examination instruction in Nebraska

2019Section 29-1207(4)(a) provides that the time periods that shall be excluded in computing the time for trial include, inter alia, “[t]he period of delay resulting from . . . an examination and hearing on competency” and “the time from filing until final disposition of pretrial motions of the defendant, including motions to suppress evidence.” Therefore, under § 29-1207(4), both the time period from February 4, 2016, when the State moved for and the court ordered an examination to determine competency, through June 16, when the court found Garcia to be competent, and the time period from June 16

2019Section 29-1207(4)(a) provides that the time periods that shall be excluded in computing the time for trial include, inter alia, “[t]he period of delay resulting from . . . an examination and hearing on competency” and “the time from filing until final disposition of pretrial motions of the defendant, including motions to suppress evidence.” Therefore, under § 29-1207(4), both the time period from February 4, 2016, when the State moved for and the court ordered an examination to determine competency, through June 16, when the court found Garcia to be competent, and the time period from June 16

1950Co., 107 Neb. 684 , 186 N. W. 991 , that “An offer to confess judgment incorporated in an answer should not be referred to in the instructions.” An examination of instruction No. 2 summarizing defendant’s answer reveals that the court did not advise the jury of the confession of judgment contained in defendant’s answer.

1950Co., 107 Neb. 684 , 186 N. W. 991 , that “An offer to confess judgment incorporated in an answer should not be referred to in the instructions.” An examination of instruction No. 2 summarizing defendant’s answer reveals that the court did not advise the jury of the confession of judgment contained in defendant’s answer.

2022MOORE Cite as 312 Neb. 263 excluded time periods under § 29-1207(4) are applicable. 8 Pertinent to this appeal, the following periods are excludable: (a) The period of delay resulting from other proceed- ings concerning the defendant, including, but not limited to, an examination and hearing on competency and the period during which he or she is incompetent to stand trial; the time from filing until final disposition of pretrial motions of the defendant, including motions to suppress evidence, motions to quash the indictment or informa- tion, demurrers and pleas in abatement, and motions for a

2022Section 29-1207(4)(a) provides: (4) The following periods shall be excluded in comput- ing the time for trial: (a) The period of delay resulting from other pro- ceedings concerning the defendant, including, but not limited to, an examination and hearing on competency and the period during which he or she is incompetent to stand trial; the time from filing until final disposition - 700 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. WEBB Cite as 311 Neb. 694 of pretrial motions of the defendant, including motions to suppress evidence, motions to quash the indictment or inf

2010Under § 29-1207(4)(a), time is excluded from the speedy trial clock for "[t]he period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including, but not limited to, an examination and hearing on competency...." In State v. Murphy, 255 Neb. 797 , 587 N.W.2d 384 (1998), the court considered whether the excludable time on a defendant's motions to take depositions ended when the motion was ruled upon or when the depositions were completed.

2010Under § 29-1207(4)(a), time is excluded from the speedy trial clock for "[t]he period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including, but not limited to, an examination and hearing on competency...." In State v. Murphy, 255 Neb. 797 , 587 N.W.2d 384 (1998), the court considered whether the excludable time on a defendant's motions to take depositions ended when the motion was ruled upon or when the depositions were completed.

2007Pursuant to § 29-1207(4)(a), the 6-month speedy trial clock excludes any “period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to an examination and hearing on competency and the period during which he is incompetent to stand trial.” (Emphasis supplied.) See, also, State v. Teater, 217 Neb. 723 , 351 N.W.2d 60 (1984) (delay due to proceedings to determine competency tolled defendant’s right to speedy trial); State v. Bolton, 210 Neb. 694 , 316 N.W.2d 619 (1982) (period of delay attributable to psychiatric evaluations and treatment properly exclud

2007Pursuant to § 29-1207(4)(a), the 6-month speedy trial clock excludes any “period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to an examination and hearing on competency and the period during which he is incompetent to stand trial.” (Emphasis supplied.) See, also, State v. Teater, 217 Neb. 723 , 351 N.W.2d 60 (1984) (delay due to proceedings to determine competency tolled defendant’s right to speedy trial); State v. Bolton, 210 Neb. 694 , 316 N.W.2d 619 (1982) (period of delay attributable to psychiatric evaluations and treatment properly exclud

2007Pursuant to § 29-1207(4)(a), the 6-month speedy trial clock excludes any “period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to an examination and hearing on competency and the period during which he is incompetent to stand trial.” (Emphasis supplied.) See, also, State v. Teater, 217 Neb. 723 , 351 N.W.2d 60 (1984) (delay due to proceedings to determine competency tolled defendant’s right to speedy trial); State v. Bolton, 210 Neb. 694 , 316 N.W.2d 619 (1982) (period of delay attributable to psychiatric evaluations and treatment properly exclud

2007Pursuant to § 29-1207(4)(a), the 6-month speedy trial clock excludes any “period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to an examination and hearing on competency and the period during which he is incompetent to stand trial.” (Emphasis supplied.) See, also, State v. Teater, 217 Neb. 723 , 351 N.W.2d 60 (1984) (delay due to proceedings to determine competency tolled defendant’s right to speedy trial); State v. Bolton, 210 Neb. 694 , 316 N.W.2d 619 (1982) (period of delay attributable to psychiatric evaluations and treatment properly exclud

1983Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-506 (Reissue 1975) provided in part that "Whoever steals ... goods ... the property of another, of the value of three hundred dollars or upwards ... shall, upon conviction thereof, be imprisoned ... not more than seven years ...." Petit larceny was defined by Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-512 (Reissue 1975) in part: "(1) If any person shall steal any ... goods ... of less value than three hundred dollars, the property of another, ... upon conviction ... shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not more than six months ...." In State v. Frandsen, 199 Neb. 546 , 260 N.W.2d 20

1983Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-506 (Reissue 1975) provided in part that "Whoever steals ... goods ... the property of another, of the value of three hundred dollars or upwards ... shall, upon conviction thereof, be imprisoned ... not more than seven years ...." Petit larceny was defined by Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-512 (Reissue 1975) in part: "(1) If any person shall steal any ... goods ... of less value than three hundred dollars, the property of another, ... upon conviction ... shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not more than six months ...." In State v. Frandsen, 199 Neb. 546 , 260 N.W.2d 20

1982State v. *698 Kinstler, 207 Neb. 386 , 299 N.W.2d 182 (1980).

1982State v. *698 Kinstler, 207 Neb. 386 , 299 N.W.2d 182 (1980).

1954After an examination of the instruction, we conclude that it correctly stated the law as approved in Schreiner v. State, 155 Neb. 894 , 54 N. W. 2d 224 ; Linder v. State, 156 Neb. 504 , 56 N. W. 2d 734 ; and Sherrick v. State, supra. Instruction No. .12 given by the trial court related to defendant’s confession and properly informed the jury with regard to the force and effect if any of all or any part of it as evidence, depending upon whether the jury first found that the confession was voluntary or involuntary.

1954After an examination of the instruction, we conclude that it correctly stated the law as approved in Schreiner v. State, 155 Neb. 894 , 54 N. W. 2d 224 ; Linder v. State, 156 Neb. 504 , 56 N. W. 2d 734 ; and Sherrick v. State, supra. Instruction No. .12 given by the trial court related to defendant’s confession and properly informed the jury with regard to the force and effect if any of all or any part of it as evidence, depending upon whether the jury first found that the confession was voluntary or involuntary.

1954After an examination of the instruction, we conclude that it correctly stated the law as approved in Schreiner v. State, 155 Neb. 894 , 54 N. W. 2d 224 ; Linder v. State, 156 Neb. 504 , 56 N. W. 2d 734 ; and Sherrick v. State, supra. Instruction No. .12 given by the trial court related to defendant’s confession and properly informed the jury with regard to the force and effect if any of all or any part of it as evidence, depending upon whether the jury first found that the confession was voluntary or involuntary.

1954After an examination of the instruction, we conclude that it correctly stated the law as approved in Schreiner v. State, 155 Neb. 894 , 54 N. W. 2d 224 ; Linder v. State, 156 Neb. 504 , 56 N. W. 2d 734 ; and Sherrick v. State, supra. Instruction No. .12 given by the trial court related to defendant’s confession and properly informed the jury with regard to the force and effect if any of all or any part of it as evidence, depending upon whether the jury first found that the confession was voluntary or involuntary.

1952In that connection, the rule is: “ ‘One testifying as an expert on a subject requiring special knowledge and skill, in the absence of a special contract, is entitled only to the statutory fee.’ Main v. Sherman County, 74 Neb. 155 .” Ulaski v. Morris & Co., 106 Neb. 782 , 184 N. W. 946 .

1952In that connection, the rule is: “ ‘One testifying as an expert on a subject requiring special knowledge and skill, in the absence of a special contract, is entitled only to the statutory fee.’ Main v. Sherman County, 74 Neb. 155 .” Ulaski v. Morris & Co., 106 Neb. 782 , 184 N. W. 946 .

1952In that connection, the rule is: “ ‘One testifying as an expert on a subject requiring special knowledge and skill, in the absence of a special contract, is entitled only to the statutory fee.’ Main v. Sherman County, 74 Neb. 155 .” Ulaski v. Morris & Co., 106 Neb. 782 , 184 N. W. 946 .

1935Thus, in Hopkins v. Scott, supra, the act construed was chapter 50, Laws 1891.

1897Had they been, they would have come within the rule announced in Sioux County v. Jameson, 43 Neb., 265 , Heald v. Polk County, 46 Neb., 28 , and Cuming County v. Thiele, 48 Neb., 888 , that “Where a claim is presented to a county board for its examination and allowance or rejection, in the examination of such claim the board acts judicially, and its order or judgment allowing or disallowing the claim is conclusive unless reversed in appellate proceedings.” (Sioux County v. Jameson, supra.) Here fees were retained under guise of credits claimed, and improperly sanctioned by the board in the exa

1897Had they been, they would have come within the rule announced in Sioux County v. Jameson, 43 Neb., 265 , Heald v. Polk County, 46 Neb., 28 , and Cuming County v. Thiele, 48 Neb., 888 , that “Where a claim is presented to a county board for its examination and allowance or rejection, in the examination of such claim the board acts judicially, and its order or judgment allowing or disallowing the claim is conclusive unless reversed in appellate proceedings.” (Sioux County v. Jameson, supra.) Here fees were retained under guise of credits claimed, and improperly sanctioned by the board in the exa

1897Had they been, they would have come within the rule announced in Sioux County v. Jameson, 43 Neb., 265 , Heald v. Polk County, 46 Neb., 28 , and Cuming County v. Thiele, 48 Neb., 888 , that “Where a claim is presented to a county board for its examination and allowance or rejection, in the examination of such claim the board acts judicially, and its order or judgment allowing or disallowing the claim is conclusive unless reversed in appellate proceedings.” (Sioux County v. Jameson, supra.) Here fees were retained under guise of credits claimed, and improperly sanctioned by the board in the exa

1895(Heldt v. State, 20 Neb., 492 ; Hill v. State, 42 Neb., 503 .) The instruction also omits the element that the money must have come into the defendant’s possession or care by virtue of his employment, as the statute requires.

1895(Heldt v. State, 20 Neb., 492 ; Hill v. State, 42 Neb., 503 .) The instruction also omits the element that the money must have come into the defendant’s possession or care by virtue of his employment, as the statute requires.

1889In this I concede that, in view of the authority in the case of McCann, supra, the court fell into an error in instructing the jury that the presence of Goodwin at the scene of the late fire, and actually seeing that the loss of the buildings was total and complete, did away with the necessity of proof of loss by the plaintiff; but, as we have seen that there was proof of loss, which was not only complete and sufficient proof, undisputed by the defendant, the incorporating with it a reference to the alleged written policy is urged- as substantive ground of defense to the action.