Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
14 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Doe v. SUNTRUST BANKgreen1 sentence2013Id. at 935 ; see also Doe v. Suntrnst Bank, 32 So.3d 133, 139-40 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (holding that a party seeking an examination under rule 1.360 must demonstrate that the condition is genuinely in controversy and that good cause exists to order the examination); Williams v. Williams, 550 So.2d 166, 167 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2013Id. at 935 ; see also Doe v. Suntrnst Bank, 32 So.3d 133, 139-40 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (holding that a party seeking an examination under rule 1.360 must demonstrate that the condition is genuinely in controversy and that good cause exists to order the examination); Williams v. Williams, 550 So.2d 166, 167 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Standard Ins. Co. of NY v. Andersongreen2 sentences2011Co. v. Anderson, 227 Miss. 397 , 86 So.2d 298, 301-02 (1956) (quoting with approval Claflin v. Commonwealth Ins. 2011Co. v. Anderson, 227 Miss. 397 , 86 So.2d 298, 301-02 (1956) (quoting with approval Claflin v. Commonwealth Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Krigsman v. Progressive Northern Insurancegreen2 sentences2011In Krigsman v. Progressive Northern Insurance Co., 151 N.H. 643 , 864 A.2d 330, 334-35 (2005), the court held that breach of an examination clause is a material breach that bars recovery under the policy. 2011In Krigsman v. Progressive Northern Insurance Co., 151 N.H. 643 , 864 A.2d 330, 334-35 (2005), the court held that breach of an examination clause is a material breach that bars recovery under the policy. | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANYgreen2 sentences2011As the court in Taylor v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 306 So.2d 638, 645 (Miss.1974), explained, the failure to comply with an examination clause precludes recovery under the policy because "`[t]he object of the provisions in the policies of insurance, requiring the assured to submit himself to an examination under oath, to be reduced to writing, was to enable the Company to possess itself of all knowledge, and all information as to other sources and means of knowledge, in regard to the facts, material to its rights, to enable it to decide upon its obligations, and to protect it against fals 2011As the court in Taylor v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 306 So.2d 638, 645 (Miss.1974), explained, the failure to comply with an examination clause precludes recovery under the policy because "`[t]he object of the provisions in the policies of insurance, requiring the assured to submit himself to an examination under oath, to be reduced to writing, was to enable the Company to possess itself of all knowledge, and all information as to other sources and means of knowledge, in regard to the facts, material to its rights, to enable it to decide upon its obligations, and to protect it against fals | 1 | 1 |
Sireci v. Mooregreen2 sentences2009As a result, “the focus in an examination of a claim of unconstitutional doubling is on the particular aggravators themselves, as opposed to whether different and independent underlying facts support each separate aggravating factor.” Sireci v. Moore, 825 So.2d 882, 885-86 (Fla.2002). 2009As a result, "the focus in an examination of a claim of unconstitutional doubling is on the particular aggravators themselves, as opposed to whether different and independent underlying facts support each separate aggravating factor." Sireci v. Moore, 825 So.2d 882, 885-86 (Fla.2002). | 1 | 1 |
Matthews v. Stategreen1 sentence2008"The examination and challenge of potential jurors is one of the essential stages of a criminal trial where a defendant's presence is mandated." Matthews v. State, 687 So.2d 908, 909 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Eslin v. Collinsgreen1 sentence1991Though some grandfather clauses in licensing statutes exempt from regulation those persons who have practiced the profession over a period of time, on the theory that such persons may be presumed to have the qualifications which others must manifest by passing an examination, Eslin v. Collins, 108 So.2d 889, 890 (Fla.1959), the grandfather clause in this statute exempts from the examination requirement only those persons who satisfy both the experience and educational requirements identified in Section 492.-105(1). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gasparino v. Murphy
green
1 sentence2013Id. at 935 ; see also Doe v. Suntrnst Bank, 32 So.3d 133, 139-40 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (holding that a party seeking an examination under rule 1.360 must demonstrate that the condition is genuinely in controversy and that good cause exists to order the examination); Williams v. Williams, 550 So.2d 166, 167 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
US SEC. Ins. Co. v. Cimino
green
2 sentences2011The court stated that its prior decision in U.S. Security Insurance Co. v. Cimino, 754 So.2d 697 (Fla.2000), correctly held that "attendance at a PIP medical examination is a condition precedent to the receipt of subsequent PIP benefits....” Custer, 62 So.3d at 1099 . 2011The court stated that its prior decision in U.S. Security Insurance Co. v. Cimino, 754 So.2d 697 (Fla.2000), correctly held that "attendance at a PIP medical examination is a condition precedent to the receipt of subsequent PIP benefits...." Custer, 62 So.3d at 1099 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Lorenzo-Martinez v. Safety Insurance
green
2 sentences2011In Lorenzo-Martinez v. Safety Insurance Co., 58 Mass.App.Ct. 359 , 790 N.E.2d 692 (2003), the court considered the examination clause in a case involving a claim for uninsured motorist benefits. 2011In Lorenzo-Martinez v. Safety Insurance Co., 58 Mass.App.Ct. 359 , 790 N.E.2d 692 (2003), the court considered the examination clause in a case involving a claim for uninsured motorist benefits. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Hanover Insurance v. Cape Cod Custom Home Theater Inc.
green
2 sentences2011In Hanover Insurance Co. v. Cape Cod Custom Home Theater, Inc., 72 Mass.App.Ct. 331 , 891 N.E.2d 703 (2008), for example, the court explained why a willful breach of an examination clause precludes recovery: Recently, we had occasion to observe that, as a general rule, an insurer may not disclaim coverage by virtue of an insured's breach of its duty to cooperate absent a showing of prejudice. 2011In Hanover Insurance Co. v. Cape Cod Custom Home Theater, Inc., 72 Mass.App.Ct. 331 , 891 N.E.2d 703 (2008), for example, the court explained why a willful breach of an examination clause precludes recovery: Recently, we had occasion to observe that, as a general rule, an insurer may not disclaim coverage by virtue of an insured's breach of its duty to cooperate absent a showing of prejudice. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smith
green
1 sentence2011After the doctor confirmed that he was aware Russell was not wearing a seatbelt, defense counsel asked whether that failure “caus[ed] or contributed substantially to any injuries she may have sustained, the whiplash?” The doctor replied, “Theoretically, it could have made it a bit worse.” As noted earlier, however, the “competent evidence” standard requires evidence that “is not uncertain, speculative, or conjectural.” Smith, 565 So.2d at 754 n. 8. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Custer Medical Center v. United Automobile Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2011The court stated that its prior decision in U.S. Security Insurance Co. v. Cimino, 754 So.2d 697 (Fla.2000), correctly held that "attendance at a PIP medical examination is a condition precedent to the receipt of subsequent PIP benefits....” Custer, 62 So.3d at 1099 . 2011The court stated that its prior decision in U.S. Security Insurance Co. v. Cimino, 754 So.2d 697 (Fla.2000), correctly held that "attendance at a PIP medical examination is a condition precedent to the receipt of subsequent PIP benefits...." Custer, 62 So.3d at 1099 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Francis v. State
green
1 sentence1997Francis, 413 So.2d at 1177 ; Lane v. State, 459 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Walker v. State, 438 So.2d 969 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Lane v. State
green
1 sentence1997Francis, 413 So.2d at 1177 ; Lane v. State, 459 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Walker v. State, 438 So.2d 969 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Walker v. State
green
1 sentence1997Francis, 413 So.2d at 1177 ; Lane v. State, 459 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Walker v. State, 438 So.2d 969 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Bolivar County Board of Supervisors v. Forum Insurance Company
green
1 sentence1995Co., 779 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir.1986) (no showing of prejudice necessary when provision is condition precedent); Reliance Ins. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, Plaintiff-Counter v. A. Buford Wigginton, D/B/A Pickens Pharmacy, Defendant-Counter
green
1 sentence1995Co. v. Wigginton, 964 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.1992) (fire policy was rendered void by insured's *304 failure to submit to examination under oath, regardless of whether insurer was prejudiced where an examination clause was a condition precedent); Bolivar County Bd. of Supervisors v. Forum Ins. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Patterson v. Venne
green
1 sentence1993Patterson v. Venne, 594 So.2d 331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (defendant, Clay County resident, was not seeking affirmative relief and was thus not required to appear in Dade County). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Robinson v. State
green
1 sentence1991In reversing the original sentence, we said that the prosecutor's examination of the defense's medical expert "was a deliberate attempt to insinuate that appellant had a habit of preying on white women and thus constituted an impermissible appeal to bias and prejudice." Robinson, 520 So.2d at 6 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Dinkins v. State
green
1 sentence1990However, in Smith , as in Dinkins v. State, 244 So.2d 148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971), the purpose of the examination was to test the person's ability to be a witness or to establish grounds for impeachment of the witness' testimony. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Gerardo v. State
neutral
1 sentence1980The procedure contemplated under Chapter 917 has been succinctly summarized in the recent decision of Gerardo v. State, 383 So.2d 1122 (Fla.2d DCA 1980): Section 917.14, Florida Statutes (1977), provides for an examination and hearing in the circuit court to determine whether a defendant is a mentally disordered sex offender: *174 (1) If a defendant has been convicted of or has pleaded guilty or no contest to an offense or attempted offense in a current prosecution, the court may defer sentencing and certify him for a hearing and examination in the circuit court to determine whether he is a me | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Esperti v. State
green
1 sentence1977Esperti v. State, 276 So.2d 58 (Fla.2d DCA 1973). [4] Moreover, the state availed itself of this provision when it moved for a stay upon the filing of the notice of appeal. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Larnel Builders, Inc. v. Martin
green
1 sentence1966Larnel Builders, Inc. v. Martin, Fla., 110 So.2d 649 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.