examination rule in Oregon

1990ORS 183.400(3); Hay v. Dept. of Transportation, 301 Or. 129, 137 , 719 P.2d 860 (1986).

1990ORS 183.400(3); Hay v. Dept. of Transportation, 301 Or. 129, 137 , 719 P.2d 860 (1986).

2023Our review of an administrative rule under ORS 183.400 “is limited to an examination of the rule under review, the statutory provisions authorizing the rule, and the documents necessary to demonstrate compliance with the applicable rulemaking procedures.” Id. (citing ORS 183.400(3)).

2016ORS 183.400(3); Wolf v. Oregon Lottery Commission, 344 Or 345, 355 , 182 P3d 180 (2008).

2016ORS 183.400(3); Wolf v. Oregon Lottery Commission, 344 Or 345, 355 , 182 P3d 180 (2008).

2015An employer can make inquiries into the ability of an employee to perform job related functions.” Plaintiffs acknowledge that this provision “shall be construed to the extent possible in a manner that is consistent with any similar provisions of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.” ORS 659A.139(1); Heiple v. Henderson, 229 Or App 693, 703 , 215 P3d 891 (2009).

2015An employer can make inquiries into the ability of an employee to perform job related functions.” Plaintiffs acknowledge that this provision “shall be construed to the extent possible in a manner that is consistent with any similar provisions of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.” ORS 659A.139(1); Heiple v. Henderson, 229 Or App 693, 703 , 215 P3d 891 (2009).

2005Respondent Liberty Northwest argues that claimant did not seek or receive “medical treatment” because, first, the Beltone employee was not licensed to practice one or more of the “healing arts” under ORS 656.005(12)(a), OAR 436-010-0005(28), or Cook v. Workers’ Compensation Department, 306 Or 134, 143 , 758 P2d 854 (1988), and was therefore incapable of providing medical treatment; and, second, claimant received the examination and hearing aid because his wife won them in a promotion.

2005Respondent Liberty Northwest argues that claimant did not seek or receive “medical treatment” because, first, the Beltone employee was not licensed to practice one or more of the “healing arts” under ORS 656.005(12)(a), OAR 436-010-0005(28), or Cook v. Workers’ Compensation Department, 306 Or 134, 143 , 758 P2d 854 (1988), and was therefore incapable of providing medical treatment; and, second, claimant received the examination and hearing aid because his wife won them in a promotion.

1990The citizens who obtained the injunction 2 contend that, based on our prior decision in State ex rel Anderson v. Paulus, 283 Or 241 , 583 P2d 531 (1978), the Secretary of State’s act of accepting and officially filing the information about financial impacts of eight ballot measures is and was impermissible.

1990The citizens who obtained the injunction 2 contend that, based on our prior decision in State ex rel Anderson v. Paulus, 283 Or 241 , 583 P2d 531 (1978), the Secretary of State’s act of accepting and officially filing the information about financial impacts of eight ballot measures is and was impermissible.

1981In School District No. 1 v. Nilsen, 271 Or 461 , 534 P2d 1135 (1975), the court examined the phrase "bona fide occupational requirement reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the employer’s business” in the context of a sex discrimination case.

1981In School District No. 1 v. Nilsen, 271 Or 461 , 534 P2d 1135 (1975), the court examined the phrase "bona fide occupational requirement reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the employer’s business” in the context of a sex discrimination case.

1974Our discussion thereof concluded : “While we are hard put to articulate the differences between intellectual and emotional understanding or appreciation of criminality — and there is no need to enter that semantic thicket in this case — the definitions found in [State v. Gilmore, 242 Or 463 , 410 P2d 240 (1966)] and in ORS 161.295 (1) each allow testimony as to both levels of cognition and the two definitions are therefore equivalent to each other in meaning and in function.” 16 Or App at 259.

1974Our discussion thereof concluded : “While we are hard put to articulate the differences between intellectual and emotional understanding or appreciation of criminality — and there is no need to enter that semantic thicket in this case — the definitions found in [State v. Gilmore, 242 Or 463 , 410 P2d 240 (1966)] and in ORS 161.295 (1) each allow testimony as to both levels of cognition and the two definitions are therefore equivalent to each other in meaning and in function.” 16 Or App at 259.

1968A majority of the courts which have squarely considered the problem, however, have held that the defendant upon a pretrial mental examination cannot be required to answer questions. *292 The decision in State v. Whitlow, supra (45 NJ 3), was criticized in State v. Olson, 274 Minn 225, 143 NW2d 69 (1966), particularly that portion providing for an instruction to the jury that they must disregard any inculpatory statement when they are considering the issue of guilt.

1968A majority of the courts which have squarely considered the problem, however, have held that the defendant upon a pretrial mental examination cannot be required to answer questions. *292 The decision in State v. Whitlow, supra (45 NJ 3), was criticized in State v. Olson, 274 Minn 225, 143 NW2d 69 (1966), particularly that portion providing for an instruction to the jury that they must disregard any inculpatory statement when they are considering the issue of guilt.

1903Assuming, in favorem vitse, that the point insisted upon is well taken, we will, in the present instance, examine the reasons advanced in support of the motion for a new trial: State v. Magers, 36 Or. 38 ( 58 Pac. 892 ).

1903Assuming, in favorem vitse, that the point insisted upon is well taken, we will, in the present instance, examine the reasons advanced in support of the motion for a new trial: State v. Magers, 36 Or. 38 ( 58 Pac. 892 ).

1900Considering the charge 0/ the court in its entirety, however, it is evident that the jury were not misled by this instruction; the rule being that whenever the instructions, considered as a whole, are substantially correct, and could not have misled the jury, the judgment will not be reversed because some instruction, considered alone, may be subject to criticism: State v. Anderson, 10 Or. 448 ; Wellman v. Or.