27 Oklahoma opinions name it 2 courts 1937–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oklahoma courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bayless v. Industrial Com'n of Arizonagreen2 sentences2017STANDARD OF REVIEW Whether the doctrine of claim preclusion prevents appellants from re-litigating their state claims is usually a mixed question of law and fact. "[A] deferential standard of review applies to resolutions of disputed facts when supported by reasonable evidence; an independent judgment standard of review applies to the ultimate conclusion that these facts do or do not trigger preclusion." AJ Bayless v. Industrial Commission of Arizona , 179 Ariz. 434, 880 P.2d 654, 659 (App.1993). 2017STANDARD OF REVIEW Whether the doctrine of claim preclusion prevents appellants from re-litigating their state claims is usually a mixed question of law and fact. "[A] deferential standard of review applies to resolutions of disputed facts when supported by reasonable evidence; an independent judgment standard of review applies to the ultimate conclusion that these facts do or do not trigger preclusion." AJ Bayless v. Industrial Commission of Arizona , 179 Ariz. 434, 880 P.2d 654, 659 (App.1993). | 2 | 2 |
Jordan v. Catesgreen2 sentences2018In contrast, punitive or exemplary damages may be assessed against an employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior if an employee's conduct "would serve to justify an exemplary damages award against the employee as an individual tortfeasor." Thiry v. Armstrong World Inds. , 1983 OK 28 , ¶ 9, 661 P.2d 515, 520 ; see also Bierman v. Aramark Refreshment Servs., Inc. , 1997 OK 9 , 935 P.2d 289 . 2018In contrast, punitive or exemplary damages may be assessed against an employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior if an employee's conduct "would serve to justify an exemplary damages award against the employee as an individual tortfeasor." Thiry v. Armstrong World Inds. , 1983 OK 28 , ¶ 9, 661 P.2d 515, 520 ; see also Bierman v. Aramark Refreshment Servs., Inc. , 1997 OK 9 , 935 P.2d 289 . | 1 | 1 |
Lambertsen v. Utah Department of Correctionsgreen1 sentence2010Relating to the last factor, PeopLease claims it is undisputed "EFI retained complete control over [Plaintiff], including decisions to hire, assign work, discipline, and/or terminate her," while PeopLease "provided payroll administration and benefit services to EFI employees and staff." £59 PeopLease's sole authority for this argument is Lambertsen v. Utah Department of Corrections, 79 F.3d 1024, 1029 (10th Cir.1996), a summary judgment case in which the U.S. Court of Appeals Tenth Cireuit affirmed the district court's decision the employer was not liable under the "hybrid test." Acknowledging | 1 | 1 |
Bristol v. The Board Of County Commissioners Of The County Of Clear Creekgreen2 sentences2010Relating to the last factor, PeopLease claims it is undisputed "EFI retained complete control over [Plaintiff], including decisions to hire, assign work, discipline, and/or terminate her," while PeopLease "provided payroll administration and benefit services to EFI employees and staff." £59 PeopLease's sole authority for this argument is Lambertsen v. Utah Department of Corrections, 79 F.3d 1024, 1029 (10th Cir.1996), a summary judgment case in which the U.S. Court of Appeals Tenth Cireuit affirmed the district court's decision the employer was not liable under the "hybrid test." Acknowledging 2010Relating to the last factor, PeopLease claims it is undisputed "EFI retained complete control over [Plaintiff], including decisions to hire, assign work, discipline, and/or terminate her," while PeopLease "provided payroll administration and benefit services to EFI employees and staff." £59 PeopLease's sole authority for this argument is Lambertsen v. Utah Department of Corrections, 79 F.3d 1024, 1029 (10th Cir.1996), a summary judgment case in which the U.S. Court of Appeals Tenth Cireuit affirmed the district court's decision the employer was not liable under the "hybrid test." Acknowledging | 1 | 1 |
Darrow v. Integris Health, Inc.green1 sentence2008"The implication of a sufficiently discernable public policy presents a question of law to be resolved either [by the trial court] or ultimately by an appellate court." Id. ¶ 9, 176 P.3d at 1210 (footnote omitted). [ 21 In her response to Employer's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff asserted that "[hlere the public policy is quite clear-notification, removal and prevention of mold in a public courthouse. | 1 | 1 |
| Lincoln Rock Corp. v. Voylesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oklahoma. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pitchford v. Jim Powell Dozer, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016Employer's brief states that "Claimant did not 'expressly ask. for Continued Medical Maintenance at the, November 23, 2013 hearing," 8 and Loyd specifically states in his. brief that the "trial court was not called upon in the [November] 2018 hearing to address [his] need for continuing medical maintenance." 9 The court's order awarding permanent partial disability did not address continuing,. medical maintenance. - Although Loyd had the opportunity to appeal the order to. seek a correction or ruling on the issue, he did not appeal and the order became final. 111 In Pitchford v. Jim Powell Doz 2016Although Loyd had the opportunity to appeal the order to seek a correction or ruling on the issue, he did not appeal and the order became final. ¶11 In Pitchford v. Jim Powell Dozer, Inc. , 2000 OK 12 , 996 P.2d 935 , the claimant was injured on the job and received an award of permanent partial disability benefits. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Thiry v. Armstrong World Industries
green
2 sentences2018In contrast, punitive or exemplary damages may be assessed against an employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior if an employee's conduct "would serve to justify an exemplary damages award against the employee as an individual tortfeasor." Thiry v. Armstrong World Inds. , 1983 OK 28 , ¶ 9, 661 P.2d 515, 520 ; see also Bierman v. Aramark Refreshment Servs., Inc. , 1997 OK 9 , 935 P.2d 289 . 2018In contrast, punitive or exemplary damages may be assessed against an employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior if an employee's conduct "would serve to justify an exemplary damages award against the employee as an individual tortfeasor." Thiry v. Armstrong World Inds. , 1983 OK 28 , ¶ 9, 661 P.2d 515, 520 ; see also Bierman v. Aramark Refreshment Servs., Inc. , 1997 OK 9 , 935 P.2d 289 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Kennedy v. BUILDERS WAREHOUSE, INC.
green
2 sentences2014Kennedy v. Builders Warehouse, Inc., 2009 OK CIV APP 32, ¶ 14 , 208 P.3d 474, 477 . 2014Kennedy v. Builders Warehouse, Inc., 2009 OK CIV APP 32, ¶ 14 , 208 P.3d 474, 477 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Miner v. Mid-America Door Co.
green
2 sentences2010Miner v. Mid-America Door Co., 2003 OK CIV APP 32 , 68 P.3d 212 . 158 PeopLease argues it and EFI should not be considered as one employer, because there is no evidentiary support for the following factors of the single employer test: (1) interrelated operations, (2) common ownership, (8) common management, and (4) centralized control over labor relations. 2010Miner v. Mid-America Door Co., 2003 OK CIV APP 32 , 68 P.3d 212 . 158 PeopLease argues it and EFI should not be considered as one employer, because there is no evidentiary support for the following factors of the single employer test: (1) interrelated operations, (2) common ownership, (8) common management, and (4) centralized control over labor relations. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Lowery v. Echostar Satellite Corp.
green
2 sentences2009Lowery, 2007 OK 38, ¶ 11 , 160 P.3d at 963-964 . 2009Lowery, 2007 OK 38, ¶ 11 , 160 P.3d at 963-964 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Smith v. Teel
green
2 sentences2009T13 In the present case, the trial court held that, because "Plaintiff did not respond to [Employer's] Motion for Summary Judgment with evidentiary support denying [Employer's] Statement of Undisputed Facts, ..., [Employer's] Motion for Summary Judgment should be sustained." However, in opposition to Employer's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff tendered a verified response denying material parts of Employer's statement of uncontroverted facts, attested that "all statements contained [in his response] are true and correct according to my best information and belief," and the verification s 2009T13 In the present case, the trial court held that, because "Plaintiff did not respond to [Employer's] Motion for Summary Judgment with evidentiary support denying [Employer's] Statement of Undisputed Facts, ..., [Employer's] Motion for Summary Judgment should be sustained." However, in opposition to Employer's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff tendered a verified response denying material parts of Employer's statement of uncontroverted facts, attested that "all statements contained [in his response] are true and correct according to my best information and belief," and the verification s | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Folsom Auto Supply v. Bristow
green
2 sentences2006The court ruled the estoppel act goes only to the question of hazardousness, and the nature of claimant's work was clearly hazardous and not in dispute, (citing Folsom Auto Supply v. Bristow, 1954 OK 254, ¶ 16 , 275 P.2d 706, 711 ) We note that although the body of the opinion does not address whether the claimant’s wages were considered in setting compensation premiums, the court’s syllabus provides "[t]he effect of the 'Estoppel Act, ... is to prohibit interposition by an employer of the defense that the employment of a claimant was nonhazardous if the remuneration paid claimant is scheduled 2006The court ruled the estoppel act goes only to the question of hazardousness, and the nature of claimant's work was clearly hazardous and not in dispute, (citing Folsom Auto Supply v. Bristow, 1954 OK 254, ¶ 16 , 275 P.2d 706, 711 ) We note that although the body of the opinion does not address whether the claimant’s wages were considered in setting compensation premiums, the court’s syllabus provides "[t]he effect of the 'Estoppel Act, ... is to prohibit interposition by an employer of the defense that the employment of a claimant was nonhazardous if the remuneration paid claimant is scheduled | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Wald v. Roto Rooter
neutral
1 sentence2006STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶ 7 To prove he or she has sustained a change of condition for the worse, a claimant must show “(1) that a change of condition for the worse has occurred since [the] last prior order, and (2) that the change of condition is due to the original injury.” Wald v. Roto Rooter, 1995 OK CIV APP 122 , ¶ 5, 910 P.2d 354, 356 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Brown v. Mom's Kitchen, LLC
neutral
1 sentence2005Id. ¶ 13 Employer’s brief itself quotes Claimant’s testimony at the December 2004 trial in which she stated, in response to counsel’s question on cross-examination: Q. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Owings v. Pool Well Service
green
2 sentences2003Owings v. Pool Well Serv., 1992 OK 159 , 843 P.2d 380 . 2003Owings v. Pool Well Serv., 1992 OK 159 , 843 P.2d 380 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Samedan Oil Corp. v. Corporation Commission
green
2 sentences2002Samedan Oil Co. v. Corporation Commission of State of Oklahoma, 1988 OK 56 , 755 P.2d 664 . 2002Samedan Oil Co. v. Corporation Commission of State of Oklahoma, 1988 OK 56 , 755 P.2d 664 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
K & K Food Services, Inc. v. S & H, INC.
green
2 sentences2001Co. v. Hollister, 1922 OK 19 , 86 Okla. 13 , 205 P. 506 syl.no. 2. [12] Tapley v. Patton, 1960 OK 23 , 349 P.2d 507, 508 . [13] Holley v. Shepard, 1987 OK 92 , 744 P.2d 945, 947 . [14] Florafax Intl., Inc. v. GTE Market Resources, Inc., 1997 OK 7, ¶ 3 , 933 P.2d 282, 287 . [15] K & K Food Services, Inc. v. S & H, Inc., 2000 OK 31, ¶ 7 , 3 P.3d 705 ; Keith v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 1954 OK 196 , 272 P.2d 371 syl. 2. [16] Rivas v. Parkland Manor, 2000 OK 68, ¶ 6 , 12 P.3d 452, 455 ; Barnes v. Okla. 2001Co. v. Hollister, 1922 OK 19 , 86 Okla. 13 , 205 P. 506 syl.no. 2. [12] Tapley v. Patton, 1960 OK 23 , 349 P.2d 507, 508 . [13] Holley v. Shepard, 1987 OK 92 , 744 P.2d 945, 947 . [14] Florafax Intl., Inc. v. GTE Market Resources, Inc., 1997 OK 7, ¶ 3 , 933 P.2d 282, 287 . [15] K & K Food Services, Inc. v. S & H, Inc., 2000 OK 31, ¶ 7 , 3 P.3d 705 ; Keith v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 1954 OK 196 , 272 P.2d 371 syl. 2. [16] Rivas v. Parkland Manor, 2000 OK 68, ¶ 6 , 12 P.3d 452, 455 ; Barnes v. Okla. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Tapley v. Patton
green
2 sentences2001Co. v. Hollister, 1922 OK 19 , 86 Okla. 13 , 205 P. 506 syl.no. 2. [12] Tapley v. Patton, 1960 OK 23 , 349 P.2d 507, 508 . [13] Holley v. Shepard, 1987 OK 92 , 744 P.2d 945, 947 . [14] Florafax Intl., Inc. v. GTE Market Resources, Inc., 1997 OK 7, ¶ 3 , 933 P.2d 282, 287 . [15] K & K Food Services, Inc. v. S & H, Inc., 2000 OK 31, ¶ 7 , 3 P.3d 705 ; Keith v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 1954 OK 196 , 272 P.2d 371 syl. 2. [16] Rivas v. Parkland Manor, 2000 OK 68, ¶ 6 , 12 P.3d 452, 455 ; Barnes v. Okla. 2001Co. v. Hollister, 1922 OK 19 , 86 Okla. 13 , 205 P. 506 syl.no. 2. [12] Tapley v. Patton, 1960 OK 23 , 349 P.2d 507, 508 . [13] Holley v. Shepard, 1987 OK 92 , 744 P.2d 945, 947 . [14] Florafax Intl., Inc. v. GTE Market Resources, Inc., 1997 OK 7, ¶ 3 , 933 P.2d 282, 287 . [15] K & K Food Services, Inc. v. S & H, Inc., 2000 OK 31, ¶ 7 , 3 P.3d 705 ; Keith v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 1954 OK 196 , 272 P.2d 371 syl. 2. [16] Rivas v. Parkland Manor, 2000 OK 68, ¶ 6 , 12 P.3d 452, 455 ; Barnes v. Okla. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Wat Henry Pontiac, Inc. v. Pitcock
green
2 sentences2001There the court held, when considering a case premised upon an accountant's negligence, that "[n]egligence of the employer is a defense only when it has contributed to the accountant's failure to perform his contract and to report the truth." 256 A.D. at 236 , 9 N.Y.S.2d at 563 . [9] See 23 O.S.1991 § 13, which provides in pertinent part: "In all actions hereafter brought, whether arising before or after the effective date of this act, for negligence resulting in personal injuries or wrongful death, or injury to property, contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, unless any negligence 2001There the court held, when considering a case premised upon an accountant's negligence, that "[n]egligence of the employer is a defense only when it has contributed to the accountant's failure to perform his contract and to report the truth." 256 A.D. at 236 , 9 N.Y.S.2d at 563 . [9] See 23 O.S.1991 § 13, which provides in pertinent part: "In all actions hereafter brought, whether arising before or after the effective date of this act, for negligence resulting in personal injuries or wrongful death, or injury to property, contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, unless any negligence | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Florafax International Inc. v. GTE Market Resources, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001Co. v. Hollister, 1922 OK 19 , 86 Okla. 13 , 205 P. 506 syl.no. 2. [12] Tapley v. Patton, 1960 OK 23 , 349 P.2d 507, 508 . [13] Holley v. Shepard, 1987 OK 92 , 744 P.2d 945, 947 . [14] Florafax Intl., Inc. v. GTE Market Resources, Inc., 1997 OK 7, ¶ 3 , 933 P.2d 282, 287 . [15] K & K Food Services, Inc. v. S & H, Inc., 2000 OK 31, ¶ 7 , 3 P.3d 705 ; Keith v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 1954 OK 196 , 272 P.2d 371 syl. 2. [16] Rivas v. Parkland Manor, 2000 OK 68, ¶ 6 , 12 P.3d 452, 455 ; Barnes v. Okla. 2001Co. v. Hollister, 1922 OK 19 , 86 Okla. 13 , 205 P. 506 syl.no. 2. [12] Tapley v. Patton, 1960 OK 23 , 349 P.2d 507, 508 . [13] Holley v. Shepard, 1987 OK 92 , 744 P.2d 945, 947 . [14] Florafax Intl., Inc. v. GTE Market Resources, Inc., 1997 OK 7, ¶ 3 , 933 P.2d 282, 287 . [15] K & K Food Services, Inc. v. S & H, Inc., 2000 OK 31, ¶ 7 , 3 P.3d 705 ; Keith v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 1954 OK 196 , 272 P.2d 371 syl. 2. [16] Rivas v. Parkland Manor, 2000 OK 68, ¶ 6 , 12 P.3d 452, 455 ; Barnes v. Okla. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Holley v. Shepard
green
2 sentences2001Co. v. Hollister, 1922 OK 19 , 86 Okla. 13 , 205 P. 506 syl.no. 2. [12] Tapley v. Patton, 1960 OK 23 , 349 P.2d 507, 508 . [13] Holley v. Shepard, 1987 OK 92 , 744 P.2d 945, 947 . [14] Florafax Intl., Inc. v. GTE Market Resources, Inc., 1997 OK 7, ¶ 3 , 933 P.2d 282, 287 . [15] K & K Food Services, Inc. v. S & H, Inc., 2000 OK 31, ¶ 7 , 3 P.3d 705 ; Keith v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 1954 OK 196 , 272 P.2d 371 syl. 2. [16] Rivas v. Parkland Manor, 2000 OK 68, ¶ 6 , 12 P.3d 452, 455 ; Barnes v. Okla. 2001Co. v. Hollister, 1922 OK 19 , 86 Okla. 13 , 205 P. 506 syl.no. 2. [12] Tapley v. Patton, 1960 OK 23 , 349 P.2d 507, 508 . [13] Holley v. Shepard, 1987 OK 92 , 744 P.2d 945, 947 . [14] Florafax Intl., Inc. v. GTE Market Resources, Inc., 1997 OK 7, ¶ 3 , 933 P.2d 282, 287 . [15] K & K Food Services, Inc. v. S & H, Inc., 2000 OK 31, ¶ 7 , 3 P.3d 705 ; Keith v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 1954 OK 196 , 272 P.2d 371 syl. 2. [16] Rivas v. Parkland Manor, 2000 OK 68, ¶ 6 , 12 P.3d 452, 455 ; Barnes v. Okla. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
DeCorte v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2001There the court held, when considering a case premised upon an accountant's negligence, that "[n]egligence of the employer is a defense only when it has contributed to the accountant's failure to perform his contract and to report the truth." 256 A.D. at 236 , 9 N.Y.S.2d at 563 . [9] See 23 O.S.1991 § 13, which provides in pertinent part: "In all actions hereafter brought, whether arising before or after the effective date of this act, for negligence resulting in personal injuries or wrongful death, or injury to property, contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, unless any negligence 2001There the court held, when considering a case premised upon an accountant's negligence, that "[n]egligence of the employer is a defense only when it has contributed to the accountant's failure to perform his contract and to report the truth." 256 A.D. at 236 , 9 N.Y.S.2d at 563 . [9] See 23 O.S.1991 § 13, which provides in pertinent part: "In all actions hereafter brought, whether arising before or after the effective date of this act, for negligence resulting in personal injuries or wrongful death, or injury to property, contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, unless any negligence | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Lawton Refining Co. v. Hollister
green
2 sentences2001Co. v. Hollister, 1922 OK 19 , 86 Okla. 13 , 205 P. 506 syl.no. 2. [12] Tapley v. Patton, 1960 OK 23 , 349 P.2d 507, 508 . [13] Holley v. Shepard, 1987 OK 92 , 744 P.2d 945, 947 . [14] Florafax Intl., Inc. v. GTE Market Resources, Inc., 1997 OK 7, ¶ 3 , 933 P.2d 282, 287 . [15] K & K Food Services, Inc. v. S & H, Inc., 2000 OK 31, ¶ 7 , 3 P.3d 705 ; Keith v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 1954 OK 196 , 272 P.2d 371 syl. 2. [16] Rivas v. Parkland Manor, 2000 OK 68, ¶ 6 , 12 P.3d 452, 455 ; Barnes v. Okla. 2001Co. v. Hollister, 1922 OK 19 , 86 Okla. 13 , 205 P. 506 syl.no. 2. [12] Tapley v. Patton, 1960 OK 23 , 349 P.2d 507, 508 . [13] Holley v. Shepard, 1987 OK 92 , 744 P.2d 945, 947 . [14] Florafax Intl., Inc. v. GTE Market Resources, Inc., 1997 OK 7, ¶ 3 , 933 P.2d 282, 287 . [15] K & K Food Services, Inc. v. S & H, Inc., 2000 OK 31, ¶ 7 , 3 P.3d 705 ; Keith v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 1954 OK 196 , 272 P.2d 371 syl. 2. [16] Rivas v. Parkland Manor, 2000 OK 68, ¶ 6 , 12 P.3d 452, 455 ; Barnes v. Okla. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand
green
2 sentences2001There the court held, when considering a case premised upon an accountant's negligence, that "[n]egligence of the employer is a defense only when it has contributed to the accountant's failure to perform his contract and to report the truth." 256 A.D. at 236 , 9 N.Y.S.2d at 563 . [9] See 23 O.S.1991 § 13, which provides in pertinent part: "In all actions hereafter brought, whether arising before or after the effective date of this act, for negligence resulting in personal injuries or wrongful death, or injury to property, contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, unless any negligence 2001There the court held, when considering a case premised upon an accountant's negligence, that "[n]egligence of the employer is a defense only when it has contributed to the accountant's failure to perform his contract and to report the truth." 256 A.D. at 236 , 9 N.Y.S.2d at 563 . [9] See 23 O.S.1991 § 13, which provides in pertinent part: "In all actions hereafter brought, whether arising before or after the effective date of this act, for negligence resulting in personal injuries or wrongful death, or injury to property, contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, unless any negligence | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Hames v. Anderson
green
2 sentences2001There the court held, when considering a case premised upon an accountant's negligence, that "[n]egligence of the employer is a defense only when it has contributed to the accountant's failure to perform his contract and to report the truth." 256 A.D. at 236 , 9 N.Y.S.2d at 563 . [9] See 23 O.S.1991 § 13, which provides in pertinent part: "In all actions hereafter brought, whether arising before or after the effective date of this act, for negligence resulting in personal injuries or wrongful death, or injury to property, contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, unless any negligence 2001There the court held, when considering a case premised upon an accountant's negligence, that "[n]egligence of the employer is a defense only when it has contributed to the accountant's failure to perform his contract and to report the truth." 256 A.D. at 236 , 9 N.Y.S.2d at 563 . [9] See 23 O.S.1991 § 13, which provides in pertinent part: "In all actions hereafter brought, whether arising before or after the effective date of this act, for negligence resulting in personal injuries or wrongful death, or injury to property, contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, unless any negligence | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Rivas v. Parkland Manor
green
2 sentences2001Co. v. Hollister, 1922 OK 19 , 86 Okla. 13 , 205 P. 506 syl.no. 2. [12] Tapley v. Patton, 1960 OK 23 , 349 P.2d 507, 508 . [13] Holley v. Shepard, 1987 OK 92 , 744 P.2d 945, 947 . [14] Florafax Intl., Inc. v. GTE Market Resources, Inc., 1997 OK 7, ¶ 3 , 933 P.2d 282, 287 . [15] K & K Food Services, Inc. v. S & H, Inc., 2000 OK 31, ¶ 7 , 3 P.3d 705 ; Keith v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 1954 OK 196 , 272 P.2d 371 syl. 2. [16] Rivas v. Parkland Manor, 2000 OK 68, ¶ 6 , 12 P.3d 452, 455 ; Barnes v. Okla. 2001Co. v. Hollister, 1922 OK 19 , 86 Okla. 13 , 205 P. 506 syl.no. 2. [12] Tapley v. Patton, 1960 OK 23 , 349 P.2d 507, 508 . [13] Holley v. Shepard, 1987 OK 92 , 744 P.2d 945, 947 . [14] Florafax Intl., Inc. v. GTE Market Resources, Inc., 1997 OK 7, ¶ 3 , 933 P.2d 282, 287 . [15] K & K Food Services, Inc. v. S & H, Inc., 2000 OK 31, ¶ 7 , 3 P.3d 705 ; Keith v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 1954 OK 196 , 272 P.2d 371 syl. 2. [16] Rivas v. Parkland Manor, 2000 OK 68, ¶ 6 , 12 P.3d 452, 455 ; Barnes v. Okla. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Keith v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp.
green
2 sentences2001Co. v. Hollister, 1922 OK 19 , 86 Okla. 13 , 205 P. 506 syl.no. 2. [12] Tapley v. Patton, 1960 OK 23 , 349 P.2d 507, 508 . [13] Holley v. Shepard, 1987 OK 92 , 744 P.2d 945, 947 . [14] Florafax Intl., Inc. v. GTE Market Resources, Inc., 1997 OK 7, ¶ 3 , 933 P.2d 282, 287 . [15] K & K Food Services, Inc. v. S & H, Inc., 2000 OK 31, ¶ 7 , 3 P.3d 705 ; Keith v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 1954 OK 196 , 272 P.2d 371 syl. 2. [16] Rivas v. Parkland Manor, 2000 OK 68, ¶ 6 , 12 P.3d 452, 455 ; Barnes v. Okla. 2001Co. v. Hollister, 1922 OK 19 , 86 Okla. 13 , 205 P. 506 syl.no. 2. [12] Tapley v. Patton, 1960 OK 23 , 349 P.2d 507, 508 . [13] Holley v. Shepard, 1987 OK 92 , 744 P.2d 945, 947 . [14] Florafax Intl., Inc. v. GTE Market Resources, Inc., 1997 OK 7, ¶ 3 , 933 P.2d 282, 287 . [15] K & K Food Services, Inc. v. S & H, Inc., 2000 OK 31, ¶ 7 , 3 P.3d 705 ; Keith v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 1954 OK 196 , 272 P.2d 371 syl. 2. [16] Rivas v. Parkland Manor, 2000 OK 68, ¶ 6 , 12 P.3d 452, 455 ; Barnes v. Okla. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Whitman v. Whitman
green
2 sentences2000Therefore, the only indication in the record of the trial court’s bases for its separate orders dismissing Wife’s claim against Employer and granting Estate’s summary judgment order is found in those orders — respectively, Wife “must first present her claim in the probate proceeding,” and “[Estate’s] summary judgment is sustained and this case is dismissed, but all without prejudice to [Wife] making her creditor’s claim in the probate case.” Considering the language of each order, we must conclude the trial court made no decision on the issues of an “equitable lien” and the “post-death surviva 2000Therefore, the only indication in the record of the trial court’s bases for its separate orders dismissing Wife’s claim against Employer and granting Estate’s summary judgment order is found in those orders — respectively, Wife “must first present her claim in the probate proceeding,” and “[Estate’s] summary judgment is sustained and this case is dismissed, but all without prejudice to [Wife] making her creditor’s claim in the probate case.” Considering the language of each order, we must conclude the trial court made no decision on the issues of an “equitable lien” and the “post-death surviva | 1 | 2000–2000 |
May v. May
green
2 sentences2000Therefore, the only indication in the record of the trial court’s bases for its separate orders dismissing Wife’s claim against Employer and granting Estate’s summary judgment order is found in those orders — respectively, Wife “must first present her claim in the probate proceeding,” and “[Estate’s] summary judgment is sustained and this case is dismissed, but all without prejudice to [Wife] making her creditor’s claim in the probate case.” Considering the language of each order, we must conclude the trial court made no decision on the issues of an “equitable lien” and the “post-death surviva 2000Therefore, the only indication in the record of the trial court’s bases for its separate orders dismissing Wife’s claim against Employer and granting Estate’s summary judgment order is found in those orders — respectively, Wife “must first present her claim in the probate proceeding,” and “[Estate’s] summary judgment is sustained and this case is dismissed, but all without prejudice to [Wife] making her creditor’s claim in the probate case.” Considering the language of each order, we must conclude the trial court made no decision on the issues of an “equitable lien” and the “post-death surviva | 1 | 2000–2000 |
First Community Bank of Blanchard v. Hodges
green
2 sentences2000Therefore, the only indication in the record of the trial court’s bases for its separate orders dismissing Wife’s claim against Employer and granting Estate’s summary judgment order is found in those orders — respectively, Wife “must first present her claim in the probate proceeding,” and “[Estate’s] summary judgment is sustained and this case is dismissed, but all without prejudice to [Wife] making her creditor’s claim in the probate case.” Considering the language of each order, we must conclude the trial court made no decision on the issues of an “equitable lien” and the “post-death surviva 2000Therefore, the only indication in the record of the trial court’s bases for its separate orders dismissing Wife’s claim against Employer and granting Estate’s summary judgment order is found in those orders — respectively, Wife “must first present her claim in the probate proceeding,” and “[Estate’s] summary judgment is sustained and this case is dismissed, but all without prejudice to [Wife] making her creditor’s claim in the probate case.” Considering the language of each order, we must conclude the trial court made no decision on the issues of an “equitable lien” and the “post-death surviva | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Richey v. Commander Mills, Inc. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Parks v. Norman Municipal Hospital green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Hix v. White Swan Food Services green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Harter Concrete Products, Inc. v. Harris green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Snyder v. Smith Welding & Fabrication green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Greene v. Circle Insurance Company green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Fireman's Fund Insurance Company v. Overton green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Cherry v. Eagle-Picher Company neutral | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Coley green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Doremus v. Root green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Reinhart green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Skelton Lead & Zinc Co. v. State Industrial Commission green | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Reams v. Malcolm neutral | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Glasgow v. State Industrial Commission neutral | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| First National Bank v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.