examination analysis in Georgia

1998Co., 157 Ga. App. 423, 426 (3) ( 278 SE2d 73 ) (1981); accord DeKalb County v. Beacon Indus., 187 Ga. App. 370, 372 (2) ( 370 SE2d 191 ) (1988).

1998Co., 157 Ga. App. 423, 426 (3) ( 278 SE2d 73 ) (1981); accord DeKalb County v. Beacon Indus., 187 Ga. App. 370, 372 (2) ( 370 SE2d 191 ) (1988).

2012Cf. Stewart v. State, 246 Ga. 70, 73-74 (3) ( 268 SE2d 906 ) (1980) (“When pertinent and essential facts can be ascertained only by an examination of a large number of entries in books of account, an auditor or an expert accountant who has made an examination and analysis of the books and figures may testify as a witness and give summarized statements of what the books show as a result of his investigation, provided the books themselves are accessible to the court and the parties.” (punctuation omitted)); Bible v. Somers Const. Co., 197 Ga. 761, 761 (2) ( 30 SE2d 623 ) (1944); Cotton v. John W

2012Cf. Stewart v. State, 246 Ga. 70, 73-74 (3) ( 268 SE2d 906 ) (1980) (“When pertinent and essential facts can be ascertained only by an examination of a large number of entries in books of account, an auditor or an expert accountant who has made an examination and analysis of the books and figures may testify as a witness and give summarized statements of what the books show as a result of his investigation, provided the books themselves are accessible to the court and the parties.” (punctuation omitted)); Bible v. Somers Const. Co., 197 Ga. 761, 761 (2) ( 30 SE2d 623 ) (1944); Cotton v. John W

2012Eshelman & Sons, Inc., 137 Ga.App. 360, 363 (2) ( 223 SE2d 757 ) (1976); Hutcheson v. Am.

2012Eshelman & Sons, Inc., 137 Ga.App. 360, 363 (2) ( 223 SE2d 757 ) (1976); Hutcheson v. Am.

2012Cf. Stewart v. State, 246 Ga. 70, 73-74 (3) ( 268 SE2d 906 ) (1980) (“When pertinent and essential facts can be ascertained only by an examination of a large number of entries in books of account, an auditor or an expert accountant who has made an examination and analysis of the books and figures may testify as a witness and give summarized statements of what the books show as a result of his investigation, provided the books themselves are accessible to the court and the parties.” (punctuation omitted)); Bible v. Somers Const. Co., 197 Ga. 761, 761 (2) ( 30 SE2d 623 ) (1944); Cotton v. John W

2012Cf. Stewart v. State, 246 Ga. 70, 73-74 (3) ( 268 SE2d 906 ) (1980) (“When pertinent and essential facts can be ascertained only by an examination of a large number of entries in books of account, an auditor or an expert accountant who has made an examination and analysis of the books and figures may testify as a witness and give summarized statements of what the books show as a result of his investigation, provided the books themselves are accessible to the court and the parties.” (punctuation omitted)); Bible v. Somers Const. Co., 197 Ga. 761, 761 (2) ( 30 SE2d 623 ) (1944); Cotton v. John W

1998Co., 157 Ga. App. 423, 426 (3) ( 278 SE2d 73 ) (1981); accord DeKalb County v. Beacon Indus., 187 Ga. App. 370, 372 (2) ( 370 SE2d 191 ) (1988).

1998Co., 157 Ga. App. 423, 426 (3) ( 278 SE2d 73 ) (1981); accord DeKalb County v. Beacon Indus., 187 Ga. App. 370, 372 (2) ( 370 SE2d 191 ) (1988).

1991If, in his questioning of Ms. Ross, appellant's counsel did not pursue the relevant topic of Carter's conversations regarding appellant's guilt or innocence and strayed into an area which was potentially incriminatory of Ms. Ross herself, then it would be appropriate to allow Ms. Ross to determine whether her answer might be incriminating. "[T]he claim of privilege should be made when the question is asked and . . . it cannot operate as a general prohibition of inquiry[.] [Cits.] The privilege against self-incrimination cannot be asserted in advance of the questions actually propounded in the

1991If, in his questioning of Ms. Ross, appellant's counsel did not pursue the relevant topic of Carter's conversations regarding appellant's guilt or innocence and strayed into an area which was potentially incriminatory of Ms. Ross herself, then it would be appropriate to allow Ms. Ross to determine whether her answer might be incriminating. "[T]he claim of privilege should be made when the question is asked and . . . it cannot operate as a general prohibition of inquiry[.] [Cits.] The privilege against self-incrimination cannot be asserted in advance of the questions actually propounded in the

2023That is significant because, at the time, our cases also suggested that the related equal protection attack on occupational licensing was “so intimately connected” with the due process inquiry as to “not require separate consideration.” Bramley, 187 Ga. at 832 ; see also Southeastern Elec., 179 Ga. at 514 (concluding that the same examination requirement for electrical contractors violated both due process and equal protection). 14 was carried forward into the 1983 Constitution.” Elliott, 305 Ga. at 184 .

2023That is significant because, at the time, our cases also suggested that the related equal protection attack on occupational licensing was “so intimately connected” with the due process inquiry as to “not require separate consideration.” Bramley, 187 Ga. at 832; see also Southeastern Elec., 179 Ga. at 514 (concluding that the same examination requirement for electrical contractors violated both due process and equal protection). 14 185 (II) (B).

2023That is significant because, at the time, our cases also suggested that the related equal protection attack on occupational licensing was “so intimately connected” with the due process inquiry as to “not require separate consideration.” Bramley, 187 Ga. at 832 ; see also Southeastern Elec., 179 Ga. at 514 (concluding that the same examination requirement for electrical contractors violated both due process and equal protection). 14 was carried forward into the 1983 Constitution.” Elliott, 305 Ga. at 184 .

2023That is significant because, at the time, our cases also suggested that the related equal protection attack on occupational licensing was “so intimately connected” with the due process inquiry as to “not require separate consideration.” Bramley, 187 Ga. at 832; see also Southeastern Elec., 179 Ga. at 514 (concluding that the same examination requirement for electrical contractors violated both due process and equal protection). 14 185 (II) (B).

2023That is significant because, at the time, our cases also suggested that the related equal protection attack on occupational licensing was “so intimately connected” with the due process inquiry as to “not require separate consideration.” Bramley, 187 Ga. at 832 ; see also Southeastern Elec., 179 Ga. at 514 (concluding that the same examination requirement for electrical contractors violated both due process and equal protection). 14 was carried forward into the 1983 Constitution.” Elliott, 305 Ga. at 184 .

2022USCR 33.5 begins by stating, “The trial judge should not participate in plea discussions.” USCR 8 Under the Georgia Constitution, “if an appellate court determines that the defendant’s right to be present was violated without his acquiescence or other waiver, prejudice is conclusively presumed and [the defendant’s] convictions must be reversed.” Champ v. State, 310 Ga. 832, 845 (2) (c) (854 SE2d 706) (2021).

2022USCR 33.5 begins by stating, “The trial judge should not participate in plea discussions.” USCR 8 Under the Georgia Constitution, “if an appellate court determines that the defendant’s right to be present was violated without his acquiescence or other waiver, prejudice is conclusively presumed and [the defendant’s] convictions must be reversed.” Champ v. State, 310 Ga. 832, 845 (2) (c) (854 SE2d 706) (2021).

1995See Sisk v. Patel, 217 Ga.App. 156, 160 , 456 S.E.2d 718 , supra. An examination of the hearing transcript as well as the trial court's summary judgment order reveals that the trial judge disposed of plaintiffs' medical malpractice claims against the treating physicians and Clark Eye Clinic because he did not believe plaintiffs' allegation that "time constraints" prevented compliance with the contemporaneous filing requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1(a).

1995See Sisk v. Patel, 217 Ga.App. 156, 160 , 456 S.E.2d 718 , supra. An examination of the hearing transcript as well as the trial court's summary judgment order reveals that the trial judge disposed of plaintiffs' medical malpractice claims against the treating physicians and Clark Eye Clinic because he did not believe plaintiffs' allegation that "time constraints" prevented compliance with the contemporaneous filing requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1(a).

1978Held: The Supreme Court ruled in Patterson v. State, 238 Ga. 204, 206 ( 232 SE2d 233 ) (1977), that a defendant chargéd with possession or sale of a prohibited substance has a "general right” to have his own expert make an independent examination of the substance.

1978Held: The Supreme Court ruled in Patterson v. State, 238 Ga. 204, 206 ( 232 SE2d 233 ) (1977), that a defendant chargéd with possession or sale of a prohibited substance has a "general right” to have his own expert make an independent examination of the substance.

1966The appellate courts have uniformly held, as exemplified by the decision of the Supreme Court in Roberts v. State, 189 Ga. 36, 41 ( 5 SE2d 340 ), that no cross examination may take place unless the prisoner first consents thereto.

1966The appellate courts have uniformly held, as exemplified by the decision of the Supreme Court in Roberts v. State, 189 Ga. 36, 41 ( 5 SE2d 340 ), that no cross examination may take place unless the prisoner first consents thereto.

1950“When pertinent and essential facts can be ascertained only by an examination of a large number of” entries in books of account, an auditor or an expert accountant who has made an examination and analysis of the books and figures may testify as a witness and give summarized statements of what the books show as a result of his investigation, provided the books themselves are accessible to the court and the parties.” Bitting v. State, 165 Ga. 55 ( 139 S. E. 877 ); and see Camp v. State, 31 Ga. App. 737, 740 (6) *291 (supra); Cabaniss v. State, 8 Ga. App. 129 ( 68 S. E. 849 ); Spence v. State, 20