examination error in New Mexico

2017Although Defendant admits that the court granted a 16 number of continuances for his restitution and sentencing hearings, Defendant argues 17 that the court became “increasingly prone to blaming [Defendant] for his attorneys’ 18 ineffectiveness[.]” He argues that an examination of the factors outlined in Torres, 19 1999-NMSC-010, ¶ 10 , demonstrates that the request for continuance should have 20 been granted. 21 {54} According to Defendant, he should have been granted continuances so that his 22 new attorney had a reasonable amount of time to provide constitutionally adequate 23 assistance.

2017Although Defendant admits that the court granted a number of continuances for his restitution and sentencing hearings, Defendant argues that the court became “increasingly prone to blaming [Defendant] for his attorneys’ ineffectiveness[.]” He argues that an examination of the factors outlined in Torres, 1999-NMSC-010, ¶ 10 , demonstrates that the request for continuance should have been granted. {54} According to Defendant, he should have been granted continuances so that his new attorney had a reasonable amount of time to provide constitutionally adequate assistance.

2009Cf. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19-21 , 122 N.M. 777 , 932 P.2d 1 ("Under the interstitial approach, the court asks first whether the right being asserted is protected under the federal constitution.

2009Cf. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19-21 , 122 N.M. 777 , 932 P.2d 1 ("Under the interstitial approach, the court asks first whether the right being asserted is protected under the federal constitution.

2007Id. {91} “[N]either a prosecutor’s good faith belief that some basis for [his or] her question exists nor reassurances to appellate courts drawn from information never presented below will suffice.” United States v. Elizondo, 920 F.2d 1308, 1313 (7th Cir.1990).

2007Id. {91} "[N]either a prosecutor's good faith belief that some basis for [his or] her question exists nor reassurances to appellate courts drawn from information never presented below will suffice." United States v. Elizondo, 920 F.2d 1308, 1313 (7th Cir.1990).

2026The State asserts that, in hearing Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, the district court erroneously “revisited” the magistrate court’s determination that there was sufficient evidence presented at the preliminary hearing to establish probable cause to bind over the criminal charges. [BIC 7-13] In support of this contention, the State relies on State v. Ayon, 2023-NMSC-025 , 538 P.3d 66 , and State v. Ruiz, 2025-NMCA-031 , 577 P.3d 232 . [Id.] As the State correctly explains in its brief in chief, see Ruiz, 2025-NMCA-031 , ¶ 1, 7, 13-15, it is established that “a district court, as a mat

2023Whether the procedural protections were adequate depends on an examination of the factors discussed in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

2018This requires an examination of the error itself, which could include an 19 examination of the source of the error and the emphasis placed upon the error.” 8 1 State v. Garcia, 2013-NMCA-064, ¶ 17 , 302 P.3d 111 (omission, internal 2 quotation marks, and citation omitted). 3 {16} We cannot say there is no reasonable probability the improper evidence did 4 not affect the verdict.

2016Id. ¶ 48. 19 {7} Defendant argues that the ten-month delay between the jury issuing its verdict 20 and Defendant’s ultimate sentencing hearing is presumptively prejudicial. 21 Furthermore, Defendant asserts that his case was not “inordinately complex or 22 demanding.” However, we note that Defendant relies on outdated caselaw, Salandre 5 1 v. State, 1991-NMSC-016 , ¶ 22, 111 N.M. 422 , 806 P.2d 562 , which recognized that 2 “a nine-month delay may be unacceptable under certain circumstances.” This 3 guideline, however, was modified by our Supreme Court in Garza when it stated that 4 “one year

2016Id. ¶ 48. 19 {7} Defendant argues that the ten-month delay between the jury issuing its verdict 20 and Defendant’s ultimate sentencing hearing is presumptively prejudicial. 21 Furthermore, Defendant asserts that his case was not “inordinately complex or 22 demanding.” However, we note that Defendant relies on outdated caselaw, Salandre 5 1 v. State, 1991-NMSC-016 , ¶ 22, 111 N.M. 422 , 806 P.2d 562 , which recognized that 2 “a nine-month delay may be unacceptable under certain circumstances.” This 3 guideline, however, was modified by our Supreme Court in Garza when it stated that 4 “one year

2016Id. ¶ 48. 19 {7} Defendant argues that the ten-month delay between the jury issuing its verdict 20 and Defendant’s ultimate sentencing hearing is presumptively prejudicial. 21 Furthermore, Defendant asserts that his case was not “inordinately complex or 22 demanding.” However, we note that Defendant relies on outdated caselaw, Salandre 5 1 v. State, 1991-NMSC-016 , ¶ 22, 111 N.M. 422 , 806 P.2d 562 , which recognized that 2 “a nine-month delay may be unacceptable under certain circumstances.” This 3 guideline, however, was modified by our Supreme Court in Garza when it stated that 4 “one year

2013Although it should not be the “singular focus of the harmless error analysis,” id., “evidence of a defendant’s guilt... may often be relevant, even necessary, for a court to consider, since it will provide context for understanding the role the error may have played in the trial proceedings.” State v. Moncayo, 2012-NMCA-066, ¶ 16 , 284 P.3d 423 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2013If she passed the exam, her objection to 7 the examination requirement would become moot, and if she failed, the reinstatement 8 of her license might be denied; “[i]n either case [she] would suffer the consequences 9 of taking the examination before any court could evaluate the Board's decision.” Id. 10 ¶ 12.

2013Because the plaintiff would have to take the exam if the Court rejected her 11 appeal, the Court determined that she had presented an issue that was ripe for review. 12 Id. 13 In this case, Plaintiffs’ right to quiet use and enjoyment of their property, the 14 right to exercise their religion, and any derivative rights to ground water, [MIO 13-14] 15 are not at risk until one of the triggering events occurs.

2012A reviewing court 4 should only conclude that a non-constitutional error is harmless when there is no 5 reasonable probability the error affected the verdict.” Barr, 2009-NMSC-024, ¶ 53 ; 6 see also Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 43 (stating that consideration of whether an 7 error was harmless “requires an examination of the error itself, which depending upon 8 the facts of the particular case could include an examination of the source of the error 9 and the emphasis placed upon the error”). 10 In concluding that there was no reasonable probability that the error affected 11 the verdict and was t

2012Such an examination is 2 exemplified by the New Mexico Supreme Court’s analysis in Martinez.3 3 In Martinez, a case that also involved a defendant’s constitutional right to 4 present a defense, the Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction because the 5 excluded character evidence “had the potential of supporting a reasonable doubt about 6 [the d]efendant’s guilt.” 2008-NMSC-060, ¶ 45 .

2010Rule 5 — 201(C) (“An information shall be filed [in the district court] within thirty (30) days after completion of a preliminary examination or waiver thereof unless such time is extended by the court upon motion of the district attorney.”) (emphasis added); Vaughn, 74 N.M. at 368 , 393 P.2d at 714 .

2010Rule 5 — 201(C) (“An information shall be filed [in the district court] within thirty (30) days after completion of a preliminary examination or waiver thereof unless such time is extended by the court upon motion of the district attorney.”) (emphasis added); Vaughn, 74 N.M. at 368 , 393 P.2d at 714 .

1986Cf. South v. Lucero, 92 N.M. 798 , 595 P.2d 768 (Ct.App.1979).

1986Cf. South v. Lucero, 92 N.M. 798 , 595 P.2d 768 (Ct.App.1979).

1954That the differences between these two methods are significant has already been recognized in Ellis v. New Mexico Const. Co., supra, 27 N.M. 312 , 201 P. 487, 490 , where the Court said: “ * * * An examination and analysis of these two laws, the first generally termed the provisional order law, the latter the petition law, display that each is complete in itself, and sets forth each step in the procedure to be followed by the municipality.

1954That the differences between these two methods are significant has already been recognized in Ellis v. New Mexico Const. Co., supra, 27 N.M. 312 , 201 P. 487, 490 , where the Court said: “ * * * An examination and analysis of these two laws, the first generally termed the provisional order law, the latter the petition law, display that each is complete in itself, and sets forth each step in the procedure to be followed by the municipality.

1943This fact was pointed to with regret by Mr. Chief Justice Brice in the recent case of Hudson v. Herschbach Drilling Co. et al., 46 N.M. 330 , 128 P.2d 1044, 1045 , when he observed that our statute authorizes an examination and hearing to determine whether there has taken place a diminution or termination of disability, in which event the court shall order diminution or termination of payment of compensation, as the facts may warrant.

1943This fact was pointed to with regret by Mr. Chief Justice Brice in the recent case of Hudson v. Herschbach Drilling Co. et al., 46 N.M. 330 , 128 P.2d 1044, 1045 , when he observed that our statute authorizes an examination and hearing to determine whether there has taken place a diminution or termination of disability, in which event the court shall order diminution or termination of payment of compensation, as the facts may warrant.