14 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1942–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rodco Systems, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Officegreen1 sentence2026Claim Appeals Off., 981 P.2d 699, 701-02 (Colo. App. 1999) (“[T]he issue is whether a reasonable person in the claimant’s position would have found the actual working conditions, as determined by the hearing 13 officer to have existed, to be so detrimental to that worker’s physical or mental well-being as to warrant resignation from employment.”). ¶ 32 The hearing officer determined that the meeting Schneider was required to attend was part of the Employer’s standard investigative process and was not unreasonable under the circumstances. | 1 | 1 |
Finlay v. Storage Technology Corp.green1 sentence2010Finlay v. Storage Technology Corp., 764 P.2d 62, 63 (Colo.1988). | 1 | 1 |
Muniz v. Garnergreen1 sentence2009Cf. Muniz v. Garner, 921 F.Supp. 700, 702-03 (D.Colo.1996) (because the allegedly negligent employee qualified as a public employee under the CGIA, and the plaintiffs' only claim against the employer was under the doctrine of respondeat superi- or, the CGIA's liability limit applied to the employer). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Quest. Sub. by US Ct. of Appealsgreen1 sentence1999See In re Question, supra, 759 P.2d at 21 . | 1 | 1 |
Cheney v. Haileygreen1 sentence1998See Cheney v. Hailey, 686 P.2d 808 (Colo.App.1984) (a dismissal which does not favorably absolve or exonerate the employee does not bar a respondeat superior claim against the employer). | 1 | 1 |
Arnold Ex Rel. Arnold v. Colorado State Hospital, Department of Institutionsgreen2 sentences1998See Arnold v. Colorado State Hospi tal, 910 P.2d 104 (Colo.App.1995); CJI-Civ.Sd 8:2 (1988) (under the doctrine of re-spondeat superior, any act or omission of the agent is, in law, the act or omission of the employer). 1998See Arnold v. Colorado State Hospital, *846 910 P.2d 104 (Colo.App.1995); CJI-Civ.3d 8:2 (1988) (under the doctrine of respondeat superior, any act or omission of the agent is, in law, the act or omission of the employer). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Kunau
green
1 sentence2020But in Williams, the employer did not challenge the DIME doctor’s MMI opinion. 147 P.3d at 34–35. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Grover v. Industrial Com'n of Colorado
green
1 sentence2019Employers have the right to “contest any future claims for medical treatment on the basis that such treatment is unrelated to the industrial injury or occupational disease.” Grover, 759 P.2d at 712 . ¶ 18 An employer may also challenge future claims for medical treatment by reopening the claim. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Borroel v. Lakeshore, Inc.
green
1 sentence1996Public Service Co. v. United Cable Television of Jeffco, Inc., 816 P.2d 289 (Colo.App.1991), supra. See also Borroel v. Lakeshore, Inc., 618 F.Supp. 354 (D.Colo.1985) (indemnification provision in lease agreement valid notwithstanding exclusive remedy provision of Act). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Public Service Co. v. United Cable Television of Jeffco, Inc.
green
1 sentence1996Public Service Co. v. United Cable Television of Jeffco, Inc., 816 P.2d 289 (Colo.App.1991), supra. See also Borroel v. Lakeshore, Inc., 618 F.Supp. 354 (D.Colo.1985) (indemnification provision in lease agreement valid notwithstanding exclusive remedy provision of Act). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Kandt v. Evans
green
2 sentences1993Section 8-41-102, C.R.S. (1992 Cum.Supp.); Kandt v. Evans, 645 P.2d 1300 (Colo.1982). 1993Kandt v. Evans, supra . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Enright v. Groves
green
2 sentences1993False imprisonment is an intentional tort, Enright v. Groves, 39 Colo.App. 39 , 560 P.2d 851 (1977), and we are bound by established precedent holding that employees are barred from maintaining tort actions against either a co-employee or against the employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior for intentional torts which arise out of and in the course of employment. 1993False imprisonment is an intentional tort, Enright v. Groves, 39 Colo.App. 39 , 560 P.2d 851 (1977), and we are bound by established precedent holding that employees are barred from maintaining tort actions against either a co-employee or against the employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior for intentional torts which arise out of and in the course of employment. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Thomas v. Thompson School District R2-J
green
2 sentences1992R2-J, 749 P.2d 966 (Colo.App.1987) (teachers' union, and not individual teacher, can compel arbitration under collective-bargaining agreement), will interfere in any substantial way with the union's ability to collectively negotiate a collective-bargaining agreement in the first instance or to administer the collective-bargaining agreement on behalf of its members after the agreement is executed. *846 We thus conclude that Shorey has standing as a third-party beneficiary of the collective-bargaining agreement to sue the school district for breach of contract, but that, pursuant to the exhausti 1992R2-J, 749 P.2d 966 (Colo.App.1987) (teachers’ union, and not individual teacher, can compel arbitration under collective-bargaining agreement), will interfere in any substantial way with the union’s ability to collectively negotiate a collective-bargaining agreement in the first instance or to administer the collective-bargaining agreement on behalf of its members after the agreement is exe cuted. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Marlin Oil Co. v. Industrial Commission
green
1 sentence1985Marlin Oil Co. v. Industrial Commission, 641 P.2d 312 (Colo.App.1982). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Hayes v. Ambassador Court, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences1977Hayes v. Ambassador Court, Inc., 58 N.J.Super. 215 , 156 A.2d 11 (1959); 1 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, supra. In Hayes, the employer testified that he instructed the employee, a maintenance man, "to do nothing for the tenants." It was held that this directive, even if supported by the evidence, was so general that its violation would not take the injury out of the course of employment. 1977Hayes v. Ambassador Court, Inc., 58 N.J.Super. 215 , 156 A.2d 11 (1959); 1 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, supra. In Hayes, the employer testified that he instructed the employee, a maintenance man, "to do nothing for the tenants." It was held that this directive, even if supported by the evidence, was so general that its violation would not take the injury out of the course of employment. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Dobesh v. Associated Asphalt Contractors, Inc.
green
2 sentences1942In the case of Dobesh v. Associated Asphalt Contractors, 138 Neb. 117 , 292 N.W. 59, 60 , recovery was adjudged against the Village of Ansley, although it was not named as the employer in the claim filed by claimant. 1942In the case of Dobesh v. Associated Asphalt Contractors, 138 Neb. 117 , 292 N.W. 59, 60 , recovery was adjudged against the Village of Ansley, although it was not named as the employer in the claim filed by claimant. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.