employer rule in Arkansas

2004In Emerson Electric v. Cargile, 5 Ark.App. 123 , 633 S.W.2d 389 (1982), we concluded that: [W]here the insurance, whether private or company administered, is provided and funded by the employer the rule announced in Southwestern Bell Telephone Company [v. Siegler, 240 Ark. 132 , 398 S.W.2d 531 (1966)] should be followed and the employer afforded the right to show, if he can, that the payments were `payments of compensation in advance.' Riverside Furniture Co. v. Loyd, 42 Ark.App. 1, 4-5 , 852 S.W.2d 147, 149-50 (1993).

2004In Emerson Electric v. Cargile, 5 Ark.App. 123 , 633 S.W.2d 389 (1982), we concluded that: [W]here the insurance, whether private or company administered, is provided and funded by the employer the rule announced in Southwestern Bell Telephone Company [v. Siegler, 240 Ark. 132 , 398 S.W.2d 531 (1966)] should be followed and the employer afforded the right to show, if he can, that the payments were `payments of compensation in advance.' Riverside Furniture Co. v. Loyd, 42 Ark.App. 1, 4-5 , 852 S.W.2d 147, 149-50 (1993).

2004In Emerson Electric v. Cargile, 5 Ark.App. 123 , 633 S.W.2d 389 (1982), we concluded that: [W]here the insurance, whether private or company administered, is provided and funded by the employer the rule announced in Southwestern Bell Telephone Company [v. Siegler, 240 Ark. 132 , 398 S.W.2d 531 (1966)] should be followed and the employer afforded the right to show, if he can, that the payments were `payments of compensation in advance.' Riverside Furniture Co. v. Loyd, 42 Ark.App. 1, 4-5 , 852 S.W.2d 147, 149-50 (1993).

2004In Emerson Electric v. Cargile, 5 Ark.App. 123 , 633 S.W.2d 389 (1982), we concluded that: [W]here the insurance, whether private or company administered, is provided and funded by the employer the rule announced in Southwestern Bell Telephone Company [v. Siegler, 240 Ark. 132 , 398 S.W.2d 531 (1966)] should be followed and the employer afforded the right to show, if he can, that the payments were `payments of compensation in advance.' Riverside Furniture Co. v. Loyd, 42 Ark.App. 1, 4-5 , 852 S.W.2d 147, 149-50 (1993).

2021Id.; Miller v. Enders, 2013 Ark. 23 , 425 S.W.3d 723 .

2021Id.; Miller v. Enders, 2013 Ark. 23 , 425 S.W.3d 723 .

2009Thus, although a jury’s exoneration of an employee also exonerates the employer when a claim involves the employer’s vicarious liability under respondeat superior, under a claim for negligent supervision and retention an employer is directly liable for its own “independent actionable negligence.” Id.

1998Hill v. Patterson, 313 Ark. 322 , 855 S.W.2d 297 (1993).

1998Hill v. Patterson, 313 Ark. 322 , 855 S.W.2d 297 (1993).

1993Intentional Tort While it is true that the intentional infliction of an injury upon an employee by an employer is an exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act [Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Cleaners Company, 217 Ark. 350 , 230 S.W.2d 28 (1950)], that exception is not created by the bare allegation, as here, that the employee’s injury was the result of willful and wanton conduct by the employer.

1993Intentional Tort While it is true that the intentional infliction of an injury upon an employee by an employer is an exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act [Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Cleaners Company, 217 Ark. 350 , 230 S.W.2d 28 (1950)], that exception is not created by the bare allegation, as here, that the employee’s injury was the result of willful and wanton conduct by the employer.

1985We next examined the tort of outrage in Givens v. Hixson, 275 Ark. 370 , 631 S.W.2d 263 (1982), again on appeal of a summary judgment in favor of the employer, and here found that the conduct complained of did not rise to the level of outrageous.

1985We next examined the tort of outrage in Givens v. Hixson, 275 Ark. 370 , 631 S.W.2d 263 (1982), again on appeal of a summary judgment in favor of the employer, and here found that the conduct complained of did not rise to the level of outrageous.

1969Ft lias been suggested that our decision herein should be controlled by Arnold v. State, 220 Ark. 25 , 245 S.W. 2d 818 (1952), wherein we held that a surety on a sheriff’s bond was not liable for punitive damages.

1969Ft lias been suggested that our decision herein should be controlled by Arnold v. State, 220 Ark. 25 , 245 S.W. 2d 818 (1952), wherein we held that a surety on a sheriff’s bond was not liable for punitive damages.