employer violation in Ohio

2017"Under such circumstances, [the statute] requires that the employee orally notify his or her supervisor or other responsible officer of the employer of the violation and subsequently file with that person a written report that provides sufficient detail to identify and describe the violation." (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 247 , 652 N.E.2d 940 ; R.C. 4113.52(A).

2017"Under such circumstances, [the statute] requires that the employee orally notify his or her supervisor or other responsible officer of the employer of the violation and subsequently file with that person a written report that provides sufficient detail to identify and describe the violation." (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 247 , 652 N.E.2d 940 ; R.C. 4113.52(A).

2025In Clawson, 2022-Ohio-4154 , the Ohio Supreme Court considered “whether a plaintiff may prevail on a claim of chiropractic malpractice against a chiropractor’s employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior when the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations has extinguished the chiropractor’s direct liability for the alleged malpractice.” Id. at ¶ 1.

2023Chiropractic Physicians, L.L.C., 170 Ohio St.3d 451 , 2022- Ohio-4154, 214 N.E.3d 540 (holding a plaintiff could not prevail on a claim of chiropractic malpractice against a chiropractor’s employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior when the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations extinguished the chiropractor’s direct liability for the alleged malpractice); Krause v. Case W.

2006Bunger v. Lawson Co., 82 Ohio St.3d at 466 , 696 N.E.2d 1029 ; Blankenship, supra, 69 Ohio St.2d 608 , 23 O.O.3d 504 , 433 N.E .2d 572 (because intentional torts of an employer do not arise from employment, the employer has no immunity for them under R.C. 4123.74).

2006Bunger v. Lawson Co., 82 Ohio St.3d at 466 , 696 N.E.2d 1029 ; Blankenship, supra, 69 Ohio St.2d 608 , 23 O.O.3d 504 , 433 N.E .2d 572 (because intentional torts of an employer do not arise from employment, the employer has no immunity for them under R.C. 4123.74).

2006The Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed that “standing alone, the failure of an employer who has otherwise complied to include one or more employees on a payroll report ‘is not an omission which will deprive an employer of immunity.’ ” Bridges, 49 Ohio St.3d at 116 , 551 N.E.2d 163 , quoting Perry v. S. S. Steel Processing Corp. (1987), 40 Ohio App.3d 198, 200 , 532 N.E.2d 783, 785 .

2006The Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed that “standing alone, the failure of an employer who has otherwise complied to include one or more employees on a payroll report ‘is not an omission which will deprive an employer of immunity.’ ” Bridges, 49 Ohio St.3d at 116 , 551 N.E.2d 163 , quoting Perry v. S. S. Steel Processing Corp. (1987), 40 Ohio App.3d 198, 200 , 532 N.E.2d 783, 785 .

1999Furthermore, because R.C. 2745.01 is an attempt by the General Assembly to govern intentional torts that occur within the employment relationship, R.C. 2745.01 “cannot logically withstand constitutional scrutiny, inasmuch as it attempts to regulate an area that is beyond the reach of constitutional empowerment.” Brady, 61 Ohio St.3d at 634 , 576 N.E.2d at 729 . 14 After determining the constitutionality of R.C. 2745.01, and after reviewing the complaint, the court of appeals concluded that Johnson properly set forth a claim for common-law intentional tort against BP.

1999Furthermore, because R.C. 2745.01 is an attempt by the General Assembly to govern intentional torts that occur within the employment relationship, R.C. 2745.01 “cannot logically withstand constitutional scrutiny, inasmuch as it attempts to regulate an area that is beyond the reach of constitutional empowerment.” Brady, 61 Ohio St.3d at 634 , 576 N.E.2d at 729 . 14 After determining the constitutionality of R.C. 2745.01, and after reviewing the complaint, the court of appeals concluded that Johnson properly set forth a claim for common-law intentional tort against BP.

2023Smith at id.

2022Osborne v. Lyles, 63 Ohio St.3d 326, 329 , 587 N.E.2d 825 (1992); Schisler v. Columbus Med.

2022Osborne v. Lyles, 63 Ohio St.3d 326, 329 , 587 N.E.2d 825 (1992); Schisler v. Columbus Med.

2020(No. 2018-0572—Submitted September 10, 2019—Decided February 5, 2020.) APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 105604, 2018-Ohio-846 . __________________ O’CONNOR, C.J. {¶ 1} In this appeal, we consider which court has jurisdiction over an employer’s claim against the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“BWC”) for the reimbursement of alleged excessive premiums paid by the employer.

2020SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-337 THE CITY OF CLEVELAND, APPELLEE v. OHIO BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, APPELLANT. [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Cleveland v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-337 .] R.C. 2743.03(A)—Employer’s claim against Bureau of Workers’ Compensation is a legal claim, not an equitable claim, and thus, it should have been filed in the Court of Claims.

2020SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-337 THE CITY OF CLEVELAND, APPELLEE v. OHIO BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, APPELLANT. [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Cleveland v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-337 .] R.C. 2743.03(A)—Employer’s claim against Bureau of Workers’ Compensation is a legal claim, not an equitable claim, and thus, it should have been filed in the Court of Claims.

2016Again, that provision states: If an employee becomes aware in the course of the employee’s employment of a violation by a fellow employee of any state or federal statute, any ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision, or any work rule or company policy of the employee’s employer and the employee reasonably believes that the violation is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety, a felony, or an improper solicitation for a contribution, the employee orally shall notify the employee’s supervisor or othe

2016Again, that provision states: If an employee becomes aware in the course of the employee’s employment of a violation by a fellow employee of any state or federal statute, any ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision, or any work rule or company policy of the employee’s employer and the employee reasonably believes that the violation is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety, a felony, or an improper solicitation for a contribution, the employee orally shall notify the employee’s supervisor or othe

2016Id. {¶ 22} The Kilbarger case involved an injured worker’s appeal from a bench trial that resulted in a finding in favor of the employer on a claim for retaliatory discharge under R.C. 4123.90.

2016Id. {¶ 22} The Kilbarger case involved an injured worker’s appeal from a bench trial that resulted in a finding in favor of the employer on a claim for retaliatory discharge under R.C. 4123.90.

2014Rather, the focus of the holding was that a reference to R.C. 4123.90 in a complaint for retaliatory discharge was sufficient to satisfy the notice pleading requirements, and that the plaintiff was not required to specifically allege that the discharge was in retaliation for her filing of a workers’ compensation claim. {¶ 23} The Tenth District in Sidenstricker further noted that, although Ohio courts frequently cite Wilson for the elements of a retaliatory discharge claim under R.C. 4123.90, only one has directly addressed the element of “injury on the job.” In that single case, Kilbarger v.

2014Rather, the focus of the holding was that a reference to R.C. 4123.90 in a complaint for retaliatory discharge was sufficient to satisfy the notice pleading requirements, and that the plaintiff was not required to specifically allege that the discharge was in retaliation for her filing of a workers’ compensation claim. {¶ 23} The Tenth District in Sidenstricker further noted that, although Ohio courts frequently cite Wilson for the elements of a retaliatory discharge claim under R.C. 4123.90, only one has directly addressed the element of “injury on the job.” In that single case, Kilbarger v.

2014Franklin No. 12AP-998, 2013-Ohio-4930, ¶ 21 , citing Mauzy v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 75 Ohio St.3d 578, 582 , 664 N.E.2d 1272 (1996). {¶39} “A plaintiff in a discrimination lawsuit may pursue ‘essentially, two theories of employment discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate impact.’” Hall v. Ohio State Univ.

2014Franklin No. 12AP-998, 2013-Ohio-4930, ¶ 21 , citing Mauzy v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 75 Ohio St.3d 578, 582 , 664 N.E.2d 1272 (1996). {¶39} “A plaintiff in a discrimination lawsuit may pursue ‘essentially, two theories of employment discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate impact.’” Hall v. Ohio State Univ.

2014Meyer v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 104 , 2009-Ohio-2463 , 909 N.E.2d 106 , paragraph one of the syllabus (“An age discrimination claim brought pursuant to R.C. 4112.99 is subject to the substantive provisions of R.C. 4112.02 and 4112.14.”). {¶36} R.C. 4112.14(A) provides: No employer shall discriminate in any job opening against any applicant or discharge without just cause any employee aged forty or older who is physically able to perform the duties and otherwise meets the established requirements of the job and laws pertaining to the relationship between employer and employ

2014Meyer v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 104 , 2009-Ohio-2463 , 909 N.E.2d 106 , paragraph one of the syllabus (“An age discrimination claim brought pursuant to R.C. 4112.99 is subject to the substantive provisions of R.C. 4112.02 and 4112.14.”). {¶36} R.C. 4112.14(A) provides: No employer shall discriminate in any job opening against any applicant or discharge without just cause any employee aged forty or older who is physically able to perform the duties and otherwise meets the established requirements of the job and laws pertaining to the relationship between employer and employ

2014Franklin No. 12AP-998, 2013-Ohio-4930, ¶ 21 , citing Mauzy v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 75 Ohio St.3d 578, 582 , 664 N.E.2d 1272 (1996). {¶39} “A plaintiff in a discrimination lawsuit may pursue ‘essentially, two theories of employment discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate impact.’” Hall v. Ohio State Univ.

2008What is disputed by the parties, however, is whether the trial court properly could enjoin Orendorff from employment with Sunlight Supply and, assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court properly could enjoin Orendorff from working for Sunlight Supply, the duration of such an injunction. {¶ 15} Specifically, Orendorff s assignments of error resolve to the following: (1) whether, absent a noncompetition agreement by the parties, a trial court, as a matter of law, may enjoin a worker from working for a direct competitor of a former employer under the doctrine of inevitable disclosure,

2008What is disputed by the parties, however, is whether the trial court properly could enjoin Orendorff from employment with Sunlight Supply and, assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court properly could enjoin Orendorff from working for Sunlight Supply, the duration of such an injunction. {¶ 15} Specifically, Orendorff s assignments of error resolve to the following: (1) whether, absent a noncompetition agreement by the parties, a trial court, as a matter of law, may enjoin a worker from working for a direct competitor of a former employer under the doctrine of inevitable disclosure,

2008For its part, Hydrofarm asserts that the trial court properly granted injunctive relief under Ohio’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act, R.C. 1333.61 et seq., but the trial court erred when it arbitrarily limited the duration of the preliminary injunction to six months. {¶ 16} The rule against inevitable disclosure “holds that a threat of harm warranting injunctive relief exists when an employee with specialized knowledge commences employment with a competitor.” Berardi’s Fresh Roast, Inc. v. PMD Ents., Inc., Cuyahoga App. No. 90822, 2008-Ohio-5470 , 2008 WL 4681825 , at ¶ 27. “[T]his doctrine is appli

2008Keefe v. Youngstown Diocese of the Catholic Church (1997), 121 Ohio App.3d 1 , 5 , 698 N.E.2d 1009 .

2008Keefe v. Youngstown Diocese of the Catholic Church (1997), 121 Ohio App.3d 1 , 5 , 698 N.E.2d 1009 .

2007For example, in Lusito v. Kruse (1940), 136 Ohio St. 183 , 186-87 , the Ohio Supreme Court stated: {¶ 9} "The liability of one tort-feasor for wrongs committed solely by another arises in the following situations: * * * {¶ 10} "Where one as principal or master delegates a course of action to his agent or servant, who, while acting within the scope of his authority or employment as to such course of action, commits a tortious act resulting in injury to a third person. * * * {¶ 11} "Between them * * * there exists a primary and secondary liability [to] the injured party." {¶ 12} "For the wrong o

2007GTE Automatic Elec, Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc. (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 146 , 351 N.E.2d 113 , paragraph two of the syllabus.

2007GTE Automatic Elec, Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc. (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 146 , 351 N.E.2d 113 , paragraph two of the syllabus.

2007For example, in Lusito v. Kruse (1940), 136 Ohio St. 183 , 186-87 , the Ohio Supreme Court stated: {¶ 9} "The liability of one tort-feasor for wrongs committed solely by another arises in the following situations: * * * {¶ 10} "Where one as principal or master delegates a course of action to his agent or servant, who, while acting within the scope of his authority or employment as to such course of action, commits a tortious act resulting in injury to a third person. * * * {¶ 11} "Between them * * * there exists a primary and secondary liability [to] the injured party." {¶ 12} "For the wrong o

2007Disabilities (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 252 , 594 N.E.2d 959 (public employees do not have a private cause of action against employer for policies embodied in the Ohio Constitution when there are other satisfactory statutory and administrative remedies). . {¶ a} Former R.C. 4101.17 provided: {¶ b} “(A) No employer shall discriminate in any job opening against any applicant or discharge without just cause any employee aged forty or older who is physically able to perform the duties and otherwise meets the established requirements of the job and laws pertaining to the relationship between employer an

2007Disabilities (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 252 , 594 N.E.2d 959 (public employees do not have a private cause of action against employer for policies embodied in the Ohio Constitution when there are other satisfactory statutory and administrative remedies). . {¶ a} Former R.C. 4101.17 provided: {¶ b} “(A) No employer shall discriminate in any job opening against any applicant or discharge without just cause any employee aged forty or older who is physically able to perform the duties and otherwise meets the established requirements of the job and laws pertaining to the relationship between employer an

2006Id., citing Contreras v. Ferro Corp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 244 , 652 N.E.2d 940 , syllabus. {¶ 17} R.C. 4113.52 (A)(1)(a) states in pertinent part: "If an employee becomes aware in the course of the employee's employment of a violation of any state or federal statute or any ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision that the employee's employer has authority to correct, and the employee reasonably believes that the violation is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety, a felony, or an improper solicit