rent due, that he retained all of her personal possessions without contractual or judicial sanction, and that all of this was done intentionally and with malice.” Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1985) (cleaned up) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment). ¶92 Although we have recognized that “publication of falsehoods concerning an individual could constitute extreme and outrageou 2025We have also sustained a plaintiff’s IIED claim where she alleged that her apartment manager “forcefully evicted her and her children when she held the premises under lease and had tendered the rent due, that he retained all of her personal possessions without contractual or judicial sanction, and that all of this was done intentionally and with malice.” Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1985) (cleaned up) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment). ¶92 Although we have recognized that “publication of falsehoods concerning an individual could constitute extreme and outrageou | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Farman-Rava v. Blu Auto Transport
neutral
1 sentence2021The district court did acknowledge that, in a supporting affidavit, Farman-Rava’s counsel explained that “he excluded time for work that did not materially advance the case and time spent on the losing claim for [IIED],” and, “[f]or work that was for both Negligence and [the] IIED claim, [he had] included only 1/2 of that time.” Nevertheless, the court went on to rule that the “attorney’s 20200250-CA 2 2021 UT App 93 Farman-Rava v. Blu Auto Transport fees for the negligence” claim should also “be deducted.” 1 This was so, the district court explained, because, Other than the workplace insuranc | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Hatch v. Davis
green
2 sentences2019Here, although the evidence was certainly conflicting, the record contains evidence sufficient to support each element of an IIED claim. ¶19 First, there was evidence that Defendants' conduct was "outrageous and intolerable." See id. 2019Here, although the evidence was certainly conflicting, the record contains evidence sufficient to support each element of an IIED claim. ¶19 First, there was evidence that Defendants' conduct was "outrageous and intolerable." See id. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Stone Flood & Fire Restoration, Inc. v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America
green
2 sentences2018Co. of Am. , 2011 UT 83 , ¶ 40, 268 P.3d 170 .) The court further concluded that "as a matter of law there is not an allegation of sufficiently outrageous conduct to give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress." ¶13 Appellants brought an IIED claim for alleged behavior connected to KeyBank's failure to pay Draw Request No. 6. 2018Co. of Am. , 2011 UT 83 , ¶ 40, 268 P.3d 170 .) The court further concluded that "as a matter of law there is not an allegation of sufficiently outrageous conduct to give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress." ¶13 Appellants brought an IIED claim for alleged behavior connected to KeyBank's failure to pay Draw Request No. 6. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Sorensen v. Barbuto
green
2 sentences2011Co., 2002 UT 68, ¶¶ 37-40 , 56 P.3d 524 (holding that insurance company's refusal to pay benefits was not outrageous as a matter of law if the company's actions were "fairly debatable"), and Nguyen v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2010 UT App 85, ¶¶ 8-9 , 232 P.3d 529 (holding that defendants' failure to follow testing protocols for use of a ventilator on a child did not, under the circumstances of the case, "amount[] to evidence of outrageous conduct"), with Cabaness, 2010 UT 23, ¶¶ 40-45 , 232 P.3d 486 (reversing summary judgment on IIED claim where plaintiff's supervisor engaged in "an ongoing a 2011Co., 2002 UT 68, ¶¶ 37-40 , 56 P.3d 524 (holding that insurance company's refusal to pay benefits was not outrageous as a matter of law if the company's actions were "fairly debatable"), and Nguyen v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2010 UT App 85, ¶¶ 8-9 , 232 P.3d 529 (holding that defendants' failure to follow testing protocols for use of a ventilator on a child did not, under the circumstances of the case, "amount[] to evidence of outrageous conduct"), with Cabaness, 2010 UT 23, ¶¶ 40-45 , 232 P.3d 486 (reversing summary judgment on IIED claim where plaintiff's supervisor engaged in "an ongoing a | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Sorensen v. Barbuto
green
2 sentences2011Co., 2002 UT 68, ¶¶ 37-40 , 56 P.3d 524 (holding that insurance company's refusal to pay benefits was not outrageous as a matter of law if the company's actions were "fairly debatable"), and Nguyen v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2010 UT App 85, ¶¶ 8-9 , 232 P.3d 529 (holding that defendants' failure to follow testing protocols for use of a ventilator on a child did not, under the circumstances of the case, "amount[] to evidence of outrageous conduct"), with Cabaness, 2010 UT 23, ¶¶ 40-45 , 232 P.3d 486 (reversing summary judgment on IIED claim where plaintiff's supervisor engaged in "an ongoing a 2011Co., 2002 UT 68, ¶¶ 37-40 , 56 P.3d 524 (holding that insurance company's refusal to pay benefits was not outrageous as a matter of law if the company's actions were "fairly debatable"), and Nguyen v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2010 UT App 85, ¶¶ 8-9 , 232 P.3d 529 (holding that defendants' failure to follow testing protocols for use of a ventilator on a child did not, under the circumstances of the case, "amount[] to evidence of outrageous conduct"), with Cabaness, 2010 UT 23, ¶¶ 40-45 , 232 P.3d 486 (reversing summary judgment on IIED claim where plaintiff's supervisor engaged in "an ongoing a | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Prince v. Bear River Mutual Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2011Co., 2002 UT 68, ¶¶ 37-40 , 56 P.3d 524 (holding that insurance company's refusal to pay benefits was not outrageous as a matter of law if the company's actions were "fairly debatable"), and Nguyen v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2010 UT App 85, ¶¶ 8-9 , 232 P.3d 529 (holding that defendants' failure to follow testing protocols for use of a ventilator on a child did not, under the circumstances of the case, "amount[] to evidence of outrageous conduct"), with Cabaness, 2010 UT 23, ¶¶ 40-45 , 232 P.3d 486 (reversing summary judgment on IIED claim where plaintiff's supervisor engaged in "an ongoing a 2011Co., 2002 UT 68, ¶¶ 37-40 , 56 P.3d 524 (holding that insurance company's refusal to pay benefits was not outrageous as a matter of law if the company's actions were "fairly debatable"), and Nguyen v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2010 UT App 85, ¶¶ 8-9 , 232 P.3d 529 (holding that defendants' failure to follow testing protocols for use of a ventilator on a child did not, under the circumstances of the case, "amount[] to evidence of outrageous conduct"), with Cabaness, 2010 UT 23, ¶¶ 40-45 , 232 P.3d 486 (reversing summary judgment on IIED claim where plaintiff's supervisor engaged in "an ongoing a | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Nguyen v. IHC HEALTH SERVICES, INC.
green
2 sentences2011Co., 2002 UT 68, ¶¶ 37-40 , 56 P.3d 524 (holding that insurance company's refusal to pay benefits was not outrageous as a matter of law if the company's actions were "fairly debatable"), and Nguyen v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2010 UT App 85, ¶¶ 8-9 , 232 P.3d 529 (holding that defendants' failure to follow testing protocols for use of a ventilator on a child did not, under the circumstances of the case, "amount[] to evidence of outrageous conduct"), with Cabaness, 2010 UT 23, ¶¶ 40-45 , 232 P.3d 486 (reversing summary judgment on IIED claim where plaintiff's supervisor engaged in "an ongoing a 2011Co., 2002 UT 68, ¶¶ 37-40 , 56 P.3d 524 (holding that insurance company's refusal to pay benefits was not outrageous as a matter of law if the company's actions were "fairly debatable"), and Nguyen v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2010 UT App 85, ¶¶ 8-9 , 232 P.3d 529 (holding that defendants' failure to follow testing protocols for use of a ventilator on a child did not, under the circumstances of the case, "amount[] to evidence of outrageous conduct"), with Cabaness, 2010 UT 23, ¶¶ 40-45 , 232 P.3d 486 (reversing summary judgment on IIED claim where plaintiff's supervisor engaged in "an ongoing a | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.