12 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1934–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jeune v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences1966If the subject statute did not apply to the option either to sue the employer or to claim compensation, the obvious place to have said so would have been in the Jeune v. Industrial Commission case, 77 Ariz. 410 , 274 P.2d 85 (1954), which was a case involving the waiver of the option to claim compensation, after having sued the employer. 1966If the subject statute did not apply to the option either to sue the employer or to claim compensation, the obvious place to have said so would have been in the Jeune v. Industrial Commission case, 77 Ariz. 410 , 274 P.2d 85 (1954), which was a case involving the waiver of the option to claim compensation, after having sued the employer. | 1 | 2 |
Mulhern v. City of Scottsdalegreen1 sentence2026Mulhern v. City of Scottsdale, 165 Ariz. 395, 398 (App. 1990) (“In order for the employer to be held liable for negligent hiring, retention or supervision, the employee must have committed a tort.”).3 3 Erma also appears to argue that Ryan v. Napier does not foreclose her negligence claims against the State for negligent hiring, training, and 14 JOHNSON v. STATE, et al. | 1 | 1 |
Sisemore v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizonagreen1 sentence2025Co. of Ariz., 161 Ariz. 564, 566 (App. 1989) (a punitive damages claim is not a separate claim that can be enforced from the underlying tort claim). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hickmangreen1 sentence2023See Hickman, 205 Ariz. at 201 ¶ 38; see also Garner at 370 (“After all, procedural rules don’t usually dictate the parties’ real-world actions or upset their expectations.”). 2. ¶20 Several compelling reasons persuade us to overrule DeGraff and its progeny to the extent these cases conclude that dismissing a claim against an employee for reasons that did not exonerate the employee from wrongdoing requires the court to also dismiss a claim against the employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior. (a) ¶21 First, DeGraff is “clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong.” See Agueda, 253 Ariz. at 3 | 1 | 1 |
Hovatter v. Shell Oil Companygreen1 sentence2023See Hovatter, 111 Ariz. at 327 (“Where the master’s liability rests solely on respondeat superior, if the servant is exonerated by trial on the merits, then, of course, the master cannot be held liable . . . .” (quoting Holcomb v. Flaving, 210 N.E.2d 565, 567 (Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Holcomb v. Flavingreen1 sentence2023See Hovatter, 111 Ariz. at 327 (“Where the master’s liability rests solely on respondeat superior, if the servant is exonerated by trial on the merits, then, of course, the master cannot be held liable . . . .” (quoting Holcomb v. Flaving, 210 N.E.2d 565, 567 (Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Lowing v. Allstate Insurancegreen1 sentence2023See Hickman, 205 Ariz. at 201 ¶ 38; see also Garner at 370 (“After all, procedural rules don’t usually dictate the parties’ real-world actions or upset their expectations.”). 2. ¶20 Several compelling reasons persuade us to overrule DeGraff and its progeny to the extent these cases conclude that dismissing a claim against an employee for reasons that did not exonerate the employee from wrongdoing requires the court to also dismiss a claim against the employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior. (a) ¶21 First, DeGraff is “clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong.” See Agueda, 253 Ariz. at 3 | 1 | 1 |
National Surety Corp. v. Lybrandgreen2 sentences1997Id. 9 N.Y.S.2d at 563 (citation omitted). 1997Id. 9 N.Y.S.2d at 563 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Smither and Company, Inc. v. Franciska T. Colesgreen1 sentence1988The legislative intent mentioned by Larson which grants the employer immunity against all actions arising out of employment related injuries was accurately described by former Chief Justice Burger, then writing for the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Smither and Co. v. Coles, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 68 , 70, 242 F.2d 220, 222 (1957) cert den 354 U.S. 914 , 77 S.Ct. 1299 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1429 (1957): The history of the development of statutes such as this [Worker’s Compensation statutes] creating a compensable right independent of the employer’s negligence and notwithstanding an employee’s | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Clark v. Ellis
green
2 sentences1988The legislative intent mentioned by Larson which grants the employer immunity against all actions arising out of employment related injuries was accurately described by former Chief Justice Burger, then writing for the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Smither and Co. v. Coles, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 68 , 70, 242 F.2d 220, 222 (1957) cert den 354 U.S. 914 , 77 S.Ct. 1299 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1429 (1957): The history of the development of statutes such as this [Worker’s Compensation statutes] creating a compensable right independent of the employer’s negligence and notwithstanding an employee’s 1988The legislative intent mentioned by Larson which grants the employer immunity against all actions arising out of employment related injuries was accurately described by former Chief Justice Burger, then writing for the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Smither and Co. v. Coles, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 68 , 70, 242 F.2d 220, 222 (1957) cert den 354 U.S. 914 , 77 S.Ct. 1299 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1429 (1957): The history of the development of statutes such as this [Worker’s Compensation statutes] creating a compensable right independent of the employer’s negligence and notwithstanding an employee’s | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Washington v. United States
green
1 sentence1988The legislative intent mentioned by Larson which grants the employer immunity against all actions arising out of employment related injuries was accurately described by former Chief Justice Burger, then writing for the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Smither and Co. v. Coles, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 68 , 70, 242 F.2d 220, 222 (1957) cert den 354 U.S. 914 , 77 S.Ct. 1299 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1429 (1957): The history of the development of statutes such as this [Worker’s Compensation statutes] creating a compensable right independent of the employer’s negligence and notwithstanding an employee’s | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Halenar v. SUPERIOR COURT, IN & FOR CTY. OF MARICOPA
green
2 sentences1973S. § 23-1022 (A). 3 Appellee claims that the recent case of Halenar v. Superior Court, In and For County of Maricopa, 109 Ariz. 27 , 504 P.2d 928 is contra to appellant’s position in that it holds that A.R:S. § 23-1022 (A) does not apply to wrongful death cases and further holds that Article 2, § 31 4 of the Arizona Constitution prohibits application of the employer immunity found in the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 1973S. § 23-1022 (A). 3 Appellee claims that the recent case of Halenar v. Superior Court, In and For County of Maricopa, 109 Ariz. 27 , 504 P.2d 928 is contra to appellant’s position in that it holds that A.R:S. § 23-1022 (A) does not apply to wrongful death cases and further holds that Article 2, § 31 4 of the Arizona Constitution prohibits application of the employer immunity found in the Workmen’s Compensation Act. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks
green
2 sentences1969The Industrial Commission cites the cases of McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of the Elks, 71 Ariz. 244 , 226 P.2d 147 (1950); Sendejaz v. Industrial Commission, 4 Ariz.App. 309 , 420 P.2d 32 (1966); and City of Phoenix v. Industrial Commission, 8 Ariz.App. 193 , 444 P.2d 750 (1968) which case was affirmed on review by the Arizona Supreme Court. 1969The Industrial Commission cites the cases of McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of the Elks, 71 Ariz. 244 , 226 P.2d 147 (1950); Sendejaz v. Industrial Commission, 4 Ariz.App. 309 , 420 P.2d 32 (1966); and City of Phoenix v. Industrial Commission, 8 Ariz.App. 193 , 444 P.2d 750 (1968) which case was affirmed on review by the Arizona Supreme Court. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
City of Phoenix v. Industrial Commission
neutral
2 sentences1969The Industrial Commission cites the cases of McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of the Elks, 71 Ariz. 244 , 226 P.2d 147 (1950); Sendejaz v. Industrial Commission, 4 Ariz.App. 309 , 420 P.2d 32 (1966); and City of Phoenix v. Industrial Commission, 8 Ariz.App. 193 , 444 P.2d 750 (1968) which case was affirmed on review by the Arizona Supreme Court. 1969The Industrial Commission cites the cases of McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of the Elks, 71 Ariz. 244 , 226 P.2d 147 (1950); Sendejaz v. Industrial Commission, 4 Ariz.App. 309 , 420 P.2d 32 (1966); and City of Phoenix v. Industrial Commission, 8 Ariz.App. 193 , 444 P.2d 750 (1968) which case was affirmed on review by the Arizona Supreme Court. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Sendejaz v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1969The Industrial Commission cites the cases of McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of the Elks, 71 Ariz. 244 , 226 P.2d 147 (1950); Sendejaz v. Industrial Commission, 4 Ariz.App. 309 , 420 P.2d 32 (1966); and City of Phoenix v. Industrial Commission, 8 Ariz.App. 193 , 444 P.2d 750 (1968) which case was affirmed on review by the Arizona Supreme Court. 1969The Industrial Commission cites the cases of McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of the Elks, 71 Ariz. 244 , 226 P.2d 147 (1950); Sendejaz v. Industrial Commission, 4 Ariz.App. 309 , 420 P.2d 32 (1966); and City of Phoenix v. Industrial Commission, 8 Ariz.App. 193 , 444 P.2d 750 (1968) which case was affirmed on review by the Arizona Supreme Court. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
O'Malley Lumber Co. v. Martin
neutral
2 sentences1963O’Malley Lumber Co. v. Martin, 45 Ariz. 349 , 43 P.2d 200 (1935). 1963O’Malley Lumber Co. v. Martin, 45 Ariz. 349 , 43 P.2d 200 (1935). | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Booth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial Comm'n of Wis.
green
2 sentences1936The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Booth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial Commission, 271 U. S. 208 , 46 Sup. Ct. 491, 70 L. 1936The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Booth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial Commission, 271 U. S. 208 , 46 Sup. Ct. 491, 70 L. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Gordon v. Buster
green
1 sentence1934If raising stock on a small farm is agriculture, raising stock on a large ranch is the same; and if raising and caring for sheep on the owner’s premises is agriculture, the laborer’s avocation is not changed by the sheep being pastured and herded elsewhere, whether on the public domain or not. ’ ’ In a comparatively recent decision, Gordon v. Buster, 113 Tex. 382 , 257 S. W. 220, 221 , the Supreme Court of Texas held that in view of the general scope of the term, “farm,” which means a tract of land *137 used for the raising of crops or the rearing of animals, the terms, “farm laborers” and “ra | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Gordon v. Buster
green
1 sentence1934If raising stock on a small farm is agriculture, raising stock on a large ranch is the same; and if raising and caring for sheep on the owner’s premises is agriculture, the laborer’s avocation is not changed by the sheep being pastured and herded elsewhere, whether on the public domain or not. ’ ’ In a comparatively recent decision, Gordon v. Buster, 113 Tex. 382 , 257 S. W. 220, 221 , the Supreme Court of Texas held that in view of the general scope of the term, “farm,” which means a tract of land *137 used for the raising of crops or the rearing of animals, the terms, “farm laborers” and “ra | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.