examination instruction in Missouri

2018Thus, while the failure to conduct a competency hearing implicates constitutional protections only when substantial evidence of incompetence exists, mere "reasonable grounds" to believe the defendant is incompetent implicates the statutory right to an examination and hearing. 339 S.W.3d 411 , 422 (Ky. 2011) (internal citations omitted).

2018"The Due Process Clause does not mandate different standards of competency at various stages of or for different decisions made during the criminal proceedings." Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 , 404, 113 S.Ct. 2680 , 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

2018"The Due Process Clause does not mandate different standards of competency at various stages of or for different decisions made during the criminal proceedings." Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 , 404, 113 S.Ct. 2680 , 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

2011Louis, 632 S.W.2d 516 (Mo.App.1982) and its progeny establish the Archdiocese owed a duty of care to John Doe commensurate with the foreseeable risks to which he was exposed.

2000See State v. Isa, 850 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. banc 1993); State v. Kirk, 636 S.W.2d 952 (Mo. banc 1982); State v. Dunn, 577 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. banc 1979).

2000See State v. Isa, 850 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. banc 1993); State v. Kirk, 636 S.W.2d 952 (Mo. banc 1982); State v. Dunn, 577 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. banc 1979).

2000See State v. Isa, 850 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. banc 1993); State v. Kirk, 636 S.W.2d 952 (Mo. banc 1982); State v. Dunn, 577 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. banc 1979).

2000See State v. Isa, 850 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. banc 1993); State v. Kirk, 636 S.W.2d 952 (Mo. banc 1982); State v. Dunn, 577 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. banc 1979).

1980Recently, in People v. Uhlemann, 9 Cal.3d 662 , 108 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 511 P.2d 609 (1973), the court, 108 Cal.Rptr. at 658 , 511 P.2d at 610 , said: It has long been the rule in this state that a magistrate’s dismissal of criminal charges following a preliminary examination does not bar the People from either refiling the same charges before another magistrate or seeking an indictment based upon those charges, [citations] In this case, defendant urges us to adopt an exception to that long-standing rule in cases wherein the magistrate’s dismissal was based upon his factual finding that the defend

1980Recently, in People v. Uhlemann, 9 Cal.3d 662 , 108 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 511 P.2d 609 (1973), the court, 108 Cal.Rptr. at 658 , 511 P.2d at 610 , said: It has long been the rule in this state that a magistrate’s dismissal of criminal charges following a preliminary examination does not bar the People from either refiling the same charges before another magistrate or seeking an indictment based upon those charges, [citations] In this case, defendant urges us to adopt an exception to that long-standing rule in cases wherein the magistrate’s dismissal was based upon his factual finding that the defend

1964Plaintiff contends that the above rule does not apply under the facts here and it invokes the rule, “[T]hat where a known, described, and definite article is ordered of a manufacturer [or producer], although it is stated by the purchaser to be required for a particular purpose, still, if the known, described, and definite thing be actually supplied, there is no warranty that it shall answer the particular purpose intended by the buyer.” Interstate Folding Box Co. v. Hodge Chile Co., supra; London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Strait Scale Company, supra; Century Electric Co. v. Detroit Copper &

1964Plaintiff contends that the above rule does not apply under the facts here and it invokes the rule, “[T]hat where a known, described, and definite article is ordered of a manufacturer [or producer], although it is stated by the purchaser to be required for a particular purpose, still, if the known, described, and definite thing be actually supplied, there is no warranty that it shall answer the particular purpose intended by the buyer.” Interstate Folding Box Co. v. Hodge Chile Co., supra; London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Strait Scale Company, supra; Century Electric Co. v. Detroit Copper &

1945See Hall v. Semple, 3 F. F., 337; Ayers v. Russell, 3 N.Y.S. 338 ; Williams v. LeBar, 141 Pa. 149 , 21 A. 525 ; 48 C.J., Physicians and Surgeons, sec. 128, p. 1133.

1945See Hall v. Semple, 3 F. F., 337; Ayers v. Russell, 3 N.Y.S. 338 ; Williams v. LeBar, 141 Pa. 149 , 21 A. 525 ; 48 C.J., Physicians and Surgeons, sec. 128, p. 1133.

1945See Hall v. Semple, 3 F. F., 337; Ayers v. Russell, 3 N.Y.S. 338 ; Williams v. LeBar, 141 Pa. 149 , 21 A. 525 ; 48 C.J., Physicians and Surgeons, sec. 128, p. 1133.

1938A reading of these cases will reveal'that they are of two classes: those contending that such an instruction, because of its hypothesis, was broader than that contained in the petition (as in the ease of Pevesdorf v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., 333 Mo. 1155 , 64 S. W. (2d) 939 , cited by the defendant); and those wherein the instruction submitted an hypothesis of general negligence (as in Owens v. McCleary, 313 Mo. 213 , 281 S. W. 682 ). i An examination of the instruction in this case fails to show that it submits or purports to submit an hypothesis based upon general negligence or that

1938A reading of these cases will reveal'that they are of two classes: those contending that such an instruction, because of its hypothesis, was broader than that contained in the petition (as in the ease of Pevesdorf v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., 333 Mo. 1155 , 64 S. W. (2d) 939 , cited by the defendant); and those wherein the instruction submitted an hypothesis of general negligence (as in Owens v. McCleary, 313 Mo. 213 , 281 S. W. 682 ). i An examination of the instruction in this case fails to show that it submits or purports to submit an hypothesis based upon general negligence or that

1938A reading of these cases will reveal'that they are of two classes: those contending that such an instruction, because of its hypothesis, was broader than that contained in the petition (as in the ease of Pevesdorf v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., 333 Mo. 1155 , 64 S. W. (2d) 939 , cited by the defendant); and those wherein the instruction submitted an hypothesis of general negligence (as in Owens v. McCleary, 313 Mo. 213 , 281 S. W. 682 ). i An examination of the instruction in this case fails to show that it submits or purports to submit an hypothesis based upon general negligence or that

1938A reading of these cases will reveal'that they are of two classes: those contending that such an instruction, because of its hypothesis, was broader than that contained in the petition (as in the ease of Pevesdorf v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., 333 Mo. 1155 , 64 S. W. (2d) 939 , cited by the defendant); and those wherein the instruction submitted an hypothesis of general negligence (as in Owens v. McCleary, 313 Mo. 213 , 281 S. W. 682 ). i An examination of the instruction in this case fails to show that it submits or purports to submit an hypothesis based upon general negligence or that

1935The jury were entitled to know the purpose for which this evidence was admitted, and it was proper for the court to instruct upon the subject. [State v. O'Leary (Mo.), 44 S.W.2d 50 , 54(3).] [2] For the purpose of requiring an examination of the instruction to ascertain whether any given particular statement (or statements) therein amounts to a comment on the evidence, the assignment fails to meet the requirements of Section 3735, Revised Statutes 1929 (Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 3275), providing that the motion for new trial "must set forth in detail and with particularity in separate numbered paragr

1935The jury were entitled to know the purpose for which this evidence was admitted, and it was proper for the court to instruct upon the subject. [State v. O'Leary (Mo.), 44 S.W.2d 50 , 54(3).] [2] For the purpose of requiring an examination of the instruction to ascertain whether any given particular statement (or statements) therein amounts to a comment on the evidence, the assignment fails to meet the requirements of Section 3735, Revised Statutes 1929 (Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 3275), providing that the motion for new trial "must set forth in detail and with particularity in separate numbered paragr

1935State v. Standifer, 319 Mo. 49 , 54, 289 S.W. 856 , 858, states: "it has become the duty of counsel for appealing defendants in criminal cases to be as fair with the trial court as he expects to be with the appellate court." Our Rule No. 15, provides, among other things, that the brief for appellant shall distinctly allege the errors committed by the trial court and contain a statement of the points relied on, with citation of authorities thereunder.

1935The jury were entitled to know the purpose for which this evidence was admitted, and it was proper for the court to instruct upon the subject. [State v. O'Leary (Mo.), 44 S.W.2d 50 , 54(3).] [2] For the purpose of requiring an examination of the instruction to ascertain whether any given particular statement (or statements) therein amounts to a comment on the evidence, the assignment fails to meet the requirements of Section 3735, Revised Statutes 1929 (Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 3275), providing that the motion for new trial "must set forth in detail and with particularity in separate numbered paragr

1935The jury were entitled to know the purpose for which this evidence was admitted, and it was proper for the court to instruct upon the subject. [State v. O'Leary (Mo.), 44 S.W.2d 50 , 54(3).] [2] For the purpose of requiring an examination of the instruction to ascertain whether any given particular statement (or statements) therein amounts to a comment on the evidence, the assignment fails to meet the requirements of Section 3735, Revised Statutes 1929 (Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 3275), providing that the motion for new trial "must set forth in detail and with particularity in separate numbered paragr

1935The jury were entitled to know the purpose for which this evidence was admitted, and it was proper for the court to instruct upon the subject. [State v. O'Leary (Mo.), 44 S.W.2d 50 , 54(3).] [2] For the purpose of requiring an examination of the instruction to ascertain whether any given particular statement (or statements) therein amounts to a comment on the evidence, the assignment fails to meet the requirements of Section 3735, Revised Statutes 1929 (Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 3275), providing that the motion for new trial "must set forth in detail and with particularity in separate numbered paragr

1935The jury were entitled to know the purpose for which this evidence was admitted, and it was proper for the court to instruct upon the subject. [State v. O'Leary (Mo.), 44 S.W.2d 50 , 54(3).] [2] For the purpose of requiring an examination of the instruction to ascertain whether any given particular statement (or statements) therein amounts to a comment on the evidence, the assignment fails to meet the requirements of Section 3735, Revised Statutes 1929 (Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 3275), providing that the motion for new trial "must set forth in detail and with particularity in separate numbered paragr

1918This identical point was recently passed upon in a well reasoned opinion by the Supreme Court of Kansas. [Creyhon v. Board of Education, 163 Pac. 145 , not yet officially reported.] In that case the school board of the city of Parsons, by rule, provided that applicants having a county superintendent’s diploma or a certificate of graduation from the eighth grade of the Parsons city schools or any other public school of equal rank, should be admitted as students in its high school, without examination; but that all other applicants should be required to pass an examination test.

1914Further attack upon this instruction is that it did not require the jury to find that the engineer failed to exercise ordinary care to stop the roller, but made the defendant liable if the jury found merely that the engineer ‘ ‘ failed to stop the noises. ’ ’ But an examination of the instruction will show that it told the jury that “it was the duty of the defendant’s engineer to stop the roller and cease the noises, if the same could be done by the exercise of ordinary care on his part.” And it seems that this portion of the instruction may be said to have supplied the element in question, so

1914Further attack upon this instruction is that it did not require the jury to find that the engineer failed to exercise ordinary care to stop the roller, but made the defendant liable if the jury found merely that the engineer ‘ ‘ failed to stop the noises. ’ ’ But an examination of the instruction will show that it told the jury that “it was the duty of the defendant’s engineer to stop the roller and cease the noises, if the same could be done by the exercise of ordinary care on his part.” And it seems that this portion of the instruction may be said to have supplied the element in question, so

1914Further attack upon this instruction is that it did not require the jury to find that the engineer failed to exercise ordinary care to stop the roller, but made the defendant liable if the jury found merely that the engineer ‘ ‘ failed to stop the noises. ’ ’ But an examination of the instruction will show that it told the jury that “it was the duty of the defendant’s engineer to stop the roller and cease the noises, if the same could be done by the exercise of ordinary care on his part.” And it seems that this portion of the instruction may be said to have supplied the element in question, so

1914Further attack upon this instruction is that it did not require the jury to find that the engineer failed to exercise ordinary care to stop the roller, but made the defendant liable if the jury found merely that the engineer ‘ ‘ failed to stop the noises. ’ ’ But an examination of the instruction will show that it told the jury that “it was the duty of the defendant’s engineer to stop the roller and cease the noises, if the same could be done by the exercise of ordinary care on his part.” And it seems that this portion of the instruction may be said to have supplied the element in question, so

1914If it was the continuation of the noises that caused plaintiff’s horse to rnn away, and the consequent injuries to plaintiff, as the jury were at liberty to find, and if defendant’s engineer could have immediately discontinued such noises after seeing plaintiff’s position of peril, and failed to do so, we think that there can be no question as to defendant’s liability; and that it could not be reversible error to instruct the jury accordingly. [See Phelan v. Paving Co., 227 Mo. l. c. 710, 127 S. W. 318 .] We have carefully considered all of the grounds for reversal urged upon us by learned cou

1914Further attack upon this instruction is that it did not require the jury to find that the engineer failed to exercise ordinary care to stop the roller, but made the defendant liable if the jury found merely that the engineer ‘ ‘ failed to stop the noises. ’ ’ But an examination of the instruction will show that it told the jury that “it was the duty of the defendant’s engineer to stop the roller and cease the noises, if the same could be done by the exercise of ordinary care on his part.” And it seems that this portion of the instruction may be said to have supplied the element in question, so

1914Further attack upon this instruction is that it did not require the jury to find that the engineer failed to exercise ordinary care to stop the roller, but made the defendant liable if the jury found merely that the engineer ‘ ‘ failed to stop the noises. ’ ’ But an examination of the instruction will show that it told the jury that “it was the duty of the defendant’s engineer to stop the roller and cease the noises, if the same could be done by the exercise of ordinary care on his part.” And it seems that this portion of the instruction may be said to have supplied the element in question, so