examination error in California

1988Thus a psychologist's examination and analysis employing the technique used by Dr. Raming may be surrounded by an `aura of infallibility,' and a trier of fact would tend to ascribe `an ordinately high degree of certainty' to the technique. ( People v. McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 372 .) Unlike with expert testimony where a witness gives a personal opinion, triers of fact are in no position to temper their acceptance of the psychological evidence `with a healthy skepticism born of their knowledge that all human beings are fallible.' ( Ibid. ) "The trial court therefore erred when it failed

1988Thus a psychologist's examination and analysis employing the technique used by Dr. Raming may be surrounded by an `aura of infallibility,' and a trier of fact would tend to ascribe `an ordinately high degree of certainty' to the technique. ( People v. McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 372 .) Unlike with expert testimony where a witness gives a personal opinion, triers of fact are in no position to temper their acceptance of the psychological evidence `with a healthy skepticism born of their knowledge that all human beings are fallible.' ( Ibid. ) "The trial court therefore erred when it failed

2021(Correira v. Liu, 28 Haw., 145 .) As is said in the concurring opinion in that case at page 154, ‘The fact that Miller was unlicensed is evidence prima facie in the eyes of the law that Miller was incompetent and that Correira committed a breach of his common–law duty not to entrust his car to a driver who was known by him to be incompetent or who, under the circumstances, should have been known by him to be incompetent and was sufficient to put Correira upon inquiry as to Miller’s competency or incompetency.’ ” ( Owens, supra, 116 Cal.App. at pp. 351–352, some italics omitted.) The importance

1931(Correira v. Liu, 28 Hawaii, 145 .) As is said in the concurring opinion in that case at page 154, “The fact that Miller was unlicensed is evidence prima- facie in the eyes of the law that Miller was incompetent and that Correira committed a breach of his common-law duty not to entrust his car to a driver who was known to him to be incompetent or who, under the circumstances, should have been known to him to be incompetent and was sufficient to put Correira upon inquiry as to Miller’s competency or incompetency.” In the present case, respondent knew that Watson had no driver’s license but poss

1921(People v. Woon Tuck Wo, 120 Cal. 294, 297 , [ 52 Pac. 833 ]; People v. Castro, 42 Cal. App. 453 , [ 183 Pac. 828 ].) [5] Gantz testified he paid defendant seven hundred dollars in 1918.

1921(People v. Woon Tuck Wo, 120 Cal. 294, 297 , [ 52 Pac. 833 ]; People v. Castro, 42 Cal. App. 453 , [ 183 Pac. 828 ].) [5] Gantz testified he paid defendant seven hundred dollars in 1918.

2025“It is axiomatic that arguments not raised in the trial court are forfeited on appeal.” (Kern County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Camacho (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1038 .) And even if he had preserved the argument for appeal, we would reject it.

2024Notwithstanding the court’s use of the term insufficient evidence, these “ambiguities” in the 1996 dismissal order provide “clear indication to the contrary” (Mannes, at p. 1315) and “make it impossible for us to conclude that the court intended to dismiss for lack of sufficient evidence as a matter of law.” (Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 274 .) This outcome is also consistent with other decisions cited by Woodward, including Hampton, Pedroza, and Salgado.

2023(Germany, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 788 .) During a preliminary examination hearing, the movant asserted he was being framed (ibid.) and that he had witnessed the arresting officer destroy the same pipe the prosecutor claimed to possess as physical evidence (id at p. 787 [“‘How are you going to come up with a pipe you then crushed?’”]). 6 The California Supreme Court has explained “[t]he phrase ‘reasonable likelihood’ denotes a lesser standard of proof than ‘more probable than not.” (Martinez v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 574, 578 [motion for trial venue change context]; see § 1033, su

2021(Correira v. Liu, 28 Haw., 145 .) As is said in the concurring opinion in that case at page 154, ‘The fact that Miller was unlicensed is evidence prima facie in the eyes of the law that Miller was incompetent and that Correira committed a breach of his common–law duty not to entrust his car to a driver who was known by him to be incompetent or who, under the circumstances, should have been known by him to be incompetent and was sufficient to put Correira upon inquiry as to Miller’s competency or incompetency.’ ” ( Owens, supra, 116 Cal.App. at pp. 351–352, some italics omitted.) The importance

2021(Correira v. Liu, 28 Haw., 145 .) As is said in the concurring opinion in that case at page 154, ‘The fact that Miller was unlicensed is evidence prima facie in the eyes of the law that Miller was incompetent and that Correira committed a breach of his common–law duty not to entrust his car to a driver who was known by him to be incompetent or who, under the circumstances, should have been known by him to be incompetent and was sufficient to put Correira upon inquiry as to Miller’s competency or incompetency.’ ” ( Owens, supra, 116 Cal.App. at pp. 351–352, some italics omitted.) The importance

2021(Correira v. Liu, 28 Haw., 145 .) As is said in the concurring opinion in that case at page 154, ‘The fact that Miller was unlicensed is evidence prima facie in the eyes of the law that Miller was incompetent and that Correira committed a breach of his common–law duty not to entrust his car to a driver who was known by him to be incompetent or who, under the circumstances, should have been known by him to be incompetent and was sufficient to put Correira upon inquiry as to Miller’s competency or incompetency.’ ” ( Owens, supra, 116 Cal.App. at pp. 351–352, some italics omitted.) The importance

2021(Correira v. Liu, 28 Haw., 145 .) As is said in the concurring opinion in that case at page 154, ‘The fact that Miller was unlicensed is evidence prima facie in the eyes of the law that Miller was incompetent and that Correira committed a breach of his common–law duty not to entrust his car to a driver who was known by him to be incompetent or who, under the circumstances, should have been known by him to be incompetent and was sufficient to put Correira upon inquiry as to Miller’s competency or incompetency.’ ” ( Owens, supra, 116 Cal.App. at pp. 351–352, some italics omitted.) The importance

2020The trial court reviewed the preliminary examination hearing transcript and denied the motion, stating it did not “appear there was [a] custodial interrogation.” B Detective Roberts’s Questioning In The Motel Room Did Not Violate Miranda “Miranda advisements are required only when a person is subjected to ‘custodial interrogation.’ ” (People v. Davidson (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 966, 970 .) “While the term ‘interrogation’ refers to any words or actions on the part of police that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, it does not extend to inquiries . . . that are ‘essentially

2020The trial court reviewed the preliminary examination hearing transcript and denied the motion, stating it did not “appear there was [a] custodial interrogation.” B Detective Roberts’s Questioning In The Motel Room Did Not Violate Miranda “Miranda advisements are required only when a person is subjected to ‘custodial interrogation.’ ” (People v. Davidson (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 966, 970 .) “While the term ‘interrogation’ refers to any words or actions on the part of police that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, it does not extend to inquiries . . . that are ‘essentially

2020The trial court reviewed the preliminary examination hearing transcript and denied the motion, stating it did not “appear there was [a] custodial interrogation.” B Detective Roberts’s Questioning In The Motel Room Did Not Violate Miranda “Miranda advisements are required only when a person is subjected to ‘custodial interrogation.’ ” (People v. Davidson (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 966, 970 .) “While the term ‘interrogation’ refers to any words or actions on the part of police that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, it does not extend to inquiries . . . that are ‘essentially

2020The trial court reviewed the preliminary examination hearing transcript and denied the motion, stating it did not “appear there was [a] custodial interrogation.” B Detective Roberts’s Questioning In The Motel Room Did Not Violate Miranda “Miranda advisements are required only when a person is subjected to ‘custodial interrogation.’ ” (People v. Davidson (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 966, 970 .) “While the term ‘interrogation’ refers to any words or actions on the part of police that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, it does not extend to inquiries . . . that are ‘essentially

2016In addition, as defendant concedes, "even the complete absence of cross-admissibility does not, by itself, demonstrate prejudice from a failure to order a requested severance." ( Alcala v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1221 , 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 272 , 185 P.3d 708 .) Rather, we look to the remaining three factors. ( Ibid. ) An examination of those factors does not reveal an abuse of discretion.

2016In addition, as defendant concedes, "even the complete absence of cross-admissibility does not, by itself, demonstrate prejudice from a failure to order a requested severance." ( Alcala v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1221 , 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 272 , 185 P.3d 708 .) Rather, we look to the remaining three factors. ( Ibid. ) An examination of those factors does not reveal an abuse of discretion.

2015(Strickler v. Greene, supra, 527 U.S. at pp. 289, 291.) A court reviewing a suspected Brady violation independently reviews the question of whether such a violation has occurred but gives “great weight to any trial court findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 176 .) Before turning to the merits of Heinrichs’ claim, we first address the People’s argument that Brady does not require the production of impeachment evidence to the defense before the preliminary examination and hearing on the suppression motion.

2015(Strickler v. Greene, supra, 527 U.S. at pp. 289, 291.) A court reviewing a suspected Brady violation independently reviews the question of whether such a violation has occurred but gives “great weight to any trial court findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 176 .) Before turning to the merits of Heinrichs’ claim, we first address the People’s argument that Brady does not require the production of impeachment evidence to the defense before the preliminary examination and hearing on the suppression motion.

2014The People’s disclosure obligations prior to the preliminary examination In their responding brief, the People cite United States v. Ruiz (2002) 536 U.S. 622 (Ruiz), for the proposition that Brady does not require the production of impeachment evidence to the defense before the preliminary examination and hearing on the suppression motion.

2014Analysis An examination of the factors listed in People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 661 does not show coercion.

2010(See United States v. Davis (D.Md. 2009) 657 F.Supp.2d 630, 649-650 .) These facts also serve to distinguish the present case from two United States Supreme Court decisions cited by defendant for the proposition that an examination or an analysis (i.e., a test) of an item already lawfully in the possession of authorities may nevertheless constitute an additional intrusion into reasonable privacy interests and therefore be an independent “search” under certain circumstances: Arizona v. Hicks (1987) 480 U.S. 321 [ 94 L.Ed.2d 347 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 ] (Hicks) and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’

2010(See United States v. Davis (D.Md. 2009) 657 F.Supp.2d 630, 649-650 .) These facts also serve to distinguish the present case from two United States Supreme Court decisions cited by defendant for the proposition that an examination or an analysis (i.e., a test) of an item already lawfully in the possession of authorities may nevertheless constitute an additional intrusion into reasonable privacy interests and therefore be an independent “search” under certain circumstances: Arizona v. Hicks (1987) 480 U.S. 321 [ 94 L.Ed.2d 347 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 ] (Hicks) and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’

2010(See United States v. Davis (D.Md. 2009) 657 F.Supp.2d 630, 649-650 .) These facts also serve to distinguish the present case from two United States Supreme Court decisions cited by defendant for the proposition that an examination or an analysis (i.e., a test) of an item already lawfully in the possession of authorities may nevertheless constitute an additional intrusion into reasonable privacy interests and therefore be an independent “search” under certain circumstances: Arizona v. Hicks (1987) 480 U.S. 321 [ 94 L.Ed.2d 347 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 ] (Hicks) and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’

2010(See United States v. Davis (D.Md. 2009) 657 F.Supp.2d 630, 649-650 .) These facts also serve to distinguish the present case from two United States Supreme Court decisions cited by defendant for the proposition that an examination or an analysis (i.e., a test) of an item already lawfully in the possession of authorities may nevertheless constitute an additional intrusion into reasonable privacy interests and therefore be an independent “search” under certain circumstances: Arizona v. Hicks (1987) 480 U.S. 321 [ 94 L.Ed.2d 347 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 ] (Hicks) and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’

2010(See United States v. Davis (D.Md. 2009) 657 F.Supp.2d 630, 649-650 .) These facts also serve to distinguish the present case from two United States Supreme Court decisions cited by defendant for the proposition that an examination or an analysis (i.e., a test) of an item already lawfully in the possession of authorities may nevertheless constitute an additional intrusion into reasonable privacy interests and therefore be an independent “search” under certain circumstances: Arizona v. Hicks (1987) 480 U.S. 321 [ 94 L.Ed.2d 347 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 ] (Hicks) and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’